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America 
and the Canal Title 



OR 



An examination, sifting and interpreta- 
tion of the data bearing on the wresting 
of the Province of Panama from the 
Republic of Colombia by the Roosevelt 
Administration in 1903 in order to secure 
title to the Canal Zone 



BY 

JOSEPH C. FREEHOFF, Ph.D. 

statistician with the Pablic Service Ct)mmissioB 
for New York City 



PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR 

S73 Fourth Avenue (Room 806) 
NEW YORK 



Copyright, 1916 

by 

Joseph C. FREEHorr 



/t- 'f^3( 



J. F. TAPLEY CO. 

NEW YORK 



FEB -8 1916 



i'Ji,A4 18744 



DEDICATED 
TO 

JOHN FREEHOFF 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface i 

CHAPTER 

I Clear the Enterprise of Every Stain . . .15 

II Roosevelt's Article — " The Panama Blackmail 

Treaty " 32 

III President Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce 

Colombia 104 

IV The " Vaudeville " Revolution on the Isthmus 138 
V Violation of the Treaty of 1846 . . . .214 

VI President Roosevelt " Took " the Canal Zone 255 
VII Acting as the Mandatory of Civilization . . 310 

APPENDICES 

I From President Roosevelt's Message to Con- 
gress ^ — December 7, 1903 351 

II President Roosevelt's Message to the Con- 
gress — January 4, 1904 2)^6 



PREFACE 

In this book the writer shows that the Roose- 
velt Administration in 1903 collaborated with a 
small party of separatists on the Isthmus, Bunau- 
Varilla acting as intermediary, for the purpose of 
devising a plan to wrest the Canal Zone and lit- 
toral from the Republic of Colombia by force, and 
that it gave assurance to these separatists that 
it would protect secession in Panama. It did ac- 
tually do the latter. In doing so, it ( i ) violated 
international law, (2) violated the Treaty of 
1846, and (3) rent asunder a sister republic. 

The critical reader will want to know how the 
damaging evidence found in this book that is not 
in the nature of an original official document 
was obtained. This has, of course, a bearing on 
Its credibility. It was obtained through rogatory 
proceedings, instituted by the New York World 
on the Isthmus while preparing its defense for 
libel in an action brought against it by the Federal 
Government. It is, therefore, sworn testimony 
in part wrenched from unwilling witnesses in a 



2 Preface 

court of record. This testimony corroborates the 
inferences suggested by official documents pub- 
Hshed by our Government. 

It is the mature judgment of the writer that in 
the conferences between the Roosevelt Adminis- 
tration and the separatists the following were the 
important provisions that were agreed to : 

1. The separatists were to persuade ($, $) the 
military and political representatives of Colombia 
on the Isthmus to cooperate in the secession of the 
Province of Panama, and, in addition, they were 
to arrange to take over its civil government. 

2. Our Government was to recognize the new 
republic not later than forty-eight hours after the 
Declaration of Independence, and to prevent Co- 
lombia from landing troops on the Isthmus to re- 
store her sovereignty. 

It is proper that we should offset this sweeping 
indictment of our then Administration with an 
excerpt from an article by Roosevelt which ap- 
peared in The Outlook on October 7, 191 1 : 

On December 7, 1903, and again on January 4, 1904, 
as President of the United States, in messages to the two 
Houses of Congress, I set forth in full and in detail every 
essential fact connected with the recognition of the Re- 
public of Panama, the negotiation of a treaty with that 
Republic for building the Painama Canal, and the actions 
which led up to that negotiation — actions without which 



Preface 3 

the canal could not have been built, and would not now 
have, been even begun. Not one important fact was omit- 
ted, and no fact of any importance bearing upon the actions 
or negotiations of the representatives of the United States 
not there set forth has been, or ever will be, discovered, 
simply because there is none to discover. It must be a 
matter of pride to every honest American, proud of the 
good name of his country, that the acquisition of the canal 
and the building of the canal, in all their details, were as 
free from scandal as the public acts of George Washington 
and Abraham Lincoln. 

It is a matter of keen disappointment to well- 
informed Americans of high character that there 
is no resemblance at all between the public acts of 
George Washington and of Abraham Lincoln on 
the one hand and those of the Roosevelt Adminis- 
tration in the taking of the Canal Zone, on the 
other hand. Of no public act of either Washing- 
ton or Lincoln can anything like the following be 
said : 

I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
it. If I had followed traditional, conservative methods I 
would have submitted a dignified state paper of probably 
two hundred pages to Congress, and the debate on it would 
have been going on yet ; but i took the canal zone and 
let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on, the 
canal does also. 

The writer has included in the appendix that 
portion of the micssage of December 7, 1903, 
which deals with the events on the Isthmus, and 



4 Preface 

the entire message of January 4, 1904. Roose- 
velt has stated in the first excerpt above that they 
contain the final word on the subject — all that is 
knowable and all that will ever be known. The 
writer hopes that before reading this book the 
reader will carefully study Roosevelt's full state- 
ment in these messages. 

Inasmuch as Roosevelt's article in the Metro- 
politan Magazine for February, 191 5, entitled: 
"The Panama Blackmail Treaty," is presumably 
his complete statement against ratification of the 
pending treaty with Colombia, the writer felt that 
its incorporation in the appendix of this book was 
required in order to give as fully as possible the 
other side of the controversy. He, therefore, re- 
quested permission to reproduce it. The follow- 
ing inconclusive letter from the Managing Edi- 
tor of the magazine is the only communication 
received in reply : 

Replying to yours of July 24th, in which you request 
permission to reprint from the Metropolitan Magazine 
Colonel Roosevelt's article on "The Panama Blackmail 
Treaty," I am unable to give you that permission with- 
out first consulting Colonel Roosevelt. As soon as he 
returns from the West I will take the matter up with 
him and let you know. 

The writer intended to set over against his own 
statement the full statement of Roosevelt. Per- 



Preface 5 

mission to reproduce the mentioned article not 
having been granted Roosevelt's side of the con- 
troversy is not fully stated. 

President Wilson, in an address delivered be- 
fore the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States on February 3, 191 5, stated the method em- 
ployed by the writer in the examination of our 
title to the Canal Zone. It is contained in the 
following excerpt : 

I agreed with a colleague of mine in the cabinet the 
other day that we had never before in our lives attended 
a school to compare with that we were now attending 
for the purpose of gaining a liberal education. 

Of course, I learn a great many things that are not so, 
but the interesting thing about that is this : Things that 
are not so do not match. If you hear enough of them, 
you see there is no pattern whatever; it is a crazy quilt. 
Whereas, the truth always matches, piece by piece, with 
other parts of the truth. No man can lie consistently, 
and he cannot lie about everything if he talks to you 
long. I would guarantee that if enough liars talked to 
you, you would get the truth ; because the parts that they 
did not invent would match one another, and the parts 
that they did invent would not match one another. Talk 
long enough, therefore, and see the connections clearly 
enough, and you can patch together the case as a whole. 

A great mass of evidence was sifted in order to 
penetrate through plausible falsehoods to basal 
facts. The sifted evidence was marshaled and 
carefully weighted. It is reproduced largely in 



6 Preface 

the form of quotations with the connecting nexus 
in the form of inferences and conclusions supplied 
by the writer. It is the first comprehensive ac- 
count in book form of the events connected with 
our acquisition of the Canal Zone. 

The conclusions expressed are based on the quo- 
tations found here and there throughout the book. 
Moreover, they are not always solely based on the 
quotations in connection with which the con- 
clusion is expressed. Viewed thus broadly the 
writer is convinced that every conclusion is war- 
ranted. It was his purpose : 

Nothing [to] extenuate, 

Nor to set down aught in malice. 

The data bearing on the taking of the Canal 
Zone by our Government are widely scattered, 
and, therefore, inaccessible to the general reader. 
Those which, so to speak, mirror this chapter of 
our history are assembled in this book, which thus 
makes them accessible to the public. 

The significant facts have been assembledv and 
sifted in our search to determine whether we have 
a clear title to the Canal Zone. They unmistak- 
ably show that it was taken by force. The pay- 
ments to our partner in crime do not clear the 
title of its stain. It is stolen. Gilding the polit- 



Preface 7 

teal crime with the gloss of fine words does not re- 
move the national disgrace. 

This is a subject on which one is not warranted 
in expressing an opinion unless he has critically 
examined the available evidence. Only the per- 
son who has a message and can present it without 
prejudice is entitled to ask audience. Therefore, 
he who speaks on the subject should state his 
credentials. In this instance, credentials take the 
form of political affiliations. The writer voted 
for Roosevelt for Vice-President in 1900 (in Wis- 
consin), supported him for President in 1904 (in 
New York), and in the Republican primary of 
19 1 2. After the Republican convention at Chi- 
cago he joined the Progressive Party and is now 
a member of that party. 

The writer's interest in Roosevelt dates from 
the picturesque support that the latter gave to 
Senator Edmunds for President in the Republi- 
can national convention of 1884. At the time, 
Roosevelt was featured in the west as a young 
Lochinvar of the east valiantly fighting the battle 
of political righteousness. His vigorous support 
of Edmunds won the writer's boyhood fancy. 

It now seems that there had grown up in the 
west a Roosevelt myth commencing with the con- 
vention named, which he attended as one of the 



8 Preface 

big four of New York. His conduct always 
seemed to be in harmony with exalted moral pur- 
pose. Social well-being seemed to be the goal 
toward which he steered with unerring precision. 
This was the writer's estimate of Roosevelt when 
the repeal of the tolls-exemption provisions of the 
Panama Canal Act became a national issue. 

A critical study of the financial policy that the 
Hay-Pauncefote treaty imposes on the United 
States in the management of the Panama Canal, 
and that is imposed on the country by the nature 
of the enterprise, coupled with an exhaustive 
study of the method employed to secure the Canal 
Zone, convinced the writer that the attitude of 
Roosevelt was foreign to the requirements of na- 
tional honor. 

It may be urged that citations which justify the 
course pursued by the Roosevelt Administration 
have been omitted from this volume. The fol- 
lowing excerpt from the pen of Secretary Hay is 
typical : 

Any charge that this Government, or any responsible 
member of it, held intercourse, whether official or unof- 
ficial, with agents of revolution in Colombia, is utterly 
without justification. 

Equally so is the insinuation that any action of this 
Government, prior to the revolution in Panama, was the 
result of complicity with the plans of the revolutionists. 



Preface 9 

The Department sees fit to make these denials, and it 
makes -them finally. 

Roosevelt cites the following from Secretary 
Hay as of controlling importance : 

The action of the President in the Panama matter is 
not only in the strictest accordance with the best prece- 
dents of our public policy, but it was the only course he 
could have taken in compliance with our treaty rights 
and obligations. 

These statements of the late lamented Secre- 
tary Hay have not survived the scrutiny of his- 
torical criticism. All communications of similar 
character have crumbled before the searchlight of 
truth and historical method for separating truth 
and falsehood. 

William Roscoe Thayer published in Harper's 
Magazine for July, 191 5, a sympathetic article on 
the connection of the Roosevelt Administration 
with the Isthmian events in the fall of 1903, which 
resulted in our securing the Canal Zone. The 
following excerpts are apropos: 

From the moment of Mr. Roosevelt's accession the 
State Department felt a new impelling force behind it: 
the Secretary still conducted the negotiations, but the 
creation and decision of policy came to rest more and 
more with the President. 

In no case was this so true as in that of the Panama 
Canal. In the earlier stages Mr. Roosevelt gave direc- 
tions which Mr. Hay carried out; before the end, how- 



10 Preface 

ever, the President took the business into his own hands ; 
and he has ever since frankly assumed entire responsi- 
bihty for the achievement. . . . 

Throughout October Mr. Hay seems to have had less 
and less communication with the Isthmus and Bogota, 
whereas the activity of President Roosevelt increased. 

Responsibility for the dynamic climax to this solution 
of the Colombia-Panama struggle rested entirely with 
the President, who seems not always to have informed 
Secretary Hay and the Cabinet officers of his acts. 

The writer reached the same conclusion by a 
comparative study of the diplomatic and other 
correspondence of the Roosevelt Administration 
of the period in question. This investigation led 
him to conclude that Secretary Hay did not know 
the facts connected with the Isthmian disturbance 
in 1903. This makes it clear that the certification 
made by Secretary Hay, of the correctness of the 
conduct of the President, is based upon belief and 
not upon knowledge. 

In this book we deal only with the principal 
events connected with our acquisition of the Canal 
Zone. A detailed and chronological statement of 
them can be found with only incidental analysis 
and interpretation, in "The Story of Panama'' by 
Henry N. Hall, staff correspondent of the New 
York World, This comprehensive statement of 
facts constitutes Mr. Hall's testimony before the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 



Preface 1 1 

Representatives from January 26 to February 20, 
1912, and has been printed as an official document. 

The citations in this book whose source is not 
indicated in connection with their presentation 
are taken from the ''Diplomatic History of the 
Panama CanaF' (official document), "The Story 
of Panama" (official document) and other official 
documents, including the Congressional Record. 

This book is the by-product of another work 
dealing with the Panama Canal finances, tolls, 
accounts and underlying treaties. The amount 
of space required to cover all these matters turned 
out to be such that it was necessary to abandon the 
original plan and treat this one phase of the ques- 
tion as an independent though related study. 
The part of the original plan that had already 
been worked out was, therefore, pigeon-holed to 
enable the writer to complete the present work. 
The other section of the work as originally 
planned will be published later under the title: 
"America and the Canal Tolls." 

This book contains more or less repetition. 
Fundamental principles and important documents 
are involved in the consideration of a question like 
this, and, as they have a bearing on the various 
standpoints from which the question was con- 
sidered, repetition was inevitable. It would not 



12 Preface 

have been desirable to have avoided it entirely if 
it could have been done. All minds are not 
equally mature and so it may well be that the 
method of here a little and there a little from dif- 
ferent standpoints is the way of correct under- 
standing. As the writer aimed to instruct as well 
as to explain official documents and secondary 
evidence, repetition became a vital part of his 
method. 

Some of the citations and arguments which 
show that there was no revolution on the Isthmus 
in the fall of 1903 also show that the Treaty of 
1846 was violated and that the Canal Zone was 
taken by force. Therefore, some of the repeti- 
tion may be more apparent than actual as the same 
data and arguments were used to show different 
contentions. 

Acknowledgments are due to President Jose V. 
Concha of the Republic of Colombia for a cable- 
gram in which he gives an official version of a 
memorandum he, as Minister of the Colombian 
Legation, handed to our Government in 1902 in 
which it was provided that the annuity to be paid 
to Colombia for the canal concession was to be de- 
termined by arbitration if it could not be deter- 
mined by diplomacy ; to Senor Francisco Escobar, 
Consulado General De Colombia, in New York, 



Preface 13 

for the cablegram from President Concha of Col- 
ombia printed on page 35, for several valuable 
pamphlets, and for having informed the writer of 
the existence of important official documents and 
how to gain access to them; to Roberto Ancizar, 
Secretary of the Colombian Legation at Washing- 
ton, for verification of two official documents, for 
a copy of a Colombian official document not yet 
printed and for several valuable pamphlets; to 
Henry N. Hall, for an official copy of 'The Story 
of Panama" comprising his testimony before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs; and to 
Leander T. Chamberlain for excerpts taken from 
his pamphlet, "A Chapter in National Dishonor," 
some of which were adapted to fit into our line 
of argument without direct acknowledgment. 
Special acknowledgment is due my colleague, 
James L. Bahret, for valuable editorial sugges- 
tions. The author was prevented through lack 
of strength from carrying out all of them. 

The author is solely and alone responsible for 
the material incorporated and the views expressed 
in this book. He received encouragement from 
Seiior Francisco Escobar of the Colombian Con- 
sulate in New York. The Colombian Legation 
at Washington was indifferent. The writer's 
suggestion that it secure for him, if possible, two 



14 Preface 

official documents not published and furnish a 
better translation of an excerpt from a Colombian 
official communication were ignored. This is 
merely stated for the purpose of focusing re- 
sponsibility for the contents of this book on the 
author. 

During the final revision of the manuscript the 
writer was ordered by his physician not to do in- 
tensive work. Therefore the book is not as well 
integrated as it would otherwise have been and 
repetition appears that would have been elimi- 
nated. It is believed that these defects in the 
story of the taking of the Canal Zone by the 
Roosevelt Administration as herein narrated are 
merely formal, and that they do not impair its 
scientific value. 

Joseph C. Freehoff. 

Saranac Lake, N. Y. 
November 15, 1915 



AMERICA AND THE 
CANAL TITLE 

Chapter I 
Clear the Enterprise of Every Stain 

Construction of the Panama Canal was com- 
pleted in the summer of 19 14. Slides now and 
then interrupt transit. Removal of these slides 
merely adds to the cost of the canal as a commer- 
cial enterprise. 

Our Government "took" the Canal Zone from 
Colombia at the point of the bayonet. It was un- 
willing to pay the price determined by due process 
of law. Our title is, therefore, stolen. This 
stain on the enterprise will remain until unstinted 
reparation has been made to the despoiled owner 
— Colombia. Concerning the construction of the 
canal and our seizure of the Canal Zone, the New 
York World said in an editorial in the winter of 
1912: 

15 



1 6 America and the Canal Title 

It is the greatest feat of construction ever undertaken 
by any government. The manner in which this work has 
been done under the direction of Colonel Goethals is one 
of the engineering triumphs of all history. Every Amer- 
ican citizen should be proud of it. 

When the canal is thrown open to the commerce of the 
world there should be no blot on the record. There 
should be nothing for the American people to explain or 
to apologize for. . . . 

The full story of . . . [the] Panama transaction is yet 
to be told — the Washington lobby, the framing of the 
treaty which Colombia rejected, the organization and 
financing of a Panama revolution in New York City, the 
part played by the United States Government in this con- 
spiracy. . . . 

The seizing of the Canal Zone did more to arouse the 
hostility of South American repubHcs against the United 
States than anything else that has happened since they 
won their independence. While Colombia's demand for 
justice remains unsatisfied this country will always be 
an object of suspicion on the part of its South American 
neighbors. . . . 

The important thing is that this international scandal 
be disposed of for all time before the canal is opened and 
that no stain be left on the American title. 

Congress owes it to the country and the country owes 
it to itself. 

In the enactment of the Panama Canal Act in 
19 1 2, Congress placed another stain on the enter- 
prise. The tolls-exemption provisions of that act 
scrapped the commercial provisions of the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty. Due primarily to the exalted 
moral purpose of President Wilson, the tolls-ex- 
emption provisions of the Panama Canal Act were 



Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 17 

repealed in 19 14, with the result that the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty was restored as our guide in 
the management of the canal. Instead of this 
treaty being now a scrap of paper, it is a world- 
view design — snatched from the scrap heap and 
restored as the vital instrument in canal adminis- 
tration. It was rescued on the way to the po- 
litical graveyard in which are interred the remains 
of our Treaty of 1846, and over which hovers a 
troubled American conscience. Only reparation 
to Colombia can bring relief. Ratification of the 
pending treaty with Colombia by the Senate will 
restore American honor and remove from our flag 
an otherwise ineffaceable stain. 

The Hay-Pauncef ote treaty is a solemn engage- 
ment whose meaning is self-evident. Besides, we 
have documentary evidence which establishes that 
meaning beyond a reasonable doubt. Willis 
Fletcher Johnson, an able newspaper man, inter- 
viewed Secretary Hay as to the bearing of this 
treaty on our intercoastal trade. This was before 
the construction of the treaty became the subject- 
matter of political controversy. Therefore, the 
opinion expressed in this interview, if properly 
corroborated, absolutely establishes its meaning. 
The interview is published in official documents 
and reads : 



i8 America and the Canal Title 

I asked Colonel Hay plumply if the treaty meant what 
it appeared to mean on its face, and whether the phrase 
"vessels of all nations," was intended to include our own 
shipping, or was to be interpreted as meaning "all other 
nations." The Secretary smiled, half indulgently, half 
quizzically, as he replied: 

"All means all. The treaty was not so long that we 
could not have made room for the word 'other' if we 
had understood that it belonged there. 'All nations' 
means all nations, and the United States is certainly a 
nation." 

That was the understanding between yourself and Lord 
Pauncefote when you and he made the treaty? I pur- 
sued. 

"It certainly was," he replied. "It was the under- 
standing of both Governments, and I have no doubt that 
the Senate realized that in ratifying the second treaty 
without such an amendment it was committing us to the 
principle of giving all friendly nations equal privileges in 
the canal with ourselves. That is our Golden Rule." 

The views of the then Secretary of State are 
corroborated by our Ambassador to Great Britain 
at the time, Joseph H. Choate, who in an address 
before the Chamber of Commerce of the City of 
New York on February 13, 19 13, said : 

It is true that I had something to do with the negotia- 
tion of this treaty. In the summer of 1901 — you will 
remember that this treaty was ratified by the Senate in 
December, 1901 — I was in England until October, and 
was in almost daily contact with Lord Pauncefote, who 
on his side represented Lord Lansdowne, the foreign sec- 
retary, and was also in very frequent correspondence with 
Mr. Hay, our Secretary of State, under whom I was act- 
ing. As the lips of both of those diplomatists and great 



Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 19 

patriots, who were each true to his own country and each 
regardful of the rights of the other, are sealed in death, 
I think it is quite proper that I should say what I believe 
both of them, if they were here, would say to-day — that 
the clause in the Panama Canal bill exempting coastwise 
American shipping from payment of tolls is in direct vio- 
lation of the treaty. 

I venture to say that in the whole course of the nego- 
tiations of this particular treaty, no claim, no suggestion, 
was made that there should be any exemption of any- 
body. 

Even more convincing are the views expressed 
by the late President McKinley. They are found 
in a letter from Secretary Hay to Senator Cullom, 
of which the following is an excerpt : 

The President was not only willing but desirous that 
'Hhe general principle" of neutralization referred to in 
the preamble of this treaty should be applicable to this 
canal now intended to be built, notwithstanding any 
change of sovereignty or of international relations of the 
territory through which it should pass. 

The views of President McKinley are ''the gen- 
eral principle'' with the meaning that the nego- 
tiators of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty attached to 
it. In a letter dated August 20, 1901, Ambassa- 
dor Choate stated its meaning as it was under- 
stood at the time the treaty was negotiated. It 
was in effect — 

That the parties constructing or owning the canal shall 
impose no other charges or conditions of traffic than are 



20 America and the Canal Title 

just and equitable ; and that the same canals or railways, 
being open to the citizens and subjects of the United 
States and Great Britain on equal terms, shall also be 
open on like terms to the citizens and subjects of every 
other State. 

The foregoing was corroborated by Henry 
White, Secretary of our Embassy in Great Britain 
during the negotiations of the Hay-Pauncefote 
treaties. Mr. White wrote a letter to Senator 
McCumber in which he told what Secretary Hay 
understood the treaty to mean relative to free 
transit for our intercoastal trade. The vital part 
of the letter reads : 

( 1 ) That the exemption of our coastwise shipping from 
the payment of tolls was never suggested to, nor by, any 
one connected with the negotiation of the Hay-Paunce- 
fote treaties in this country or in England; 

(2) That from the day on which I opened the nego- 
tiations with Lord Salisbury for the abrogation of the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty until the ratification of the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty, the words "all nations" and ''equal 
terms" were understood to refer to the United States as 
well as to all other nations, by every one of those, whether 
American or British, who had anything to do with the 
negotiations whereof the treaty last mentioned was the 
result. 

Henry White had at the date of writing the 
above a more minute knowledge of the negotia- 
tions leading up to the agreement on the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty than any other person. His 



Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 21 

statement is, therefore, final and conclusive as to 
the meaning of that instrument 

It does not take much erudition to know what 
the negotiators intended the Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty to mean — to know what the Hay-Paunce- 
fote treaty actually does mean. It means what 
its negotiators intended it to mean. It was clearly 
the intent of the negotiators that the charge for 
the commercial use of the Isthmian Canal which 
was to be constructed should be non-discrimina- 
tory and without distinction of flag. This is con- 
firmed by the inclusion of this sentence in the 
Hay-Pauncefote treaty: 

Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be 

JUST AND equitable. 

Appreciating the fact that the Panama Canal 
is a public utility, our public vessels are entitled to 
free transit, because they are either engaged in 
maintenance or in maneuvers to acquire the efKi- 
ciency required for its protection. The public 
vessels of the Republic of Panama pass through 
free as an offset to rent. Similarly, the public 
vessels of Colombia will pass through free if the 
treaty with Colombia now pending in the Senate 
is ratified. This will be part of the compensation 
incurred to secure a clear title to the Canal Zone. 



22 America and the Canal Title 

All the commercial traffic through the canal 
must pay a non-discriminatory rate. The United 
States, as the owner of the canal, is entitled to a 
reasonable return on its investment — a principle 
that applies in the regulation of national, state,, 
and municipal utiHties, that is, domestic utilities. 
It is empowered to collect this amount from the 
traffic using the canal, but is compelled to collect 
it by imposing a reasonable and non-discrimina- 
tory rate. Realizing that this is what the fore- 
going sentence of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty 
means, the careful student of public utilities and 
of our domestic policy in relation thereto needs 
only to see this sentence of the Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty in order to know that free transit for our 
intercoastal shipping is prohibited by that instru- 
ment. 

It is now clear that a solemn engagement and 
the nature of the enterprise prohibit free transit 
to our coastwise shipping. In a state paper 
worthy of the occasion. President Wilson, there- 
fore, asked the Congress to repeal the tolls-ex- 
emption provisions of the Panama Canal Act. 
We give it in full below : 

Gentlemen of the Congress : I have come to you upon 
an errand which can be very briefly performed, but I beg 
that you will not measure its importance by the number 



Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 23 

of sentences in which I state it. No communication I 
have addressed to the Congress carried with it graver 
or more far-reaching implications as to the interest of 
the country, and I come now to speak upon a matter with 
regard to which I am charged in a particular degree, by 
the Constitution itself, with personal responsibility. 

I have come to ask you for the repeal of that provision 
of the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 19 12, which ex- 
empts vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United 
States from payment of tolls, and to urge upon you the 
justice, the wisdom, and the large policy of such a repeal 
with the utmost earnestness of which I am capable. 

In my own judgment, very fully considered and ma- 
turely formed, that exemption constitutes a mistaken eco- 
nomic policy from every point of view, and is, moreover, 
in plain contravention of the treaty with Great Britain 
concerning the canal concluded on November 18, 1901. 
But I have not come to urge upon you my personal views. 
I have come to state to you a fact and a situation. What- 
ever may be our own differences of opinion concerning 
this much debated measure, its meaning is not debated 
outside the United States. Everywhere else the language 
of the treaty is given but one interpretation, and that in- 
terpretation precludes the exemption I am asking you 
to repeal. We consented to the treaty; its language we 
accepted, if we did not originate it; and we are too big, 
too powerful, too self-respecting a nation to interpret 
with a too strained or refined reading the words of our 
own promises just because we have power enough to give 
us leave to read them as we please. The large thing to do 
is the only thing we can afford to do, a voluntary with- 
drawal from the position everywhere questioned and mis- 
understood. We ought to reverse our action without rais- 
ing the question whether we were right or wrong, and 
so once more deserve our reputation for generosity and 
for the redemption of every obligation without quibble 
or hesitation. 

I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the 



24 America and the Canal Title 

administration. I shall not know how to deal with other 
matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence 
if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure. 

The high moral purpose of this memorable 
state paper was recognized abroad. Sir Edward 
Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, comple- 
mented it in a speech in the House of Commons. 
In the course of his remarks, he exposed misrep- 
resentation, and, in so doing, revealed the exalted 
moral purpose of President Wilson. The fol- 
lowing excerps from Sir Edward Grey's speech 
should have the widest circulation : 

It is due to the President of the United States and to 
ourselves that I should so far as possible clear away that 
misrepresentation. It was stated in some quarters that 
the settlement was the result of bargaining or diplomatic 
pressure. Since President Wilson came into office no 
correspondence has passed, and it ought to be realized in 
the United States that any line President Wilson has 
taken was not because it was our line, but his own. 

President Wilson's attitude was not the result of any 
diplomatic communication since he has come into power 
and it must have been the result of papers already pub- 
lished to all the world. 

It has not been done to please us or in the interests 
of good relations, but I believe from a much greater 
motive — ^the feeling that a government which is to use its 
influence among the nations to make relations better must 
never when the occasion arises flinch or quail from inter- 
preting treaty rights in a strictly fair spirit. 

President Wilson's attitude toward the tolls- 



Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 25 

exemption clause of the Panama Canal Act was 
reaffirmed in his address at Independence Hall on 
July 4, 1 9 14. It is reported as follows : 

I say that it is patriotic sometimes to prefer the honor 
of the country to its material interest. Would you rather 
be deemed by all nations of the world incapable of keep- 
ing your treaty obligations in order that you might have 
free tolls for American ships ? The treaty under which we 
gave up that right may have been a mistaken treaty, but 
there was no mistake about its meaning. 

When I have made a promise as a man I try to keep 
it, and I know of no other rule permissible to a nation. 
The most distinguished nation in the world is the nation 
that can and will keep its promises even to its own hurt. 
And I want to say, parenthetically, that I do not think 
anybody was hurt. I cannot be enthusiastic for sub- 
sidies to a monopoly, but let those who are enthusiastic for 
subsidies ask themselves whether they prefer subsidies 
to unsullied honor. 

Our own former ''Secretary for Foreign Af- 
fairs/' William Jennings Bryan, speaks in the 
same tone as did Sir Edward Grey, both viewing 
the matter from the standpoint of the influence 
of a nation in international affairs if it keep its 
solemn engagements. In a letter dated Septem- 
ber 4, 1914, quoted elsewhere, Secretary Bryan 
wrote : 

The position taken by the President on the tolls ques- 
tion aroused more opposition at that time than it would 
arouse to-day, subsequent events having completely vindi- 
cated the wisdom of his action. 



26 America and the Canal Title 

The enviable position which our nation occupies to-day- 
is due, in part, to the fact that it has allowed no doubt to 
exist as to its purpose to live up to the stipulations of its 
treaty. 

There were economic considerations which weighed 
heavily in favor of the repeal of the free tolls law, but 
these were less important than those which affected the 
international standing of our nation. 

A government must be above suspicion in the matter 
of good faith. No pecuniary advantage, even where such 
an advantage actually exists, can for a moment justify 
the violation of a treaty obligation, and violation must 
be the more scrupulously avoided if the question is one 
which is not to be submitted to arbitration. 

In international matters the question is not whether we 
are ourselves certain of our Government's purpose in the 
position taken, but whether other nations, also, have con- 
fidence in our rectitude. 

The President set a high standard, and the support 
given to him in the Senate and House was as creditable 
to Congress as it was complimentary to him. The pop- 
ular approval which is now accorded to both the Presi- 
dent and Congress on this subject is proof positive that 
the people can be trusted to pass judgment upon the merit 
of international, as well as domestic, questions. 

Especially gratifying is any appreciation of our 
President by Viscount James Bryce. The reason 
is that he is held in affectionate esteem by all well- 
informed Americans. Therefore, his views have 
an importance among us that does not attach to 
those of any other foreigner. At the Independ- 
ence Day dinner . in London on July 4, 1914, 
he paid the following tribute to President Wil- 
son : — -^ 



Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 2y 

Courage is a virtue rare among politicians. What we 
have all admired in the President is his courage in the 
matter of the canal tolls. 

Absolutely no pressure was brought to bear by Great 
Britain to obtain repeal of the tolls-exemption clause of 
the Panama Canal Act. 

In a letter commenting on a book designed and 
prepared by the writer and published with another 
as co-author, Lord Bryce expresses appreciation 
of President Wilson which supplements the 
foregoing. The following therefrom is apro- 
pos: 

Besides the value which your book has for the student 
as a collection of documents bearing upon a significant 
passage in diplomatic history, it has the further interest 
of placing on record the admirable example set by Pres- 
ident Wilson of the spirit in which questions affecting 
the faith of treaties ought to be handled. No praise can 
be too high for the rectitude and the courage which he 
showed on this occasion. Wisdom also he showed and 
clear foresight. He perceived that one of America's 
greatest assets is her reputation for righteous dealing and 
for loyalty to the international obligations she has under- 
taken. He understood the mind and conscience of the 
American people, and knew that when an appeal was 
made to them in the name of good faith they would re- 
spond. The result vindicated his judgment. 

Your book calls attention to the testimony borne by 
the British Foreign Secretary and by myself (for I was 
Ambassador at Washington when Mr. Wilson entered the 
White House) to the fact that no pressure whatever was 
exerted by the British Government in the matter. To 
this I may add that when I reported to my Government 
the last conversation I had with Mr. Wilson in which the 



28 America and the Canal Title 

subject was mentioned, I expressed to them the confident 
belief that whenever the President had had time to study 
and master the issues involved he would do whatever he 
felt to be right, and would not be diverted by any political 
considerations from what he might hold to be the course 
that honor prescribed. 

Those of us in England who know America best and 
love her most rejoiced at the approval which she gave to 
the President's policy in this matter, not on account of 
any British interest involved but because it showed that 
to be true which we had often declared — that no nation 
in the world has a truer love of peace and good-will or a 
higher sense of international honor than have the Ameri- 
can people. 

Especially pertinent at this time is this appre- 
ciation because of the violation of the Treaty of 
1839 by Germany and the storm of indignation 
it aroused in neutral countries. This ought to 
impel us to remove the stigma attaching to our 
violation of the Treaty of 1846. American good 
faith can be restored only by the ratification of 
the treaty with Colombia now pending in the 
Senate. 

President Wilson rendered a distinguished 
public service when he insisted on the repeal of 
the provision of the Panama Canal Act which ex- 
empted our vessels engaged in the coastwise trade 
from the payment of tolls. He stood for the re- 
nunciation of an advantage inconsistent with the 
interpretation put upon the Hay-Pauncefote 



Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 29 

treaty, by the men who framed it. He had to 
fight down serious opposition in his own party 
to square our record with that of honor. 

The repeal of the tolls-exemption provisions of 
the Panama Canal Act will always stand high on 
the list of the good works of the President, for the 
enactment of the repeal bill was due to his great 
influence, very directly exerted. It was a con- 
troverted question, but the sound opinion of the 
country supported the President in his endeavor 
to get Congress to do its plain duty and to set the 
record of the country straight. A very great 
majority of the American people, and practically 
all of those who were in a position to judge the 
matter impartially, held that the exemption act 
was wrong, that the repeal was right, that it was 
an act of justice to England, and, above all, to 
ourselves. 

The opinion of all well-informed Americans of 
high character was voiced by Vice-President 
Marshall when, at the Panama-Pacific Exposi- 
tion, San Francisco, on March 24, 1915, he said: 

In justice to the day, Woodrow Wilson should be 
here. The office and the man would each fittingly grace 
this occasion. But duty said to him that justice to all 
the people bade him stay in Washington. You hope for 
continued peace. Do not forget that he is your greatest 
peacemaker. May the truth that he seeks your good, 



30 America and the Canal Title 

rather than his own or your pleasure, lighten the disap- 
pointments of this hour. ... 

I am sure that I express the thought of the President 
and the hope of the American people when I say that 
our canal was built not alone for glory or great gain, but 
with a sincere desire to make the whole world kin. There 
are two gospels now instead of one. The gospel of good 
will has been supplemented with the gospel of personal 
contact. The gospel of good will continues to be su- 
preme, but nothing will help it preach as loudly as those 
human agencies which eliminate distance, blend languages, 
and give us sight as well as knowledge each of the other. 

I am quite sure that I am but one of a countless throng 
in this republic who regret that this altruistic work has a 
real or seeming defect in the charge of an injustice done 
a sister republic to the south. Let us not be too much 
dismayed this day by reason of that fact. The American 
people are wise, and they know he is not wise who is not 
just. I look with confidence for the early arrival of that 
good hour when whatever wrong may have been done 
shall be righted, and when there will be left no drop of 
bitter water to flow in that channel which unites the seas. 

The present war vitally concerns the progress 
of the world's civilization. It marks an epoch 
in world history comparable only with the Fall of 
the Roman Empire or the Reformation. Future 
history will date from it. Ought not the United 
States to start the new era without a stain on its 
good name ? 

Due to the high character of President Wilson, 
the tolls-exemption provisions of the Panama 
Canal Act are in the scrap-heap. Ratification of 
the pending treaty with Colombia is as vital to 



Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 31 

the restoration of American national honor as 
was the repeal of tolls-exemption. 

As already stated, the tolls-exemption pro- 
visions of the Panama Canal Act have been re- 
pealed. The good work should be completed by 
making reparation to Colombia. That would 
clear the canal of its remaining stain. President 
Wilson and Secretary Bryan have done their part. 
Let the people of the United States insist that the 
Senate do its part by demanding that it ratify the 
pending treaty with Colombia, thus enabling us 
to start the new era with a chastened conscience 
and with unsullied honor. 



Chapter II 

Roosevelt's Article — ''The Panama Blackmail 
Treaty'' 

We shall, in this chapter, subject to a critical 
examination an article by Roosevelt entitled 'The 
Panama Blackmail Treaty," which appeared in 
the Metropolitan Magazine for February, 191 5. 
The article advances an argument against the 
ratification of the treaty negotiated with Colombia 
by the Wilson Administration for the purpose of 
reestablishing friendly relations and of compen- 
sating that country for loss suffered when the 
Province of Panama was wrested from her sov- 
ereignty by the United States. Not only is the 
article couched in language that is lacking in 
dignity, but it is positively offensive. Its princi- 
pal arguments will be answered in this chapter 
and the remaining ones will be disposed of in 
other chapters. 

We shall quote excerpts from this article as 
the discussion proceeds and follow them with an 
accurate statement of facts and of conclusions 

32 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 33 

based on them. The article opens with these 
paragraphs : 

In 1903 a shameless and sordid attempt was made by 
the then dictator of Colombia and his subordinate fellow- 
poUticians at Bogota to force the United States by scan- 
dalously improper tactics to pay a vastly larger sum for 
the privilege of building the Panama Canal than had been 
agreed upon in a solemn treaty. As President of the 
United States I resisted this attempt, and prevented the 
United States from being blackmailed. Had I not suc- 
cessfully resisted the attempt, the Panama Canal would 
not now be built, and would probably never have been 
built. The attempt was blackmail then ; and to yield to it 
now is to yield to blackmail. 

Yet the present Administration now proposes to pay 
Colombia twenty-five million dollars, and to make what 
is probably an apology for our conduct in acquiring the 
right ta build the canal. Apparently this is done on the 
theory of soothing the would-be blackmailers and making 
them forget the mortification caused them by the failure 
of their initial attempt to hold up the United States. 

This article and the messages to the Congress 
as of December 7, 1903 (part devoted to Canal), 
and of January 4, 1904, are neither fact nor 
fiction. They are a gallery-playing farce in- 
tended to dazzle instead of to instruct the 
American people. They may sound like truth, 
but in reality they bear false witness against 
a sister Republic, retarding the formation of 
a correct public opinion on the question of our 
duty to Colombia. They are in reality a plea to 



34 America and the Canal Title 

keep our national honor in pawn so that the poli- 
tical crime of 1903 may not be officially disowned. 

The charge of "blackmail" is, in reality, nothing 
more than a pretext to justify the taking of the 
Canal Zone by force. Realizing that there is no 
justification that can withstand the scrutiny of 
historical method, Roosevelt tries to withdraw 
attention from the real facts by this unwarranted 
counter charge. What proof has he offered? 
Or does he act on the principle that if you throw 
mud some of it will stick — at least in the minds 
of the unwary? His charge is serious, but 
searching inquiry shows that it is absolutely with- 
out foundation. 

When it became evident that the compensation 
for the canal concession could not be satisfactorily 
arranged by diplomacy, Colombia suggested that 
the matter be referred for determination to an 
arbitral tribunal and offered to enter into an en- 
gagement which would provide for its determina- 
tion in this way. This phase of the canal con- 
troversy is admirably stated in a paragraph of an 
article in the North American Review for Janu- 
ary, 1904, by Sefior Francisco Escobar, Consul 
of Colombia in New York: 

The money consideration first offered by Secretary 
Hay was far from satisfactory. Minister Concha was. 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 35 

right when he said that the Secretary was trying to drive 
a sharp bargain. Yet it was the accepted opinion in the 
United States that Colombia was the "sharper" ; but the 
best proof I can adduce to the contrary is that Minister 
Concha proposed to leave the money consideration to be 
adjusted by an arbitrator or by The Hague Tribunal. 

Mr. Escobar was asked by the writer to secure 
confirmation of the foregoing from the then 
Minister Concha, now the President of the Re- 
public of Colombia, which was done. It is con- 
tained in the following cablegram : 

Bogota, August 10, 191 5 
Francisco Escobar, New York: 

By article XXV of the memorandum presented to the 
Department of State on April 18, 1902, the Colombian 
Legation proposed to fix by means of arbitration the 
amount of the annuity to be paid Colombia. On April 
21, Secretary Hay accepted this proposal and promised 
to sign a covenant in accordance therewith, but on July 
18, having changed his mind, proposed an option [$7,000,- 
000 on final agreement and an annuity of $100,000 or 
$10,000,000 and an annuity of $10,000] instead of arbi- 
tration. The memorandum was published with other 
state papers by said Department. 

Concha 

In article XXV of the memorandum, Colombia 
proposed a method for determining the value of 
the canal concession that was scientific. This 
article contains the following sections: 

As the price or compensation for the right to use the 
zone granted in this convention by Colombia to the United 



36 America and the Canal Title 

States for the construction of a canal, together with the 
proprietary right over the Panama Railroad, and for the 
annuity of $250,000 gold, which Colombia ceases to re- 
ceive from the said railroad, as well as in compensation 
for other rights, privileges, and exemptions granted to 
the United States, and in consideration of the increase in 
the administrative expenses of the department of Panama 
consequent upon the construction of the said canal, the 
Government of the United States binds itself to pay Co- 
lombia the amount of $7,000,000 in American gold on 
the exchange of the ratification of this convention after 
its approval by the legislative bodies of both countries, 
and fourteen years after the date aforesaid a fair and 
reasonable annuity, that shall be agreed upon by the con- 
tracting Governments three years before the expiration of 
the above-mentioned term of fourteen years. 

In fixing this fair and reasonable annuity there shall 
be taken into consideration the present price of the 
usufruct of the railway as well as the compensation that 
is to be stipulated for the use of the zone and for the 
additional administrative expenses that the construction 
of the canal will impose upon Colombia; and also the 
advanced payment of $7,000,000 and the comparative cost 
and conditions upon which the United States reasonably 
could have expected to acquire concessions satisfactory to 
it in respect of any other canal route. 

Three years before the expiration of each term of one 
hundred years the annuity for the following term shall 
be fixed in a similar manner. 

But in the event that the parties are unable to come to 
an understanding within the periods above referred to as 
to such fair and reasonable annuity, then before the sec- 
ond year prior to the termination of the periods above 
referred to, the contracting parties shall proceed to con- 
stitute a high commission, to be composed of five mem- 
bers, of whom two shall be appointed by Colombia, two 
by the United States, and the fifth (who shall be the 
president of such high commission) shall be the presi- 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 37 

dent, for the time being, of the International Peace Tri- 
bunal of* The Hague ; and the determination reached by 
said commission, by a majority vote, concerning such 
fair and reasonable annuity that is to be paid to Colom- 
bia by the United States in conformity with this article, 
shall be binding upon the contracting parties. 

But no delay nor difference of opinion in fixing such 
amount shall affect nor interrupt the full operation and 
effect of this convention in all other respects. 

Minister Concha accompanied the memoran- 
dum with a letter, which contains the following 
paragraph : 

Confirming the conclusions reached as the result of the 
conference held between yourself and Mr. Cromwell, and 
adopting, as far as practicable, your valuable suggestions, 
I beg leave to hand you the concessionary convention or 
treaty (in Spanish and in English) embodying the amend- 
ments agreed upon in the conference referred to. 

My previous communication of March 31, 1902, pro- 
posing the concessionary convention or treaty in behalf 
of my Government, and the expository communications 
of myself and Mr. Cromwell under the same date, apply 
equally to the inclosures. 

The following paragraphs are the contents of 
the letter of Secretary Hay, dated April 21, 1902 : 

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt at your hands 
of a communication dated the 31st of March, 1902, and 
another of the i8th of April, inclosing a proposal of the 
Republic of Colombia for a concessionary convention or 
treaty between the Republic of Colombia and that of the 
United States of America respecting the completion, 
maintenance, operation, control, and protection of an in- 
ter-oceanic canal over the Isthmus of Panama. 



38 America and the Canal Title 

I am directed by the President to inform you that I 
shall be ready to sign with you the proposed convention 
as soon as — 

First. The Congress of the United States shall have 
authorized the President to enter into such an arrange- 
ment; and 

Second. As soon as the law officers of this Govern- 
ment shall have decided upon the question of the title 
which the New Panama Canal Company is able to give 
of all the properties and rights claimed by it and pertain- 
ing to a canal across the Isthmus and covered by the 
pending proposal. 

That Secretary Hay rejected Colombia's pro- 
posal of April 18, 1902, for fixing the price of the 
canal concession by arbitration has already been 
stated. In January, 1903, Acting Minister Her- 
ran of Colombia renewed the proposal of his Gov- 
ernment to have an arbitral tribunal fix the an- 
nuity to be paid Colombia. Our administration 
insisted that the annuity should be a fixed amount 
in perpetuity and that this amount should be 
stipulated in the treaty, and offered for the canal 
concession the sum of $7,000,000, and an annuity 
of $100,000 during the life of the engagement, or, 
$10,000,000 and an annuity of $10,000. Colom- 
bia asked $7,000,000 for the concession, and an 
annuity of $600,000. As there was a decided 
difference in the amount of the annuity offered 
and asked, Colombia proposed that it be settled 
by arbitration, but our Government refused. 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 39 

America, the country which to-day has gone the 
furthest along Hnes of international arbitration, 
refused as recently as 1903 to arbritrate the price 
of an easement, as is done under similar circum- 
stances in the exercise of domestic eminent do- 
main if the matter is not settled by mutual agree- 
ment. America enforces upon her citizens what 
she declined to accept as a member of the family 
of nations. 

The spirit in which Colombia acted during the 
negotiation of the canal concession is found in 
the following excerpt from a letter by Minister 
Concha, dated March 31, 1902: 

The Republic that I represent realizes the importance 
of the contemplated interoceanic waterway for the civ- 
ilization and progress of the world, and since nature has 
placed the shortest and most expeditious route within the 
territory of the Republic, Colombia widely and generously 
opens her doors so that the grand work may be achieved 
within the shortest possible time. 

If the people of the United States evince an earnest 
desire that their Government apply its energies and treas- 
ure to the completion of the canal, Colombia not only 
will not place any obstacle whatever in the way of such 
a purpose or keep her concessions within the bounds of 
those previously conceded to private enterprise, but will 
enlarge those concessions to such an extent as to re- 
nounce a demand for the ownership after the lapse of a 
number of years of operation, as stipulated in the French 
company's contract ; she will grant the use of a much more 
extensive zone than that originally conceded for the exe- 
cution of the work; extend facilities in all the ports of 



40 America and the Canal Title 

the Republic for cooperation in the work of the enter- 
prise, relinquish her proprietary and usufructuary rights 
in the Panama Railway, and lastly, foregoes a fixed par- 
ticipation in the proceeds of the canal, confining her de- 
mands to a fee or annuity for the price of the zone, the 
revenues of the railway, and the heavier expenses put 
upon the public administration in the Isthmus by the in- 
crease of population and the traffic consequent to the 
work on the canal itself. 

Thus does Colombia give fresh evidence of her long 
standing and cordial sentiments of friendship toward the 
United States and evinces in a clear and sincere manner 
the gratification with which she will receive the indus- 
trious and intelligent citizens of your Republic in her 
territory. 

Colombia has no lust of unjust gain through the con- 
struction of the canal in her territory, and a final con- 
vention on this subject will not be hampered by pe- 
cuniary considerations. Her pride in the matter is bent 
on having the neutral waterway between the two oceans, 
that idea of universal peace and progress, become a re- 
ality on her territory and under the protection of her sov- 
ereignty. The compensations asked by Colombia have 
special importance only in that they will imply a practical 
and constant recognition of her sovereignty. 

In the light of the. foregoing official documents 
or of excerpts from documents, whose conduct 
comes under the dictionary definition of attempted 
blackmail ? The Standard Dictionary defines this 
favorite term of Roosevelt's when he is discussing 
the acquisition of the canal title as ^^extortion by 
intimidation; especially, extortion of money by 
threats or accusations." 

With this definition as a guide, it would be 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 41 

more truthful to say that the manner in which 
our Administration secured the signature of 
Herran to the Hay-Herran treaty, and attempted 
to secure its ratification by the Colombian Con- 
gress, savors of blackmail than to say that those in 
official control of Colombia attempted blackmail. 
The characterization of their actions by this term 
is wholly inaccurate, and, as already indicated, 
is a deliberate attempt to conceal the fact that our 
Administration was guilty of a political crime. 
The facts upon which this statement is based are 
given in detail in chapters which follow. 

Whatsoever evidence of attempted blackmail 
exists is contained in the gossip of the time. It 
can be duplicated at any session of our Congress 
or of the legislature at Albany. The council of 
the city of New York was shorn of important 
powers because of this practice. On the day of 
writing (March 23, 1915), Hamilton Fish 
charged in the New York Assembly : 

The Republican Party here represented is acting on 
this bill in behalf of several men who get retainers from 
casualty companies and who pull down the levers that 
operate things here at Albany. You are acting for one or 
two men who are in the employ of the insurance com- 
panies. . . . 

I demand an investigation. No one has told who is 
behind this bill that we rushed through without a hearing. 

I stand pat on my statement that improper influences 



42 America and the Canal Title 

put the Direct Settlement bill through this House. You 
have the investigators named and I'll give the proof." 

Van Benschoten, in the celebrated Barnes- 
Roosevelt libel suit, said : 

Investigation after investigation had shown the abso- 
lute rottenness of the condition of many of the depart- 
ments of the State. Public officials had been indicted 
and convicted for neglect of duty and for conspiring to 
defraud the State. Other officials had been removed 
from office. The newspapers and periodicals were filled 
with the details of the conditions which had for some 
time been existing. 

"Blackmail!'' Have not some United States 
Senators and Congressmen been convicted of 
crime? Others left inadequate footprints and 
so the legal evidence was wanting. We have our 
own *'Black Horse Cavalry," and some of them 
have "done time." It would be a miracle if 
Colombia were entirely free from them. 

We should not expect a virtue there that we 
do not ourselves possess. Guilt does not point 
to the Colombian Congress as a body. It is safe 
to say that in the history of civilized diplomacy 
there never was such an unwarranted and im- 
proper characterization of another nation's mo- 
tives as is contained in Roosevelt's official and un- 
official arraignment of Colombia. 

Do not the official documents here presented 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 43 

prove that Roosevelt has wantonly attacked 
Colombia's national character? Do they not 
show that he has ruthlessly assailed the charac- 
ter of her public men in order to conceal the theft 
of the Canal Zone by his Administration? A 
critical examination of the diplomatic correspond- 
ence between the United States and Colombia 
having a bearing on the Hay-Herran treaty con- 
vinced the writer that the following from the pen 
of Ex-Minister Du Bois is a correct estimate of 
the character of the governing class of Colom- 
bia: 

An impartial investigation at Bogota, running over a 
period of two years . . . convinced me that, instead of 
"blackmailers" and ''bandits," the public men of Colom- 
bia compare well with the public men of other countries 
in intelligence and respectability, while the social life is 
as refined and cultured as can be found in any capital in 
the world. Bogota is called the Athens of South 
America. 

The New York World is authority for this 
statement : 

It is noteworthy that of all the amendments introduced 
into the Colombian Senate, there was not one relating to 
the compensations, either in money or in any other form, 
that Colombia was to receive from the United States in 
exchange for the concessions granted by the former to 
the latter country. There is not the ghost of a shadow 
of justification for the oft-repeated falsehood that Colom- 
bia was trying to hold up the United States for more 
money. 



44 America and the Canal Title 

Calling names does not alter facts. To shout 
^'Blackmail!" from the housetops does not alter 
the fact that Colombia had vested interests in the 
Province of Panama for which she is entitled to 
compensation. If she deserved all the epithets 
hurled at her by Roosevelt, her infamy would not 
by a hair's breadth alter our duty. No man has 
a right to rob a person just because the latter con- 
templated blackmail. 

The writer is not specially interested in Colom- 
bia, and has no ties whatever which bind him to 
her, but he is vitally interested in seeing a great 
power, in respect to whose policies he, like all 
citizens, has a right to be heard, deal justly with 
a small nation regardless of her character. 

We are not aware that Colombia is a black- 
mailer. We are aware that the United States 
is in possession of a stolen canal title, which will 
remain tainted until our Government has made 
reparation. No amount of rhetoric, or of abuse 
of Colombia, will alter a single word in the in- 
dictment against the United States. 

The charge of blackmail is reiterated by Roose- 
velt in the following: 

In his message of July 21, Minister Beaupre reported 
that the Colombian Government had sounded both Ger- 
many and England to see if they could not be persuaded 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 45 

to construct, or aid in the construction of, the canal in 
place of the United States. The Government of Colom- 
bia, therefore, not only sought to blackmail us and to 
blackmail the French company, but endeavored to put 
one of the great Old World powers on the Isthmus in 
possession of the canal. And because the then Adminis- 
tration refused to submit to such infamy on the part of 
Colombia, the present Administration actually proposes 
to pay the wrongdoer $25,000,000 of blackmail. 

In short, it was a crime for Colombia to seek 
reasonable terms; it was, however, a virtue for 
the United States to do so. And, of course, 
Roosevelt — and not an impartial arbitral tribunal 
— was to decide what were proper terms. As 
already stated, Colombia offered to submit the 
entire question of compensation to an arbitral 
tribunal. Therefore, it is nearer the truth to 
say that the Roosevelt Administration sought 
through coercion and duress to secure an unduly 
advantageous bargain. 

As to blackmailing the French company — no 
penetrating student of corporation finance and of 
stock exchange methods will lose sleep over the 
spoliation of the innocent investors in the French 
company; they had already been despoiled. It 
only remained to determine whether the ''Black 
Horse Cavalry" of finance would get the actual 
value of the investment or whether Colombia 
would share it with them as compensation for the 



46 America and the Canal Title 

right to transfer title to a sovereign state denied 
to them by charter. 

It is safe to assume that at the collapse of the 
French company, the wreckers were "out from 
under" and that they repurchased the securities 
for a "song'' when these reappeared on the 
market. ''Set the table over again'' has become 
an art in high finance — an art in which the small 
and innocent investors are fleeced. It is, there- 
fore, not clear why our Administration should 
have been so much concerned about the holders 
of the securities of the French company. At its 
worst, malefactors of great wealth would have 
been shorn of only a fraction of their ill gotten 
gains. It was clearly not a case for the Roosevelt 
Administration to become excited over ; and not 
a case that warranted the applying of epithets to 
a friendly nation. 

The Roosevelt Administration voluntarily came 
to the relief of the investors — we call them by 
that name as a matter of courtesy — in a company 
chartered by France. It is nearer correct to call 
them financial buccaneers — who wrecked the pro- 
ject to despoil bona Ude investors — and their poli- 
tical "pals." This anxious concern of the Ad- 
ministration does not have a holy look, nor does 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 47 

it appear entirely disinterested. An impartial 
survey of all attendant facts and circumstances 
bars the inference that it was prompted by motives 
that were exalted. 

Instead of there having been an official attempt 
at blackmail on the part of Colombia, there was 
ignorance, there was impatience, there was pas- 
sion on the part of our Government. As for the 
White House at the time, one could hardly say 
that patience and calm cold reason were domiciled 
there. There was, however, no official attempt 
at blackmail on the part of the United States, any 
more than on that of Colombia. If Roosevelt 
insists that there was, we will not strenuously as- 
sert that his Administration was not guilty. As 
already stated, Colombia offered to submit the 
question of compensation to arbitration ; our Ad- 
ministration rejected arbitration as a solution. 
Whose conduct looks suspicious? Is it the con- 
duct of the country that offers to arbitrate the 
point at issue, or is it the conduct of the country 
that sidesteps arbitration? 

Roosevelt seems incapable of thinking in terms 
of accounts, finance and sovereignty. If it were 
not so he would not inflict upon his readers state- 



48 America and the Canal Title 

ments which destroy his prestige among the well- 
informed. The following is introduced merely 
as a sample of his reckless utterances : 

A private French company had attempted to build a 
canal across the Isthmus of Panama, and had failed after 
making only a beginning of the work. Various proposi- 
tions for a trans-Isthmian canal to be undertaken by the 
United States Government had been made. . . . 

Congress only considered seriously, however, the 
Panama and Nicaragua routes, and was in much doubt 
between them. A commission of experts appointed by 
the President for that purpose had reported that if we 
could buy the rights of the French canal company for 
$40,000,000 we ought to take the Panama route, but that 
otherwise we should take the Nicaragua route. . . . 

The French had real rights. They had spent hundreds 
of millions of dollars, and although much of this had 
been wasted, yet we received at least $40,000,000 worth 
of property and of accomplished work for the $40,000,000 
we agreed to pay them. Colombia had no rights that 
were not of the most shadowy and unsubstantial kind ; and 
even these shadowy rights existed only because of the ac- 
tion of the United States. . . . Ten million dollars repre- 
sented the very outside limit which generosity could fix 
as a payment to Colombia for rights which she was im- 
potent to maintain save by our assistance and protection, 
and for an opportunity which she was utterly unable 
herself to develop. Nobody of any consequence in the 
United States, within or without Congress, would at that 
time for one moment have considered agreeing to pay 
$25,000,000 or any sum remotely approaching it. 

Sovereignty, the most important consideration, 
is not mentioned by Roosevelt in the foregoing 
excerpt. The Hay-Herran treaty provided for 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 49 

the payment of $10,000,000 to Colombia. It 
must, however, not be forgotten that Colombia 
remained the sovereign owner of the whole 
Isthmus of Panama. The offer of $10,000,000 
and the right to retain the Isthmus were worth 
more than the $25,000,000 which are now offered. 
The circumstances of the Hay-Herran treaty, by 
virtue of which Colombia was offered the $10,- 
000,000 before she lost Panama, were entirely dif- 
ferent from those which obtain now when she is 
to be paid $25,000,000, after having lost the 
Isthmus. 

The $10,000,000 was to be paid for leasehold 
rights to a Canal Zone in the Province of Panama. 
The $25,000,000 is intended as part payment for 
the loss of sovereignty — sovereignty wrested from 
Colombia by the display of overwhelming force 
in Isthmian waters. It is part payment for the 
loss of a province and vested interests there 
located, such loss being the result of collusion be- 
tween the Roosevelt Administration and a few 
separatists on the Isthmus. The Hay-Herran 
treaty provided payment only for rights to a strip 
of land. The present treaty provides payment 
for the loss of ownership of a whole province with 
its concomitant rights. The two propositions are 
as far apart as the two poles. 



50 America and the Canal Title 

Colombia had other rights in the Province of 
Panama. One of these was the right stipulated 
in the contract with the French company to take 
possession of the partly completed canal if not 
completed by it. The contract provided specifi- 
cally that if within a certain time and a generous 
extension of time, which the Colombian govern- 
ment granted, the French company failed to con- 
struct the canal, the whole work should become 
the property of the Republic of Colombia. By 
merely waiting the necessary time, the position 
of Colombia as owner of the work would have 
become absolutely solid. Colombia, however, did 
not take advantage of that right. This very im- 
portant right she had at the time when the United 
States was negotiating the Hay-Herran treaty. 

Further, in order that the French company 
might sell its assets to the United States, it was 
necessary, as already indicated, first to secure the 
consent of Colombia, because, in the concession 
granted by Colombia to that company, it was ex- 
pressly stipulated (art. 21) that such concession 
could not be transferred to any foreign govern- 
ment. This was by itself a right, and, therefore, 
Colombia was entitled to refuse transfer to the 
United States Government unless a fair price was 
paid for her consent. 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 51 

111 addition to the foregoing rights, Colombia 
had a reversionary interest in the Panama Rail- 
road. It was to become the property of Colombia 
at the end of the period for which the concession 
was granted. 

In the light of the foregoing, is it not apparent 
that the $25,000,000 is not blackmail, but only 
part payment for rights unlawfully wrested from 
Colombia by our Administration — for vested in- 
terests taken from her by force when we estab- 
lished the so-called RepubHc of Panama as a pro- 
tectorate of the United States. 

The bland assertion of Roosevelt in the article 
in question that the rights of Colombia (of the 
sovereign) were shadowy and that they existed 
only because of the protection afforded to her by 
the United States is interesting, but the vital fact 
is again omitted, and that is that the .United 
States received for this protection a liberal quid 
pro quo. We received valuable commercial con- 
cessions, including transit across the Isthmus on 
the Panama Railroad on the same terms as those 
granted to citizens of Colombia, a concession that 
Roosevelt wanted to deny to non-nationals in the 
commercial use of the Panama Canal. The 
burden assumed by the United States in the 
Treaty of 1846 was a mere trifle when compared 



52 America and the Canal Title 

with the benefits which accrued to Americans un- 
der that treaty. 

This point is well stated in a communication to 
our Department of State by the resident Minister 
of Colombia, dated May 3, 19 13, in which, speak- 
ing of the obligation the United States assumed 
in the Treaty of 1846, he says: 

And this solemn undertaking, to which the United 
States pledged its public faith, was not a burdening ob- 
ligation, nor a gratuitous protection, in favor of the 
rights of Colombia. On the contrary, the undertaking 
to guarantee [the soA^ereignty of Colombia on the 
Isthmus] was established in compensation, in payment, 
of the immense advantages which the United States ob- 
tained from Colombia by the said treaty. Your Excel- 
lency knows full well the history of your own country, 
and therefore, it is not necessary for me to remind you 
that the great development of California and of all the 
Pacific coast was principally due to the free and untaxed 
transit across the Isthmus of Panama which the United 
States secured under the Treaty of 1846. . . . 

In truth, it is not possible to find any other interna- 
tional agreement carrying such great advantages and con- 
cessions to one of the contracting parties as those that 
the United States obtained, and which were granted to 
it by Colombia, principally with a view to obtaining an 
impregnable guarantee of her undeniable rights of sov- 
ereignty and property over the Isthmus of Panama. 
Such was, on the part of Colombia, the object she had in 
mind, the intention with which she entered into the 
Treaty of 1846. 

While it may be argued that the interests men- 
tioned belonged to Panama, and that the rights 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 53 

of Colombia became automatically vested in 
Panama after the establishment of the new Re- 
public, such an argument is not supported by prec- 
edent. Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus, 
however, was extinguished not by the revolt of 
Panama, but through the collusion of the Roose- 
velt Administration before the event, and the dis- 
play of force before and after the event. This 
is the very heart of the question. 

It was the solemn duty of the Colombian Con- 
gress to reject the Hay-Herran treaty as an un- 
scientific instrument. The rights of neither party 
were set forth with sufficient definiteness to fore- 
shadow harmony in the application of its pro- 
visions in administration. Who but the weaker 
nation would have had to suffer? Of friction, 
Colombia had an example in the new construc- 
tion placed on the Treaty of 1846 in the fall of 
1902. Simon Creel's statement in the New York 
Sun on April 3, 1914, is apropos: 

A leetle country never misconstrues a: treaty with a 
big one; that is contrary to self-preservation and the 
law of nations. A leetle country alius construes a treaty 
with a big one jest the same from fust to last, strictly 
in accordance with its original meanin' an' intent; but 
a big nation aint so gol blamed hide-bound ner bigoted, 
not by a long sight. 

This reflection is suggestive, furnishing the key 



54 America and the Canal Title 

which explains Colombia's anxiety — misinter- 
preted as roguery — during and after the negotia- 
tion of the canal treaty. 

But the United States benefited enormously by 
Colombia's rejection as far as concerns its mate- 
rial interests. In the present treaty with 
Panama, the United States is the de facto sov- 
ereign of the Canal Zone, and will, in due course, 
probably become the de jure sovereign at the re- 
quest of Panama. We should, therefore, as 
already stated, be more than willing to pay 
$25,000,000 additional to the amount stipulated 
in the Hay-Herran treaty for these additional 
benefits. 

In the provisions embodied in the present canal 
treaty, Panama was generous to a fault. It is 
doubtful if a more one-sided treaty was ever ne- 
gotiated. Secretary Hay, with the consent of the 
Junta, gave the United States so much latitude 
that it is almost equivalent to sovereignty. The 
United States may use any of the rivers and lakes 
in the Republic necessary to the canal, and it may 
acquire additional land outside of the Canal Zone 
if it is needed for canal purposes. These pro- 
visions are broad enough to permit the conversion 
of the Republic into an adjunct of the canal. If 
Panama cannot preserve order, the United States 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 55 

may, at its discretion, use its own military forces 
to maintain it. The foregoing and other pro- 
visions make the so-called Republic of Panama a 
protectorate of the United States. 

One would hardly argue that this increment 
in the value of the rights America finally acquired 
in the Canal Zone should be paid to Panama if 
paid at all. Panama was enabled to grant the 
rights to the Canal Zone and in the canal littoral 
that she did only because our Administration 
wrested her from the sovereignty of Colombia. 
Sovereignty alone has value. Because of the 
strategic importance of the Canal Zone, the sov- 
ereignty of the Isthmus has tremendous value. 
Of this value, the United States despoiled Colom- 
bia. I repeat, the $25,000,000, if paid to Colom- 
bia, will reimburse that country for only a frac- 
tion of the value of which she was despoiled. 

This is not all. The $25,000,000 will only in- 
crease the cost of the canal as a business under- 
taking. As it is a proper charge to cost, it can 
be amortized out of revenues. 

Roosevelt argues as though the $25,000,000 
were a direct charge on the national treasury. 
It need not, ought not, and will not be if the canal 
is managed as a business enterprise. As he has 
only a superficial knowledge of finance, his dis- 



56 America and the Canal Title 

cussion of this phase of the problem is especially 
weak and deserves serious attention only because 
of his prestige. An adequate title is a part of 
cost. The $25,000,000 payment provided for in 
the pending treaty is necessary to give the United 
States a clear title to the Canal Zone. It is there- 
fore a proper charge to investment in the canal 
and can be amortized through revenues. The 
burden will then be borne by the commerce that 
uses the canal and the commerce of the United 
States will bear only its proportionate share. 

Roosevelt maintains in his article that the 
$10,000,000 stipulated in the Hay-Herran treaty 
represented the very outside limit that generosity 
could fix. This observation presumably applies 
also to the annuity of $250,000. As the extent 
of future developements is unknown even to the 
wisest, it is impossible to say that the amount of- 
fered was liberal. The arrangem^ent was, to say 
the least, grossly unscientific. The State is pre- 
sumed to live forever and so must act on that 
basis. This fact alone, if properly understood, 
justified Colombia in considering the compensa- 
tion stipulated in the Hay-Herran treaty as un- 
satisfactory. As already indicated, the Colombia 
Legation in Washington and the Colombian 
Senate suggested periodic revaluation of the con- 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 57 

cession .and adjustment by arbitration if not set- 
tled by diplomacy. That would have settled the 
question in harmony with the ^'square deal," as 
that expression is understood among experts in 
public utility finance. 

Colombia was then receiving $250,000 a year 
from the railroad, which was merely continued 
in the Hay-Herran treaty. She had a reversion- 
ary interest in the railroad which would have 
vested in the United States had the treaty been 
ratified. Therefore, Colombia was to receive 
only $10,000,000 for the canal concession and for 
its reversionary interest in the railroad. This 
$10,000,000 could have been amortized through 
revenue so that it would ultimately have cost the 
United States nothing. The $250,000 would also 
have been a charge to revenue. Reliable data 
show that the whole outlay for the canal as a busi- 
ness enterprise can be amortized in about seventy- 
five years. Yet the income of Colombia, the 
sovereign, would have remained at $250,000 
a year ; that of the United States would have been 
limited only by the degree of its self respect. 

The situation just described would have been 
the same as that found in those American munic- 
ipalities where perpetual franchises have been un- 
wisely granted, and where hoards of unearned 



58 America and the Canal Title 

wealth are being appropriated by private con- 
cerns or individuals. Advanced municipalities 
now grant only indeterminate franchises subject 
to periodic revaluation, so that the unearned in- 
crement in the value of the franchise will be 
secured by the municipality. The aim is to allow 
only a reasonable return to the investors. The 
value of the franchise is created by the commu- 
nity; the return, over and above the reasonable 
rate on the investment, is therefore appropriated 
by the municipality. New York City has out- 
standing franchises of this sort amounting to 
some half a billion dollars, with reversion at- 
tached thereto. This city now makes terms with 
street-railway corporations less liberal than those 
that Colombia was wilHng to accept. 

Only a person ignorant of the elementary prin- 
ciples of finance as related to franchises can fail 
to see that Colombia's suggestion of periodic 
revaluation was exactly in line with the methods 
of modern cities. The United States was en- 
titled to a reasonable return on the actual invest- 
ment. Colombia was entitled to reasonable com- 
pensation for the site and a reasonable annuity 
in proportion to the increasing value of the site. 
The remainder belonged to collective civilization 
— the actual creator of the surplus value. This 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 59 

was the arrangement desired by Colombia, a solu- 
tion suggested by common sense ; our solution was 
that of the shot-gun — ^'Ratify the Hay-Herran 
treaty or you will regret it." In other words, 
Colombia was informed that if she did not accept 
dictated terms, our Administration would take 
the Canal Zone. 

As already indicated, advanced municipalities 
grant only indeterminate franchises subject to 
periodic revaluation so that the unearned incre- 
ment in the value of the franchise will be secured 
by the municipality. According to the Hay-Her- 
ran treaty, the increment in value was to be ap- 
propriated by the United States in perpetuity. 
Even Colombia's sovereignty was to be impaired 
in perpetuity instead of only until she had ad- 
vanced to stability in administration. She hesi- 
tated and desired time to think. She is now 
reviled for having thus attempted to safeguard 
her just rights. She was weak and so her sov- 
ereign rights were hurled into the scrap-heap by 
the use of our gunboats. 

There seems to have been an obstinate and un- 
reasoning belief on the part of the Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration that the terms offered to Colombia 
were liberal — generous to a fault. These it at- 
tempted to force Colombia to accept. They were 



6o America and the Canal Title 

not liberal. They did not take into consideration 
the possibilities of the future. They ignored the 
fact that our municipal franchises granted in per- 
petuity in the past now plague us and that colossal 
sums of unearned wealth are being appropriated 
by private interests because of these unwise 
grants. Colombia was attempting to safeguard 
her permanent interests against such a blunder 
as a perpetual grant without periodic revaluation 
to determine the amount of the annuity to be paid 
for the said grant. 

Clearly the stand taken by our Administration 
was highly improper. Colombia's attitude was 
right — was the only position that an intelligent 
and self-respecting nation could take. When we 
view the matter from the policy pursued by ad- 
vanced municipalities in granting franchises — 
the emphasis that they place on periodic revalua- 
tion — we are driven to the conclusion that the 
Roosevelt Administration, in its attempt to force 
Colombia to accept terms that our own cities have 
outlawed, acted as a refined grafter. 

Territory, which belongs to future generations 
£ts well as to the present, should never be sur- 
rendered in perpetuity by any government, for 
otherwise the dead hand of the past will control 
the future, which should be left free and be 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 6i 

allowed to make its own arrangements. It ap- 
pears conclusive that long-period revaluation of 
the concession was the only equitable arrange- 
ment. This Colombia proposed and our Govern- 
ment refused. In the light of the foregoing, who 
can reasonably be charged with having attempted 
blackmail ? 

Were a railroad company to do what the Roose- 
velt Administration perpetrated on the Isthmus, 
it would be summoned before a court of com- 
petent jurisdiction. Such a court would disre- 
gard the amount paid to the partner in crime and 
would direct that the value of the property taken 
from the lawful owner be paid to him with lawful 
interest. This is the way in which our brig- 
andage on the Isthmus in the fall of 1903 would 
have been settled if there had been a tribunal with 
power to determine and enforce justice between 
sovereign states. 

Ex-Minister Du Bois (to Colombia) is author- 
ity for the following statement : 

It is a matter of record that Colombia never seriously 
intended to seize the French company's property, and 
everybody knows that Colombia wanted the canal dug 
and wanted the United States to dig it, and had urged 
it for fifty years. 

Sovereignty adequately safeguarded, and such 



62 America and the Canal Title 

compensation as an impartial and competent 
tribunal would determine, constituted the modest 
demands of Colombia. 

The charge of blackmail is, I repeat, an un- 
pardonable slander, trumped up for the purpose 
of concealing the robbery of a weak nation by one 
possessing the necessary brute force. The com- 
pensation provided for in the Hay-Herran treaty 
was not only not liberal but inadequate. The 
whole official correspondence shows that Colombia 
would have accepted financial terms that were 
less than reasonable, and that she would have 
been reasonable on the question of sovereignty. 
The meddling of the Roosevelt Administration in 
the affairs of Colombia and its concessionary com- 
panies was as improper as it was reprehensible, 
and I venture to add that it will always have a 
suspicious look. 

One might ignore Roosevelt's utterances on the 
subject if it were not for the fact that our national 
honor and the interests of a sister Republic are 
involved. Absurdity reaches its climax in the 
following excerpt from the article under review : 

Our people should also remember that what we were 
paying for was the right to expend our own money and 
our own labor to do a piece of work which if left undone 
would render the Isthmus of Panama utterly valueless. 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 63 

If we had gone to Nicaragua, or had undertaken to build 
a canal anywhere else across the Isthmus, then the right 
which Colombia was so eager to sell for $10,000,000 
would not have been worth ten cents. The whole value 
was created by our prospective action; and this action 
was to be taken wholly at our own expense and without 
making Colombia or any one else pay a dollar, and this 
although no power would benefit more by the canal than 
Colombia, as it would give her waterway communication 
by a short and almost direct route between her Caribbean 
and Pacific ports. 

It is difficult to believe that Roosevelt is merely 
ignorant. Would that it were so! It is a pity 
that one who has held the high office of President 
of the United States should use the prestige 
thereby gained to foist upon the public statements 
which are absolutely untrue. We will give here 
only a bird's-eye view of the actual facts, develop- 
ing them in great detail in several chapters of 
another work entitled "America and the Canal 
Tolls." 

In order to think clearly on this subject we 
must differentiate between the canal as a business 
enterprise and the canal as an annex to our pro- 
tective system — military and naval. All outlays 
for the canal as a business enterprise should be 
made a liability of the canal and be amortized 
through its revenues. Therefore, if the United 
States properly manages the canal, the business 
end of it will ultimately cost nothing. It is only 



64 America and the Canal Title 

a matter of loaning the country's credit until the 
entire cost can be amortized through charges to 
revenue. The outlay for canal fortifications and 
other means of protection is more apparent than 
actual because a given amount of protection with 
the canal will cost less than the same amount 
would cost without the canal. 

The outlays of the United States for the canal 
as a business enterprise are not of the nature of 
an expenditure, but are an investment to be re- 
turned at compound interest. The actual outlay 
of the United States consists of the expenditures 
for the canal's protection. As the canal will in- 
crease the efficiency of our navy and therefore 
make possible a less expenditure for national pro- 
tection than would otherwise be necessary, it fol- 
lows that the canal is not a charge to the national 
treasury if business principles are adopted and 
maintained in its management. 

As already stated, the United States will have 
merely loaned its credit to the enterprise, suffer- 
ing no loss if she manages it properly, becoming, 
rather, the gainer because as large expenditures 
for protection as would have had to be incurred 
will not have to be incurred because of the canal. 

Thus, if one scrutinizes the financial aspect, 
and substitutes the actual for the apparent, he 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 65 

will obtain a correct view of the relation of the 
United States Treasury to the canal, Colombia 
would have furnished the site ; the United States 
would have furnished the business ability for pay, 
and have loaned its credit. Our outlay is more 
apparent than actual. 

To sum up, Roosevelt beclouds fundamental 
issues when he discusses the benefits that were to 
accrue to Colombia, but prefers to remain dis- 
creetly silent as to the sacrifices Colombia was 
asked to make, as we have shown. In addition 
he exaggerates the sacrifices that the United 
States has made. His statements as to the finan- 
cial aspects of the negotiations are grotesque, 
failing even to attain the dignity of half-truths. 
Colombia merely insisted on the right to control 
her own actions and her own possessions, subject 
only to the equal right of every other nation to 
do the same; the United States sought to coerce 
her into granting a concession of her most valu- 
able possession without adequately safeguarding 
her permanent interests. 

Even though the United States had proceeded 
with the construction of the canal by the Nica- 
ragua route, the concessionary interest of Colom- 
bia in the railroad would have remained valuable. 
In addition to this her reversionary interest in it 



66 America and the Canal Title 

would have had an increasing actuarial value. 
The route would have continued to have value as 
that of a potential canal. The United States is 
willing to pay a price for all available canal routes, 
as the pending treaty with Nicaragua shows, and 
as the effort to secure a concession on the Atrato 
route proves. Therefore the statement that the 
Panama route would not have been worth ten 
cents had the United States constructed the canal 
elsewhere is merely picturesque. 

Colombia could have voided the Treaty of 1846 
and then in the course of time, after a marked 
development, have disposed of the route to a 
European country. The United States could not 
have objected with good grace after refusing to 
pay for the concession the price determined by an 
arbitral tribunal. 

Calling attention again to the statements of 
the foregoing excerpt, we will ask which is the 
more important — the canal site or the capital used 
in the construction of the canal ? Capital, always 
subject to depreciation and obsolescence, must be 
renewed through charges to revenue. The 
amount invested can be amortized through rev- 
enue. The site is a permanent ensemble of values, 
the amount of which will fluctuate with the ebb 
and flow of commercial progress. As the site 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 67 

did not belong to the United States, it did not 
have the right to determine the price. To fix the 
price belonged to the owner, who, however, 
magnanimously offered to leave it to the arbitra- 
ment of a neutral third party. 

Roosevelt's argument that our large invest- 
ment there alone made the site valuable is alto- 
gether unwarranted. The site made the invest- 
ment possible and therefore had coordinate im- 
portance with the capital invested. Our former 
President may know which blade of a pair of 
scissors is the more important, but those of us 
who are not equally gifted can only feel that 
the two blades are of coordinate importance. 

We prohibited European countries from co- 
operating in the construction of the canal by the 
Panama route, thus obligating ourselves to join 
Colombia in submitting the question of the com- 
pensation to be paid for the concession to an im- 
partial tribunal if it could not be arranged by 
mutual agreement. This our Administration re- 
fused to do. We actually barred cooperation by 
France in the construction of the Panama Canal 
and insisted on sale of the route to us on terms 
dictated by us. We refused to acquiesce in the 
terms proposed by Colombia, though they seem 
reasonable when intelligently scrutinized. What 



68 America and the Canal Title 

is our attempt to force our own terms upon 
Colombia but an unconscious attempt at black- 
mail? 

Not imlike the cry of "Stop thief !" on the part 
of the actual culprit who seeks to divert attention 
is the charge of blackmail in this connection. Re- 
sisting the encroachment of the United States, 
Colombia sought to preserve her sovereignty over 
the Isthmus, thus standing for the maintenance 
of international law and adherence to the funda- 
mental principles of justice. The United States 
acted as the Captain Kidd of civilization. Colom- 
bia sought to safeguard her rights on the Isthmus 
and requested that our Administration join her 
in submitting compensation for leasehold rights 
to the Canal Zone to arbitration. 

The solution of our Government was, however, 
that of the shot-gun — gunboats in Isthmian 
waters, Colombia was telegraphed: "Ratify 
the treaty [Hay-Herran] or you will regret it.'' 
In other words, Colombia was informed that if 
she did not accept the terms dictated by the 
Roosevelt Administration, the latter would take 
the Canal Zone. It was taken. The book now 
in the hands of the reader tells, in unvarnished 
EngHsh, the story of how '7 [Roosevelt] took the 
Canal Zone." 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 69 

The financial terms pressed upon Colombia 
were unscientific. Determination by an impartial 
tribunal of the amount to be paid her was refused. 
The political terms insisted upon were humiliat- 
ing. And these terms were to be in perpetuity, 
and not subject to periodic reconsideration with 
provision for arbitration if not mutually arranged. 
The critical student of institutions finds nothing 
in the conduct of the Roosevelt Administration 
to commend; rather does he find much to con- 
demn. Under a veneer of respectability, it 
secured title to the Canal Zone, sandbagging 
Colombia and despoiling her of her choicest pos- 
session. 

Is Colombia entitled at the present time to com- 
pensation for the group of values that we have 
enumerated? We will let Roosevelt furnish the 
key with which to answer this question. In a 
speech delivered at the University of California 
on March 23, 191 1, he said: 

I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
it. If I had followed traditional conservative methods 
I should have submitted a dignified state paper of prob- 
ably 200 pages to the Congress, and the debate would 
have been going on yet. But I took the Canal Zone, 
and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on 
the Canal does also. 

'7 took the Canal ZoneT This is the key; 



70 America and the Canal Title 

argument is unnecessary; the political crime is 
admitted, leaving nothing to arbitrate, leaving 
only damages to be assessed. They should be 
assessed by an impartial tribunal. By paying 
the amount determined in this way the United 
States can restore her honor, refusing to be 
satisfied with paying less than the amount prop- 
erly determined. Colombia ought not to be 
compelled to accept less. This is the repara- 
tion that a man of high character would make 
to another whom he had injured. Colombia 
is powerless. She cannot exact justice. Our 
adjustment of this matter is the measure of our 
national character. It pays to be just. 

By way of closing our argument on the charge 
of blackmail, we commend to Roosevelt's prayer- 
ful attention the following excerpt taken from 
Shakespeare : 

Who steals my purse steals trash ; 'tis something, nothing ; 
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed. 

The Panama route was merely an alternative 
one. Roosevelt discusses the provisions in the 
Spooner law which directed him to construct the 
canal by the Nicaragua route if he could not 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 71 

secure satisfactory title for the one at Panama. 
He says : 

I was directed to take the Nicaragua route, but only 
if within a reasonable time I could not obtain control of 
the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia upon 
reasonable terms; the direction being explicit that if I 
could not thus get the control within a reasonable time 
and upon reasonable terms I must go to Nicaragua. 
Colombia showed by its actions that it was thoroughly 
acquainted with this fact, and eagerly demanded and 
entered into a treaty with the United States, the Hay- 
Herran treaty, under which $10,000,000 was the price 
stipulated to be paid in exchange for our acquiring the 
right to the zone on which to build the canal. 

Are the facts concerning the agreement of the 
representatives of the two countries on the Hay- 
Herran treaty correctly stated by Roosevelt? 
What does the letter of Secretary Hay to the 
charge d'affaires Herran of the Colombian Lega- 
tion indicate? This letter is dated January 22, 
1903, and reads: 

I am commanded by the President to say to you that 
the reasonable time that the statute accords for the con- 
clusion of negotiations with Colombia for the excavation 
of a canal on the Isthmus has expired, and he has author- 
ized me to sign with you the treaty of which I had the 
honor to give you a draft, with the modification that the 
sum of $100,000, fixed therein as the annual payment, 
be increased to $250,000. I am not authorized to con- 
sider or discuss any other change. 

Was it the United States, or was it Colombia 



72 America and the Canal Title 

who entered eagerly into the agreement known 
as the Hay-Herran treaty ? All has not yet been 
said. The New York World is authority for the 
statement that Cromwell, representative of those 
interested in the canal company, called on Herran 
the same day that he received the foregoing note 
and informed him that if he did not accept the 
terms offered by the United States, Colombia 
would lose everything, as the United States had 
decided to proceed with the construction of the 
canal by the Nicaragua route. How did Crom- 
well know? Who told Cromwell of the ultima- 
tum ? Again, how did he know the day, yea, and 
the hour, that the ultimatum was dispatched? 
Can it be that financial buccaneers and our De- 
partment of State were in collusion to dragoon 
the representative of Colombia into signing an 
unsatisfactory treaty ? 

Cromwell and Herran called at Secretary 
Hay's private residence that evening and there 
signed the Hay-Herran treaty. Three days later 
Dr. Herran received this telegram from his Gov- 
ernment : 

Do not sign canal treaty. You will receive instruc- 
tions in letter of to-day. 

The writer adopts the following comment of 
the New York World as his own : 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 73 

The Colombian Government never in any way, shape 
or form approved the Hay-Herran treaty. It maintained 
the position it had taken from the first that the canal and 
railroad companies would have to pay Colombia for the 
right to transfer their concessions to the United States. 

Through the omnipresent Cromwell it had been 
ascertained by our Government that the acting 
Minister of Colombia had instructions from his 
Government to sign the projected canal treaty if 
it was accompanied by an ultimatum. The Hay- 
Herran treaty was signed by Dr. Herran with 
the reservation that it would be submitted to the 
Colombian Congress for its untrammeled action. 
Our Government knew that the instrument when 
signed was imsatisfactory to the Colombian Gov- 
ernment and that it would not be ratified by the 
Colombian Congress without pressure, if at all. 

Roosevelt tells us that as early as August, 1903, 
he commenced to consider what course to advise 
the Congress to pursue in view of the fact that 
ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty seemed then 
improbable. He felt that several situations might 
develop. They are stated in his message of Jan- 
uary 4, 1904. The portion of his statement that 
proves duplicity reads : 

One was that Colombia would at the last moment see 
the unwisdom of her position. That there might be noth- 
ing omitted. Secretary Hay, through the Minister at 



74 America and the Canal Title 

Bogota, repeatedly warned Colombia that grave conse- 
quences might follow from her rejection of the treaty. . . . 
A second alternative was that by the close of the session 
on the last day of October, without the ratification of the 
treaty by Colombia and without any steps taken by 
Panama, the American Congress on assembling early in 
December would be confronted with a situation in which 
there had been a failure to come to terms as to building 
the canal along the Panama route, and yet there had not 
been a lapse of a reasonable time — using the word reason- 
able in any proper sense. 

In January, 1903, the reasonable time had ex- 
pired, and so Dr. Herran had to be overawed and 
had to be induced to sign a treaty without first 
consulting his Government. Seven months later 
the reasonable time had not yet elapsed and would 
not elapse until the Congress had been consulted. 
And this slippery method of securing the signa- 
ture of Herran to the Hay-Herran treaty we are 
solemnly assured was in harmony with all the ac- 
cepted canons of ethics ! 

Roosevelt feels indignant that his actions which 
eventuated in our securing the Canal Zone should 
be condemned. He gives voice to his feelings in 
the following: 

There are in every great country a few men whose 
mental or moral make-up is such that they always try to 
smirch their own people, and sometimes go to the length 
of moral treason in the effort to discredit their own 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 75 

national government. A campaign of mendacity was 
started against this treaty from the outset by certain 
public men and certain newspapers. One of the favorite 
assertions of these men and newspapers was that the 
United States Government had in some way or other in- 
stigated, and through its agents been privy to, the revolu- 
tionary movement on the Isthmus. The statement is a 
deliberate falsehood, and every man who makes it knows 
that it is a falsehood. . . . 

Even had I desired to foment a revolution — which I 
did not — it would have been wholly unnecessary for me 
to do so. The Isthmus was seething with revolution. 
Any interference from me would have had to take the 
shape of preventing a revolution, not of creating one. 
All the people residing on the Isthmus ardently desired 
the revolution. The citizens of Panama desired it. 
Every municipal council, every governmental body the 
citizens themselves could elect or control, demanded and 
supported it. 

Not only does Roosevelt obstruct the restora- 
tion of national honor by opposing the making 
of reparation to Colombia, but he prevents the 
truth about the method employed to secure the 
Canal Zone from becoming known. Therefore, 
criticism of him persists. It will persist until our 
national honor has been taken out of pawn in 
which he placed it when he ''took'' the Canal Zone 
by force. 

In another chapter we will show that no revo- 
lution on the Isthmus was projected or eventu- 
ated. The Province of Panama merely estab- 
lished a government independent of that of Co- 



76 America and the Canal Title 

lombia after the details had been arranged. Our 
Administration used the navy to prevent Colom- 
bia from exercising the right of sovereignty in 
this Province after its Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, and interfered with its exercise before 
that date. 

Let there be no misunderstanding. There was 
no revolution on the Isthmus in the fall of 1903. 
No revolution was projected and none eventu- 
ated. The Province of Panama seceded frpm 
Colombia after assurance from our Administra- 
tion that it would protect secession within forty- 
eight hours after the Declaration of Independ- 
ence. This protection was extended earlier than 
agreed to — on November 3-5, 1903. Colombia 
was overawed by the display of overwhelming 
force. The so-called Republic of Panama was 
organized as a protectorate of the United States 
under a pretense at revolution. Pretense at 
revolution, as that term is understood in history, 
is not revolution. It is the rape of a weak nation 
by a stronger one. It is international burglary 
under a veneer of respectability. 

The Isthmus did not seethe with revolution. 
No real revolution had even been contemplated, 
Du Bois, our Ex-Minister to Colombia, states: 

I say, and can prove it, that a handful of men, who 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty yy 

were to be the direct beneficiaries of the revolution, con- 
ceived it, and not the hundredth part of the inhabitants 
of the Isthmus knew of the revolt until an American 
officer, in the uniform of the United States army, raised 
the flag of the new republic. 

An excerpt from an American newspaper pub- 
lished in Colon throws light on the subject. It 
effectually disposes of Roosevelt's : "The Isthmus 
was seething with revolution.'' It reads as fol- 
lows : 

When the inhabitants awoke in the morning [Novem- 
ber 4, 1903] after a night of undisturbed slumber, they 
little dreamt that their tranquillity would be disturbed ere 
the setting of the sun. But it is the unexpected that 
often occurs. It was so in the present case. With the 
assurance of peace in the country there was nothing 
known yesterday to the public of Colon to have aroused 
any misapprehension. But the disquieting news which 
had been flashed across the wire from Panama had leaked 
out, and in a very short time it had spread throughout 
the whole town. The news was to the effect that Panama 
had declared its independence on the afternoon of the 
3d instant. To one and all the news came like a bolt 
from a clear sky. No one cared to talk or express an 
opinion. Such was the gravity of the situation. 

This newspaper clipping is taken from a speech 
delivered in the Senate by the late Senator Car- 
mack. His comment in connection therewith siz- 
zles with irony, an excerpt from which follows : 

That was the condition of the people who were rising 
there with unexampled unanimity, rising as one man 



78 America and the Canal Title 

against the terrible tyranny of Colombia. The news that 
they were conducting a revolution came to that people 
like a bolt from a clear sky. No inhabitant dared to 
express an opinion about the revolution. They rose as 
one man . . . but the one man was in the White House. 

Evidence of this character should be cumula- 
tive. Elsewhere we will give data which match 
so perfectly with those given here that the con- 
clusion is irresistible. We will close this line of 
evidence with the following clipping from the 
New York Tribune, dated December 28, 1903: 

The secessionist movement began with three men, and 
was executed under the supervision of those three and 
four others, the seven working under the advice and 
counsel of four Americans. Before the coup d'etat others 
were, perforce, taken into the secret ; but so closely were 
the plans guarded that those who were really in the 
secret and knew definitely the details might be counted 
on the fingers of the two hands. This brings us to the 
revolution itself, and introduces the strongest of all con- 
tradictions discoverable in connection with the birth of 
this national infant. The uprising took place on the 3d 
day of November, being initiated by the arrest of Gen- 
erals Tovar and Amaya and Governor Obaldia, which 
took place in the City of Panama. That city knew, of 
course, what had occurred the moment the arrests were 
effected, but Colon was kept in ignorance of the secession 
until the following day. It was on the 4th of the month 
that the public meeting was held in the cathedral plaza, 
Panama, the independence of the Republic proclaimed, 
and the declaration of independence, or manifestation, 
as they call it here, was signed. 

Bearing in mind the fact that seven men, aided by the 
soldiers and others whose support to the movement had 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 79 

been purchased with dollars, were alone responsible for 
the sudden revolution in the political status of Panama, 
one may tvander away down a stretch of not uninterest- 
ing inquiries. Were the people of other provinces con- 
sulted as to what it was proposed by the secessionists to 
do? They were not. Were the people, speaking in gen- 
eral terms, of the Provinces of Colon and Panama let into 
the secret? They were not. They knew, by general 
rumor, that a revolution was on the tapis, but they had 
not been consulted nor their advice asked as to the wisdom 
or unwisdom of what was contemplated. Was a pro- 
visional Congress composed of delegates from the several 
provinces held for the purpose of debating the project 
and framing a bill of separation? Nothing of the kind 
was ever thought of. . . . 

The little band of secessionists let the members of the 
city council of Panama into their secret late in October, 
when it became evident that a blow would have to be 
struck very soon or be forever withheld. These city 
councilmen — eleven in number — were willing to further 
the project, so that when the public meeting was held in 
the Cathedral plaza, Panama, on November 4, they were 
all in attendance. They, too, were the first to sign the 
declaration of independence, and immediately after that 
formality they adjourned across the street to the munici- 
pal building and went into session behind closed doors. 
Their first act then was to pass the declaration, which 
had already been engrossed in a book of record, and to 
append their names to the engrossed copy. This done, 
the city council appointed the three members of the pro- 
visional governing junta, authorizing them to take charge 
of the affairs of the new Republic. The junta assembled 
at once and named the members of the provisional cabinet, 
and the new Republic became a fact. On the same day 
Porfirio Melendez had taken charge of affairs at Colon 
as provisional governor appointed by the junta; but out- 
side of the Cities of Panama and Colon and along the 
line of the Panama Railroad the people of the new Re- 



8o America and the Canal Title 

public were in entire ignorance of the fact that they were 
no longer subjects of Colombia. 

It seems almost incredible that the municipal council 
of a city of fewer than 25,000 people should take unto 
themselves the right to create a Republic out of a terri- 
tory equal in area to the State of Indiana [population 
300,000] ; but that was what was actually done in this 
case. Instead of a provisional congress, the city council 
of Panama passed the act of independence. Every legis- 
lative formality incident to the creation of this Republic 
was performed by these city councilmen, no portion of 
the new Republic, except the City of Panama, having a 
voice, by representation, in what was done. Nor has 
any other portion of the new Republic had such a voice 
to this day. No congress had been called to ratify the 
secession, nor has any one of the seven provinces been 
requested to assemble, in council or by mass-meeting, to 
pass an act of ratification. . . . 

Immediately after the creation of the Republic and the 
appointment of the junta by the city council of Panama, 
the junta took steps to this end. Emissaries were sent 
into the different provinces to proclaim the establishment 
of the Republic. These emissaries were effective orators 
— as are nearly all the people of these southern countries. 
They toured along both coasts, east and west, and stopped 
at the principal cities. ... 

In each of these cities the emissary would, upon his 
arrival, employ the local band of musicians. Taking a 
stand in the principal plaza he would draw the crowd by 
the band's efforts, and when a number sufficient for his 
purposes had assembled, he would read the declaration 
of independence. Following the reading would come his 
harangue, the burden of which was that the establishment 
of the Republic meant the construction of the ship canal 
by the United States across the Isthmus, and that the 
construction of this canal meant that the United States 
would have to pay to the Republic a sum of money suffi- 
cient to make all of the people rich and prosperous. . . . 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 8i 

He never failed to elicit enthusiastic responses in ap- 
proval of what had been done. The business of the 
emissary 'was then to report to the junta that the people 
of that city accepted the Republic and gloried in its crea- 
tion. 

And all the people resident on the Isthmus ar- 
dently desired the revolution! We are not told 
that all included merely all of an inner circle in 
Panama and a fringe of adventurers. Had not 
our Administration collaborated with that inner 
circle through Bunau-Varilla as intermediary 
there would be no Republic of Panama to-day. 

We now take up arguments of the article re- 
ferred to in the title to this chapter which are not 
directly apropos to the main theme of this book, 
but which are here discussed in order to show 
more fully that the public statements of Roose- 
velt concerning the acquisition of the Canal Zone 
must be discounted. 

Seeking means to discredit the Wilson Admin- 
istration, Roosevelt takes up, in this article, its 
policy on the canal tolls. The excerpt which fol- 
lows is representative of his inaccurate and mis- 
leading statements : 

The Administration has succeeded in getting Congress 
to take the position that the United States has no special 
rights in its own canal. It now proposes by treaty to get 



82 America and the Canal Title 

Congress to give to the one nation which conspicuously 
wronged us in connection with that canal special rights 
which it would deny to ourselves and to all other countries. 
President Wilson denies that we have the right to ex- 
empt our own vessels engaged in peaceful coast commerce 
from tolls, and yet he now proposes to exempt from tolls 
the war vessels and transports of Colombia. A year ago 
I should have deemed it impossible that two such proposi- 
tions could have been entertained by the same Administra- 
tion. 

Had the writer been told a year ago that our 
foremost private citizen was knowingly a pur- 
veyor of incorrect information he would have 
spurned the suggestion. But analysis of the 
foregoing excerpt and of excerpts from the same 
source which follow, together with comparison 
of them with the correct information, establish 
the fact. The writer is aware that Roosevelt has 
a wider range of superficial information than any 
other man in the public eye, yet he is constrained 
to believe that even Roosevelt knows the differ- 
ence between a public vessel (vessel of war) and 
a vessel engaged in coastwise trade (vessel of 
commerce). The foregoing statement is plainly 
intended to mislead. If it were not, the compari- 
son would have been made between the public 
vessels of Colombia and the public vessels of the 
United States; between the vessels of citizens of 
Colombia engaged in the coastwise trade and the 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 83 

vessels of citizens of the United States similarly 
engaged. The Wilson Administration merely 
proposes to give to Colombia the same rights in 
the use of the Canal for her public vessels that 
the United States possesses. If the pending 
treaty with Colombia is ratified, the coastwise 
trade of Panama, Colombia and the United States 
using the Canal will be subject to tolls, while 
their public vessels will be exempt. The United 
States is the only country that has any special 
rights in the use of the Canal. That is, in the 
event of war, she can shut out the enemy and use 
the canal in her military operations. 

Roosevelt quotes the following from the pend- 
ing treaty with Colombia : 

The Republic of Colombia shall be at liberty at all times 
to transport through the interoceanic canal its troops, 
materials of war, and ships of war, even in case of war 
between Colombia and another country, without paying 
any charges to the United States. 

This provision has the same meaning and is 
the same in purpose as the one in the treaty 
drafted during the Roosevelt Administration. It 
grants no privileges whatsoever to the vessels 
of commerce owned by citizens of Colombia en- 
gaged in coastwise trade. There has been no 
change whatsoever in the right of the United 
States to pass, its public vessels through the canal 



84 America and the Canal Title 

without charge. Yet Roosevelt comments on 
this provision in the treaty as follows : 

To grant such a right to both Colombia and Panama 
was permissible so long as we also insisted on exercising 
it ourselves, on the grounds set forth by the then Secre- 
tary of State, Mr. Root, in his note to the British Govern- 
ment of January i6, 1909. In this note Secretary Root 
took the ground that the United States had the right to 
except from "coming within any schedule of tolls which 
might thereafter be established" the ships of the powers 
entering into the agreement necessary in order to give 
title to the land through which the canal was to be built, 
and to authorize its construction and the necessary juris- 
diction or control over it when built. These nations were 
Panama, Colombia and the United States. Since then 
the present Administration has surrendered the right so 
far as the United States is concerned; and yet it pro- 
poses to give to the most envenomed opponent of the 
building of the canal rights to its use which are denied 
to the power giving the rights. In other words, the Ad- 
ministration says that our people who built the canal 
can give to others rights which they dare not themselves 
exercise. Such a position is a wicked absurdity. 

The foregoing statement is a distortion of the 
truth. It is so unutterably false that it staggers 
belief. In the note of Secretary Root, mentioned 
by Roosevelt, it is stated : 

The United States has found it necessary to renew 
the reservation of the specific right of Colombia to send 
its warships through the canal without the payment of 
dues, which has been insisted upon by that country in 
every concession and treaty she has made regarding 
it, . . . 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 85 

In agreeing to accord to Colombia this reservation, 
the United States is not deaUng with the general subject 
of canal tolls. It is treating Colombia, for the reasons 
which I have described, as being in a wholly exceptional 
position, not subject to the rule of equality of the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty and not to come within any schedule 
of tolls which may hereafter be established, which must, 
of course, under the treaty, be equal for all nations to 
whom the rule of equality is properly applicable. 

The Root note and the treaty drafted in con- 
formity therewith merely designed to exclude the 
public vessels of Colombia from coming within 
any schedule of tolls which might hereafter be es- 
tablished. The public vessels of Panama were al- 
ready excluded by treaty. Those of the United 
States were excluded because they are engaged in 
maintenance and protection. It is thus clear that 
the Roosevelt Administration proposed to do just 
what the Wilson Administration proposes to do, 
that is, grant free transit to the public vessels of 
Colombia in the use of the canal. 

The foregoing excerpt from the Root note can 
only be fully understood when examined in con- 
nection with the subject matter to which it refers. 
This subject matter was the following paragraph 
from the draft of a treaty then negotiated with 
Colombia but not ratified: 

The Republic of Colombia shall have liberty at all times 
to convey through the ship canal now in course of con- 



86 America and the Canal Title 

struction by the United States across the Isthmus of 
Panama the troops, materials for war, and ships of war 
of the Republic of Colombia, without paying any duty 
to the United States, even in the case of an international 
war between Colombia and another country. 

The reply to the Root note by the British Gov- 
ernment shows conclusively that only the public 
vessels of Colombia were under consideration, 
and that Roosevelt's distinguished Secretary of 
State did not intend to include in the contem- 
plated exemption any vessels of commerce. In 
the tolls-exemption repeal, nothing was surren- 
dered by the United States. It merely restored 
a treaty that had been made a scrap of paper by 
the previous Administration. The British note 
reads : 

His Majesty's Government are content to note that the 
United States Government hold that the right of the free 
passage for warships which the present treaty proposes 
to extend to Colombia is deemed by them to grow out of 
the entirely special and exceptional position of Colombia 
toward the canal and the title thereto, and accordingly 
does not constitute a precedent, and will not hereafter 
be drawn into a precedent, for the exception of any other 
nation from the payment of equal dues for the passage 
of war vessels in accordance with such schedules as shall 
be hereafter constituted in conformity with the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty, or for any other concession of a special 
nature to Colombia or to any other power. 

I have accordingly the honor of stating to you that His 
Majesty's Government consider that they can forego the 
making of such a protest as they had formerly contem- 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 87 

plated, and that they accept the assurance contained in 
your note. 

Nor is this all. The claim that the public ves- 
sels of the United States could not pass through 
the canal free of charge was never put forward 
by Great Britain. In order to remove all doubt 
on this point Secretary Knox wrote : 

It is not believed, however, that in the objection now 
under consideration Great Britain intends to question the 
right of the United States to exempt from the payment 
of tolls its vessels of war and other vessels engaged in 
the service of this Government. Great Britain does not 
challenge the right of the United States to protect the 
canal. United States vessels of war and those employed 
in Government service are a part of our protective system. 
By the Hay-Pauncefote treaty we assume the sole re- 
sponsibility for its neutralization. It is inconceivable that 
this Government should be required to pay canal tolls for 
the vessels used for protecting the canal, which we alone 
must protect. The movement of United States vessels 
in executing governmental policies of protection are not 
susceptible of explanation or differentiation. The United 
States could not be called upon to explain what relation 
the movement of a particular vessel through the canal 
has to its protection. The British objection, therefore, 
is understood as having no relation to the use of the canal 
by vessels in the service of the United States Govern- 
ment. 

Great Britain assented to this construction of 
the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Therefore, the right 
of the United States to pass its public vessels 
through the canal free of charge was not even 
questioned. Vessels engaged in the coastwise 



88 America and the Canal Title 

trade are not public vessels, and so do not come 
within the purview of the Root note. 

The actual canal situation is as follows: The 
public vessels of the United States and of Panama 
are exempt from the payment of tolls. It is pro- 
posed, in the pending treaty, to extend the same 
right to the public vessels of Colombia. The pub- 
lic vessels of all other countries must pay the es- 
tablished rate. The vessels of commerce of all 
nations are on the same footing in the use of the 
canal — all privilege is barred. In the event of 
war, the United States has the exclusive use of 
the canal for military purposes. The United 
States is, therefore, the only nation that has spe- 
cial rights in the use of the canal, that is, during 
a war in which she is a belHgerent. Accordingly 
the situation is just the opposite from that indi- 
cated by Roosevelt. 

Equality in the commercial use of the Panama 
Canal is provided for in two treaties: One, 
signed, ratified and proclaimed (Hay-Paunce- 
fote treaty) ; the other, negotiated, signed, rati- 
fied and proclaimed (Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty) 
while Roosevelt was President. Roosevelt is 
criticizing an Administration which is merely ob- 
serving the treaties, as they stand, which were 
entered into during his Administration. 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 89 

The weakness of Roosevelt's contention in the 
passages so far quoted in this chapter is found in 
the effort he has put forth to confuse. Why is 
not this effort put forth to clear up circumstances 
that have a suspicious look? For instance, the 
cablegram to the commander of the Nashville on 
October 30, 1903, ordering him to proceed to 
Colon, is missing. What became of it? And 
what was its relation to the journey of Bunau- 
Varilla from New York to Washington the previ- 
ous night ? 

We deal with the contents of some of the fore- 
going excerpts more fully in other chapters. 
Space does not permit us to deal with the entire 
mass of stuff that has been injected into the con- 
troversy for the purpose of concealing the theft 
of the Canal Zone. The following from the 
article is typical: 

The land could not have been acquired and the canal 
could not have been built save by taking precisely and ex- 
actly the action which was taken. Unless the nation is 
prepared heartily to indorse and stand by this action, it 
has no right to take any pride in anything that has been 
done on the Isthmus and it has no right to remain on the 
Isthmus. If there is a moral justification for paying 
Colombia $25,000,000, then there is no moral justification 
for our staying on the Isthmus at all and we should 
promptly get off. If President Wilson and Secretary 
Bryan are right in their position, then they have no busi- 
ness to take part in any ceremony connected with open- 



90 America and the Canal Title 

ing the canal ; on their theory they would be engaged in 
the dedication of stolen goods. 

We cannot see that a work of art ceases to be 
a masterpiece because it was painted on stolen 
canvas. The painting remains a thing of beauty 
without regard to the method used in getting the 
canvas on which it was painted. In praising the 
work of art we do not condone the act of the bur- 
glar. It is merely necessary to compensate prop- 
erly the original owner of the canvas. We are 
not prevented from admiring the skill of our 
civil and sanitary engineers because our Admin- 
istration 'Hook" (did not secure by due process 
of law) the Canal Zone. It is merely necessary 
that the owner be compensated for loss suffered. 

We have now examined a number of excerpts 
from the article under consideration and have 
shown that they are grossly inaccurate. Simi- 
larly, the whole article is a collection of garbled, 
inaccurate and misleading statements. It de- 
ceives those who believe it to be a truthful ex- 
amination of a phase of our foreign policy. It 
conveys a false impression. We will conclude 
direct consideration of the article by commenting 
on its closing paragraph : 

As a matter of fact, every action we took was not only 
open and straightforward, but was rendered absolutely 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 91 

necessary by the misconduct of Colombia. Every action 
we took was in accordance with the highest principles of 
national, international, and private morality. The honor 
of the United States, and the interest not only of the 
United States but of the world, demanded the building 
of the canal. The canal could not have been built, it 
would not now have been begun, had our Government not 
acted precisely as it did act in 1903. No action ever 
taken by the Government, in dealing with any foreign 
power since the days of the Revolution, was more vitally 
necessary to the well-being of our people, and no action 
we ever took was taken with a higher regard for the 
standards of honor, of courage, and of efficiency which 
should distinguish the attitude of the United States in 
all its dealings with the rest of the world. 

If the cause of the United States was so just, 
why did not Roosevelt as President welcome the 
opportunity to submit it to arbitration ? On De- 
cember 23, 1903, Colombia proposed that the en- 
tire matter be submitted to the Arbitration Tri- 
bunal of The Hague. From that date to March 
4, 1909, Roosevelt had the opportunity to vindi- 
cate his course by joining Colombia in submitting 
the matter to an impartial tribunal for adjudica- 
tion. He refused — refused to submit what he 
calls a just cause to an arbitral tribunal for de- 
cision. We are thus warranted in asserting that 
his protestations lack sincerity. 

The foregoing paragraph from the article un- 
der review reminds one of an observation made 
by Samuel Weller concerning veal pie : 



92 America and the Canal Title 

Werry good thing is weal pie, when you know the lady 
as made it, and is quite sure it ain't kittens. 

Are the protestations of Roosevelt what they 
profess to be ? What is the value as evidence of 
statements made by him concerning the opera 
bouffe revolution on the Isthmus? It is one of 
the purposes of this chapter to answer this ques- 
tion. We will give further data bearing on the 
question from his discussion of the Hague conven- 
tions and the duty of the United States in regard 
to their enforcement. In the Independent of 
January 4, 1915, he writes: 

To violate these conventions, to violate neutrality 
treaties, as Germany has done in the case of Belgium, is 
a dreadful thing. It represents the gravest kind of inter- 
national wrongdoing, but it is really not quite so con- 
temptible, it does not show such short-sighted and timid in- 
efficiency, and above all, such selfish indifference to the 
cause of permanent and righteous peace, as has been 
shown by the United States (thanks to President Wilson 
and Secretary Bryan) in refusing to fulfill its solemn ob- 
ligations by taking whatever action was necessary in order 
to clear our skirts from the guilt of tame acquiescence in 
a wrong which we had solemnly undertaken to oppose. 

If I had for one moment supposed that signing these 
Hague conventions meant literally nothing whatever be- 
yond the expression of a pious wish which any power 
was at liberty to disregard with impunity in accordance 
with the dictation of self-interest I would certainly not 
have permitted the United States to be a party to such a 
mischievous farce. President Wilson and Secretary 
Bryan, however, take the view that when the United 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 93 

States assumes obligations in order to secure small and 
unoffending neutral nations against hideous wrong, its 
action is not predicated on any intention to make the 
guarantee effective. 

They take the view that when we are asked to redeem 
in the concrete promises we made in the abstract our 
duty is to disregard our obligations and to preserve ignoble 
peace for ourselves by regarding with cold-blooded and 
timid indifference the most frightful ravages of war com- 
mitted at the expense of a peaceful and unoffending 
country. This is the cult of cowardice. 

What is the cult of Roosevelt? Does not a 
shorter word than '^cowardice" correctly express 
it? It is sad that a person of so great prestige 
should bear false witness on questions of foreign 
relations. In his book entitled "America and the 
World War/' Roosevelt criticizes President Wil- 
son as follows : 

In his over anxiety not to offend the powerful who have 
done wrong, he scrupulously refrains from saying one 
word on behalf of the weak who have suffered wrong. 
He makes no allusions to the violation of the Hague Con- 
ventions at Belgium's expense, althougji this nation had 
solemnly undertaken to be a guarantor of those conven- 
tions. 

What are the facts about the Hague Conven- 
tions ? What are the obligations assumed by the 
United States in signing some of them ? We will 
let William Bayard Hale answer these questions : 

Thus rashly and violently writes Mr. Roosevelt. Igno- 
rant of the fact that The Hague rules regarding neutral- 



94 America and the Canal Title 

ity, . . . regarding everything which troubles Mr. Roose- 
velt and saddens us all, have never been ratified by Great 
Britain, nor by France, nor by Belgium, and that by 
their own provision these articles are binding only if 
ratified by all belligerents; ignorant likewise of the fact 
that the United States, in ratifying certain of The Hague 
rules, added the express stipulation that the action was 
not to be taken as involving this Government in any way 
in an obligation to enforce their observance on other 
powers. 

Is the United States the guarantor of the 
Hagiie Conventions ? Or, is this nation only ob- 
ligated to observe those it signed? These con- 
ventions were signed during the Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration with the understanding that the 
United States was under no obligation to enforce 
their observance by others. By observing those 
it signed the United States compHes with every 
obligation assumed. It is not the guarantor of 
a single Hague Convention, 

Does not Roosevelt rely on the absence of ac- 
curate information among his readers and their 
inability to detect garbled, misleading and false 
statements in bearing false witness against the 
present Administration? His arguments in the 
article which has just been under consideration 
rest on as shadowy a foundation as his assertions 
about the Hague Conventions. His statements 
and conclusions contained therein are an affront 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 95 

to readers informed on vital facts. Prof. Chan- 
cellor of the University of Wooster supplements 
the statement of William Bayard Hale as fol- 
lows : 

When a nation is a party to a guarantee of neutral- 
ity, whether explicit or implicit, such participation guar- 
antees only the action of the nation, and does not bind 
such a nation to enforce upon other nations the continued 
recognition of such neutrality. The independence of na- 
tions is a more complete and integral independence than 
that of individuals. If explicitly or implicitly the United 
States has ever been a party to the guarantee of Belgian 
neutrality, all that this means is that for ourselves we 
should recognize that neutrality. It might be conclu- 
sively shown that we have never guaranteed that Belgian 
neutrality must be recognized by Germany and Austria 
and Hungary. Here former President Roosevelt has 
fallen into pernicious error. Common sense is against 
any doctrine of international law that should make one na- 
tion the keeper of the consciences of other nations. The 
law of nature is against any undertaking by the United 
States to regulate the morals of Germany, of Mexico, and 
of such other nations as may from time to time or syn- 
chronously lose the ability to consider and parley, and in 
sheer default of thought and talk seize the sword. 

The conference at The Hague, in 1907, elab- 
orated fifteen Conventions. The delegates of the 
United States signed only twelve of these. No 
nation became the guarantor of any of these con- 
ventions. That was neither the nature nor pur- 
pose of the conference. The signers merely ob- 
ligated themselves to obey the Conventions they 



96 America and the Canal Title 

signed under the general reservation determined 
by the conference as stated in the foregoing ex- 
cerpt by William Bayard Hale. One of these 
conventions the delegates from the United States 
signed with the following special reservation : 

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so con- 
strued as to require the United States of America to de- 
part from its traditional poHcy of not intruding upon, 
interfering with, or entangling itself in the political ques- 
tions of policy or internal administration of any foreign 
state; nor shall anything contained in the said Conven- 
tion be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United 
States of its traditional attitude toward purely American 
questions. 

These are the facts concerning the Hague Con- 
ventions. Is Roosevelt merely mistaken concern- 
ing their import? It taxes credulity to believe 
that observations similar to those of William 
Bayard Hale and Professor Chancellor entirely 
escaped his notice. Yet we find in his statement 
at or near the Military Instruction Camp at 
Plattsburgh on August 25, 19 15, his false asser- 
tions about our obligations under The Hague 
Conventions, reasserted in the following form: 

Let us treat others justly and keep the engagements 
we have made, such as those in The Hague Conventions, 
to secure just treatment for others. . . . 

Under The Hague Convention it was our bounden duty 
to take whatever action was necessary to prevent and, 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 97 

if not to prevent, then to undo, the hideous wrong that 
was done to Belgium. We have shirked this duty. . . . 
For thirteen months America has played an ignoble 
part among the nations. We have tamely submitted to 
seeing the weak, whom we had covenanted to protect, 
wronged. 

In the Metropolitan Magazine for October, 
191 5, Roosevelt defends his earlier assertions con- 
cerning The Hague Conventions as follows : 

If no duty had been expressly imposed upon the United 
States in this matter, we ought nevertheless to have acted 
in accordance with the generous instincts of humanity. 
But as a matter of fact such a duty was expressly imposed 
upon us by the Hague Conventions. The Convention, 
signed at The Hague October i8th, 1907* [footnote re- 
fers to pages 133-144 of "The Hague Conventions and 
Declarations" edited by James Brow^n Scott], begins by 
saying that *'His Majesty the German Emperor, King 
of Prussia," and the other signatory powers, including 
France, Belgium, Russia and the United States, have 
resolved to conclude a Convention laying down clearly 
the rights and duties of neutral powers in case of war on 
land. Article i runs : "The territory of neutral powers 
is inviolable." Article 5 states that a neutral power 
"must not allow belligerents to move troops across its 
territory." Article 10 states that "the fact of a neutral 
power resisting even by force attempts to violate its 
neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act." Article 
7 states that "a neutral power is not called upon to pre- 
vent the export or transport on behalf of one or other of 
the belligerents of arms, munitions of war or in general 
of anything which could be of use to an army or a fleet." 
This Convention was ratified by Belgium on August 8th, 
1910; by France on October 7th, 1910; by Germany, the 
United States and Russia on November 27th, 1909. . . . 



98 America and the Canal Title 

A treaty is a promise. The signing powers make 
promises each to the others and each to each of the others 
in such a case as this. Germany had promised France, 
Belgium, the United States and Russia that it would treat 
the territory of a neutral power (in this case Belgium) 
as inviolable. Germany violated this promise. Belgium 
had promised Germany, the United States, France and 
Russia that it would not permit such violation of its neu- 
trality as Germany committed. Belgium kept its promise. 
Germany had promised that if a neutral power (Belgium) 
resisted by force such an attempt as it, Germany, made 
to violate its neutrality, Germany would not regard such 
an act as hostile. Germany broke this promise. When 
Germany thus broke her promises, we broke our promise 
by failing at once to call her to account. The treaty was 
a joint and several guarantee, and it was the duty of 
every signer to take action when it was violated; above 
all it was the duty of the most powerful neutral, the 
United States. 

An exact reproduction of those articles of The 
Hague Conventions which are vital is the best 
answer to the foregoing excerpt from Roosevelt's 
article. Therefore, we will reproduce them and 
print in italics the paragraph of Article 5 which 
is omitted. This paragraph shows that the in- 
tent of this Convention (No. 5) is just the op- 
posite of the foregoing assertion by him. The 
articles from this Convention which are apropos 
follow : 

ARTICLE I 

The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 99 

ARTICLE 2 

Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, 
whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the 
territory of a neutral Power. 

ARTICLE 4 

Corps of combatants must not be formed, nor recruit- 
ing agencies opened, on the territory of a neutral Power, 
to assist the belligerents. 

ARTICLE 5 

A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts re- 
ferred to in Articles 2 and 4 to occur on its territory. 

It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of the 
neutrality unless such acts have been committed on its 
own territory. 

The closing paragraph of Article 5 shows that 
the United States is not the guarantor of The 
Hague Conventions as alleged by Roosevelt. 
Reiteration does not convert false statements into 
truth whether the false statements are due to 
error or to sinister political propaganda to dis- 
credit an official of exalted moral purpose, as is 
this propaganda against our esteemed President 
— propaganda buttressed by falsehood of the 
basest character. The United States is not the 
guarantor of the Hague Conventions. This is 
self-evident to a student of American diplomacy. 
Roosevelt knows something about diplomacy. 
We are, therefore, warranted in inferring that 
he is attempting to discredit the Wilson Admin- 



100 America and the Canal Title 

istration by statements known to him to be false. 
His. conduct seems to come under the following 
condemnation penned by himself : 

There are in every great country a few men whose 
mental or moral make-up is such that they ... go to the 
length of moral treason in the effort to discredit their own 
national government. 

One is not warranted in expecting accuracy 
from Roosevelt where nothing is recorded, since 
he makes assertions easily contradicted by docu- 
mentary evidence. In order to have value as 
evidence, it is apparent that any statement made 
by him relative to the part his Administration 
played in the creation of the so-called RepubHc 
of Panama must have substantial corroboration. 

For an individual to tell a falsehood and re- 
peat it in various ways consistently for any length 
of time is difficult. It is impossible for a number 
of individuals to do so. These are facts not 
sufficiently taken account of by Roosevelt when 
his Administration cooperated in planning the 
opera houife revolution on the Isthmus. It is 
the weakness in the armor used to defend his Ad- 
ministration. There are too many established 
facts which become consistent only when viewed 
in the light of an understanding between his Ad- 
ministration and those sponsor for the secession 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty loi 

movement on the Isthmus. The understanding 
was oral — was not reduced to writing. Oral 
understandings, however, result in historical 
facts. The meaning of these facts will be dis- 
closed by historical research. Historical re- 
search shows that our Administration in 1903 
was in collusion with the separatists on the 
Isthmus to effect the secession of the Province 
of Panama from Colombia in order to establish 
it as a protectorate of the United States. 

In this and other chapters of this work, we 
have applied the method suggested by President 
Wilson in an address delivered before the United 
States Chamber of Commerce: 

I agreed with a colleague of mine in the Cabinet the 
other day that we had never before in our lives attended 
a school to compare with what we were now attending 
for the purpose of gaining a Uberal education. 

Of course, I learn a great many things that are not 
so. But the interesting thing about it is this : Things 
that are not so do not match. If you hear enough of them 
you see there is no pattern whatever — it is a crazy quilt ; 
whereas the truth always matches, piece by piece, with 
other parts of the truth. No man can lie consistently, 
and 'he cannot lie about everything if he talks to you 
long. So that I would guarantee that if enough liars 
talked to you, you would get the truth, because the parts 
that they did not invent would match one another, and 
the parts they did invent would not match one another. 
If they talked long enough, therefore, and you saw the 



102 America and the Canal Title 

connections clearly enough, you could patch together the 
case as a whole. 

It is the mature judgment of the writer that 
statements made by Roosevelt concerning the 
establishment of the so-called Republic of Panama 
must be corroborated to have value as historical 
evidence. Statements not corroborated must be 
discounted or, as statisticians would say, be 
weighted in order to determine their value. In 
this work, the writer has given statements of 
Roosevelt only the importance which analysis, 
criticism, and weighting attach to them. 

The writer finds substantially his own view ex- 
pressed by Mark Twain in a letter written to his 
friend. Rev. Joseph Twichell, and given a place 
in ''Mark Twain, a Biography" by Albert Bige- 
low Paine : 

Dear Joe, — I knew I had in me somewhere a definite 
feeling about the President. If I could only find the 
words to define it with ! Here they are, to a hair — from 
Leonard Jerome: 

"For twenty years I have loved Roosevelt the man, and 
hated Roosevelt the statesman and politician." 

It's mighty good. Every time in twenty-five years that 
I have met Roosevelt the man a wave of welcome has 
streaked through me with the hand-grip; but whenever 
(as a rule) I meet Roosevelt the statesman and politician 
I find him destitute of morals and not respect-worthy. 
It is plain that where his political self and party self are 
concerned he has nothing resembling a conscience; that 



The Panama Blackmail Treaty 103 

under those inspirations he is naively indifferent to the 
restraints of duty and even unaware of them; ready to 
kick the Constitution into the backyard whenever it gets 
into his way. 

The bearing of false witness against a national 
administration on vital questions of foreign 
policy during a world-crisis like the present is 
as repugnant to a man of exalted moral purpose 
as is collaboration with separatists of another 
country to effect the secession of a province. 
With this conclusion in the foreground we will 
close the chapter with the following conclusion 
in the background. If Isthmian events point 
to collusion between the Roosevelt Administra- 
tion and the separatists on the Isthmus to effect 
the secession of the Province of Panama from 
Colombia, and to establish it as a protectorate of 
the United States called a Republic, the charac- 
ter of the President is not a bar to belief in such 
collaboration. 



Chapter III 

President Roosevelt Attempted To Coerce 
Colombia 

In this chapter, we deal primarily with the 
method employed to secure the ratification of the 
Hay-Herran treaty, to which the signature of the 
charge d'affaires of Colombia was obtained 
through an ultimatum that should have been ad- 
dressed to his Government. The method was 
sui generis. We believe that the following ex- 
cerpt from the pen of Roosevelt warrants the con- 
clusion that he was responsible for it : 

When in August, 1903, I became convinced that Colom- 
bia intended to repudiate the treaty made the preceding 
January, under cover of securing its rejection by the 
Colombian Legislature, I began carefully to consider 
what should be done. By my direction. Secretary Hay, 
personally and through the Minister at Bogota, repeatedly 
warned Colombia that grave consequences might follow 
her rejection of the treaty. 

In the ultimatum to Colombia, Secretary Hay 

stated that the President had directed him to say 

what the note contained. Roosevelt admits re- 

104 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 105 

sponsibility for equally formidable notes to 
Colombia commanding her to ratify the Hay-Her- 
ran treaty. The ultimatum merely blends with 
the notes and completes the story of coercion. 
Here is further corroboration : 

The Congress as well as the Dictator [President Mar- 
roquin] had ample warning of all the dangers they by 
their action were inviting. Representatives from Panama 
warned the Colombian Administration that Panama would 
revolt if the treaty was rejected; and our Department of 
State in the gravest manner called their attention to the 
serious situation their conduct would create. 

It is clear that the coercion of Colombia, from 
the time that the signature of her acting Minister 
to the Hay-Herran treaty was secured by a 
method that is common on the ''Bowery'' to the 
rejection of that ill-fated document by the unani- 
mous vote of the Colombian Senate, was directed 
by President Roosevelt. 

J It would appear that Roosevelt contended that 
an act forbidden by international law, by a solemn 
engagement, and by ordinary morality, became 
honorable provided warning was given. To the 
connoisseur in ethics, the warning adds to the 
offense of which it was a forerunner in that it 
shows premeditation. The warning thus be- 
comes a part of the offense, proving motive for 
the act which was threatened. It strengthens the 



io6 America and the Canal Title 

evidence which points to collusion between our 
Administration and the separatists of Panama, 
as that was the only way in which the threat 
could be carried into effect. 

Do not the warnings show determination to lay 
violent hands on Colombia unless she surrendered 
in perpetuity her choicest possession for a con- 
sideration that has ceased to be respectable in 
public utility regulation? Viewed from the 
standpoint of international law and of correct 
financiering, these warnings are so base that one 
is surprised at the moral obtuseness of their 
author. That he should cite them in exculpation 
of the rape of Colombia seems incomprehensible 
to a mind sensitive to ethical principles. 

We will now proceed to a detailed considera- 
tion of the coercion of Colombia. We will give 
official documents in their sequence and connect 
them by stating their apparent meaning, adding 
general conclusions which we derive from them 
after the documents have been assembled and cor- 
related. Their interpretation by the writer will 
be found in the closing pages of the chapter. 

While the Colombia Congress convened June 
20, 1903, interference with its freedom of action 
commenced as early as April. In a note dated 
April 24, our Minister to Colombia officially in- 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 107 

formed the Colombian Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs: ' 

With reference to the interview I had with your ex- 
cellency at which were discussed the negotiations for the 
annulment of the present concessions of the Panama canal 
and railroad companies and other matters, I have the 
honor to inform your excellency that I have received in- 
structions from my Government in that respect. 

I am directed to inform your excellency, if the point 
should be raised, that everything relative to this matter 
is included in the convention recently signed between 
Colombia and the United States on the 22d of January 
last, and that, furthermore, any modification would be 
violative of the Spooner Act, and therefore inadmissible. 

How negotiations between Colombia and her 
concessionary corporations could be in violation 
of the Spooner law is not clear, for, most as- 
suredly, the American Congress would not pass 
an act, or presume to have the right to pass an 
act, which prohibited Colombia from negotiat- 
ing with concessionary corporations for the can- 
cellation of concessions granted by her and the 
surrender of her reversionary interests in these 
enterprises. Such a prohibition cannot be read 
into a treaty unless it is clearly stated therein. 
Save by a construction of the Hay-Herran treaty 
which violated precedents, it is not found in that 
instrument, with the most obvious result that 
Colombia and the United States placed different 



io8 America and the Canal Title 

constructions on an article in a projected solemn 
engagement before ratification. After ratifica- 
tion, the United States would have enforced its 
understanding of the treaty — an understanding 
determined by self-interest. This is not all. No 
self-respecting government will permit another 
country to interpose between itself and corpora- 
tions to whom it has granted concessions; nor 
will a self-respecting government offer such an 
affront to a sister republic. The mantle of 
charity is not large enough to cover the acts of 
the Roosevelt Administration whereby we secured 
the Canal Zone. This, however, is merely the 
beginning of insolence to which Colombia was 
subjected, for, on June 13, 191 3, our Minister 
handed to the Colombian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs a memorandum which reads : 

I have received instructions from my Government by 
cable in the sense that the Government of Colombia to 
all appearances does riot appreciate the gravity of the 
situation. The Panama Canal negotiations were initiated 
by Colombia and were earnestly solicited of my Govern- 
ment for several years. The propositions presented by 
Colombia with slight alterations were finally accepted by 
us. By virtue of this agreement our Congress recon- 
sidered its previous decision and decided in favor of the 
Panama route. If Colombia now rejects the treaty or 
unduly delays its ratification, the friendly relations be- 
tween the two countries would be so seriously compro- 
mised that our Congress might next winter take steps 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 109 

that every friend of Colombia would regret with 
sorrow. 

The canal negotiations were initiated by Wil- 
liam Nelson Cromwell, attorney for the New 
Panama Canal Company. At first acting only 
as intermediary, he finally did succeed in creat- 
ing the situation which resulted in direct negotia- 
tions between the two governments. To say in 
substance, as in the excerpt quoted, that Colombia 
urged upon the United States the construction of 
an Isthmian Canal by the Panama route, is en- 
tirely incorrect. 

We will now show that the sentence: "The 
propositions presented by Colombia with slight 
alterations were finally accepted by us," is both 
false and misleading. This can be most effec- 
tively done by paraphrasing an excerpt from a 
memorandum of the Colombian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs addressed to our Government on 
June 18, 1903. It effectively disposes of Secre- 
tary Hay's contention that the propositions pre- 
sented by Colombia, with slight alteration, were 
finally accepted by the United States. In this 
memorandum, the Colombian Minister observes: 

There is a notable difference between some of the prop- 
ositions presented by Colombia and the modifications in- 
troduced by the United States. 



no America and the Canal Title 

That difference becomes apparent when we compare 
the memorandum submitted by the Colombian Legation 
on March 31, 19 13, with the propositions of the Secre- 
tary of State, This is especially true of those provisions 
which refer to the sovereignty of the Canal Zone, judicial 
jurisdiction in it, and the compensation to be paid for the 
concession. The annuity of $250,000 stipulated in the 
Hay-Herran treaty was merely the then income of Colom- 
bia from the Railroad, and even payment of this amount 
was not to commence until nine years after ratification, 
although the railroad was to become the property of the 
United States immediately. In the memorandum of the 
legation the establishment of judicial tribunals in the 
Canal Zone was not mentioned, while the Secretary of 
State, in the project sent with his note of November 18, 
1902, proposed them. In this project, they were divided 
into three classes, namely, Colombian, American, and 
mixed. 

In the Colombian memorandum, the sum of $7,000,000, 
American gold, was asked, and an annuity, which was to 
be fixed by arbitration unless otherwise satisfactorily ar- 
ranged. The Secretary of State only offered $7,000,000 
and an annual rental of $100,000, or, if preferred, $10,- 
000,000, and an annual rental of $10,000. The Colom- 
bian Government had ordered its legation to accept an 
annuity of $600,000. The Secretary of State, in a note 
which had the form., of an ultimatum, reduced it to 
$250,000. The diminution of $350,000 in a period of 
only one , hundred years represents a difference of 
$35,000,000, and as the convention was to run in per- 
petuity, it is clear that the difference was not slight, but 
was very great. 

It is also well to note another item of substantial differ- 
ence. In the Colombian proposition, the canal and rail- 
road companies could not transfer their privileges to the 
United States without the consent of the Colombian Gov- 
ernment. 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia iii 

In addition to the observations already made 
in this paraphrase of an excerpt, it should be 
pointed out that the actuarial value of $250,000 
at the interest rate of the then Colombian credit 
for the nine years that Colombia was to be de- 
prived of the $250,000 was approximately 
$2,870,000. This amount must be deducted from 
the apparent figures contained in the proposition 
of Secretary Hay to get at their actual value. 
The actuarial (real) value of an annuity of 
$350,000 (amount mentioned in the paraphrased 
excerpt) at the end of one hundred years at 3 
per cent is $212,550,000, at 4 per cent, $433,170,- 
000, and not $35,000,000, as stated by the Colom- 
bian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was ap- 
parently an amateur in finance. Note — the treaty 
was to be perpetual and not merely for one hun- 
dred years. 

It is already clear that the propositions sub- 
mitted by the Colombian legation to the United 
States were not accepted with "slight altera- 
tions." Moreover, the Colombian proposition 
safeguarded her sovereignty. The Hay-Herran 
treaty impaired her sovereignty to such an ex- 
tent that the United States would, by construc- 
tion of the engagement, have become the de facto 
sovereign in an undefined area of Colombia. The 



112 America and the Canal Title 

difference between the propositions was not only 
*'not slight," but vital. Note particularly the fol- 
lowing: 

Our Congress might next winter take steps that every 
friend of Colombia would regret with sorrow. 

Congress had provided the Nicaragua route as 
an alternative one in the Spooner law. So con- 
struction of the canal elsewhere could not have 
been meant. Therefore, it could only have had 
reference to laying hands on Colombia. This is 
what was actually done. The method could not 
be disclosed, so the Congress is referred to in 
order to make the warnings effective. These 
warnings are merely the forerunner of collusion 
between the separatists of Panama and our Ad- 
ministration. We will discuss this in detail in 
the next chapter. 

On June 13, 1903, our Minister to Colombia 
sent the following telegram to Secretary Hay: 

I have the honor to advise you that I have had an in- 
terview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which 
I communicated to him the substance of my instructions, 
and also left with him a memorandum containing a sub- 
stantial copy of said telegram. 

The minister's first question was as to what action by 
our Congress was contemplated — whether it meant action 
against Colombia, or the adoption of the Nicaragua route 
— ^to which I replied that I had received no other in- 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 113 

structions than those contained in the telegram, and that 
I could .not, therefore, aid him in construing it. 

He said, in substance, that it must be understood that 
no matter what the Government's actions or desires may- 
have been in the preliminary negotiations, a treaty could 
not be made without the approval of Congress ; that this 
was true in the United States as well as Colombia; that 
the Colombian Congress was very soon to meet, and that 
upon it would devolve the consideration of all these mat- 
ters. 

Colombia, left in doubt as to the meaning of 
the note addressed to her, was, in fact, the victim 
of a veiled threat, as she knew what was expected 
of her, but did not know what to expect should 
she act within her constitutional and other legal 
rights, and, in so doing, offend her powerful 
neighbor. 

We will conclude this phase of the evidence by 
stating on the authority of Hannis Taylor and of 
Ex-Minister DuBois that a cable was sent to 
Bogota saying: "The treaty must not he m'odi- 
iied or amended/' In this connection, remember 
that the signature of the acting Minister of 
Colombia was secured by strategy. The gentle- 
men named above also state that this cable was fol- 
lowed by a mandate saying: "Ratify the treaty 
or you will regret it/' Again, remember that Dr. 
Herran signed that treaty under pressure. Is it 
any wonder Colombia refused to ratify the Hay- 



114 America and the Canal Title 

Herran treaty? And Roosevelt calls this con- 
duct classic! Contrast these warnings with the 
following excerpt from an address delivered by 
President Wilson : 

For the interesting and inspiring thing about America,, 
gentlemen, is that she asks nothing for herself except 
what she has a right to ask for humanity itself. We want 
no nation's property; we wish to question no nation's 
honor; we wish to stand selfishly in the way of the de- 
velopment of no nation ; we want nothing that we cannot 
get by our own legitimate enterprise and by the inspira- 
tion of our own example, and, standing for these things, 
it is not pretention on our part to say that we are privi- 
leged to stand for what every nation would wish to stand 
for, and speak for those things which all humanity must 
desire. 

How different are the foregoing inspiring 
words when compared with the following by 
Roosevelt : 

I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
it. If I had followed traditional conservative methods 
I should have submitted a dignified state paper of prob- 
ably two hundred pages to the Congress and the debate 
would have been going on yet. But / took the Canal Zone, 
and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on the 
canal does also. 

The excerpt from the address by President Wil- 
son mirrors the underlying spirit of his Admin- 
istration and exalts righteousness for its own 
sake; while the excerpt from the address by 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 115 

Colonel Roosevelt glories in having* taken the 
Canal Zone by physical and mental prowess. 

This brings the narrative down to June 20, 
1903, when the Colombian Congress assembled. 
President Marroquin submitted a dignified state 
paper to it, which dealt with the ratification of 
the Hay-Herran treaty, as follows : 

To my Government has been presented this dilemma; 
either it lets our sovereignty suffer detriment or renounces 
certain pecuniary advantages, to which, according to the 
opinion of many, we have a right. In the first case, to 
consent to the sacrifice of our sovereignty and not as- 
piring to great indemnification, the just wishes of the 
inhabitants of Panama and other Colombians would be 
satisfied if the canal were opened, but the Government 
would be exposed to the charge afterwards that it did 
not defend our sovereignty and that it did not defend the 
interests of the nation. In the second case, if the canal 
is not opened by Panama the Government will be accused 
for not having allowed Colombia that benefit which is 
regarded as the commencement of our aggrandizement. 
I have already allowed my wish to be understood that the 
canal should be opened through our territory. I believe 
that even at the cost of sacrifices we ought not to put 
obstacles to such a grand undertaking, because if is an 
immensely beneficial enterprise for the country, and also 
because once the canal is opened by the United States 
our relations will become more intimate and extensive, 
while our industries, commerce, and our wealth will gain 
incalculably. I leave the full responsibility the decision 
of this matter brings with Congress. I do not pretend 
to make my opinion weigh. When I have given instruc- 
tions to our representative in Washington it has been 
coupled with the order that the decision of this important 



ii6 America and the Canal Title 

matter must be left with Congress. After years in which 
the question has been treated in a vague way, without 
precise conditions, it is now presented in a way to obtain 
practical and positive results. It has been our indisput- 
able diplomatic triumph that the Senate and Government 
of the United States should declare, notwithstanding 
every effort to the contrary, the superiority of the Colom- 
bian route. 

Although President Marroquin's motives have 
been impugned by Roosevelt, we will inquire 
whether he was sincere in the foregoing com- 
munication. Advices from our Minister to 
Colombia will furnish the answers. We read in 
a letter from him, dated August 30, the follow- 
ing: 

I am informed authoritatively that to assure the elec- 
tion of Reyes, Marroquin has already changed the gov- 
ernors of Bolivar, Magdalena, and Panama, nominating, 
respectively, Insignares, Barrios, and Senator Obaldia. 
All pledged to the treaty and to Reyes. 

It is to be noted that General Reyes was the 
candidate for the presidency of Colombia who 
succeeded at the election, thus making it evident 
that President Marroquin was using the power 
of his ofiQce to secure ratification. General Reyes 
urged ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty. 
The next day our Minister to Colombia wrote to 
Secretary Hay : 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 117 

I had an interview with Senator Obaldia to-day. He 
informed me that he is willing to remain as long as there 
i5 hope for the treaty, but he is convinced that there is 
none. . . . Confirms General Reyes' statement concern- 
ing presidential candidate, and says that the next Senate 
was made certain for the treaty; that he bears instruc- 
tions to Governors Insignares and Barrios concerning the 
elections which will be held next December; that in ac- 
cepting governorship of Panama he told the President 
that in case that the department found it necessary to 
revolt to secure canal, he would stand by Panama; but 
he added if the Government of the United States will 
wait for the next session of Congress, canal can be se- 
cured without a revolution. Senator Campo, from the 
Cauca, is about to leave, thinking the treaty gone. 

My opinion is that nothing satisfactory can be expected 
from this Congress. Caro's party has been joined by 
Velez and Soto and their followers, constituting a de- 
cisive majority against the treaty. General Reyes seems 
to still entertain hopes. 

There is a difference in the influence of an 
incoming and of an outgoing President. Presi- 
dent Marroquin, an octogenarian, was retiring, 
and General Reyes was to succeed him. Reyes 
favored ratification of a treaty that should have 
been rejected. By the exercise of patience, it is 
thus evident that agreement on a treaty granting 
the United States an adequate title to the Canal 
Zone could have been secured from Colombia, but 
threats were substituted for restraint. These 
threats are summarized in a communication, dated 
August 5, 1903, which our Minister to Colombia 



ii8 America and the Canal Title 

sent to the Colombian Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, from which the following is taken : 

I avail myself of this opportunity respectfully to re- 
peat that which I already stated to your excellency, that 
if Colombia truly desires to maintain the friendly rela- 
tions that at present exist between the two countries, and 
at the same time secure for herself the extraordinary ad- 
vantages that are to be produced for her by the con- 
struction of the canal in her territory, in case of its being 
backed by so intimate an alliance of national interests as 
that which would supervene with the United States, the 
present treaty will have to be ratified exactly in its present 
form without amendment whatsoever. I say this because 
I am profoundly convinced that my Government will not 
in any case accept amendments. 

What would any self-respecting Government 
have done under the circumstances? Would it 
not have done what Colombia did ? It is properly 
stated by General Reyes in the following : 

The Congress being unable to accept in its actual word- 
ing at least one of the stipulations contained in the treaty, 
because inhibited from doing so by the Constitution, no 
one will wonder that under the pressure of threats so 
serious and irritating and in presence of a formal notifi- 
cation from the party which had authority to serve it that 
no amendment would be accepted, preference was given 
to disapproval. 

One is automatically reminded of the follow- 
ing characterization, by Sir Edward Grey, of the 
note addressed to Servia by Austria: 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 119 

I had never before seen one State address to another in- 
dependent State a document of so formidable a character. 

It is to be observed that, while there was no 
stipulation for the absolute cession to the United 
States of the Canal Zone, there was to be per- 
petual occupancy and jurisdiction, i. e., periods 
were for one hundred years, with the option of 
renewal by the United States, but no option of 
rejection by Colombia. The stipulations in- 
cluded the right to safeguard the canal and 
granted extensive police and sanitary control. 
The constitutional authorities in Colombia held 
that such a grant, although less than absolute 
cession, was contrary to the nation's organic law. 

What sovereign state would have lightly rati- 
fied a treaty which impaired its control over the 
most valuable section of its domain ? Would the 
Senate of the United States have held otherwise 
in case it had been proposed to grant to a foreign 
power a similarly endless occupancy and jurisdic- 
tion of a part of our national domain? Yet it 
was proposed in the deliberations of the Colom- 
bian Senate to amend the constitution and thereby 
remove the legal objection! 

It is unquestionably true that Colombia re- 
jected the Hay-Herran treaty because it involved 
an impairment of her de facto sovereignty on the 



I20 America and the Canal Title 

Isthmus, and an alienation of national territory 
in terms believed to have been prohibited by the 
Colombian constitution. It also entailed an 
abandonment, by Colombia, of concessionary and 
reversionary rights in the Panama Railroad and 
in the projected Isthmian Canal, and made no 
equitable provision for settlement with Colombia 
by the canal and railroad companies to secure the 
release of her concessionary and reversionary in- 
terests such as were contemplated by the transfer 
of their rights and property to the United States. 
When we make a comprehensive survey of 
Colombia's pecuniary interest in the then exist- 
ing transit arrangements on the Isthmus, and the 
strategic value of the Isthmus for further tran- 
sit development, we are forced to conclude that 
the United States attempted to secure unduly ad- 
vantageous terms by duress. 

Colombia's statesmen were looking for a satis- 
factory solution. They were conciliatory. They 
wanted the canal built on their territory and were 
merely endeavoring to secure reasonable terms. 
They appealed to our Government in terms that 
would have wilted a heart not made of adamant. 
On August II, 1903, Minister Rico of the De- 
partment for Foreign Affairs addressed our Min- 
ister as follows : 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 121 

The Colombian Government, fully aware that justice 
and equity govern the course of the United States in its 
relations ' with all powers, and that its respect for the 
autonomy of the Spanish-American countries is a sub- 
stantial guaranty of the stability and independence of 
those nations, is confident that the principles which I have 
adduced in favor of the right which the Colombian Con- 
gress has, not only to propose modifications to the con- 
vention for the opening of the canal, but also to refuse 
its approval, can not but convince your excellency's Gov- 
ernment that the exercise of that right can not in any 
manner entail complications, great or small, in the rela- 
tions of the two countries, which it is to be hoped will 
continue on the same equal footing and in the same good 
understanding which has happily existed until now, and 
that they will facilitate the removal of the difficulties 
which have retarded the final agreement, the result of 
which is to accomplish that work, of such great impor- 
tance to the two high contracting parties and to the 
world's commerce. 

Why was Colombia so cautious? Was there 
anything in our construction of the Treaty of 
1846 that warranted it? Had we recently read 
into that solemn engagement something that war- 
ranted the conclusion that our public men re- 
garded national honor lightly when it conflicted 
with national interests? The new construction 
that our Adminstration placed on the Treaty of 
1846 in 1902 is the answer. In a letter dated 
October 26, 1902, the Colombian Minister at 
Washington wrote to Secretary Hay : 

I have the honor to address your excellency for the 



122 America and the Canal Title 

purpose of informing you that on the 24th instant I re- 
ceived from my Government supplementary and full in- 
structions to close the negotiations for the construction of 
the Panama Canal which have been progressing between 
Colombia and the United States, and that in said docu- 
ment are comprised all the points to which your excel- 
lency adverted as modifications of the memorandum pre- 
sented by the legation to the Department of State on the 
2 1 St of April last. 

The instructions to which I refer bear date of Bo- 
gota, September 9, 1902, before the action was taken in 
the Department of Panama by United States naval offi- 
cers which implies, on the part of your excellency's Gov- 
ernment, a new interpretation of the treaty in force be- 
tween the two countries, an interpretation concerning 
which I am not now at liberty to express any opinion, for 
the reason that the Minister for Foreign Relations at 
Bogota has undertaken to discuss it directly himself, as 
your excellency is aware; but which would essentially 
affect the convention now pending, since article 35 of that 
treaty is incorporated and developed therein. 

In view of the foregoing, your excellency will recog- 
nize that it is just now impossible for me to act in pur- 
suance of the instructions received, in consequence of 
which I have addressed my Government by cable, stating 
the circumstances, to the end that it may decide upon 
what it considers most proper. 

What are the facts in this connection? Our 
Administration had just prohibited the Panama 
Railroad Company from transporting Colombian 
troops and munitions of war across the Isthmus 
in its attempt to suppress an insurrection. The 
railroad company was required to transport them 
by its charter. Our Administration acted as 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 122, 

though the rights of the United States took pre- 
cedence over those of the actual sovereign. 
Seward, Hamilton Fish, and Bayard held that the 
rights of the sovereign were supreme. This 
phase of the question will be considered in another 
chapter. Suffice it to say here that this unwar- 
ranted construction of the Treaty of 1846 caused 
Colombia to act with extreme caution where im- 
pairment of her sovereignty was to be affected 
by the projected treaty. It — it — and not at- 
tempted blackmail — prevented final agreement 
with Colombia on a canal concession. 

In order to arrive at correct conclusions in this 
matter we must distinguish between de jure and 
de facto sovereignty. The one is nominal sov- 
ereignty; the other is actual sovereignty. Nomi- 
nal sovereignty may be held in suspense while 
actual sovereignty is being exercised by a foreign 
power for a consideration. Panama is at pres- 
ent the de jure sovereign of the Canal Zone. The 
United States is the actual sovereign as long as 
she pays the consideration named in the treaty. 
De jure sovereignty is in suspense — is not ex- 
ercised. That Colombian sovereignty was not to 
be impaired in the Hay-Herran treaty is the as- 
sertion of Roosevelt. This is true of de jure 
sovereignty, but is not true of de facto sover- 



124 America and the Canal Title 

eignty. Article IV of the Hay-Herran treaty 
provided : 

The rights and privileges granted to the United States 
by the terms of this convention shall not affect the sov- 
ereignty of the Republic of Colombia over the territory 
within whose boundaries such rights and privileges are 
to be exercised. 

The United States freely acknowledges and recognizes 
this sovereignty and disavows any intention to impair it 
in any way whatever or to increase its territory at the 
expense of Colombia or of any of the sister republics in 
Central or South America, but on the contrary, it desires 
to strengthen the power of the republics on this continent, 
and to promote, develop and maintain their prosperity and 
independence. 

This is not true when we consider de facto or 
actual sovereignty. That which is the substance 
of sovereignty was vitally impaired in the pro- 
jected engagement. We will mention only one 
of a number of provisions to illustrate the point. 
We find that section II of Article XIII of the 
Hay-Herran treaty reads as follows: 

Subject to the general sovereignty of Colombia over 
said zone, the United States may establish judicial tri- 
bunals thereon, which shall have jurisdiction of certain 
controversies hereinafter mentioned to be determined ac- 
cordi!ig to the laws and judicial procedure of the United 
States. 

Such judicial tribunal or tribunals so established by the 
United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction in said 
zone of all controversies between citizens of the United 
States, and between citizens of the United States and 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 125 

citizens of any foreign nation other than the Republic 
of Colombia ; and of all controversies in any wise grow- 
ing out of or relating to the construction, maintenance or 
operation of the canal, railway and other properties and 
works. 

The portion printed in italics contains the 
joker. It is the elastic clause under which the 
permanent interests of Colombia would have suf- 
fered. 

Because of our altered interpretation of the 
Treaty of 1846, Colombia decided on a reconsid- 
eration of the whole matter. Its Minister for 
Foreign Affairs addressed our Minister in Bogota 
on August 14, 1903, as follows: 

As your excellency has been pleased to address me va- 
rious notes relative to the treaty for the opening of the 
Panama Canal which was signed in Washington the 226. 
of January last, I inform your excellency that the Senate 
of the Republic disapproved that pact, by the unanimous 
vote of the senators present, in the session of the 12th 
of this month, and the day following approved, also unan- 
imously, the proposition which I have the honor to com- 
municate to your excellency, and which is as follows : 

The Senate of the Republic, in view of the disapproval 
given to the treaty signed in Washington the 226. of Jan- 
uary of the present year, by the charge d'affaires of Co- 
lombia and the Secretary of State of the American Union, 
and taking into account the desire of the Colombian peo- 
ple to maintain the most cordial relations with the people 
of the United States of America, and its sentiment that 
the completion of the interoceanic canal across the Isth- 
mus of Panama is a work of the greatest importance for 



126 America and the Canal Title 

the commerce and advancement of the world, as well as 
for the development and progress of the American na- 
tions, resolved: 

I. That a commission of three senators, appointed by 
the president of the Senate, consulting in every possible 
way the opinion of the House of Representatives, study 
the manner of meeting the earnest desire of the Colom- 
bian people touching the construction of the Panama 
Canal, in harmony with the national interests and observ- 
ance of the law by which the Senate was ruled on this 
solemn occasion. 

In addition the Colombian Senate addressed a 
communication to our Government wherein it 
stated : 

A treaty of this nature could only be approved by a 
national convention or by a reforming act of the Consti- 
tution. 

Other portions of this appeal are better stated 
in a communication handed to Secretary Hay by 
General Reyes, showing how anxious Colombia 
was to have the canal constructed on her territory, 
and how desirous she was of finding a formula 
which would grant to the United States an ad- 
equate title and yet properly safeguard Colom- 
bian interests. It is expressed by General Reyes 
as follows: 

It is proper to observe that under our constitution the 
Congress is the principal guardian, defender, and inter- 
preter of our laws. And it can not be denied by any one, 
I take it, that the Hay-Herran convention provides for the 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 127 

execution of public works on a vast scale and for the 
occupancy in perpetuity of a portion of the territory of 
Colombia, the occupant being not a juridical person whose 
acts were to be governed by the civil law and the Colom- 
bian code, but rather a sovereign political entity, all of 
which would have given occasion for frequent conflicts, 
since there would have been a coexistence in Panama of 
two public powers, the one national, the other foreign. 

Hence the earnest efforts evinced by the Senate in as- 
certaining whether the American Government would 
agree to accept certain amendments tending especially to 
avoid as far as practicable any restriction in the treaty 
of the jurisdiction of the nation within its own terri- 
tory. . . . 

It follows that the Congress of Colombia, which is 
vested, according to our laws, with the faculty or power 
to approve or disapprove the treaties concluded by the 
Government, exercised a perfect right when it disap- 
proved the Hay-Herran convention. This course did not 
disqualify the Government for the conclusion of another 
treaty with the Government of your excellency and it 
indeed resolved to make a proposition to that effect, and 
Mr. Herran, whom our Minister for Foreign Affairs in- 
trusted with that duty by cable, had the honor of bringing 
this purpose to your excellency's knowledge. Neither did 
that course imply any slight toward the Government of 
the United States, and, on the contrary, the Senate, ob- 
servant of the existing friendly relations, relied on the 
sentiments of American fraternity, by which it is ani- 
mated, for the introduction in the new agreement that 
was to be made of stipulations more consonant with the 
notion of sovereignty entertained by the people of Co- 
lombia. 

Standing upon her dignity as a sovereign state, 
Colombia refused to be coerced, and by the unani- 
mous vote of her Senate, treated our warnings 



128 America and the Canal Title 

with the contempt they deserved. Our Senate 
did not ratify the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1900. 
It was sought by us, discussed at length in the 
Senate, and amended by it in vital particulars. 
We, however, received no warning note from 
Great Britain. A treaty which we sought and 
which was agreed to by our Government was not 
ratified by our Senate. This action was not rep- 
rehensible, but when the Colombian Senate re- 
jected a treaty not agreed to by the Colombian 
Government — wrested from her charge d'affaires 
by stealth — Roosevelt hurled at Colombia epithets 
unparalleled in the history of modern diplomacy. 
The reasons which prompted the adverse ac- 
tion of the Colombian Senate were properly be- 
yond our official animadversion or even official 
discussion. High-minded diplomacy usually 
holds in courteous respect the motives which may 
have inspired the legislative act of a sovereign 
nation. Yet in speaking of Colombia, our Ad- 
ministration ascribed to her the basest of motives. 
A comprehensive survey of all trustworthy evi- 
dence does not disclose a scintilla of evidence that 
sinister motives prompted Colombia's official ac- 
tion. In short, the evidence looks like a boom- 
erang, showing that Colombia stood ready to ac- 
cept the award of an impartial arbitral tribunal. 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 129 

The United States insisted on dictating terms 
which history will pronounce unfair. 

Because of our conduct under the Treaty of 
1846, Colombia acted with caution. Our Gov- 
ernment at that time (1902) had just read into 
that treaty a prerogative not contained in it when 
viewed from the standpoint of its construction 
up to that time. Up to that time, the United 
States assisted only in keeping Isthmian transit 
open at the request of the sovereign and in co- 
operation with the sovereign. In 1902, as 
already mentioned, the United States prevented 
Colombia from using the railroad for the trans- 
portation of her troops when it was required to 
furnish this service by charter. Therefore, 
Colombia rightly scrutinized the Hay-Herran 
treaty. When we consider that the United States 
has just attempted to violate the Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty, we are compelled to conclude that the cau- 
tion with which Colombia acted v/as more than 
justified. 

Impairment of sovereignty was the controlling 
factor in the consideration of the Hay-Herran 
treaty by the Colombian Senate, and so the warn- 
ings sent to Colombia by our Government were 
as gratuitous as they were offensive. They were 
outside the circle of respectable diplomacy. 



130 America and the Canal Title 

Colombia wanted the canal on her territory; she 
was merely parleying for reasonable terms. A 
president favorable thereto was already assured 
of election. Therefore, only differences re- 
mained to be ironed out as was the case between 
the United States and Great Britain when the 
first Hay-Pauncefote treaty was disapproved by 
our Senate through amendment. 

In another place, the writer has stated that the 
reason Great Britain and the United States 
finally agreed on the second Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty was the following: 

The United States needed the Panama Canal as a mili- 
tary and naval asset, and therefore sought the modifica- 
tion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with that end in view. 
Great Britain desired the construction of the canal be- 
cause of its large commercial interests. The one sought 
ownership and control as a military necessity; the other 
sought conditions and charges of traffic that would be 
just and equitable — that would be equal for identical 
units of traffic using the canal. The paramount object 
desired by the two contracting parties was different. 
Final agreement was secured by writing into the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty the controlling object of each of the 
two contracting parties. The United States secured 
thereby its desired military and naval asset. Great 
Britain secured thereby the assurance of equality in tolls 
between our nationals and its own subjects. 

In the canal treaty that was being negotiated 
with the sovereign, Colombia, the interests to be 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 131 

reconciled were abridgement of sovereignty and 
determination of the proper amount to be paid 
to the de jure sovereign for the concessions which 
were to be granted. Both countries needing the 
canal, the United States was in a stronger posi- 
tion than Colombia as bargainer, inasmuch as the 
Nicaragua route was available. Colombia in- 
dicated willingness to undertake the amendment 
of her constitution so as to permit impairment of 
her sovereignty and suggested periodic revalua- 
tion by an impartial tribunal as the proper method 
to determine the amount to be paid to her. It is 
thus evident that proper results could have been 
secured by further negotiations if our Adminis- 
tration of that time had merely desired proper 
adjustment of the conflicting interests. 

We have already stated that General Reyes was 
the most formidable candidate for the Colombian 
presidency at the election that was to be held in 
December, 1903. He favored ratification of the 
Hay-Herran treaty with all of its objectionable 
features. There was a strong minority in the 
Colombian Congress in favor of its ratification. 
Is it not clear that General Reyes, with the power 
and prestige of an incoming president, could have 
secured ratification of a treaty granting to the 
United States an adequate title to the Canal Zone 



132 America and the Canal Title 

upon reasonable terms ? The following from our 
Minister to Colombia, dated November i, 1903, 
is now apropos : 

Yesterday the Government issued a manifesto to the 
nation, which has been published and posted on the 
streets this morning. It severely criticises the action of 
Congress, and especially that of the Senate, which latter 
body has wasted its time in attacks on the Executive in- 
stead of devoting itself to the consideration of measures 
necessary to the well-being of the country. As regards 
the canal, it states that the Government has decided to 
resume negotiations in the hope of being able to come to 
a fresh agreement which shall meet with the approval of 
the next Congress, and that the Colombian charge d'af- 
f aires at Washington has been instructed to convey this 
information to the Government of the United States. 

The Hay-Herran treaty was not a satisfactory 
international compact because : first, the franchise 
was not subject to revaluation at stated intervals; 
second, a conflict of jurisdiction within the Canal 
Zone and the canal littoral was inevitable by 
reason of the elasticity of some of the provisions 
contained in it. Who but the weaker nation, 
Colombia, would have suffered? Therefore, it 
was her duty to act with caution. She was justi- 
fied in rejecting the Hay-Herran treaty on the 
grounds that the financial provisions were un- 
scientific and its administrative provisions were 
charged with inevitable conflict in their applica- 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 133 

tion, without including a provision for their ad- 
judication by an impartial tribunal. 

In view of the foregoing, what are we to think 
about the threats our Administration sent to 
Colombia? Let us reason together. An appro- 
priate analogy is an aid to clear thinking and so 
we will use the following: If at the time that 
the United States Senate was considering the first 
Hay-Pauncefote treaty^ Great Britain had sent 
us warnings similar to those we sent Colombia, 
what would our Congress have done? The 
Senate would have peremptorily rejected the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty, and Congress would have im- 
mediately abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
Congress would then have proceeded with the 
Isthmian canal project in complete disregard of 
Great Britain. Yet our Administration in 1903 
addressed communications to a friendly nation 
that we would have treated with scorn if they had 
been addressed to us. These warnings were rep- 
rehensible and provocative of the course that 
Colombia thereafter pursued. No self-respect- 
ing nation will yield to coercion. 

What did Colombia do ? She declined to ratify 
the Hay-Herran treaty, after provocation. We 
declined to ratify the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty. 
The latter caused delay in entering upon canal 

/ 



134 America and the Canal Title 

construction. History shows that our Senate 
acted with wisdom when it amended the first Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty. If a treaty is a solemn en- 
gagement, it is important that all of its provisions 
should be properly scrutinized — especially if it is 
to run in perpetuity without any provision for 
readjustment of its terms. Why this haste on 
our part? Why? It is now evident that pro- 
cedure by the orderly processes of public law 
would have given proper results. Colombia de- 
sired to do what we did when we amended the 
first Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Our conduct, of 
course, was beneficent; that of Colombia was 
base! Who commissioned Roosevelt to be the 
mentor of civilization? 

Coercion solidified Colombian sentiment 
against the ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty. 
The maintenance of Colombian dignity assumed 
paramount importance in the deliberations of the 
Colombian Senate. Both friend and foe of the 
treaty voted against ratification. A unanimous 
vote against ratification was the answer of the 
Colombian Senate to the attempted coercion by 
our Government. History, while pointing the 
unmoving finger of scorn at our Administration, 
will, at the same time, vindicate the action of the 
Colombian Senate. 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 135 

The Panama Canal, as an actuality, is a monu- 
ment to the genius of our engineers. Would that 
it could be said of Roosevelt that he : ''Nothing 
common did or mean, upon that memorable 
scene," when he took the Canal Zone and let the 
Congress debate the act after the deed! Would 
that it could be said that he exercised the patience 
of Job and displayed the wisdom of Solomon in 
the negotiations to secure an adequate title to the 
Canal Zone ! As already stated, an adequate title 
could have been secured by the proper diplomatic 
methods as it was in the interest of Colombia to 
come to an understanding with the United States 
so that the construction of the most colossal en- 
terprise ever undertaken by man could be pros- 
ecuted with vigor. 

It is infinitely better for a nation to forego the 
construction of a canal on its territory than to 
lose its honor and self-respect by yielding to 
coercion. Craven cowardice is an unfailing sign 
of either national decadence or national degen- 
eracy. A nation that fails to protect its honor, 
a nation that fails to restore its honor when sul- 
lied, can not be the important factor in the ad- 
vancement of mankind that it otherwise would 
be. Let us hope that the United States, rich and 
powerful, will take its honor out of pawn by mak- 



136 America and the Canal Title 

ing reparation to Colombia. Unless this is done 
she is likely to remain an Ishmaelite among the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere. 

The dismemberment of Colombia by the United 
States was an offense against international law, 
a violation of a solemn engagement and an embar- 
rassment to Spanish-America. It is an offense 
which is not in the slightest degree palliated by 
the warnings to Colombia. A warning does not 
excuse an unlawful act ; rather does it aggravate 
the deed ; it is included in the offense. Our warn- 
ings to Colombia are merely the forerunner of 
collaboration with the separatists on the Isthmus 
to effect the secession of the Province of Panama 
from Colombia. A nation, not unlike an indi- 
vidual, that resorts to coercion is on dangerous 
ground. Roosevelt carried it to the point where 
he could not retreat without humiliation, or pro- 
ceed without stultifying his Administration. He 
had to make good according to his ethics. How 
could he? By an understanding, direct or by 
proxy, with the separatists on the Isthmus. This 
was effected through Bunau-Varilla as inter- 
mediary, the separatists playing the part allotted 
to them, and our Administration doing the rest. 
Our gunboats were the means employed to effect 
the dismemberment of Colombia. It was our 



Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 137 

navy that made possible the establishment of the 
so-called Republic of Panama. It was the as- 
surance of protection by the United States that 
caused the separatists to proceed with the pro- 
jected secession of the Province of Panama from 
Colombia. These statements will be substanti- 
ated in the next chapter. They are the fruit of 
attempted coercion — the last step in the process 
of using chicane, instead of the method approved 
by modern diplomacy, to secure the Canal Zone. 
Try coercion on your neighbor and see how it 
works. You will then be in a position to under- 
stand the procedure described in this and the 
three following chapters which tell how the 
Roosevelt Administration ''took" the Canal Zone. 



Chapter IV 
The ''Vaudeville" Revolution on the Isthmus 

Was there a real revolution on the Isthmus of 
Panama in the fall of 1903 ? This is a vital ques- 
tion. It must be answered before passing judg- 
ment on the Roosevelt Administration. If, upon 
a searching examination, it appears that there 
was only a make-believe revolution and not an 
actual uprising, the conduct of our Administra- 
tion at that time becomes brigandage under a 
veneer of respectability. If it appears that there 
was no revolution on the Isthmus at the time, the 
acts of our Administration must be disowned and 
reparation must be made to Colombia or the act 
will become for all time the nation's act. We 
will now show that there was no revolution on 
the Isthmus at the time. 

As already stated, there was no real revolu- 
tion in the Province of Panama in the fall of 
1903 when the latter was organized into an in- 
dependent state under the protection of the 
United States. Those interested in secession es- 

138 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 139 

tablished a nominal government independent of 
that of Colombia on November 4, 1903. The 
independence of the nominal government was 
recognized by the United States on November 6, 
1903. This was two days before the Govern- 
ment of Colombia learned of the secession of its 
choicest province. The rape of Colombia was 
completed two days before the Colombian Gov- 
ernment received information of the occurrences 
on the Isthmus. American vessels of war were 
ordered to Isthmian waters before the event to 
protect secession against attack by Colombia, 
and to safeguard the establishing of a govern- 
ment in the Province, which was to be a pro- 
tectorate of the United States. 

Assurance that the American navy would be 
used to protect secession and to assure its suc- 
cess were conveyed to the Separatists of Panama 
by Bunau-Varilla. We will show that this as- 
surance was given to him by the Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration. Had not this assurance been 
given, the separatists would not have proceeded 
with the secession of the Province and there 
would be no so-called ''Republic of Panama'* to- 
day. 

The foregoing statement is a severe indict- 
ment of our then Government. It is so far- 



140 America and the Canal Title 

reaching that it is an unpardonable libel unless 
it rests on a basis of fact. We will now marshal 
the facts on which this indictment is based. 

We are dealing only incidentally with the post- 
secession activities of our then Administration. 
We are dealing primarily with its ante-secession 
activities. These were so improper that it sought 
to conceal them. It is now established that se- 
cession was predicated on them and was pro- 
ceeded with only because of the arrival of the 
Nashville — tangible evidence of assured protec- 
tion. In short, there was no revolution or inten- 
tion to promote a revolution. There was to be 
secession if the United States would guarantee 
its success. Secession eventuated and the pro- 
tection was furnished. The so-called Republic 
of Panama is mute evidence of pre-arrangement 
(of an adequate understanding) between the 
Roosevelt Administration and the separatists of 
Panama. 

Some statements crystalHze a story — give it 
objectivity so that it can be seen in a flash. Such 
a statement is the one made by Roosevelt to the 
students of the University of California. As re- 
ported it reads: 

I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
it. If I had followed traditional, conservative methods, 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 141 

I would have submitted a dignified state paper of prob- 
ably two hundred pages to Congress, and the debate on 
it would have been going on yet; but / took the Canal 
Zone and let Congress debate ; and while the debate goes 
on the canal does also. 

Another such statement is the following by 
Roosevelt : 

I did not lift my finger to incite the revolutionists. 
The right simile to use is totally different. I simply 
ceased to stamp out the different revolutionary fuses that 
were already burning. 

These statements are charged with informa- 
tion that their author did not intend to disclose, 
but which a mind conversant with Isthmian 
events of the time automatically supplies. There 
were no revolutionary fuses on the Isthmus at 
the time. There was merely effort to secure ad- 
vance assurance of protection of secession by the 
United States. It succeeded. Therefore, the ob- 
servation would be correct if it had stated that 
the separatists were assured that the Ameri- 
can Administration would prevent Colombia 
from putting out the fuse — that secession would 
be protected within forty-eight hours after the 
Declaration of Independence. 

Bunau-Varilla was in conference with our Ad- 
ministration on October 16, 1903. On October 



142 America and the Canal Title 

17, he addressed Doctor Amador, first President 
of the RepubHc of Panama, as follows: 

I CAN GIVE YOU THE ASSURANCE THAT YOU WILL BE 
PROTECTED BY THE AMERICAN FORCES FORTY-EIGHT HOURS 
AFTER YOU HAVE PROCLAIMED THE NEW REPUBLIC ON THE 
WHOLE ISTHMUS. 

The real story of the opera bouife revolution 
on the Isthmus in the fall of 1903 can best be 
told by commencing with the account of it by 
Bunau-Varilla. It is found in his book: 
^'Panama, the Creation, Destruction and Resur- 
rection,'' pages 289-342. 

When it became apparent that the fate of the 
Hay-Herran treaty hung in the balance, an inner 
circle in the city of Panama commenced to con- 
sider secession. Their first endeavor was to as- 
certain if the cooperation of the United States 
could be secured. William Nelson Cromwell 
was consulted. He undertook to arrange 
it. 

Results were satisfactory. Warning reached 
him from the seat of government of Colombia. 
He was counsel for the French company. Their 
interests had been placed in jeopardy by his ac- 
tivities. He had to retire from ostensible con- 
nection with the venture. So Bunau-Varilla 
was summoned from France, The continuity 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 143 

of the movement was not interrupted. Bunau- 
Varilla started where Cromwell left off. 

What transpired at the conference above men- 
tioned is not of record. We have the ipse dixit 
of Roosevelt. Events, however, stand in a causal 
relation. Actions speak louder than words. 
The events that followed in precise coordination 
tell the story as clearly as though a full record 
had been kept. No revolution could have been 
planned and carried out with such clockwork pre- 
cision without a perfect understanding between 
the parties in interest. The separatists of 
Panama had foreknowledge of the intentions of 
the Roosevelt Administration. There was but 
one person who could have given them that fore- 
knowledge, and that was the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army and Navy. 

On September 23, the Hay-Herran treaty ex- 
pired. It had been rejected August 12 by the 
Colombian Senate. This was the psychological 
moment for decisive action. So Bunau-Varilla 
appears on the scene. Colombia had not yielded 
to coercion. To coerce her by force would re- 
quire the cooperation of the Congress. With the 
Nicaragua route available. Congress would hesi- 
tate and would probably refuse to concur. 
Hence, collaboration with the separatists offered 



144 America and the Canal Title 

the solution. Bunau-Varilla's presence offered 
the opportunity. Later events show that this 
was the method adopted. 

Bunau-Varilla states in the book named, that 
he inferred what the action of the Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration would be in the event of an upris- 
ing in Panama. He gives the facts on which he 
based the inference. On thorough investigation, 
the writer finds that the facts are other than as 
stated by the author named, and would have 
forced a conclusion other than the one given. 
The actual facts would have compelled the infer- 
ence that the United States would expect Colom- 
bia to maintain free and uninterrupted transit, 
and that she would be given a free hand to quell 
any uprising. This is what had transpired there- 
tofore. Nothing could have been inferred save 
that the United States would respect Colombia's 
sovereignty. Therefore he could have got the 
information which he claims to have possessed 
only by being told. Only the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army and Navy could have told him, 
either directly or by proxy, that is, the Presi- 
dent. 

Men do not risk their lives, their property and 
the welfare of their families in a wild-goose chase 
after a revolution; nor does an outsider risk prop- 



The Vaudeville T<:evolutlon on Isthmus 145 

erty and all that others hold dear on a mere in- 
ference not inferable from established facts. 
The known facts plainly show that there was an 
understanding between our then Administration 
and Bunau-Varilla, and that the latter was the 
intermediary for communicating with the sepa- 
ratists of Panama. Bunau-Varilla's explana- 
tion transforms suspicion into knowledge, and 
establishes collusion between our Administration 
and the separatists of Panama. 

The status of secession as of September 22, 
1903, can be inferred from a conversation be- 
tween Bunau-Varilla, who had just arrived in 
New York from France, and an M. Lindo, a 
merchant of New York and Panama. It is given 
in Bunau-Varilla's book on Panama. We will 
reproduce it in the form of a dialogue, preserv- 
ing the exact words reported : 

Bunau-Varilla — Well, is the rumor true that the peo- 
ple of Panama are going to make a revolution ? 

M. Lindo — They have no financial means. . . . With- 
out money a revolution cannot be brought about any 
more than a war. But if you care to know what the 
situation really is, I will ask Amador to come and see you. 
. . . He has come precisely to obtain the means of bring- 
ing about a revolution. But he has failed, and is sailing 
for Panama in a few days. He will tell you all. He is 
in despair. 

This seems to show that something resembling 



146 America and the Canal Title 

a revolution had been comtemplated, and that it 
was to be abandoned for lack of assured support 
from the United States. But the time limit for 
the ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty expired 
the next day. Perhaps our Administration would 
after that give the desired assurance. 

On the following day (September 23), Bunau- 
Varilla met Doctor Amador in conference. In 
his book, Bunau-Varilla tells the story that Doc- 
tor Amador told him. The following is a cor- 
rect transcript of the narrative as recorded in the 
section of the book devoted to demonstrating that 
he (Bunau-Varilla) and not Roosevelt is the fos- 
ter-father of the so-called uprising on the Isth- 
mus: 

During the past year a group of citizens of the Isth- 
mus, of whom I was one, have met together to consider 
the measures to be taken if Colombia rejected the Hay- 
Herran treaty. 

We one and all agreed that such a decision would stop 
all activity, ruin the inhabitants, and within a few years 
again transform the Isthmus into a virgin forest. 

Confronted by a decision so despotic, we decided to 
prepare for an armed combat, rather than submit pas- 
sively to the tyrant's sentence of death. 

But Colombia was capable of crushing all resistance: 
as its power is enormously superior to that of the Prov- 
ince of Panama. Consequently we turned our eyes 
towards the great American Republic. She also had an 
interest in making an effective protest in the presence of 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 147 

the extraordinary tide of the Colombian sentiment 
against the execution of the Canal. 

Why should not this great Republic, so rich, so power- 
ful, give the necessary cooperation in money and in mili- 
tary force? 

This idea seemed to us so reasonable that we decided 
to entrust with a mission to the United States a certain 
Beers, more generally known by the name of Captain 
Beers. 

He was an employee of the Panama Railroad. His 
mission consisted in visiting the right person in order to 
learn whether this double support could be obtained. 

The persons whom Beers saw assured him that noth- 
ing was easier and they promised to obtain all that we 
asked for. Captain Beers came back to Panama to tell 
of the happy result of his mission. 

Our friends then decided to delegate two of their num- 
ber in order to reach a final understanding. I was one 
of the two delegates. ... As soon as I arrived I was 
received with open arms by the persons whom Captain 
Beers had seen. I was to go to Washington to see Mr. 
Hay, Secretary of State, in order to conclude the final 
transaction. 

But suddenly the attitude of the person who was to 
take me to Washington entirely changed. 

Whenever I went to see him strict orders had been 
given to the effect that he was not in. I had to install 
myself in the hall, to camp there, and, so to speak, besiege 
his office. Nothing resulted from it. And there I am. 
All is lost. At any moment the conspiracy may be dis- 
covered and my friends judged, sentenced to death, and 
their property confiscated. I at first decided to return 
to Panama to share their fate. But I am hesitating. If 
my friends are shot I prefer to devote my life to aveng- 
ing them on the man who will have been the cause of 
their deaths. ... 

There is to-day only a weak Colombian garrison at 



148 America and the Canal Title 

Panama. Moreover, these men who have been living 
for many years on the Isthmus have ceased to count as 
foreigners to us. Our emotions, our aspirations, are 
theirs. Their general, Huertas, a valiant soldier, who 
has his troops well in hand, is himself shocked at the way 
Colombia is behaving towards Panama. 

A revolution would to-day meet with no obstacle. 
But the Colombians have the command of the sea; their 
ships' crews are loyal. We must first, therefore, acquire 
a fleet to prevent Colombia from overwhelming with her 
troops the Province of Panama. 

Besides this we want arms. It was to obtain ships and 
arms that I have come here. Our first envoy, Captain 
Beers, had been assured, and the same pledge was re- 
peated to me when I came, that the United States would 
give us all the money we needed to buy arms and ships 
and pay the troops. . . . We need $6,000,000. 

Let it be noted that it was September 2^, 1903, 
when Dr. Amador told the story just described. 
At that time only a few citizens of the Isthmus 
had considered revolution. No effort had been 
made to promote discontent on the Isthmus. No 
effort had been made to promote a general upris- 
ing. No preparation had yet been made for an 
organized revolt. Real revolutions are not the 
product of such methods. An Isthmus "seething 
with revolution" was not an element of the? suc- 
cess. Protection of secession by an adequate 
fleet was the only method that was considered. 
Our navy had such a fleet, and the Canal Zone 
was in the Province of Panama. The only prep- 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 149 

aration needed was a bargain — an understanding. 
Our Administration had what the separatists on 
the Isthmus needed to succeed (a fleet) and they 
offered what we wanted (the Canal Zone). 

The secessionists needed warships to control 
the sea in order to prevent Colombia from land- 
ing troops on the Isthmus. There was no other 
way in which Colombia could send troops to 
maintain her sovereignty. The United States 
had the warships. The money in the provincial 
treasury, with the amount to be advanced by 
Bunau-Varilla ($100,000), was enough to pur- 
chase official Colombia domiciled on the Isthmus. 
Therefore, if Colombia could be prevented from 
landing additional troops on the Isthmus, the suc- 
cess of secession was assured in advance. This 
was the program. There was no need of the 
Isthmus being aflame with revolution to carry it 
out. It was only necessary that our Administra- 
tion should be ''seething with revolution/' 

The foregoing excerpt shows the hopeless con- 
dition of the so-called revolution on September 
2:^, It was predicated on the conditional sup- 
port of the United States. Seemingly no assur- 
ance had as yet been secured. Such assurance 
was necessary to give it vitality. Was it secured ? 

There is unmistakable evidence that Bunau- 



150 America and the Canal Title 

Varilla had foreknowledge of adequate military 
and naval support. He claims to have played a 
role similar to that of Sherlock Holmes, and to 
have found it out without having been told. His 
narrative, however, supplies the missing links 
that connect our Administration with the col- 
laboration in which secession was arranged. 

In the time intervening between September 23 
and October 10, Bunau- Varilla sounded our Ad- 
ministration. He tells us in the accounts of his 
conferences what he wants us to believe and not 
what actually transpired. We find in his Sher- 
lock Holmes tale as given in his book the f oUow- 



I left the private office of the President [October 10, 
1903] in possession of all the elements necessary for 
action. 

I had at last the direct confirmation of the inductions 
which thus far I had drawn solely from pure reasoning: 
the President of the United States was holding firm for 
Panama. 

If a revolution were to generate new conditions favor- 
able to the acquisition of the Canal Zone by the United 
States, President Roosevelt would immediately seize the 
opportunity . . . [interesting! interesting!]. 

It remained for me to discover the second unknown 
quantity. How could a revolution be made successfully 
at Panama without the financial cooperation of the 
United States, and without the express promise of her 
military support? . . . 

The great and apparently unsurmountable obstacle was 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 151 

the obtaining of a sum of $6,000,000 for the necessary 
armament. In trying to reduce this demand of Amador, 
the Hght suddenly flashed across my mind during my 
railway journey back to New York. 

What was going to be the use of this $6,000,000, ac- 
cording to Amador? To buy ships, which would be 
equipped for war in order to sink Colombian ships, and 
to prevent the transportations of troops ! 

But where were these military movements to be 
feared? Was it in the Isthmus itself? By no means, 
because the Treaty of 1846 gave the United States the 
right, and imposed upon her the duty, of turning any bel- 
ligerents away from the line of transit. 

Bunau-Varilla concluded that the $6,000,000 
were not needed as the United States under the 
Treaty of 1846 was obligated to prohibit fighting 
within the zone of the railroad, and that that 
would automatically prevent Colombia from 
maintaining her sovereignty over the area needed 
for canal purposes. Is this construction of the 
Treaty of 1846 correct ? Suffice it to say that the 
construction of this Treaty from its adoption to 
the assumption of the Presidency by Theodore 
Roosevelt is contained in a letter addressed to 
our Minister in Bogota by Secretary of State, 
Hamilton Fish. It reads : 

By the Treaty of 1846 with New Granada this Gov- 
ernment has engaged to guarantee the neutrality of the 
Isthmus of Panama. This engagement, however, has 
never been acknowledged to embrace the duty of protect- 
ing the road across it from the violence of local factions ; 



152 America and the Canal Title 

but it is regarded as the undoubted duty of the Colombian 
Government to protect it against attacks from local in- 
surgents. 

You are consequently requested to address a repre- 
sentation upon this subject to the Colombian minister for 
foreign affairs, and to ask that a sufficient force be kept 
on the Isthmus to deter attacks upon the road. 

Instead of it being the duty of the United 
States to exclude the sovereign, Colombia, from 
the line of railroad for military purposes she was, 
in accordance with the earlier construction of the 
Treaty of 1846, obligated not to interfere with 
her in the maintenance of order on the Isthmus. 
If the guarantee of the United States under the 
Treaty of 1846 during the fifty-five years that it 
had then been in force did not lead to independ- 
ence — especially in 1885 and in 1 899-1902, when 
there were formidable revolts — how could it be 
expected to do so in 1903 without any prepara- 
tion whatever? Bunau-Varilla nowhere ex- 
plains. We will again quote from his book: 

I had myself seen the United States, in 1885, perform- 
ing her duty and preventing any fighting in this zone 
[between the watersheds of the Chagres and of the Pana- 
man Rio Grande]. . . . 

It may be remembered that in 1885 a Revolutionary 
army commanded by General Aizpuru had seized Pan- 
ama. The town once taken, the American troops had 
entered Panama to prevent disorder. But when it was 
seen that the Revolutionary Government was maintain- 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 153 

ing order, the American forces were withdrawn, and 
they confined themselves to garrisoning the railroad and 
its wharf, the sole [interesting with a?] means of com- 
munication with the Pacific Ocean. 

Some days later, two ships laden with Government 
troops tried to land at the wharf. 

General Reyes, who commanded the Colombian troops, 
was invited to withdraw, and the landing was forbidden 
by Commander McCalla. 

I had seen with my owm eyes, therefore, in 1885, the 
Revolution protected from the aggression of the Gov- 
ernment troops by the American military authorities. 

The foregoing is a garbled and grossly inac- 
curate account of the Isthmian events in the 
spring of 1885. It shows a deliberate attempt 
to bear false witness in order to dissipate the 
suspicion resting on the Roosevelt Administra- 
tion for complicity in the Isthmian disturbance 
of 1903. We will let official documents tell the 
actual story. The first is a telegram from the 
Secretary of the Navy, Whitney, to Rear Ad- 
miral Jouett, dated April 3, 1885. It was sent 
because an American steamship had been seized 
at Colon, its cargo had been taken from her, and 
her officers and the American consul had been 
imprisoned. The parts bearing on the subject 
matter under consideration read: 

The duty you are called upon to perform calls for the 
exercise of great discretion. The object of the expedi- 
tion is the protection by the United States of its citizens. 



154 America and the Canal Title 

to preserve the neutrality and keep open the transit from 
Colon to Panama, and further to protect the lives and 
property of American citizens. . . . 

You have no part to perform in the political or social 
disorder of Colombia, and it will be your duty to see that 
no irritation or unfriendliness shall arise from your pres- 
ence at the Isthmus. 

Thus events that had transpired were to be 
adjusted through diplomatic channels. The 
Rear Admiral was sent to protect American in- 
terests without ofTense to the sovereign, Colom- 
bia. The following telegram from Rear Admiral 
Jouett to Commander McCalla, dated April 17, 
1885, clinches this point: 

In order to preserve the strict neutrality of the Isth- 
mus of Panama, and to avoid interruption to the transit, 
you will please prevent any insurgent force from landing 
or operating in this vicinity. 

The United States clearly recognized that the 
rights of the sovereign were supreme. Her ef- 
forts to protect American lives and property 
and to keep the line of transit open were in co- 
operation with the sovereign. Only the in- 
surgents were restrained. This point is reen- 
f orced in a telegram sent by Rear Admiral Jouett 
to Secretary Whitney, dated April 17, 1885. In 
this telegram, the Rear Admiral informed the 
Secretary of his arrival, and states : 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 155 

As Colonel Ulloa was the only representative of the 
Colombian Government in this vicinity, I immediately 
addressed a letter to him, informing him of my arrival 
and requesting his permission to land men for the protec- 
tion of American lives and property and preserving the 
free transit of the Isthmus. He replied that he could 
see no objection to landing the men, and that he would 
forward my letter to the Government at Bogota. 

In 1885 the United States asked permission to 
land forces on the Isthmus. The rights of the 
sovereign were respected. In 1903, the sovereign 
was prohibited from landing forces on the Isth- 
mus for the maintenance of order. In 1885 the 
sovereign was accorded every facility to establish 
order. 

Thus the official documents completely dis- 
credit Bunau-Varilla. He had advance informa- 
tion that the United States would protect seces- 
sion within forty-eight hours after the event. 
He is attempting to explain hov/ he came thereby. 
Therefore, the importance of our discrediting 
him as the narrative unfolds. It will leave him 
wath advance information — unexplained by him. 
In a communication to Secretary Whitney, dated 
April 18, 1885, Rear Admiral Jouett clearly 
states the spirit of American intervention: 

Panama is still held by the insurgents, and until the 
Government forces reestablish themselves in that city, 
serious disorder is likely to occur there at any time. 



IS6 America and the Canal Title 

It is probable that the Government troops who have 
put down the revolution in the interior will soon come to 
Panama and take charge. In that event, I would advise 
the immediate withdrawal of one-half of the force sent 
by steamer from New York, and afterwards, as circum- 
stances permit, the gradual reduction of our force to an 
establishment which can be maintained here without in- 
termission. 

Order was maintained by our forces until the 
Government succeeded in reestablishing its 
authority. This also shows that Bunau-Varilla 
is guilty of willful misrepresentation. 

But, General Reyes, who commanded the 
Colombian troops, was prevented from landing 
certain troops just arrived. Again an official 
document will tell the true story. It is by Com- 
mander McCalla to the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Colombian forces at Panama, dated April 28, 
1885, and reads: 

I have the distinguished honor ... to inform you that 
for the protection of the transit across the Isthmus, and 
for the protection of Americans and their property, I 
occupy the railroad station at this place with a United 
States naval force. 

My lines for this purpose necessarily extend from the 
railroad wharves to the passenger station at the bridge. 

May I beg leave to request that the national force un- 
der your command may be directed not to land within 
my lines. 

I shall take the first opportunity of paying my respects 
to you ; meanwhile I shall be most happy to place my per- 
sonal services at your disposition. 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 157 

The note from which the last quotation is made 
was' transmitted by the agency of Lieutenant 
Reeder. During the conversation, General 
Reyes stated to Lieutenant Reeder that he was 
having the Rio Grande, south of the city, ex- 
amined with the view of finding out whether he 
would be able to land his forces in the vicinity. 
They did land. 

On the following day there was a conference 
attended by General Reyes for Colombia, General 
Aizpuru for the insurgents, and Rear Admiral 
Jouett. The conference resulted in an agree-, 
ment being signed between General Reyes and 
General Aizpuru by which the latter agreed to 
surrender. 

This shows that the American military au- 
thorities did not protect the insurgents. Bunau- 
Varilla's inference vanishes as the actual facts 
are stated. 

Our best witness is Grover Cleveland. His 
word was as good as his bond throughout the 
length and breadth of the land. His message to 
the Congress in the following December leaves 
no doubt as to the course that the United States 
pursued. It completely disposes of the preten- 
sions of Bunau-Varilla, and with it vanishes the 
inference. The section of the message devoted 



158 America and the Canal Title 

to our intervention in the uprising on the Isthmus 
states : 

Emergencies growing out of the civil war in the United 
States of Colombia demanded of the Government at the 
beginning of this Administration the employment of 
armed force to fulfill its guarantee under the thirty-fifth 
article of the Treaty of 1846, in order to keep the transit 
open across the Isthmus of Panama. 

Desirous of exercising only the powers expressly re- 
served to us by the treaty, and mindful of the rights of 
Colombia, the forces sent to the Isthmus were instructed 
to confine their action to ''positively and efficaciously" 
preventing the transit and its accessories from being "in- 
terrupted or embarrassed." 

The execution of this delicate and responsible task nec- 
essarily involved police control where the local authority 
was temporarily powerless, but always in aid of the sov- 
ereignty in Colombia. 

The prompt and successful fulfillment of its duty by 
this Government was highly appreciated by the Govern- 
ment of Colombia, and has been followed by expressions 
of its satisfaction. . . . The restoration of peace on the 
Isthmus by the reestablishment of the constituted Gov- 
ernment there being accomplished, the forces of the 
United States were withdrawn. 

We have now shown that events on the Isth- 
mus in the spring of 1885 were other than as 
stated by Bunau-Varilla. This is of controlling 
importance in our argument. It was the repre- 
sentations which he made to the separatists that 
caused secession. These representations indi- 
cated foreknowledge that the United States 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 159 

would protect secession. These representations 
caused those interested in secession to proceed 
with the project. It is because of this fact that 
we give his explanation with great detail, and 
answer it with official documents woven into a 
narrative. We hope to leave him at the end of 
our argument securely in possession of the ad- 
vance information which resulted in the estab- 
lishment of the so-called Republic of Panama, 
and with a demolished explanation as to how he 
came by the information. 

We will now sidestep the story of Bunau- 
Varilla until we have presented data which point 
to the correctness of the conclusion we are de- 
veloping. This done, we will conclude the story 
of Bunau-Varilla and our interpretation of it. 

We will commence with the statement made 
by Dr. Amador to General Amaya of Colombia 
on November 4, found in the report of the latter 
to the Colombian Minister of War dated Novem- 
ber 14, 1903: 

Dr. Amador, an old friend of mine, came to see me 
within a few hours of my being placed in jail, and he said 
to me textually, ''You must understand that we who 
started this movement are not insane; we fully appreci- 
ated the fact that in no case could we withstand all the 
rest of the nation, and in consequence we had to resort 



i6o America and the Canal Title 

to means that, although painful, were indispensable. 
The United States has fully entered into this movement, 
and the Panamans are not alone, as in every event they 
will back up our actions. Not another Colombian sol- 
dier will ever disembark again on any of the coasts of 
the Isthmus, and our independence is guaranteed by that 
colossus." He offered me his services and said that he 
wished to present his respects to my chief, to whom I 
heard him make similar assertions, which, unfortunately, 
were corroborated by the increasing number of warships 
of that power in both seas, and by the disembarkation of 
its forces to mock our weakness. 

And yet, according to Roosevelt, the Isthmus 
was * 'seething with revolution !" We — some ten 
— who started this movement are not mad! 
There is no evidence that the Isthmus was 
'^seething with revolution." There is only evi- 
dence of duplicity. But, truth matches. Those 
who arranged and carried out secession from 
Panama to Washington cannot blot out history. 
The true story of the birth of the so-called Re- 
public of Panama is being recorded. General 
Tovar, in his report to the Colombian Minister 
of War, dated November 20, 1903, states: 

The solitary confinement in which I was kept from the 
afternoon of the 3d was broken on the evening of the fol- 
lowing day by the visit which Sefior Manuel Amador 
Guerrero, principal leader of the revolutionary move- 
ment, paid me in my prison. Dr. Amador, after having 
spoken with General Amaya, had me brought down from 
the room I occupied at police headquarters, and informed 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus i6i 

me that events which had taken place on the previous 
evening were the result of a plan for a long time con- 
ceived and discussed at length in Panama and in Wash- 
ington,' and executed under the protection and guaranty 
of the Government of the United States with which he 
personally had recently come to an understanding . . . 
that in consequence it was ridiculous to suppose that the 
Panamans could have successfully defied the rest of the 
republic, and for the same reason all resistance on my 
part would be quite useless; that therefore I ought to 
order the reembarkation of the battalion Tiradores which 
remained in Colon, taking advantage for this purpose of 
the royal mail steam packet Orinoco, then in that port, 
and thus avoiding in a spirit of humanity the shedding 
of blood. At the same time he informed me that there 
were in Colon several American warships which had 
come to protect the revolutionary movement. I an- 
swered Senor Amador that I would take no account of 
what he had just told me, as my duty and the duty of the 
army I commanded was sufficiently clear, and that in 
consequence no human force could drag from me the 
order that he desired. I considered my conference with 
him at an end, and turned to be conducted back to my 
prison, where I learned that a similar proposition had 
been made to General Amaya, but without success. 

Dr. Porras, one of the loyal Colombians on the 
Isthmus, was also arrested and confined in the 
police barracks. General Aizpuru of the muni- 
cipal council of Panama called on him and told 
him that the separatists' movement was the work 
of only a few leaders. This dialogue as re- 
corded in the hearings before the House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations clinches the story of 



1 62 America and the Canal Title 

collusion between our Administration and the 
separatists on the Isthmus. It starts with Gen- 
eral Aizpuru saying: 

Yes; but the Republic of Panama is an accomplished 
fact, as you will soon be convinced. 

I cannot believe it [answered Doctor Porras]. Co- 
lombia will soon call Panama to account for her temerity 
and ingratitude. 

The Government of Colombia will not be able to do 
anything in the matter [was Aizpuru's answer]. Pan- 
ama is under the protection of the United States; if it 
were not it would have recognized its helplessness and 
would not have attempted its freedom. 

We are now in a position to see why the newly 
arrived Colombian soldiers acted as they did. In- 
stead of the entire Isthmus being aflame with 
revolution, an inner circle of Panama used with 
telling effect their assurance of the support of 
the United States and its tangible evidence — the 
presence of the Nashville and the refusal of the 
railroad company to transport troops. So Colo- 
nel Torres decided to reembark his soldiers for 
the return to Cartagena. The following tele- 
gram to Secretary Hay, dated November 5, 1903, 
speaks for itself: 

All Colombian soldiers at Colon now, 7 p. m,, going on 
board Royal Mail steamer returning to Cartagena. Ves- 
sel, supposed to be Dixie, in sight. 

What was the effect of the presence of the 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 163 

American marines on the Colombian troops at 
Colon? The following from an official commu- 
nication of Commander Hubbard of the Nash- 
ville, dated November 5, 1903, tells the story: 

I am positive that the determined attitude of our men, 
their coolness and evident intention of standing their 
ground, had a most salutary and decisive effect on the 
immediate situation, and was the initial step in the ulti- 
mate abandoning of Colon by these troops and their 
return to Cartagena the following day. 

Does this sound like keeping the line of transit 
open? It had only been closed to the sovereign 
up to that time. The Isthmians were not pre- 
pared for military operations, and, therefore, 
there was no obstruction to transit threatened or 
imminent. This was the only time in the history 
of the Treaty of 1846 that troops of the sovereign 
were expelled from the Isthmus by our forces. 

Our Administration clearly ordered the Nash- 
ville to Colon for the unlawful purpose of inter- 
fering with the sovereign rights of Colombia and 
of effecting her dismemberment. This is as re- 
pugnant to morality as collaboration with the 
separatists of Panama to effect the dismember- 
ment of Colombia and to establish the so-called 
Republic of Panama. We will give the telegram 
to the commander of the Nashville, dated Novem- 



164 America and the Canal Title 

ber 2, 1903, because of its significance when sub- 
jected to careful examination: 

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interrup- 
tion threatened by armed force, occupy the line of rail- 
road. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile 
intent, either Government or insurgent, either at Colon, 
Porto Bello, or other point. Send copy of instructions 
to the senior officer present at Panama upon arrival of 
Boston. Have sent copy of instructions and have tele- 
graphed Dixie to proceed with all possible dispatch from 
Kingston to Colon. Government force reported ap- 
proaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing 
if in your judgment this would precipitate a conflict. 

On November 2, 1903, there were no insurgents 
in the Province of Panama. The Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration must have known— did know — that 
the separatists had no ships and so could not 
project a military movement by water. The 
order to the commander of the Nashville, there- 
fore, was designed to prevent Colombia (the 
sovereign) from landing troops in her own terri- 
tory. It was an order equivalent to assuring the 
success of secession before there was secession 
— before any Isthmians bore arms. The sepa- 
ratists were not prepared to bear arms. It was 
not on the program that they should. Secession 
was to be bloodless. Therefore, our marines 
were to be the military end of the so-called revo- 
lution. To hold that collaboration is not the 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 165 

prelude to the foregoing does violence to reason 
and to common sense. 



Before dealing with the change in the tradi- 
tional American Isthmian policy, we will take a 
backward look, and, in so doing, get our bear- 
ings. Bunau-Varilla states that he assured the 
separatists that the United States would protect 
secession. We learn from those interested in se- 
cession that they acted on the assurance of 
Bunau-Varilla when it was supported by tangible 
evidence — the arrival of the Nashville at Colon 
on November 2, 1903. Dr. Amador, first Presi- 
dent of the Republic of Panama, stated that they 
knew that the United States would not allow 
Colombia to attack them. The history of the 
United States in relation to the Treaty of 1846 
shows that she would not intervene to keep the 
transit open save at the request of Colombia. The 
traditional American policy shows that Bunau- 
Varilla could not have inferred that the United 
States would protect secession, as the evidence 
points to the opposite conclusion. How did he 
become informed and who informed him? As 
already stated, the separatists staked their all on 
this knowledge. We know that their request for 
a man-of-war at Colon caused Bunau-Varilla to 



1 66 America and the Canal Title 

hurry to Washington. He went to Washington 
for a sufficient reason, and not for a breath of 
Washington ozone. There was domiciled there 
the person who could order a man-of-war to 
Colon, and the man-of-war forthwith hastened 
to Colon with all possible speed. The conclusion 
is apparent. There was an understanding be- 
tween Bunau-Varilla and our Administration. 
That is how he became informed. Isthmian 
events from November 2, to November 6, 1903, 
corroborate this conclusion. The military end 
of secession was on our gunboats, the civil gov- 
ernment end of it was at Panama. Each partv 
executed its allotted part. 

The separatists at first thought they needed 
$6,000,000 for an effective revolution. They had 
to have vessels of war to prevent Colombia from 
landing her troops on the Isthmus. Resistance 
was otherwise deemed impossible. This shows 
a well-thought-out plan — a plan that depended for 
fulfillment on the cooperation of an adequate 
navy. Suddenly it was found that a few hun- 
dred thousand dollars (to pursuade official 
Colombia on the Isthmus) was all that was 
needed. Why this change? There is a reason. 
It is not of record. It is, however, as indelibly 
written as if it had been committed to parchment. 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 167 

Comparison of the instructions to our naval offi- 
cers prior to those of November 2, 1903, with 
those from and after that date, tell the story as 
emphatically as any written record could. 

The so-called revolution was designed in 
Panama. After the Hay-Herran treaty had 
been rejected by Colombia, the finishing touches 
were put on the project at Washington. It was 
coordinated in collaboration with our Adminis- 
tration. The only discordant note in its smooth 
execution was the appearance of Colombian 
troops earlier than expected, on November 3, 
1903. This compelled such a modification of the 
plan that footprints were left which reveal col- 
laboration. 

We will now deal with the abandonment of 
our traditional Isthmian policy under the Treaty 
of 1846. We have already given the instruc- 
tions to our naval officers in Isthmian waters dur- 
ing the administration of Grover Cleveland. 
They should perhaps be reread at this point so 
that the contrast between them and those of 
November 2, 1903, may be clearly seen. During 
McKinley's Administration the following tele- 
gram, dated July 25, 1900, was sent to our Consul 
at Panama : 



1 68 America and the Canal Title 

You are directed to protest against any act of hostility 
which may involve or imperil the safe and peaceful tran- 
sit of persons or property across the Isthmus of Panama. 
The bomibardment of Panama would have this effect, and 
the United States must insist upon the neutrality of the 
Isthmus as guaranteed by the treaty. 

This was simply a protest in advance of harm. 
It was merely a request that Colombia pursue a 
certain course. In it we find no evidence that it 
was then held that the United States could law- 
fully prevent Colombia from landing troops on 
the Isthmus. 

This brings the dispatches to our naval officers 
in Isthmian waters down to the Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration. The telegram of November 20, 
1901, to our Consul at Panama first demands 
attention : 

Notify all parties molesting or interfering with free 
transit across the Isthmus that such interference must 
cease and that the United States will prevent the inter- 
ruption of traffic upon the railroad. Consult with cap- 
tain of the Iowa, who will be instructed to land marines, 
if necessary, for the protection of the railroad, in accord- 
ance with the treaty rights and obligations of the United 
States. Desirable to avoid bloodshed, if possible. 

This order merely demanded that interruption 
of the Isthmian transit cease, and provided the 
means for the order's enforcement. It clearly 
recognized the duty of the sovereign to protect 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 169 

the transit in the first instance. The United 
States, would intervene only in case of necessity. 
The order sent by Secretary Hay to Com- 
mander Perry of the Iowa, dated November 20, 
1901, reads: 

Notify all persons, including leader insurgents, inter- 
ference with transit must immediately cease, otherwise 
you will land force and maintain free transit and tele- 
graphic communications. 

The result of the order last given is shown in 
a telegram by Commander Perry to Secretary 
Long, dated November 21, 1901 : 

Everything quiet. No further interference since no- 
tification. Transit and telegraphic communication open. 
Shall land force if there should be further interference. 
Colon in possession of liberals and quiet. 

The truth of the matter is that the contending 
forces feared the United States to such an extent 
that battles would halt to permit trains to pass, 
and be resumed when these were beyond the zone 
of conflict. Because of this fact, it was found 
necessary to employ American forces on the Isth- 
mus only 164 days, from the date of the supersed- 
ing of the New Granada government by that of 
Colombia, to November, 1903. During the 164 
days traffic on the Panama railroad was merely 
irregular, but not suspended. When this slight 



170 America and the Canal Title 

inconvenience is contrasted with the benefits 
which accrued to the United States under the 
Treaty of 1846, it is wholly negligible. 

Such was the situation when the formidable 
telegrams of November 2, 1903, were sent to our 
naval forces in, or presently to be in, Isthmian 
waters. Roosevelt's wrath toward Colombia can 
only be referred to as ''Much Ado About Noth- 
ing.'' 

The following telegram by Commander Mc- 
Crea to Secretary Long, dated November 24, 
1 90 1, is apropos as it occurred during the Roose- 
velt Administration: 

Gunboat Pinzon here with 600 troops. Have forbid- 
den bombardment until non-combatants can be removed. 
Have requested Liberals not to fire on Pinzon without 
attempted landing. Shall landing with incidental firing 
be permitted at American wharves? Request instruc- 
tions. 

He was not instructed to prevent the ves- 
sel named from landing within fifty miles of 
Panama! The Roosevelt Administration was 
not seeking title to the Canal Zone from insur- 
gents at that time. What a difference! The 
orders and instructions to the fall of 1902 (we 
will deal with those of 1902 in another chapter 
of this book) were in accordance with Colombia's 
understanding of the Treaty of 1846. They 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 171 

sought, in authorized ways, to safeguard Isth- 
mian transit from actual interruption, and con- 
stituted no assault upon either the supreme juris- 
diction or the supremely free action of Colombia. 
The instructions of November 2, 1903^ grossly 
violated each of the foregoing. They had prime 
reference to a mythical political insurrection 
against Colombia's territorial integrity and na- 
tional control, with no reference whatsoever to 
transit interruption. They laid violent hands on 
Colombia's sovereignty and forcibly prevented 
her from taking precautionary measures. Co- 
lombia was suddenly and peremptorily restrained 
from making free disposition of her own troops 
on her own soil. 

The separatists of Panama knew that if they 
would go through the trifling acts of raising a 
flag and of adopting a Declaration of Independ- 
ence, the American Navy would do the rest. 
Then they could proceed to organize a civil gov- 
ernment while the American Navy would patrol 
Isthmian waters and prevent Colombia from in- 
terfering with the establishment of the so-called 
Republic of Panama. And this is the Province 
of Panama that was ''seething with Revolution" ! 
A microscope would have been needed to discover 
it. 



172 America and the Canal Title 

, The altered instructions to our men-of-war in 
Isthmian waters disclose design. The lack of 
domestic preparation for resistance to Colombia 
shows that the Junta knew the design. How 
did they become informed ? Who could have in- 
formed them? There was but one person that 
could alter the traditional instructions to our 
naval commanders, and that was the Commander- 
in-Chief of our Army and Navy — the President, 
The Senate, by a resolution dated January 22, 
1904, asked the President to inform them as to 
when the United States forces were used in ful- 
fillment of the Treaty of 1846, (i) at the request 
of the sovereign, (2) on its own initiative* The 
reply was prepared by Acting-Secretary of State 
Francis B. Loomis. It shows that during the 
fifty-five years that the treaty was in force, the 
American forces were used seven times, and that 
only once were they landed on our own initiative, 
and even at that time the Colombian Government 
was duly notified. This was in 1902, that is, dur- 
ing the Roosevelt Administration. The Colom- 
bian official on the Isthmus protested. This con- 
struction of the Treaty of 1846 was not acquiesced 
in by Colombia, and was the controlling reason 
for its rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty. It, 
therefore, cannot serve as a precedent for the 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 173 

action of 1903, which is indeed without a pre- 
cedent. 

In Senate Document No. 143, Second Session, 
Fifty-eighth Congress, we find Acting-Secretary 
Loomis' summary after a detailed answer to the 
foregoing request of the Senate. It is as fol- 
lows : 

It appears from the correspondence transmitted here- 
with that on one occasion United States forces were 
landed solely on the initiative of the United States — 
namely, in September, 1902 — when the Panama authori- 
ties were duly notified of the proposed landing. 

The telegrams of November 2, 1903, are with- 
out a precedent in American Diplomatic history. 
For them, American history offers no counter- 
part and international law no sanction. They 
are sui generis. They violated the constitution 
of the United States, international law and the 
Treaty of 1846. This will be shown in other 
chapters of this book. 

While the separatists on the Isthmus were still 
in doubt — were trying to resolve the unknown 
factor in the situation, that is, the attitude of our 
Government, the Nashville was speeding to 
Colon. Sight of it would resolve the doubt and 
precipitate secession. Before their decision was 
rendered, the following dispatches were sent to 



174 America and the Canal Title 

the Commanders of our men-of-war which were 
to be in Isthmian waters on and after November 
2, 1903. To those on the west coast : 

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interrup- 
tion is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of rail- 
road. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile 
intent, either Government or insurgent, at any point 
within 50 miles of Panama. Government force reported 
approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their land- 
ing if, in your judgment, the landing would precipitate 
a conflict. 

To those on the east coast : 

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interrup- 
tion is threatened by armed force, occupy line of rail- 
road. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile 
intent, either government or insurgent, either at Colon, 
Porto Bello or other point. 

Roosevelt characterizes his course on the Isth- 
mus, at this time as follows: 

Not only was the course followed as regards Panama 
right in every detail, but there could have been no varia- 
tion from that course except for the worse. We not 
only did what was technically justifiable, but we did what 
was demanded by every ethical consideration, national 
and international. 

Our counterpart of this characterization is, in 
the words of Treitschke : 

A thing that is wholly a sham cannot, in this universe 
of ours, endure forever. It may endure for a day, but 
its doom is certain. 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 175 

The explanations of Isthmian events by Roose- 
velt and by Bunau-Varilla are wholly a sham. 
They are contravened by facts. The facts have 
not suffered ; the explanations have been reduced 
to historical scrap. 

Bunau-Varilla, Roosevelt, Amador and others 
interested in Isthmian secession have not profited 
by the sage advice of one Bill Devery, 'When 
caught with the goods on, say nothing/' They 
have talked too much. As already shown, that 
which is true matches — the rest is scrap. That 
which matches is the true story of the rape of 
Colombia by the United States. 

We will now resume the story of Bunau- 
Varilla. He was telling how he inferred that 
the Roosevelt Administration would protect se- 
cession. We sidestepped his narrative in order 
to introduce data in support of our contention 
that his story is an invention. 

Bunau-Varilla knew what the Administration 
would do in the event of the secession of the 
Province of Panama. He has told us in his book, 
and it is independently established. Statements 
by several of the separatists show that they acted 
upon his assurance. This is corroborated by the 
character of Isthmian preparation, which was 



176 America and the Canal Title 

preparation for taking over the civil government 
of the Province of Panama. There was no mili- 
tary preparation such as we find when a real 
revolution is projected. The secession of the 
Province of Panama, was, therefore, due solely 
to foreknowledge that the Roosevelt Administra- 
tion would protect secession. 

Bunau-Varilla has told us how he became in- 
formed. We are showing that he did not become 
informed in the way he has told us. His state- 
ments crumble when examined by historical 
methods. What then is the source of his ad- 
vance information? Established facts will un- 
erringly reveal the source. 

The revolution was to be bloodless, we are told ! 
The uprising was to cover the Canal Zone and 
the canal littoral — the line of the railroad. 
Bunau-Varilla is our authority. Ah! The 
Isthmus was not "seething with revolution." A 
few men could determine the extent of the terri- 
tory it would cover. But the whole Isthmus 
arose as one man ! Roosevelt has told us. These 
are statements of practical men. The one de- 
sired to vindicate Roosevelt; the other sought to 
justify precipitate intervention by showing that 
an entire population arose and threw off the yoke 
of oppression. They can't have it both ways. 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 177 

If the Isthmus was ''seething with revolution," 
Bunau-Varilla did not tell the truth. If the rev- 
olution could have been confined to the Canal 
Zone and the canal littoral, Roosevelt did not tell 
the truth. 

We will let Bunau-Varilla continue his story. 
We read in his book on Panama : 

In the preceding year of 1902, the same principle had 
been reenforced at the very moment of the difficult nego- 
tiations with M. Concha, for the grant of the canal con- 
cession to the United States. . . . 

How could it be doubted that the American forces 
would act in the same manner one year later, at a time 
when Colombia had taken a decidedly hostile attitude? 

No hesitation was possible. The solution had been 
found ! The mysterious problem was solved ! The final 
unknown quantity had been at last discovered and the 
equation resolved, as the French mathematicians say, in 
the most elegant manner. 

It was no longer necessary to spend enormous sums for 
a useless war. 

It was no longer necessary to present the impossible 
request for protection by American forces. Such a thing 
was indispensable to an insurrection covering the whole 
Province of Panama, but it was eliminated entirely if the 
insurrection was limited to the Isthmus, properly speak- 
ing. 

If a revolution was started from Colon to Panama, the 
American forces were automatically, and without any 
anterior understanding, obliged to intervene. 

There intervention would consist in forbidding any 
armed force to come within gunshot of the line of 
transit. 



178 America and the Canal Title 

All the villages, all the houses, all the inhabitants 
within that zone, would immediately enjoy all necessary 
protection. 

Once such military protection was secured, the new 
Republic could wait. 

These statements are grotesque. They hardly 
need refutation. We will deal with the Isthmian 
events of 1902 in the next two chapters which 
follow. Suffice it to say here that Bunau- 
Var ilia's statement of Isthmian events in 1902 is 
as false as was his statement of those of 1885. 
There was to be no revolution in the fall of 1903. 
Therefore, no military preparation was neces- 
sary. If there was no military force in Colon 
— there was none — what justification could there 
be for the United States keeping out Colombian 
troops! Military preparation was necessary to 
warrant intervention on the part of the United 
States, if intervention could be warranted, which 
we deny. Uprisings had not eventuated in an 
independent government for the Isthmus in 1885 
or 1902. Why now? The explanation of 
Bunau-Varilla explains altogether too much. It 
ignores the facts. When there is collision be- 
tween facts and an explanation, it is the explana- 
tion which suffers and not the facts. 

It was clearly known to Bunau-Varilla that the 
actual revolution was to be on the American gun- 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 179 

boats. He does not tell us who told him — who 
gave him the assurance. His story is interest- 
ing — interesting in a way other than it was in- 
tended to be. Especially interesting is this state- 
ment to Dr. Amador : 

Doctor Amador, the moment has come to clear the 
deck for action. Be satisfied with my assertions. There 
is no more time for discussing their genesis. 

/ can give you the assurance that you will he protected 
by the American forces forty-eight hours after you have 
proclaimed the new Republic in the whole Isthmus. 

That secession would be protected by American 
forces was communicated to Dr. Amador, a rep- 
resentative of the separatists, by Bunau-Varilla, 
as stated above. This was immediately after one 
of his trips to Washington. Was secession pro- 
tected? This question is easily answered. It 
had been arranged that the Province of Panama 
was to declare her independence on November 4, 
1903. This was actually done. The Nashville 
arrived at Colon on November 2. The Dixie (at 
Colon) and the Boston (at Panama) arrived a 
few days later. The telegrams to their comman- 
ders, dated November 2, 1903, quoted on an 
earlier page, show that the protection was fur- 
nished exactly as promised to the separatists by 
Bunau-Varilla. 



i8o America and the Canal Title 

The question at once arises how could Bunau- 
Varilla have given such an assurance? Events 
show that it was carried out as given. Who gave 
him the advance information? It is an estab- 
Hshed fact that he had it. He told us in his book 
that he had it. After giving an account of the 
movement of American warships, he observes : 

Evidently the movements of Amador had been 
watched, and his departure for the Isthmus after his 
conference with me had raised suspicions of an early 
explosion of the revolution after the Colombian Congress 
had closed its session. 

The sending of the Dixie to Guantanamo showed the 
preoccupation of the American Government. It did not 
disguise its preoccupation in its communications to the 
press. Does not this simple fact in itself give the lie to 
the absurd and prejudiced story of a revolution organ- 
ized by the United States Government? 

They had probably at Washington associated in their 
minds the departure of Amador and the prediction I had 
formulated in my interview with President Roosevelt on 
the 9th of October, and with Mr. Hay on the i6th as to 
the imminent peril of a revolution. The conclusion 
which must have been reached was that the departure 
of Amador after his interviews with me was the begin- 
ning of revolutionary operations. 

To think of the Government at Washington 
watching the movements of Amador! Moving 
men-of-war as Amador moved! What hypoc- 
risy ! Soldiers and munitions of war were needed 
for a real revolution. Therefore, watching, if 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus i8i 

any, would have been on the Isthmus. There 
was no watching. Facts controvert the supposi- 
tion. There is no evidence of it. Instead of 
watching there was a dispatch from the Isthmus 
calHng for an American man-of-war at Colon, 
and making compliance a condition of secession. 
Evidence shows that the Roosevelt Administra- 
tion came to an understanding with the separa- 
tists through Bunau-Varilla as intermediary and 
that it was not engaged in watching the move- 
ments of anybody. 

Dr. Amador encountered difficulty in persuad- 
ing the separatists to proceed v/ith secession. He 
had only oral assurances of protection. They 
expected documentary evidence. They insisted 
that tangible evidence of protection by the forces 
of the United States should precede action. We 
will let Bunau-Varilla state the situation : 

One of them [separatists] must have arisen and said: 
"If Bunau-Varilla is so powerful, let him prove it. He 
says we shall be protected forty-eight hours after estab- 
lishing the new Republic. Well? We will believe him, 
if he is capable of sending an American man-of-war to 
Colon at our request." . . . The whole question of the 
life and death of the canal was condensed in the follow- 
ing words: An American man-of-war must be sent to 
Colon. 

If I succeeded in this task the canal was saved. If I 
failed, it was lost. . . . 



1 82 America and the Canal Title 

I could just as well think it over in the train [to Wash- 
ington] as in my own room. 

On October 29, Bunau-Varilla actually re- 
ceived a telegram from Dr. Amador to the effect 
that an American man-of-war must be sent to 
Colon. The Nashville was ordered to Colon on 
October 30th. It arrived there on November 2. 
On October 31, Bunau-Varilla telegraphed Dr. 
Amador from Baltimore that a man-of-war 
would arrive at Colon in two-and-a-half days. 
It arrived at Colon as promised. This is no mere 
coincidence. It taxes credulity to believe it, but 
let Bunau-Varilla continue his observations : 

The revolution was made because the connection be- 
tween the request of a boat to me and the arrival of the 
boat materialized in the eyes of the confederates the 
reality of the influence which Amador had asserted to 
them I possessed over the American Government. 

Evidently they imagined the situation to be quite dif- 
ferent from what it really was. They believed this influ- 
ence to be of a direct and material order. They could 
not understand matters as they really were. .They could 
not imagine that there was no material influence exerted 
and that I was merely correctly and mathematically cal- 
culating [correctly and mathematically calculating — what 
audacity !] the forces at play, among which the main ones 
were the duty and the interest of the American Govern- 
ment. 

The arrival of the Nashville corroborated the 
information communicated to the separatists by 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 183 

Dr. Amador. They were skeptical until the 
Nashville appeared. When it appeared as prom- 
ised they were convinced — in short, they knew. 
The Colombians also knew. Now it is inefface- 
able history, with a meaning other than that which 
Bunau-Varilla would have us beheve. He says 
in his book : 

Every one interpreted the Nashville's arrival as a de- 
termined intervention of the United States, and the Co- 
lombians were just as much persuaded of this as were 
the people of Panama. This carried to such a pitch the 
enthusiasm of the latter, and the discouragement of the 
former, that the Colombians decided to withdraw peace- 
fully. 

Is the so-called Republic of Panama the out- 
come of mathematically calculating the forces at 
play? Does a sane man counsel others in such 
a grave case as glibly as Bunau-Varilla alleges 
he did? We do not believe his own indictment 
of himself. If true, it would make him a degen- 
erate. There is no evidence of degeneracy in his 
story. We find in it only evidence of calculated 
duplicity. 

Is it believable that Bunau-Varilla advised the 
separatists in Panama to proceed with secession 
with no other assurance of protection by the 
United States than his inference ? There was at 
stake for the separatists: their lives, their prop- 



184 America and the Canal Title 

erty and the welfare of their f amiHes ; for Bunau- 
Varilla, his large holdings of stock in the New 
Panama Canal Company. His story has none of 
the earmarks of truthfulness. It is a crude in- 
vention. It is, however, necessary to conclude 
that he had the advance information that he com- 
municated to the separatists, but that he did not 
come by it as he would have us believe. 
Swift says : 

As universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one 
as it seems, it is astonishing that it has been brought to 
so Httle perfection, even by those who are most celebrated 
in that faculty. 

This is another way of saying that the mind 
cannot create a substitute for reality. Facts are 
inexorable. Reason will, in due course, puncture 
the inconsistency in a pseudo-explanation, and 
truth will stand revealed because it matches. 

Secession was to be effected on November 4. 
The United States was to have men-of-war at 
Colon and at Panama to protect secession within 
forty-eight hours. But a hitch occurred. It be- 
came loiown on October 29 that Colombian forces 
not expected until November 10 would arrive in 
about five days. Panama, although ''seething 
with revolution," as Roosevelt would have us be- 
lieve, was not prepared to deal with an unex- 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 185 

pected force of some two hundred soldiers. 
Hence, Dr. Amador telegraphed Bunau-Varilla 
for aid on October 29 : 

We have news of the arrival of Colombian forces on 
the Atlantic side within five days ; they are more than 
two hundred strong; urge warships Colon. 

Upon receipt of this telegram, Bunau-Varilla 
hurried to Washington. The Nashville arrived 
at Colon one day before the Colombian troops. 
Panama called for help seven days before seces- 
sion, and on the sixth day help was already speed- 
ing to Colon. But why did Bunau-Varilla has- 
ten to Washington upon receipt of the above tele- 
gram ? It would seem that his advance informa- 
tion was not based on inference after all, that is, 
upon nice mathematical calculation. Such calcu- 
lations are best worked out in a quiet room and 
not in a noisy train to Washington. It would, 
therefore, seem that our then Administration was 
the source of his knowledge. 

In the Independent of November 26, 1903, Dr. 
Amador states that the separatists of Panama be- 
lieved that the United States would not allow 
Colombia to suppress secession. He states 
guardedly : 

Of course, we expected that the United States would 
not let the Colombian troops attack us, because of the 



i86 America and the Canal Title 

effect that war would have in the way of blocking the 
traffic across the Isthmus, but we had no understanding 
with the Government here, nor are the people of the 
United States at all responsible for the revolution. It 
was our own act. 

This statement is indicative of foreknowledge. 
It could not have been inferred from previous at- 
tempts at secession. Therefore, there must have 
been an understanding with our Administration. 
Will the latter make good? That was the final 
unknown quantity in the anxious days preceding 
secession. Secession was held in abeyance until 
tangible evidence appeared. It appeared on No- 
vember 2 — the Nashville. Thereupon Shaler, su- 
perintendent of the Panama Railroad, gets into 
communication with Prescott. What transpired 
is recorded in the following: 

Have just wired you that the Nashville had been 
sighted. This I presume settles the question. 

It did settle the question. It was to be seces- 
sion. It also settles another question. It shows 
that our then Administration was the foster- 
father of secession^gave it form and substance, 
and became its controlling spirit just before and 
immediately after the Declaration of Independ- 
ence. 

From and after November 2, 1903, the follow- 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 187 

ing warships appeared in Isthmian waters : The 
Dixie, Nashville, Atlanta, Maine, and Mayflower, 
at Colon; the Boston, Marblehead, Concord, and 
Wyoming, at Panama. This is a larger number 
than were sent on previous occasions when there 
was actual revolt. Therefore, their object was 
different. On all previous occasions our war- 
ships were ordered to Isthmian waters to protect 
the lives and property of Americans and to assist 
the sovereign in maintaining uninterrupted 
transit. In the fall of 1903, they were sent to 
protect secession. This is clearly reflected in the 
telegrams to the Nashville, Dixie and Boston on 
November 2, 1903. 

These dispatches were not sent for the purpose 
of protecting Isthmian transit, but for the pur- 
pose of assuring the peaceful birth of the so- 
called Republic of Panama, and maintaining it 
after birth. In short, before the birth of the so- 
called Republic of Panama, and at a time when 
Colombia wa^ in undisputed possession of the 
Isthmus and exercised undisputed sovereignty 
over it, dispatches were sent to armed vessels of 
the United States in the Atlantic and Pacific in- 
structing them to prevent the Government of Co- 
lombia from landing troops on her Isthmian ter- 
ritory. 



1 88 America and the Canal Title 

We have given complete the telegram to the 
commander of the Nashville, dated November 2, 
1903. The vessel named was the first warship to 
arrive in Isthmian waters on the Atlantic side. 
The telegram to Rear Admiral Glass of the Bos- 
ton, dated November 2, 1903, is interesting from 
the fact that the vessel named was the first man- 
of-war to arrive in Isthmian waters on the Pa- 
cific side. It is here reproduced in full : 

Proceed with all possible dispatch to Panama. Tele- 
graph in cipher your departure. Maintain free and un- 
interrupted transit. If interruption is threatened by 
armed force occupy the line of railroad. Prevent land- 
ing of any armed force, either Government or insurgent, 
v^ith hostile intent at any point within 50 miles of Pan- 
ama. If doubtful as to the intention of any armed force, 
occupy Ancon Hill strongly with artillery. If the Wy- 
oming would delay Concord and Marhlehead, her dis- 
position must be left to your discretion. Government 
force reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Pre- 
vent their landing if in your judgment landing would 
precipitate a conflict. 

Collaboration in the secession of the Province 
of Panama is no worse than the foregoing tele- 
gram. Collaboration is merely the forerunner of 
such a telegram. The policy embodied therein is a 
departure from our traditional Isthmian policy. 
Collaboration matches with this and other tele- 
grams of the same date. An Administration ca- 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 189 

pahle of sending them is capable of collaboration 
because the two are clearly complementary and 
stand on the same ethical plane. The collabora- 
tion planned the dismemberment of a friendly 
state ; the telegrams directed the carrying out of 
dismemberment. Why balk at the planning, col- 
laboration, and not balk at the act, which is merely 
a part of an indivisible whole? The one is a 
corollary of the other. We know that our then 
Administration is guilty of the act of dismember- 
ment. We believe that the known facts warrant 
the conclusion that it collaborated with Bunau- 
Varilla in making arrangements for protecting 
secession. 

Collaboration to effect the dismemberment of 
Colombia adds no sting to that of dismember- 
ment which is conceded. In November, 1902, 
three provinces in revolt for some three years 
laid down their arms. In November, 1903, we 
are asked to believe that one of them actually 
projected a serious uprising. It staggers belief. 
Facts show that there was no intent of a serious 
uprising on the part of the inhabitants as a whole. 
They also show that if advance assurance of the 
cooperation of the United States could not have 
been secured, there would have been no secession. 
As projected, planned and executed, the ma- 



190 America and the Canal Title 

chinery of the so-called revolution was to be and 
actually was on our gunboats. A microscope 
does not disclose any other preparation. The so- 
called Republic of Panama is a fact. It is mute 
evidence of collaboration. 

Colombia hesitated about curtailment of her 
sovereignty in the Canal Zone. She felt that if 
curtailment were to be acquiesced in, then the 
compensation offered was not adequate and so 
she was seeking a formula along the line of 
abridged sovereignty, and of enlarged compensa- 
tion through long period re-valuation of the 
grant. This was repugnant to our Administra- 
tion. Panama would grant all that it wanted and 
ask no questions. Here is an impelling motive 
for collaboration, and one that was in harmony 
with the desire to make good the threats made 
when the Hay-Herran treaty was under consid- 
eration. 

We have examined several telegrams dated 
November 2, 1903. We have seen that they were 
not designed to protect transit between Colon and 
Panama, but to protect secession. Plans do not, 
however, unfold with clockwork precision. The 
telegram to the Commander of the Nashville was 
delayed in delivery, and so the landing of the new 
contingent of Colombian troops already men- 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 191 

tioned was not prevented. It is shown in the fol- 
lowing telegram received by Secretary Hay from 
Colon, dated November 3, 1903 : 

Troops from vessel Cartagena have disembarked; are 
encamping on Pacific dock awaiting orders to proceed to 
Panama from commander-in-chief, who went there this 
morning. No message for Nashville received. 

On the same date (November 3) Commander 
Hubbard of the Nashville replied to the telegram 
sent him November 2, as follows : 

Receipt of your telegram of November 2 is acknowl- 
edged. Prior to receipt this morning about 400 men 
were landed here by the Government of Colombia from 
Cartagena. No revolution has been declared on the Isth- 
mus and no disturbances. Railway company have de- 
clined to transport these troops except by request of the 
governor of Panama. Request has not been made. It 
is possible that movement may be made to-night at Pan- 
ama to declare independence, in which event I will . . . 
(message mutilated here) here. Situation is most criti- 
cal if revolutionary leaders act. 

Message mutilated! The most vital part of 
the message mutilated so that its contents are to 
remain forever unknown! And the original 
message to the Commander of the Nashville or- 
dering him to proceed with all possible speed to 
Colon missing! We will not indulge in infer- 
ence. The reader will know that it is not a co- 
incidence — that it has a sinister look. In his of- 



192 America and the Canal Title 

ficial report, Commanded Hubbard tells us why 
he did not prevent the landing of the Colombian 
troops which arrived on the Cartagena on No- 
vember 3 : 

Inasmuch as the Independent party had not acted and 
the Government of Colombia was at that time in undis- 
puted control of the Province of Panama, I did not feel, 
in the absence of instructions, that I was justified in pre- 
venting the landing of those troops. 

If Commander Hubbard of the Nashville had 
had the telegram sent him on November 2, the 
troops and administrative officers on the Carta- 
gena would not have been allowed to land. In 
short, Colombia would have been prevented from 
landing troops on a part of her territory when 
there was no disturbance whatsoever. And that 
is called protecting the transit and maintaining 
order! It is the only interruption of the transit 
and of the peace that there was. 

As already stated, there was no revolution, 
there was no uprising. Certain interested per- 
sons merely volunteered to organize a civil gov- 
ernment in the Province of Panama, independent 
of that of Colombia, if assured of protection by 
the United States. The protection was assured 
and was given. The purpose was to enable the 
one to grant and the other to receive title to the 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 193 

Canal Zone. Colombia was to be barred from 
interfering by the display of overwhelming force. 
That is what was planned, and that is what event- 
uated. 

The military forces of Colombia arrived at 
Colon in fulfillment of her obligations under the 
Treaty of 1846 and in the performance of the 
most elementary duty of a sovereign state. Those 
of the United States were there to interrupt in its 
most sacred use. It was the sovereign right of 
Colombia to secure transit from Colon to Panama 
for her troops, and the duty of the Railroad, un- 
der its charter, to supply it. The United States 
did interfere without a scintilla of right and in 
violation of the Treaty of 1846. Note the follow- 
ing telegram to the Commander of the Nashville 
at Colon, dated November 3, 1903: 

In the interests of peace make every effort to prevent 
Government troops at Colon from proceeding to Panama. 
The transit of the Isthmus must be kept open and order 
maintained. 

Peace prevailed in the Province of Panama on 
the date of this telegram. There were no insur- 
gents. There was no preparation whatsoever for 
an uprising. We adopt the following from the 
pen of Leander T. Chamberlain as our own : 

Yet the President issued an order preventing Colom- 



194 America and the Canal Title 

bia from moving her own troops, via her own railway, 
from her own Colon to her own Panama! So far as 
concerned their freedom to go to the scene of danger, 
Colombia's troops were reconcentradoed and manacled! 
Let it still be borne in mind that there was no interrup- 
tion of transit by either loyalist or insurgent. Let it 
be taken into account that the President, himself, under 
the pretense of maintaining peace and order when peace 
and order perfectly prevailed, violently interrupted free 
transit, absolutely closing it to the forces of sovereign 
Colombia, a treaty-bound ally of the United States ! 

There is no direct evidence known to the writer 
that the Roosevelt Administration collaborated in 
the ante-secession arrangements to wrest the 
Province of Panama from Colombia. The 
known facts, however, point overwhelmingly to 
collaboration. The evidence is circumstantial, 
but not a link is missing. The evidence is re- 
enforced by motive on the part of the Adminis- 
tration at Washington. Colombia had not yielded 
to solemn warnings. 

We read on page 564 of Roosevelt's autobi- 
ography: 

No one connected with the American Government had 
any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the revo- 
lution, and except for the reports of our military and 
naval officers, which I forwarded to Congress, no one 
connected with the Government had any previous knowl- 
edge concerning the proposed revolution, except such as 
was accessible to any person who read the newspapers 
and kept abreast of current questions and current af- 
fairs. 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 195 

Small provinces, planning a revolution, keep 
such matters secret so as to enable them to make 
adequate preparation without interference. The 
foregoing seems to indicate that there was prepa- 
ration on the Isthmus, which is contrary to the 
facts. If it were true, Colombia must have 
known. Why then did she not have an adequate 
force on the Isthmus ? 

The separatists of Panama knew what the 
Roosevelt Administration would do after inde- 
pendence had been declared. All statements as 
to how they found out crumble before the search- 
light of historical method. The sifting process 
leaves certain established facts from which we 
can draw our conclusion. The separatists knew 
what our Government would do and the line of 
action pursued by our Administration was in 
accord with what they knew and with what they 
expected. Tradition forbids inference to be the 
source of their enlightenment. The Commander- 
in-chief of the Army and Navy was the sole and 
only person who could have communicated to 
Bunau-Varilla information of so formidable a 
character as he conveyed to the separatists of 
Panama. 

The Roosevelt Administration gave form and 
substance to the arrangements for the secession 



196 America and the Canal Title 

of Panama, in short, gave the movement the vi- 
taHty that it possessed. Without collaboration 
there would have been no secession. An inner 
circle in Panama were the Alpha and our Admin- 
istration was the Omega of this vaudeville, with 
Bunau-Varilla acting as Master of Ceremonies, 
that is, acting as the coordinating genius who ef- 
fected the cooperation of those interested in the 
performance. Had not the vessel Cartagena, 
with its new contingent of Colombian soldiers, 
introduced a discordant note by arriving seven 
days earlier than originally expected, the per- 
formance would have become history exactly as 
prearranged. 

The aim of the United States in the negotiation 
of the Hay-Herran treaty was to secure de facto 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone, and its equiva- 
lent over the canal littoral. Colombia desired 
that the United States should become, as far as 
concerned the canal, a corporation sole for the 
purpose of constructing and operating it under 
her own sovereignty. There was a vital conflict 
of interests. It could only be adjusted by com- 
promise. Colombia asked for the reopening of 
negotiations with the view of finding a workable 
formula. The Roosevelt Administration cut the 
Gordian knot by guaranteeing the success of the 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 197 

secession of the Province of Panama from Co- 
lombia. . 

The quotations given in this chapter from 
Bimau-Varilla's book on Panama and those from 
otherwise trustworthy sources point unmistaka- 
bly to the conclusion drawn by us from them. 
These have been stated as the narrative pro- 
gressed. We will now assemble them and give 
them a setting in arguments not heretofore fully 
presented. In doing this we aim to show more 
fully than we have done so far that there was col- 
lusion between our Administration in 1903 and a 
few separatists on the Isthmus, and that this con- 
clusion is not only warranted but inescapable. 

Roosevelt seeks in a variety of forms to convey 
the impression that conflict was imminent on the 
Isthmus and that American intervention pre- 
vented it. The fact is just the opposite. There 
was no preparation on the Isthmus for physical 
combat. We hear of a so-called fire department 
of some four hundred men having a military pur- 
pose. But what are four hundred undisciplined 
men against Colombia's more or less trained army 
of some ten thousand ! 

The unavoidable conclusion is that the Roose- 
velt Administration collaborated with the sepa- 



198 America and the Canal Title 

ratists of Panama through Bunau-Varilla as in- 
termediary, gave form and substance to seces- 
sion, and was its controUing spirit just prior to 
and immediately after the Declaration of In- 
dependence by the council of the City of Panama 
on November 4, 1903. Our then Administration 
and the separatists in the City of Panama — the 
rest of the province was not consulted — under- 
stood each other before the Rubicon was crossed. 
Bunau-Varilla positively asserts that he was in 
possession of the information that the Roosevelt 
Administration would protect secession and that 
the act of secession was based on that assurance 
and shaped to conform to it. We have shown 
that the data on which Bunau-Varilla alleged he 
inferred it are false. With it crumbles inference 
as a source of his information. He, however, 
had the information. He said so in his book. 
Events show that he had it. That proves his 
statement. He could have gotten it in but one 
way and that was by collaboration with our Ad- 
ministration. He has shown the opportunity — 
conferences with members of our Administration 
including the President. It is now the province 
of the student of history to do some inferring and 
that inference is that our Administration con- 
veyed to Bunau-Varilla the information that he 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 199 

says he arrived at in an elegant manner by a nice 
mathematical calculation. 

The statements of Bunau-Varilla do not ring 
true. When viewed as a whole, they sound like 
an attempt to explain events connected with the 
dismemberment of Colombia so as to disprove ac- 
tual connection of the Roosevelt Administration 
with it as far as concerns its planning. In this 
he has not only failed, but has actually furnished 
the corroboration needed to establish it. 

When statements — it matters not with what 
unction they are uttered — conflict with established 
facts, it is the statements which suffer, the facts 
are mute evidence that the statements are false. 
It is impossible for the assurances given by 
Bimau-Varilla to the separatists of Panama, and 
subsequent events on the Isthmus, to have been 
the result of inference. They were the result of 
information communicated. It is immaterial 
whether it was conveyed to him in whole or in 
part, direct or by proxy. Secession and the or- 
ganization of the so-called Repubhc of Panama 
were based on it. 

We may well ask where a man would go who 
was basing everything on inferences derived from 
facts. Presumably to a large library where he 
would have access to the facts on which to rest 



200 America and the Canal Title 

the inferences derived by refined mathematical 
calculations. Possessed of the facts, he would 
perhaps seek the quiet of a dark room and medi- 
tate undisturbed by distracting noises present on 
a train. But Bunau-Varilla went to Washing- 
ton. Why? There was domiciled the person 
who could order a warship to Colon. The Nash- 
ville was ordered to Colon ! 

Isthmian events show such a perfect coordina- 
tion that they preclude any other conclusion than 
that of collaboration between the Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration and the separatists of Panama. The 
coordination was too perfect to permit of any 
other conclusion. The discord caused by the ar- 
rival of 474 Colombian soldiers earlier than orig- 
inally expected must be eliminated to see the plan 
as pre-arranged, and this additional item must 
then be fitted in to give us the true story. 

The original plan provided for the prompt 
recognition of the de facto government of the 
new republic by the United States after the 
Declaration of Independence. The telegrams 
which pertain to the elimination of the new Co- 
lombian forces which arrived on November 3 are 
supplementary thereto. The formidable charac- 
ter of these telegrams and the sayings and con- 
duct of the Isthmians during the three stirring 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 201 

days in which they were eHminated are now mute 
evidence of pre-arrangement — that a workable 
understanding existed between Bunau-Varilla 
and our Administration. 

Every vital statement made by Bunau-Varilla 
on which he claims to have based his inference is 
false. This disposes of the nice mathematical 
calculations whereby he claims to have arrived at 
the conclusions on which the separatists acted. 
There remains, however, the fact that the sep- 
aratists acted in the confident belief that the 
United States would protect secession and see the 
movement through. She did as they believed. 
The assurance was given to them by Bunau- 
Varilla. He did not come by the knowledge as 
he alleges. How did he come by it ? How could 
he have come by it? As it involved a departure 
from traditional American policy, the knowledge 
could have been received from but one person — 
the President. No subordinate could have set in 
motion the machinery actually set in motion 
whereby the success of secession was effected. 

All the details of this discreditable and regret- 
table affair cannot yet be filled in. The salient 
points alone are known. It is imlikely that the 
missing details will alter the general conclusion 
as to how the rape of Colombia was arranged and 



202 America and the Canal Title 

effected. It may alter somewhat the connection 
between Washington and Panama, but it will not 
sever it at a vital point. 

Tracy Robinson, prominent among the separa- 
tists and author of a book on Panama, ventures 
this statement concerning secession: 'The de- 
tails would afford material for a wonder story." 
Clearly, according to this, all is not recorded, all 
has not been told. If the course that our then 
Administration pursued was honorable, there is 
nothing to conceal. A wonder story would be a 
good seller. The separatists would figure in it as 
heroes. They smote the oppressor, threw off the 
yoke of oppression and founded a Republic dedi- 
cated to liberty and justice. But the wonder 
story is not yet written. The fact that it is not 
written — that those who know the facts have not 
recorded them — is mute evidence that there are 
facts connected with the secession of Panama 
that would not look well in print. We have as- 
sembled the known facts and matched them so as 
to reveal the essentials of the story. 

As already indicated, Roosevelt and Bunau- 
Varilla have attempted to construct a substitute 
for actual history in their accounts of the seces- 
sion of Panama. They have attempted the im- 
possible. Their invented facts do not fit into 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 203 

their assigned places. They do not match with 
the actual facts and with one another. This is 
the weakness of their explanation. It is the rock 
on which their explanations founder. 

If we take the known facts ^nd arrange them so 
that they match, the mind automatically supplies 
any missing link. The missing link in the history 
of the secession of the Province of Panama from 
Colombia is the fact that an understanding 
existed with our then Administration. With 
that supplied, the story is complete, the record be- 
comes rational and the events stand in a causal 
relation. Roosevelt's assertion, ''I took the Canal 
Zone,' is virtually the missing link, that is, it is 
another way of stating that an understanding 
existed between our Administration and the sep- 
aratists on the Isthmus. 

The writer vacillated between suspicion and 
conviction until he had read Bunau-Var ilia's book 
on Panama. This convinced him that there had 
been an informal exchange of views between the 
Roosevelt Administration and Bunau-Varilla, and 
that the latter was informed that the American 
navy would be used to prevent the landing of Co- 
lombian soldiers on the Isthmus if the separatists 
in Panama would take over the civil government 
of the province. 



204 America and the Canal Title 

That those who sought the secession of the 
Province of Panama from Colombia made over- 
tures to our Administration is acknowledged. 
Secession was for the sole purpose of creating a 
state capable of granting to the United States the 
coveted title to the Canal Zone. Naturally, such 
overtures would be made. It was not necessary 
to record the understanding arrived at. The 
Declaration of Independence on November 4, 
1903, recognition of Panama as a sovereign state 
on November 6, 1903, and the signing of the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla treaty on November 18, 1903 — all 
in two weeks — tell us that there was an antecedent 
understanding, regardless of pretensions to the 
contrary. 

The separatists of Panama spent their time 
designing political machinery instead of prepar- 
ing to overthrow Colombian sovereignty by force. 
They acted differently in 1899-1902 when there 
was a real revolution. Why this departure from 
the normal course? Because coercion of Colom- 
bia by the United States had failed, and our Ad- 
ministration had entered into the calculations of 
the separatists, either direct or by proxy. At 
first the separatists had apparently looked for 
money and military preparedness. That was 
abandoned in the twinkling of an eye. Why! 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 205 

Because a substitute had been found. The 
American marines would be there. They would 
be sufficient. Indeed the known facts connected 
with the secession of Panama connect our Ad- 
ministration with the ante-secession arrange- 
ments as unmistakably as though there were offi- 
cial documents to prove it. More so because 
documents can be tampered with, but events can- 
not. A Persian poet has well said : 

The moving finger writes, and having writ 
Moves on; nor all your piety nor wit, 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line. 
Nor all your tears wash out one word of it. 

The action of General Huertas of the Colom- 
bian forces at Panama and of the officials of the 
Panama railroad in the stirring days prior to the 
Declaration of Independence show that they had 
foreknowledge (convincing proof) of what the 
United States had agreed to do. General Huer- 
tas committed treason. The railroad officials 
jeopardized the interests of the stockholders of 
the property in their care. Are steps with such 
grave consequences lightly taken? To ask the 
question is to answer. Pre-arrangement with 
the United States is writ large over the portal to 
Isthmian events which resulted in the establish- 
ment of the so-called Republic of Panama. In- 



2o6 America and the Canal Title 

sert pre-arrangement into the ensemble of Isth-^ 
mian events and they match. Without it they 
are bizarre — discordant facts. 

History is not bizarre. Human beings act ac- 
cording to law. Tradition is their guide unless it 
is positively and efficaciously set aside by an ante- 
cedent assurance. Such antecedent assurance 
Bunau-Varilla gave to those directing the seces- 
sion movement in Panama. They acted on it. 
They were not deceived. Bunau-Varilla did not 
become informed as he states he did. His only 
source of information could have been the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, either direct or by proxy, and he is 
believed to have been too shrewd a politician to 
employ a proxy. 

Bunau-Varilla gave assurance to the separat- 
ists that the United States would protect seces- 
sion. It is reported that when the time for action 
arrived, Dr. Amador cabled to him in New York 
to verify this assurance of protection. Dr. 
Amador is reported to have said as he wrote the 
telegram : 

If this man Varilla can bring an American warship to 
each side of the Isthmus, then we may proceed. 

The answer to the telegram came : 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 207 

Go ahead. American warships will be on either side 
of the Isthmus in forty-eight hours. 

The first arrived on November 2, and the others 
a little later. They did not arrive as the result of 
accident. It was not coincidence. The Bunau- 
Varilla telegram was not based on inference. 
This IS confirmed in a newspaper article of the 
time. Teague writes in the Washington Post 
for December 7, 1903: 

It is an indisputable fact that the conspirators for in- 
dependence at Panama believed implicitly, before they 
made a single open move for independence, that advance 
assurances of support had been given by the Government 
at Washington. This belief is so fixed that those in the 
conspiracy do not hesitate to say that the first move 
would never have been made had it not been believed 
that Washington had given a promise of support. 

These statements of Teague are abundantly 
corroborated by other journals. We read in the 
New York Evening Post of December 8, 1903: 

The Cartagena outfit, civil and military, was landed at 
Colon. Leaving command to Colonel Torres, the gen- 
erals (Amaya and Tovar) boarded a train for Panama. 
This city was in a ferment. The revolutionists thought 
the jig was up. What should be done? Now, General 
Huertas, in command of the garrison, had fought under 
General Herbert O. Jeffries. . . . He said to Jeffries: 

"Will you stand by if I deliver the garrison to the 
revolutionists ?" 

"Sure," answered Jeffries. 

Then Jeffries went to the nonplussed revolutionists 
and declared, "You have arrived at the time described in 



2o8 America and the Canal Title 

an old Spanish proverb saying — ^You have got to give 
birth now, or burst." ... A dispatch came from Colon. 
... It said that the Panama Railroad had refused to 
transport the Colombian troops across to Panama. 
Hearing this, the revolutionists took heart. They would 
go on. At five o'clock they would serenade the Colom- 
bian generals. Then after dinner the generals would be 
seized, and the same band which had welcomed them 
would sound the tocsin of the revolution. 

On the evening of October 31, 1903, there was a final 
meeting of the secessionists at the home of Doctor Ama- 
dor — eight in number. 

They heard that Doctor Amador had telegraphed Va- 
rilla that everything was now ready for the overturning. 
They adjourned with the remark that *Tf Varilla could 
move some American men-of-war to the Isthmus, he is 
somebody, and we can go ahead." In the morning [No- 
vember i] arrived a reply from Varilla, dated October 
31, saying that American men-of-war would be at the 
Isthmus immediately to keep transit open. . . . 

November 4 was fixed on as the date for "the move- 
ment." The work of enlisting the aid of Government 
officers had progressed. Admiral Varon of the Colom- 
gian gunboat Twenty-first of November was won over 
with all his forces. General Huertas, commandant of the 
garrison, was found easy to approach. ... To rid him- 
self of officers and men he was not sure would enter the 
plot to revolt, he pretended to have had a dispatch say- 
ing that revolutionists were landing at Cocla, down the 
coast. Then he sent off all the distrusted officers and 
men to put down Coda's imaginary insurrection. 

Senor Melendez, of Colon, was called to Panama, and 
asked to be ready to take the governorship of Colon on 
the 4th. About noon on the 26. the Nashville arrived at 
Colon. Everything was favorable, except that no Amer- 
ican warship had yet appeared at Panama. Suddenly 
that evening, to the consternation of the plotters, the 
Colombian warship Cartagena steamed into Colon, 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 209 

bearing some 500 soldiers, 50 clerks and a new gov- 
ernor. 

Further confirmation of the foregoing is fur- 
nished by Teague in the Baltimore American for 
December 12, 1903: 

The promoters of the revolution are compelled by ex- 
perience to distrust a large proportion of those men upon 
whom they are now forced to rely. They know that the 
army and police force were purchased to support the 
revolution, and knowing that these factors are suscepti- 
ble to corruption, they do not know to-day whether the 
military and police officials are true or untrue to the re- 
public. . . . 

All they [the real revolutionists] hope for is that they 
can keep things going as they now are until after the 
Canal treaty is signed by the members of the junta. 
That act of ratification accomplished, the revolutionists 
will have little interest in the Republic. . . . The revo- 
lutionists have a bland and childlike faith in the great 
American Republic. 

It matters not what statements may be made at Wash- 
ington or what stories may be current in the States, all 
Panama believes that the revolution was made possible 
by Washington's foreknowledge of what was proposed, 
and an expressed determination by the Government at 
V/ashington to give moral and physical support to the 
revolutionists. There is a reason for this belief, for it 
was not actually decided to attempt the coup which re- 
sulted in the creation of the Republic until advices were 
received from the State to the effect that if it should be 
attempted the United States would back it up. ' 

These advices were not official, so far as the Adminis- 
tration was concerned, but they were of such a character 
... as to convince the revolutionists that all they had 
to do was to take the initiative and then rely on the 
United States to insure the success of the project. 



2IO America and the Canal Title 

These excerpts give support to the assertions 
already made that the Roosevelt Administration 
expected warships to reach Isthmian waters in 
time to prevent the landing of any new contingent 
of Colombian troops, and that the separatists 
knew that all they needed to do was to persuade 
($, $) the Colombian forces then on the Isthmus 
to acquiesce in secession. They were persuaded. 
This was the part that the separatists were to play 
in the rape of Colombia. Our marines were there 
to do the rest. In short, Isthmian cash and the 
American navy were to cooperate to effect the 
success of secession. 

Obviously, the inner circle in Panama could 
not have proceeded with the extreme measures 
that it did unless it had made adequate local 
preparation or had an understanding with our 
Administration. The absence of local prepara- 
tion will be discussed in Chapter VI. We hear 
of nothing but the non-resistence of Colombia's 
troops in the City of Panama, and their yielding 
to persuasion of a pecuniary kind. Therefore, it 
is a probability amounting to a certainty that 
there was an understanding between the separat- 
ists and the Big Brother of the north. The Big 
Brother acted with such clockwork precision in 
the scheme that doubt is transformed into con- 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 211 

viction. No reasoning along the ordinary infer- 
ences of human Hf e can arrive at any other con- 
clusion. 

It was plainly the understanding that the Prov- 
ince of Panama should declare her independence 
of Colombia and simultaneously assume all the 
functions of civil government. The United 
States was to recognize the independence of 
the new republic immediately. Thereafter the 
Treaty of 1846 was to be construed as in force 
with the new republic and Colombia would, ipso 
facto, be like any other foreign country in this 
respect. American warships were to be there to 
prevent the landing of any new contingent of 
Colombian troops on the Isthmus. This was to 
be done under the pretense of complying with the 
Treaty of 1846. No additional Colombian troops 
were expected until the entire coup was com- 
pleted. Thus, there was an attempt to give to an 
unlawful act the appearance of regularity and 
legality. 

Malmros, American Consul at Colon, in his 
telegram to Secretary Hay, dated November 3, 
1903, states: 

Revolution imminent. Government force on the Isth- 
mus about 500 men. Their official promised support 
revolution. Fire department Panama, 441, are well or- 



212 America and the Canal Title 

ganized and favor revolution. Government vessel, Car- 
tagena, with about 400 men, arrived early to-day with 
now commander-in-chief, Tovar. Was not expected un- 
til November 10. 

And this is the extent of the preparation for 
military operations in a province that is "seething 
with revolution" ! A political fire department of 
some 400 men and some other patriots whose ad- 
hesion was secured by the cash-nexus. Revolu- 
tion! Robbing a sister repubHc of a province 
under a cloak of respectability. 

The seizure of the Canal Zone, as originally 
planned, provided for the persuasion ($, $) of 
the Colombian garrison and officials domiciled on 
the Isthmus to act with the separatists and for the 
United States to have an adequate naval force 
near enough so that it could reach Isthmian 
waters in time to prevent Colombia from landing 
troops to reestablish her sovereignty. This plan 
was frustrated by the earlier arrival of a new con- 
tingent of Colombian troops. Had these troops 
not arrived before the plan was ready for execu- 
tion. Dr. Amador would not have had to make 
the representations to the Colombian generals that 
he did make. These representations match with 
established facts and are, therefore, conclusive as 
evidence. They point unmistakably to collusion. 



The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 213 

The events connected with the elimination of these 
Colombian troops tell the story as convincingly as 
though it were a matter of official record — signed, 
sealed and delivered. They prove that there was 
no revolution projected. They prove that none 
eventuated. They prove that the so-called Re- 
public of Panama is the product of intrigue be- 
tween Washington and Panama through the good 
offices of Bunau-Varilla. 



Chapter V 
Violation of the Treaty of 1846 

In this chapter, we will show that President 
Roosevelt, in the part that his Administration 
took in the vaudeville revolution on the Isthmus 
in the fall of 1903, violated the Treaty of 1846, 
then in force with Colombia, as well as a univer- 
sally recognized principle of international law. 
We will give the provisions of the treaty violated 
and point out wherein they were violated. We 
will conclude with an appeal for a more sacred 
keeping of our solemn engagements than we have 
done in the case of our Isthmian Canal treaties. 

The foregoing statement of faithlessness on the 
part of an American Administration is so grave 
that no self-respecting person would make it 
lightly. It must be immediately followed by 
something tangible that will indicate the possibil- 
ity of its being sustained by evidence. Various 
utterances of Roosevelt serve the purpose. We 
will begin with the associated press report of a 

talk by Colonel Goethals before the University 

214 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 215 

Club of Chicago on January 3, 191 5. President 
Roosevelt is reported to have said to Colonel 
Goethals : 

Colonel, I think I'll abolish that commission and con- 
centrate all authority in you. An Executive order will 
do it. 

Colonel Goethals mentioned the foregoing to 
Secretary of War Taf t, who responded : 

Yes, that's the way it ought to be done, but it isn't in 
accordance with the law. 

Colonel Goethals stated that he reported the 
observation of Secretary Taf t to President Roose- 
velt, who remarked characteristically : 

I don't care a hang for the law, I WANT THE 
CANAL BUILT. 

A public official who does not care a hang for 
statute law probably does not care a hang for a 
treaty, although it is now generally considered to 
be a solemn engagement. Roosevelt has practi- 
cally told us so. Speaking of the peace treaties 
negotiated by the Wilson Administration, he says : 

There is no likelihood that they will do us any great 
material harm, because it is absolutely certain that we 
would not pay the smallest attention to them in the event 
of their being invoked in ^ny matter where our interests 
were seriously involved. 



2i6 America and the Canal Title 

He, however, observes that the breaking of a 
treaty would do us harm in other than our ma- 
terial interests. We, of course, would unerringly 
pursue our material interests and disregard the 
moral. He says : 

But it would do us moral harm to break them even 
though this were the least evil of two evil alternatives. 

The foregoing observations by Roosevelt are 
vital in this discussion. The Treaty of 1846 and 
international law stood in the way of our material 
interests. So he did not "pay the smallest atten- 
tion to them" as the following shows: "/ took 
the Canal Zone!' His philosophy permitted him 
to disregard treaties and the law of nations and 
he did. It is seldom that a man boasts of faith- 
lessness, and counts it a virtue. Roosevelt has 
committed himself to the doctrine that a treaty is 
not binding if our ''interests are seriously in- 
volved.'' We, therefore, merely charge Roose- 
velt with having practiced in 1903 what he 
preached in 1914. Our offset to the foregoing is 
that our duty to civilization is paramount. This 
requires that we keep our solemn engagements 
even though our material interests are seriously 
involved. 

Roosevelt has told us what the United States 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 217 

would do if a situation arose where a treaty seri- 
ously conflicted with its material interests. In so 
doing, he has told us what he would do if he were 
President. In this book we are only telling what 
he did as President, and it is merely what he told 
us that he would do if he were President. We 
have also told how it was done — this is not con- 
firmed by anything that he has said. We are 
merely applying his philosophy to the most impor- 
tant event of his Administration, and assert noth- 
ing except that he put his philosophy into practice 
in the fall of 1903. 

Speaking of the labor-capital conflict in Col- 
orado, Roosevelt is reported to have said at Union- 
town, Pa., on October 28, 19 14, according to the 
New York World: 

It becomes the duty of the United States to remove the 
injustices that cause that disorder, just as I did in the 
anthracite coal strike. I finally got them to submit to 
the judgment of the commission which I appointed. 
There was a laboring man on that commission, inciden- 
tally. 

But I then held myself ready if they had refused to 
have used the army. I would have taken possession of 
the mines. I would have put a complete stop to all law- 
lessness and would have seen that the mines were 
worked; but I would have had a Major-General of the 
United States run the mines as a receiver. 

This is suggestive. ''I would have taken pos- 



2i8 America and the Canal Title 

session of the mines." By what authority, hu- 
man or divine ? We are not told. *'I don't care 
a hang for the law.'' Enough has been said. 
We now know that he would not hesitate to vio- 
late a treaty or to disregard fundamental provi- 
sions of international law. We will show that he 
practiced in 1903 what he defended in theory in 
1914. 

An official who does not care a hang for statute 
law probably does not care a hang for interna- 
tional law or a solemn engagement if they delay 
the beginning of an undertaking which he is de- 
termined shall appear in the galaxy of great deeds 
to his credit. Therefore it can not be repugnant 
to such an official to violate a treaty (say that of 
1846) if, in so doing, he can expedite the getting 
of the title to the Canal Zone which is preliminary 
to entrance upon canal construction. We be- 
lieve that the philosophy he has expressed in the 
abstract covers the events on the Isthmus in the 
fall of 1903 as history is recording them. 

The provisions of the treaty whose violation we 
allege form our starting point. The spirit of the 
treaty is found in the preamble and in Article i. 
It must not be overlooked that the treaty was not 
negotiated with Colombia, but with the Govern- 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 219 

ment which exercised authority over the same ter- 
ritory, namely, New Granada. It was continued 
unimpaired with Colombia until the Roosevelt 
Administration. This treaty was signed Decem- 
ber 12, 1846, ratified and proclaimed in June, 
1848. The preamble and Article i follow: 

The United States of North America and the Republic 
of New Granada in South America, desiring to make 
lasting and firm the friendship and good understanding 
which happily exist between both nations, have resolved 
to fix in a manner clear, distinct, and positive the rules 
which shall in the future be religiously observed between 
each other, by means of a treaty or general convention 
of peace and friendship, commerce and navigation. 

Article I 
There shall be a perfect, firm, and inviolable peace and 
sincere friendship between the United States of America 
and the Republic of New Granada in all the extent of 
their possessions and territories, and between their 
citizens respectively without distinction of person or 
places. 

We claim that Article XXXV of that treaty 
was violated. We will give this article in full 
save the portion dealing with the supersession of 
an earlier treaty. The bracketed insert gives a 
condensed summary of articles IV, V and VI, 
referred to in article XXXV. This insert, the 
preamble and Article I, as already mentioned, 
give the spirit underlying Article XXXV. The 
latter reads : 



220 America and the Canal Title 

The United States of America and the Republic of 
New Granada, desiring to make as durable as possible 
the relations which are to be established between the two 
parties by virtue of this treaty, have declared solemnly, 
and do agree to the following points : 

1st. For the better understanding of the preceding 
articles, it is and has been stipulated between the high 
contracting parties, that the citizens, vessels and mer- 
chandise of the United States shall enjoy in the ports of 
New Granada, including those of the part of the 
Granadian territory generally denominated Isthmus of 
Panama, from its southernmost extremity until the 
boundary of Costa Rica, all the exemptions, privileges 
and immunities concerning commerce and navigation, 
which are now or may hereafter be enjoyed by 
Granadian citizens, their vessels and merchandise; and 
that this equality of favors shall be made to extend to 
the passengers, correspondence and merchandise of the 
United States, in their transit across the said territory, 
from one sea to the other. The Government of New 
Granada guarantees to the Government of the United 
States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus 
of Panama upon any modes of communication that now 
exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open 
and free to the Government and citizens of the United 
States, and for the transportation of any articles of prod- 
uce, manufactures or merchandise, of lawful commerce, 
belonging to the citizens of the United States; that no 
other tolls or charges shall be levied or collected upon the 
citizens of the United States, or their said merchandise 
thus passing over any road or canal that may be made by 
the Government of New Granada, or by the authority of 
the same, than is, under like circumstances, levied upon 
and collected from the Granadian citizens; that any 
lawful produce, manufactures or merchandise, belonging 
to citizens of the United States, thus passing from one 
sea to the other, in either direction, for the purpose of 
exportation to any other foreign country, shall not be 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 221 

liable to any import-duties whatever; or, having paid 
such duties, they shall be entitled to drawback upon their 
exportation; nor shall the citizens of the United States 
be liable to any duties, tolls or charges of any kind, to 
which native citizens are not subjected for thus passing 
the said Isthmus. And, in order to secure to themselves 
the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, 
and as an especial compensation for the said advantages, 
and for the favors they have acquired by the 4th, 5th, 
and 6th [That is, extend to each other the most favored 
nation commercial advantages in addition to the mutual 
guarantees contained in this article, XXXV, concerning 
Isthmian transit] articles of this treaty, the United 
States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New 
Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality 
of the before-mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the 
free transit from the one to the other sea may not be inter- 
rupted or embarrassed in any future time while this 
treaty exists ; and, in consequence, the United States also 
guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty 
and property which New Granada has and possesses 
over the said territory. 

2nd. The present treaty shall remain in full force 
and vigor for the term of twenty years from the day of 
the exchange of the ratifications 

3rd. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if neither party 
notifies the other of its intention of reforming any of, or 
all, the articles of this treaty twelve months before the ex- 
piration of the twenty years stipulated above, the said 
treaty shall continue binding on both parties beyond the 
said twenty years, until twelve months from the time 
that one of the parties notifies its intention of proceeding 
to a reform. 

4th. If any one or more of the citizens of either party 
shall infringe any of the articles of this treaty, such 
citizens shall be held personally responsible for the same, 
and the harmony and good correspondence between the 
nations shall not be interrupted thereby; each party en- 



222 America and the Canal Title 

gaging in no way to protect the offender, or sanction 
such violation. 

5th. If unfortunately any of the articles contained in 
this treaty should be violated or infringed in any way 
whatever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the 
two contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts 
of reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other on 
complaints of injuries or damages, until the said party 
considering itself offended shall have laid before the 
other a statement of such injuries or damages, verified 
by competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, 
and the same shall have been denied, in violation of the 
laws and of international right. 

6th. Any special or remarkable advantage that one or 
the other power may enjoy from the foregoing stipu- 
lation, are and ought to be always understood in virtue 
and as in compensation of the obligations they have just 
contracted, and which have been specified in the first 
number of this article. 

This treaty clearly imposed upon the sovereign 
the duty to keep the transit unobstructed. If the 
sovereign was unable to do so on account of local 
disturbances, the United States, its nationals, or 
both, were entitled to compensation for dam- 
ages actually sustained. The article provided a 
method for securing reparation, and it was actu- 
ally applied in 1857 when damages were collected 
that resulted from the interruption of transit. 
The treaty, however, from the preamble to the 
closing article, does not derogate from the rights 
of the sovereign and none of the rights that the 
United States acquired by it supervened those of 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 223 

the sovereign or any of the rights of sovereignty. 
This blends the violation of this treaty with that 
of the violation of international law, that is, the 
violation of the rights of sovereignty, under the 
law of nations. 

What fundamental provision of international 
law was violated ? In order to point it out clearly, 
we must define sovereignty. Sovereignty is the 
sum total of rights which attach to an independent 
state by virtue of being such. What then is a 
sovereign state? Stockton defines a sovereign 
state as follows : 

A sovereign state may be defined in general terms to 
be a fully independent and civilized community of 
persons, permanently located within a fixed country, 
organized under common laws into a body politic for 
mutual advantage, exercising the rights of government 
over all persons and things within its territory, and 
capable of entering into relations and intercourse with 
other states of the world. 

This is enlarged upon and somewhat amplified 
in the following : 

All sovereign states within the purview of inter- 
national law are equal, that is, equal in their rights and 
in their obligations, equal in their sovereignty, and in 
their independence. 

From the foregoing it follows that sovereign 
states have two paramount rights : 



224 America and the Canal Title 

1. The right of self-preservation. 

2. The right of exclusive jurisdiction over their 
territory. 

Sovereignty is a combination of all power, that 
is, power to do anything and everything in a state 
without legal accountability. It is the right of a 
nation to govern itself independent of any foreign 
power. This includes, of course, the right to 
suppress insurrection and to prevent dismember- 
ment. Colombia had the right to suppress seces- 
sion without interference from our Government. 

Did New Granada impair or intend to impair 
in any way whatsoever, either of the foregoing 
rights when she entered into the Treaty of 1846 
with the United States? If not, Colombia had 
the indisputable right to use force to preserve her 
sovereignty over the Province of Panama. In- 
terference with that right was in violation of in- 
ternational law. 

Whether impairment of the sovereignty of New 
Granada was intended can be best seen in official 
documents connected with the negotiation of the 
treaty, the most important of which is the follow- 
ing from a message of President Polk: 

The general considerations which have induced me to 
transmit the treaty to the Senate for their advice may be 
summed up in the following particulars: 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 225 

1. The treaty does not propose to guarantee a terri- 
tory to a foreign nation in which the United States will 
have no common interest with that nation. On the con- 
trary, we are more deeply and directly interested in the 
subject of this guaranty than New Granada herself, or 
any other country. 

2. The guaranty does not extend to the territories of 
New Granada generally, but is confined to the single pro- 
vince of the Isthmus of Panama, where we shall acquire 
by the treaty a common and coextensive right of passage 
with herself. 

3. It will constitute no alliance for any political object, 
but for a purely commercial purpose, in which all the 
navigating nations of the world have a common interest. 

4. In entering into the mutual guarantees proposed by 
the thirty-fifth article of the treaty, neither the Govern- 
ment of New Granada nor that of the United States has 
any narrow or exclusive views. The ultimate object . . . 
is to secure to all nations the free and equal right of 
passage over the Isthmus. If the United States, as the 
chief of the American nations, should first become a 
party to this guaranty, it cannot be doubted — indeed, it 
is confidently expected by the Government of New 
Granada — that similar guarantees will be given to that 
Republic by Great Britain and France. 

All that the United States secured by this treaty 
on the Isthmus was a common and coextensive 
right of transit with the sovereign. As similar 
rights were to be extended to the other nations, 
according to the excerpt of the message quoted, 
in return for the guarantees embodied in Article 
XXXV, it follows that no impairment of sover- 
eignty was intended by the negotiators of the 



226 America and the Canal Title 

treaty. The guaranteeing powers, according to 
the intent of the treaty, were to keep transit open 
against obstruction by foreign powers and to 
maintain the neutrahty of the Province of Pan- 
ama under the sovereignty of New Granada. 
New Granada remained the sole protector of Isth- 
mian transit against domestic obstruction. Out- 
side intereference without her consent or request 
would be in violation of the treaty and of her 
rights as a sovereign state. 

That the treaty was merely to grant to the 
United States a common coextensive right of 
transit with the sovereign on the Isthmus is 
further shown in the following excerpt from an 
official communication of Mallarino, at the time 
Minister of New Granada at Washington : 

On account of these reasons, and for the convenience 
of not awakening international jealousies by extraor- 
dinary and special treaties, the guaranty of territorial 
possession, to be given by the United States, ought to be 
incidentally introduced in treaties of commerce, as a 
part of and subordinate to them. . . . 

This end is simply and naturally to be obtained by 
stipulating, in favor of the United States, the total repeal 
of the differential duties, as a compensation of the obli- 
gation they impose upon themselves of guaranteeing the 
legitimate and complete or integral possession of those 
portions of territory that the universal mercantile 
interests require to be free and open to all nations. 

In the course of his argument, Mallarino 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 227 

points out that Great Britain would be at a com- 
mercial (disadvantage — 

Unless she invited New Granada to alter upon the 
same conditions, the British treaty, constituting herself 
thereby, also, as a guaranteeing power of New Granada 
sovereignty upon the Isthmus. 

It is clear from this, as well as from the treaty 
itself, that New Granada sought the guarantee of 
her sovereignty over the Province of Panama, 
and was offering as compensation a common and 
coextensive right of transit over the Isthmus, and 
the favored nation commercial provision in her 
entire territory. Under date of February 10, 
1847, President Polk, in a special message to the 
Senate, said: 

There does not appear any other effectual means of 
securing to all nations the advantages of this important 
passage but through the guarantee of great commercial 
powers that the Isthmus shall be neutral territory. . . , 

The guarantee of the sovereignty of New Granada 
over the Isthmus is a natural consequence of this neutral- 
ity. . . . New Granada would not yield this province that 
it might become a neutral State; and if she should, it is 
not sufficiently populous or wealthy to establish or main- 
tain an independant sovereignty. But a civil govern- 
ment must exist there to protect the works which shall be 
constructed. New Granada is not a power which will 
excite the jealousy of any nation. 

The protection of the works to be constructed, 
canal and railroad, was to be under the exclusive 



228 America and the Canal Title 

jurisdiction of the sovereign. There was not 
only no intent in this treaty to impair any of the 
then rights of sovereignty of New Granada over 
the Province of Panama, but there was, on the 
contrary, a clearly defined intent to safeguard for 
her that sovereignty in perpetuity. 

The Isthmus has always had strategic value and 
therefore its possession has been coveted by other 
powers. The United States was one of them. 
This country guaranteed the sovereignty of Co- 
lombia over this territory in the Treaty of 1846. 
It gave no guarantee, however, against the suc- 
cess of a domestic insurrection. Therefore the 
United States was not obligated to keep transit 
open during a domestic uprising. The Treaty 
was entirely extra-domestic. The United States 
could intervene to keep transit open during a do- 
mestic conflict only at the request of the sovereign. 
Compensation for loss suffered during an inter- 
ruption of transit was the only remedy open to 
the United States under the Treaty of 1846. She 
was clearly estopped from being the revolution 
herself under the cloak of a few separatists domi- 
ciled in the City of Panama. 

One of the reasons advanced for the adoption 
of the Treaty of 1846 was that it would allay sus- 
picion in Spanish-America. The argument ad- 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 229 

vanced by the Minister of New Granada, Malla- 
rino, clearly showed that the United States was 
believed to have territorial designs there. His 
argument clearly shows that one of the purposes 
of the Treaty was to secure territorial integrity 
for New Granada. The following, by the Minis- 
ter named, is quoted from an official document on 
record in the State Department : 

Other reasons are relative to the United States* own 
fame and reputation, as assuredly nothing would so 
brilliantly vindicate them, nor acquire them greater 
augmentation of American affection than the fact that 
they, after having been branded as the oppressors and 
future conquerors of Spanish American republics should 
present themselves as the most jealous protectors of the 
territorial integrity of those very same republics in whose 
preservation they would appear taking an open and 
direct interest. 

Did the sovereign surrender, or intend to sur- 
render, the right of protection of isthmian transit 
to the United States, or did she contract, by im- 
plication, for the right to call on this country for 
assistance in the event that she was unable to 
afford protection? As already shown, the intent 
of the negotiators of the Treaty of 1846 was 
clearly not to derogate from the sovereign rights 
of New Granada, but to secure their inviolability. 

In the light of the foregoing, read the telegrams 



230 America and the Canal Title 

of November 2, 1903, to our naval forces in or 
soon to arrive in Isthmian waters. They are so 
vital that we reproduce vital excerpts from them. 
To the Nashville at Colon : 

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If inter- 
ruption threatened by armed force, occupy the line of 
railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with 
hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, either at 
Colon, Porto Bello or other point. . . . Government force 
reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent 
their landing if in your judgment this would precipitate 
a conflict. 

To the Boston at Panama : 

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If inter- 
ruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of 
railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with 
hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, at any 
point within 50 miles of Panama. . . . Government force 
reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent 
their landing if, in your judgment, the landing would 
precipitate a conflict. 

When these telegrams were sent to our naval 
commanders, our Government read into a solemn 
engagement a construction not warranted by its 
wording or the intent of its negotiators. 

The Treaty of 1846 would, of course, not have 
been agreed to by New Granada nor would it have 
been continued by Colombia if it had been believed 
that the United States would use it as a pretext 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 231 

to wrest from its sovereignty the Province of 
Panama. The construction placed on this treaty 
by our Government in 1903 gave the United 
States power equivalent to that of de facto sover- 
eignty over the line of transit and its littoral. As 
applied this power took precedence of the rights 
of the de jure sovereign. This construction of 
the treaty is without precedent in American di- 
plomacy and without sanction in international 
law. 

Contrast the foregoing telegrams with the 
policy pursued by our Government under the 
Treaty of 1846 previous to the Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration. Our earlier policy is well stated in 
a letter to his Government by Minister Concha, 
dated October 30, 1902. In this letter he pro- 
tested against the new construction of the treaty, 
and clearly states our earlier interpretations. 
The portion that is to the point reads : 

When for the first time the United States used the 
right of transit via the Isthmus, which is guaranteed 
them by the existing treaty, it was with the simple object 
of sending troops to Oregon and Cahfornia; that was 
effected by disembarking them and sending them across 
the Isthmus without having given any previous notice to 
the authorities ; for that our Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
presented a protest in Washington through the legation, 
and in a conference in September of 1858 between the 



232 America and the Canal Title 

Granadian minister, General Herran, and the Secretary of 
State, General Casey, it was agreed that in future when- 
ever it was necessary to send American forces through the 
territory of the Isthmus they would come unarmed and 
as groups of private individuals "without enjoying the 
exemptions which are customary when troops pass 
through foreign territory, but, on the contrary, being 
subject to the territorial jurisdiction exactly like all other 
strangers." This agreement was punctually fulfilled 
during the American war of secession on the occasion 
when forces of the Government of the United States 
were sent to the Pacific. To-day, so advanced is the 
interpretation, that American forces are disembarked in 
Panama to disarm those of the sovereign of the territory. 
Whatever more extensive comment might be made on 
this point would be redundant. 

Comparison of the foregoing excerpts of tele- 
grams to our naval forces with the previous policy 
of our Government shows that the Treaty of 1846 
was scrapped by the Roosevelt Administration in 
1903. This treaty was negotiated by New Gra- 
nada and continued by Colombia for the purpose 
of safeguarding their sovereignty over the Isth- 
mus. It was violated, and, at the same time, used 
as a pretext to conceal from the American people 
the rape of Colombia. 

When the telegrams just quoted from were 
sent, there was peace on the Isthmus. Yet, the 
sovereign of the territory was forbidden to land 
troops there to protect her sovereignty and was 
barred from the use of the Panama railroad, 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 233 

which was obliged by its charter to transport 
Colombian troops from one side of the Isthmus 
to the other on demand. 

On November 9, 1865, Secretary Seward sent 
a communication to our Minister at Bogota which 
clearly defined the duty of the United States and 
that of the sovereign state in relation to the pro- 
tection of Isthmian transit if obstruction was 
threatened as a result of domestic trouble. It 
reads: 

The question which has recently arisen under the 
thirty-fifth article of the treaty with New Granada, as to 
the obHgation of this Government to comply with a req- 
uisition of the President of the United States of 
Colombia for a force to protect the Isthmus of Panama 
from invasion by a body of insurgents of that country 
has been submitted to the consideration of the Attorney 
General. His opinion is that neither the text nor 
the spirit of the stipulation in that article, by which 
the United States engages to preserve the neutrality 
of the Isthm.us of Panama, imposes an obligation 
on this Government to comply with a requisition like 
that referred to. The purpose of the stipulation was 
to guarantee the Isthmus against seizure or invasion 
by a foreign power only. It could not have been con- 
templated that we were to become a party to any civil 
war in that country by defending the Isthmus against 
another party. As it may be presumed, however, that 
our object in entering into such a stipulation was to 
secure the freedom of transit across the Isthmus, if that 
freedom should be endangered or obstructed, the employ- 
ment of force on our part to prevent this would be a 
question of grave expediency to be determined by cir- 



234 America and the Canal Title 

cumstances. The department is not aware that there is 
yet occasion for a decision upon this point. 

For the purpose of comparison with the fore- 
going telegrams, the following by Secretary 
Seward is even more to the point : 

THE UNITED STATES DESIRES NOTHING ELSE, NOTHING 
BETTER^ AND NOTHING MORE IN REGARD TO THE STATE OF 
COLOMBIA THAN THE ENJOYMENT^ ON THEIR PART, OF 
COMPLETE AND ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPEND- 
ENCE. IF THOSE GREAT INTERESTS SHALL EVER BE AS- 
SAILED BY ANY POWER AT HOME OR ABROAD, THE UNITED 
STATES WILL BE READY, COOPERATING WITH THE GOVERN- 
MENT AND THEIR ALLY, TO MAINTAIN AND DEFEND THEM. 

We will now throw into relief, that is, contrast 
the Roosevelt policy as contained in the telegrams 
quoted above with the policy of other earlier ad- 
ministrations. 

Secretary Hamilton Fish declared that it was 
the duty of the sovereign under the treaty to pro- 
tect Isthmian transit from domestic interference, 
and that the United States would insist upon it. 
It is contained in the following communication 
addressed to our Minister at Bogota : 

This Government, by the Treaty with New Granada j 
of 1846, has engaged a guaranty of neutraHty of the % 
Isthmus of Panama. This engagement, however, has 
never been acknowledged to embrace the duty of protect- 
ing the road across it from the violence of local factions. 
Although such protection was of late efficiently given by 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 235 

the force under the command of Admiral Almy, it 
appears to have been granted with the consent and at the 
request of the local authorities. It is, however, regarded 
as the undoubted duty of the Colombian Government to 
protect the road against attacks from local insurgents. 
The discharge of this duty will be insisted upon. 

Compliance with the treaty obligated the sov- 
ereign to keep an adequate force on the Isthmus 
to maintain order during ordinary times and to 
send additional forces when needed. As already 
stated, there is not the sHghtest suggestion of im- 
pairment of sovereignty, or of any right of the 
United States to prevent the sovereign from land- 
ing troops on any part of the Isthmus, to maintain 
order or shifting them on the Isthmus as emer- 
gency arose. 

The telegrams to our naval officers just quoted 
were sent to obstruct transit in its most sacred 
use. The sovereign was to be barred from its 
legitimate use. These telegrams were sent to 
give assurance to the separatists on the Isthmus 
that secession would be protected. In a time of 
profound peace, the sovereign was to be barred 
from the use of a railroad in his own dominion. 
This would hearten the separatists — galvanize the 
movement — and give vitality to secession. 

In an earlier chapter we gave the view of 
Grover Cleveland. We will now contrast the 



236 America and the Canal Title 

telegrams under examination with the following 
from the pen of his Secretary of State, Bayard : 

On several occasions the Government of the United 
States, at the instance, and always with the assent of 
Colombia, has, in times of civil tumult, sent its armed 
forces to the Isthmus of Panama to preserve American 
citizens and property along the transit from injuries 
which the Government of Colombia might at the time be 
unable to prevent. But, in taking such steps, this 
Government has always recognized the sovereignty and 
obligation of Colombia in the premises, and has never 
acknowledged, but, on the contrary, has expressly dis- 
claimed the duty of protecting transit against domestic 
disturbances. 

The policy pursued during the Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration is without a sustaining precedent. 
It is sui generis. It stands unique in its isolation. 
Its offspring is the so-called Republic of Panama. 
Its heritage is the ill-will of Colombia and of 
Spanish- America. Its by-product is national dis- 
honor. Its aftermath is a stain on the Roosevelt 
Administration which all the waters of the canal 
can never wash away. 

We have contrasted the action of the Roosevelt 
Administration in 1903 with that of earlier ad- 
ministrations. It is now proper to contrast it 
with that of the Roosevelt Administration in 
1902, when, hat in hand, it was a suppliant at the 
feet of Colombia for a title to the Canal Zone. 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 237 

We will do so in detail in the next chapter. A 
bird's-eye view serves our purpose here. The 
telegram dated October 16, 1902, sent by Secre- 
tary Hay to our Minister at Bogota reads : 

This Government regrets misunderstanding which has 
apparently arisen in Panama. No intention to infringe 
sovereignty or wound dignity of Colombia. American 
commander was instructed in that sense October 10. 

This telegram concedes that Colombian sover- 
eignty was not impaired by the Treaty of 1846. 
Is not that which is conceded in 1902 binding in 
1903? Therefore, Colombia had the unques- 
tioned right in 1903 to dispatch her forces to the 
Isthmus to maintain order and to protect her 
sovereignty over the Province of Panama. It 
was also her duty to do so under the Treaty of 
1846. The United States prevented her from 
performing her duty by the display of overwhelm- 
ing force. In so doing our Administration vio- 
lated the Treaty of 1846 and the principle of sov- 
ereignty as defined in international law. 

In a time of profound peace (November 2, 
1903), the United States forbade the actual sov- 
ereign to land troops to keep open the Isthmian 
transit and obstructed transit herself in its most 
sacred use, that of preserving territorial integ- 
rity. In a time of unsettled conditions (Novem- 



238 America and the Canal Title 

ber 6, 1903), the United States ordered the de 
facto sovereign (Panama) to keep open Isthmian 
transit. On the latter date Secretary Hay tele- 
graphed our Consul at Panama : 

When 3^ou are satisfied that a de facto government, re- 
publican in form, and without substantial opposition 
from its own people, has been established in the State of 
Panama, you will enter into relations with it as the re- 
sponsible government of the territory and look to it for 
all due action to protect the persons and property of citi- 
zens of the United States and to keep open the Isthmian 
transit in accordance with the obligations of existing 
treaties governing the relation of the United States to 
that territory. 

We will now give a summary of the changes 
{de convenance) in the interpretation of the 
Treaty of 1846, for which the Roosevelt Adminis- 
tration is responsible. In 1857, as already seen, 
the United States informed New Granada, now 
Colombia, that it was her duty to keep Isthmian 
transit unobstructed and because she failed to do 
so, a disinterested tribunal was constituted to 
assess damages. This construction of the treaty 
remained in full force until some time after 
Roosevelt became President. Thereafter its con- 
struction altered as did the exigencies surround- 
ing the title to the Canal Zone. 

In 1903, from November 2 to November 6, the 
United States for the first time held that it was its 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 239 

duty to keep the line of transit open and so for- 
bade Colombia to land soldiers anywhere on the 
Isthmus to protect her sovereignty over the Prov- 
ince of Panama. Again in 1903, from Novem- 
ber 6 and after, as just seen, the United States 
required Panama to keep the line of transit open. 
And yet there is no more honorable chapter in 
American history than this perfidious somer- 
saulting in the construction of the Treaty of 
1846! 

If the obligation to keep Isthmian transit open 
was imposed on the new-born Government of 
Panama because of its having succeeded to the 
rights and duties of Colombia under the Treaty of 
1846, then in the name of all that is sacred how 
could our Government honestly deny to Colom- 
bia the right and duty, under the same treaty, to 
comply with the same obligation? How could 
she deny to the de jure and the de facto sovereign 
on November 2, 1903, when peace prevailed on the 
Isthmus, what she imposed on the de facto Gov- 
ernment (not sovereign) on November 6, 1903? 
''Consistency, thou art a jewel T 

The Treaty of 1857 between the United States 
and New Granada throws an interesting sidelight 
on the construction placed on the Treaty of 1846, 



240 America and the Canal Title 

when title to the Canal Zone was not a disturbing 
factor. Transit across the Isthmus was ob- 
structed in 1856. This treaty was negotiated for 
the purpose of enabling citizens of the United 
States to collect damages from New Granada by 
reason of this obstruction. The damages were 
demanded by the United States because it held 
that it was the duty of New Granada and not that 
of the United States to keep transit open. New 
Granada admitted that this was the correct con- 
struction of the Treaty of 1846. Article I of the 
Treaty of 1857 reads: 

All claims on the part of . . . citizens of the United 
States upon the Government of New Granada . . . and 
especially those for damages which were caused by the 
riot at Panama on the 15th of April, 1856, for which 
the said Government of New Granada acknowledges its 
liability arising out of its privileges and obligation to 
preserve peace and order along the transit route. 

It thus clearly appears from this treaty that it 
was held to be the duty of the sovereign to pre- 
serve peace and order along the line of transit; 
and because in this instance the sovereign was un- 
able to preserve it as it had guaranteed to do, 
United States citizens claimed and collected dam- 
ages. Could there have been a more solemn 
recognition by one country of the duty of another 
to keep open the latter's own line of transit ? 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 241 

Section 5 of Article XXXV of the Treaty of 
1846 is so important that we quote it again. It 
reads : 

If, unfortunately, any of the articles contained in this 
treaty should be violated or infringed in any way what- 
ever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two 
contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of 
reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other in com- 
plaints of injuries or damages, until the said party con- 
sidering itself offended shall have laid before the other a 
statement of such injuries or damages, verified by com- 
petent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, and 
the same shall have been denied, in violation of the laws 
and of international right. 

It required the aggrieved party to notify the 
other party of its grievance before using force. 
On November 2, 1903, when the Roosevelt Ad- 
ministration entered upon the dismemberment of 
Colombia, the United States had not notified Co- 
lombia of any fault or delinquency on her part in 
observing her treaty obligations. This omission 
in itself would have been a violation of this solemn 
compact, even though there had existed a bona fide 
grievance. But, as already stated, none worthy 
of mention existed. Our intervention in the 
secession of the Province of Panama rests on 
some other ground than grievance under the 
Treaty of 1846. 

The de jure and de facto sovereign of the Isth- 



242 America and the Canal Title 

mus had maintained, with almost negligible ex- 
ceptions, unobstructed transit across the Isthmus 
for fifty-five years, the then lifetime of the Treaty 
of 1846. International law. does not permit the 
destruction of sovereignty in order to prevent 
temporary interruption of transit. The Treaty 
of 1846 provided a method for its adjustment in 
case of interruption. More important, however, 
is the fact that civilization will suflfer more from 
the violation of a treaty than from an interrup- 
tion of traffic only temporary in character. The 
controlling fact, however, is that in 1903 there 
was no intention anywhere to interfere with Isth- 
mian transit save at the White House, and that 
interference was aimed at the sovereign, Colom- 
bia. This is the contra of what was expected 
under the treaty. Under it one would have ex- 
pected that if the weaker nation was temporarily 
incapable of a perfect fulfillment of its guarantee, 
the stronger nation would, upon request, lend as- 
sistance. 

By the law of nations and the terms of the 
Treaty of 1846, Colombia, as the lawful successor 
of New Granada, was the sovereign peer of the 
United States. This being so the following 
from the pen of Leander T. Chamberlain is apro- 
pos: 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 243 

Save for the main purpose of protecting free transit 
and thus safeguarding her own interests in such transit, 
the United 'States might no more land her forces on Co- 
lombia's soil, or even threaten such landing, than she 
might land her forces, or threaten to land them, on the 
soil of Russia or Japan. 

Nor is even this the full measure of the restraint 
which the Executive^ of the United States was bound to 
recognize and respect. It has been conceded that the 
guaranteed neutrality and sovereignty had reference to 
foreign powers. But it is to be borne in mind that in 
guaranteeing Colombia's neutrality and sovereignty as 
against foreign powers, the United States distinctly de- 
creed and surpassingly emphasized her own exclusion 
from acts of invasion. She determinately erected an 
impassable barrier against her own interference with 
Colombia's independent authority. And this, in the sim- 
ple fact that she herself was a "foreign nation" ! The 
treaty inhibition affected her, first of all. She virtually 
named herself in the guarantee; and the guarantor, be- 
ing thus included in the inhibition, was, beyond all oth- 
ers, forbidden to violate its terms. 

Hannis Taylor, an authority on international 
law and the history of diplomacy, makes the fol- 
lowing observations concerning the Treaty of 
1846 and its violation in 1903 : 

Thus by the most solemn guarantee known to the fam- 
ily of nations the United States pledged itself, by express 
contract, to respect and uphold the sovereignty of New 
Granada over the Isthmus of Panama, a plain duty al- 
ready due to New Granada under the general principles 
of international law. In emergencies other than the dis- 
turbance of interoceanic transit or peril to the persons 
and possessions of American citizens, there might be no 



244 America and the Canal Title 

intervention in the affairs of New Granada, reestab- 
lished as the United States of Colombia in 1863. By 
the terms of the treaty, and by the principles of inter- 
national law, Colombia, as the successor of New Gra- 
nada, was the sovereign peer of the United States, which, 
save for the purpose of protecting free transit, might no 
more land forces on Colombian soil, or even threaten 
such landing, than she might land such forces on the 
shores of France or England. After a careful exam- 
ination of the subject a competent expert has said that, 
during the 40 years that intervened between the estab- 
lishment of Colombia in 1863 and the Panama imbroglio 
of 1903, United States forces were employed in only 
seven instances and for a total period of 164 days, and 
in each instance with Colombia's approval. In no case 
was there fighting, the mere precautionary measures be- 
ing sufficient. 

In continuation of the foregoing we may ap- 
propriately observe that Colombia's inherent sov- 
ereignty, whether guaranteed or not, would have 
given her a right paramount to the right of even 
her ally, the United States. In fine, in the emer- 
gency of self-preservation, the control of Isth- 
mian transit was completely Colombia's. In that 
case, the President of the United States was au- 
thorized to do no more than see to it that Colom- 
bia's interruption of transit was neither wantonly 
imposed nor unreasonably prolonged. Only on 
proof of such wantonness or unreasonableness 
would there be just cause for offense. To hold 
otherwise would be to hold that, in our own Civil 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 245 

War, foreign nations might have justly com- 
plained because our blockade of an insurgent coast 
rendered nugatory, for the time being, their long- 
standing right to navigate our ports and rivers. 

The neutrality of the Isthmus guaranteed to 
New Granada by the Treaty of 1846 referred to 
foreign nations, as already stated. It was 
against interference by an outside government, 
interference which might, among other evil re- 
sults, interrupt the transit from the one to the 
other sea. Similarly the guarantee of New 
Granada's rights of sovereignty and property was 
with reference to an invasion by a foreign power, 
which might imperil the Isthmian transit. Since 
the paramount issue in the case of both the neu- 
trality and sovereignty which the United States 
guaranteed was the safeguarding of the transit, 
there was a valid implication that the United 
States, on due occasion, would give aid to prevent 
interruption of transit from any source whatever, 
whether foreign or domestic. This had been the 
unbroken policy of the United States until Roose- 
velt became President, when the precedent was 
scrapped. 

Worst of all is the fact that there was no revo- 
lution planned or projected on the Isthmus at the 
time. There was a movement to effect the seces- 



246 America and the Canal Title 

sion of the Province of Panama provided the 
United States would agree to protect it. Without 
this assurance it was not to be attempted. It is 
thus clear that there was no need whatsoever of 
American marines on the Isthmus at that time. 
They were the revolution by the grace of our then 
President. 

For the orders sent in the telegrams of Novem- 
ber 2, 1903, and in those sent immediately there- 
after, designed to prevent Colombia from landing 
troops within fifty miles of Panama on the west 
coast of the Isthmus, from landing troops any- 
where on the east coast, and from moving the new 
contingent of troops already at Colon across the 
Isthmus, American history offers no counterpart 
and international law no sanction. There is 
nothing in American history resembling the opera 
bouffe revolution on the Isthmus in November, 
1903, and it is to be doubted if there is anything 
in modern history resembling it. It was a make- 
believe revolution for the purpose of giving the 
appearance of respectability to the method em- 
ployed to secure the Canal Zone. The United 
States prevented Colombia from doing what she 
was obligated to do under the Treaty of 1846 and 
what it had insisted on her doing theretofore. 
Moorfield Story well says: 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 247 

New Granada agreed to protect travelers across the 
Isthmus against interference, and to pay damages in case 
she failed: It was clearly her duty, and therefore her 
right, to use all force necessary for the purpose. In 
consideration of this, the United States agreed to help 
New Granada and not to act against her. It is impos- 
sible to torture language so as to find in the treaty any 
right on our part to prevent her keeping order and pro- 
tecting travel on her own territory. 

The rule laid down for the construction of 
treaties is that unless the treaty is so clearly 
drawn that no other conclusion is warranted it 
shall not be held that any government intended to 
surrender any control, or cede to another power 
any right of sovereignty within its jurisdiction. 
In this connection, the following excerpt from a 
speech of the late Senator Carmack is apropos: 

We have protected the transit again and again, but 
never before was the claim made that we had a right to 
exclude Colombia from her own dominions. Never be- 
fore was the claim made that we had the right under 
the Treaty of 1846 to support an insurrection against the 
authority of Colombia. You do not have to read the 
Treaty of 1846 to know that it contains no such prepos- 
terous provision. No nation on earth ever surrendered 
the right to protect its own soil and the integrity of its 
own domain with its own troops or surrendered to an- 
other government the right to prevent or to suppress an 
insurrection against its authority. No such thing can 
be found /in the Treaty of 1846. 

The language of the treaty speaks for itself. 



248 America and the Canal Title 

On its very face it imports an engagement by the 
sovereign to protect the freedom of transit. It 
has been so construed by Presidents Polk and 
Cleveland; also, by Secretaries Seward, Fish, 
Bayard and Hay ( 1902) . It has been twice con- 
strued by treaties — the Treaty of 1857 and the 
treaty which grew out of it because of unfinished 
work. The telegrams of November 2, 1903, and 
those of like import later reduced the Treaty of 
1846 to a scrap of paper as ruthlessly as did 
the conduct of Germany reduce the Treaty of 
1839. 

It is clear that the right and duty of the United 
States were supplementary to those of the sov- 
ereign and did not supersede them. Our coun- 
try's duty commenced only after the sovereign 
had failed to maintain transit uninterrupted. 
Then we could act only in cooperation with and 
at the request of the sovereign. It is clear that 
in the Treaty of 1846 the sovereign did not abate 
any of her rights and duties or subordinate any of 
them to those of the United States. 

The only thing that there was wrong on the 
Isthmus at the time was the presence of our ma- 
rines and their exercising military control over 
it for the purpose of excluding the representatives 
of the sovereign. That was nothing more and 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 249 

nothing less than the conquest of the Isthmus in 
violation of the Treaty of 1846. 

And yet we are told by the self-appointed apos- 
tle of righteousness : 

We did harm to no one, save as harm is done to a 
bandit by a poHceman who deprives him of his chance 
for blackmail. 

What will be the verdict of history? It is our 
mature judgment that the following from the 
pen of an author unknown to the writer accurately 
forecasts it: 

The policeman himself under the guise of friendship, 
he smote the innocent and plundered the defenseless! 

What do other nations say of our rape of Co- 
lombia ? The London Graphic stated at the time : 

We regret exceedingly that President Roosevelt has 
allowed the fair name of his Administration to be 
smirched by a transaction so utterly at variance with the 
most elementary principles of public law and interna- 
tional morality. We cannot conceive a more lamentable 
outrage on the public conscience of the civilized world. 

General von Bernhardi defends the rape of Bel- 
gium by pointing to our seizure of the Canal Zone 
by the display of overwhelming force. He is 
quoted by the New York World as saying : 

Your seizure of Panama was only justifiable on the 
ground that the future interests of the American people 



250 America and the Canal Title 

are higher and greater than the abstract principles of in- 
ternational law. 

In its editorial on the above, this metropolitan 
journal appropriately observes : 

Mr. Roosevelt did seize Panama, and by so doing we 
reduced our treaty with Colombia to a scrap of paper, 
but there has not been a day since that time when mil- 
lions of Americans were not in protest, and there is 
pending at Washington a treaty calculated to right the 
wrong. . . . 

With General von Bernhardi throwing our wanton 
aggression at the Isthmus in our faces, how many more 
sessions of the United States Senate must there be be- 
fore that body will make the honorable amends that a 
great power owes to a weak and injured neighbor? 

Baron von Hengelmiiller, Austrian Ambas- 
sador to the United States in 1903, defends 
the rape of Belgium by pointing to the seizure 
of the Canal Zone by the United States. The 
New York World deals with it in an editorial as 
follows : 

Nothing that has developed in the European war has 
stirred Colonel Roosevelt to such indignation as the vio- 
lation by Germany of the neutral territory of Belgium. 
He has written and spoken frequently on this subject, 
always blaming the Administration at Washington for 
not instantly entering a protest, and sometimes even sug- 
gesting that the remonstrance should have been accom- 
panied by shot and shell. 

Let us grieve, therefore, that Baron von Hengelmiiller, 
once Austrian Ambassador to the United States, now 
publishing the recollections of his American experience, 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 251 

finds in all the annals of nations no such glorious justi- 
fication of what Germany has done to Belgium as is to 
be had in the brief and simple record of what President 
Roosevelt did to Panama in 1903. He "took" it because 
he wanted it, and there was no nonsense about treaties 
or anything else. "The good of the state meant more to 
him than the letter of the law." 

. . . The hair shirt thus presented to Colonel Roose- 
velt seems to us to be a snug fit, and we trust that he is 
having "a bully time" wearing it. 

South American opinion, which we give m an- 
other chapter, is even more pronounced than the 
foregoing from the old world. Colombia rightly 
feels toward the United States as Belgium feels 
toward Germany. 

Any violation of a treaty is a blot upon the 
character of the nation that is guilty. Its extent 
thereof is measured by the importance of the 
event. It always lowers a nation's plighted word. 
Ours is below par in Spanish- America because of 
this incident and will remain at a discount until 
we disown the act and recompense Colombia for 
loss of vested interests. 

It is with nations as with men. Let a man go 
back on his word, and henceforth all men will 
sidestep when he makes overtures. We can only 
restore our promises to par by making reparation 
for past dereliction and by jealously keeping our 



2'52 America and the Canal Title 

solemn engagements in the future. There are 
some prices which nations as well as individuals 
cannot afford to pay for success — our violation of 
the Treaty of 1846 is one of them. 

James Bryce, who, among foreigners, stands 
foremost in the affection and esteem of the Amer- 
ican people, wrote to President Thwing: 

The awful calamity of a world-wide war, in which 
more than half of the human race are involved, compels 
us to study more earnestly than ever before the means 
by which war may be averted. Chief among these 
means are two. One is the maintenance of the faith of 
treaties as the guarantee of safety to small nations. 

The other means is the setting up of arbitration as the 
proper method for settling international disputes. Your 
nation has led the world in this worthy cause; and both 
America and England have by their resort to this method 
set many examples and given many proofs of their belief 
in its value. 

Let there be a revival in the keeping of the 1 
plighted word, in the observing of solemn engage- 
ments. America should lead the way by making 
reparation to Colombia for the violation of the 
Treaty of 1846 and for wresting from her her 
choicest province by the use of force. 

American honor cannot be fully restored until 
such reparation is made to Colombia as an impar- 
tial tribunal would impose. Until reparation sati 



Violation of Treaty of 1846 253 

isfactory to Colombia is made we may invoke the 
solace of the poet who taught us : 

Yea, and though we sinned and our rulers went from 

righteousness ; 
Deep in all dishonor though we stained our garment^s 

hem; 
Oh, be ye not dismayed. 
Though we stumbled and we strayed; 
We were led by evil counselors — the Lord shall deal 

with them. 

The excerpts from the treaty itself, the con- 
struction placed on this treaty by all Administra- 
tions called upon to construe it, from Polk to 
Roosevelt, and the story of the opera houife revo- 
lution on the Isthmus as told in the previous chap- 
ter, conclusively show that the Treaty of 1846 and 
international law were ruthlessly violated in the 
fall of 1903 when our Administration 'Hook'' the 
Canal Zone so that construction of the canal 
might go on simultaneously with the debate in the 
Congress. 

Treaties are the contracts of nations. Increase 
in the number of points of contact due to advanc- 
ing civilization increases dependence of one na- 
tion on another. This increase in solidarity is 
embodied in treaties not enforcible by a sover- 
eign. Maintenance of these treaties depends on 
the states which enter into them keeping the 



254 America and the Canal Title 

plighted word. Collective well-being is advanced 
by keeping these solemn engagements and is re- 
tarded by their violation. We know that domes- 
tic well-being is enhanced by the maintenance of 
private contracts. Treaties are as important in 
international relations as contracts are in domes- 
tic. Therefore, they should be maintained in- 
violate. The United States should make repara- 
tion to Colombia for violation of the Treaty of 
1846. 

We have shown conclusively that our Adminis- 
tration in 1903 deliberately and willfully violated 
the Treaty of 1846 and the law of nations when 
it ''took'' the Canal Zone. In the next chapter 
we will show in detail that the Canal Zone was 
taken by force — stolen. The payment of $10,- 
000,000 to the partner in crime and an annuity 
of $250,000 in perpetuity to the said partner does 
not clear the title of its stain. 



Chapter VI 
President Roosevelt ''Took" the Canal Zone 

The data of Chapter IV, which show that there 
was no real revolution on the Isthmus in the fall 
of 1903, also show that the Roosevelt Administra- 
tion ''took'' the Canal Zone by force. The pres- 
ent chapter must, therefore, be viewed as merely 
supplementary to the earlier chapter. It views 
the event from a different standpoint. 

In this chapter we undertake to point out in 
additional detail that Roosevelt "took" the Canal 
Zone by force. "Force" carries with it the idea 
of war. Did Roosevelt wage war against Co- 
lombia in the fall of 1903 ? If his own conception 
as to what constitutes war is correct, he did wage 
war against Colombia. His idea as to what con- 
stitutes war is found in an article published in the 
New York Times in the fall of 1914. The por- 
tion which is apropos reads: 

An astonishing proof of the readiness of many persons 
to pay heed exclusively to words and not at all to deeds 
is supplied by the statement of the defenders of this Ad- 

255 



256 America and the Canal Title 

ministration that President Wilson has "kept us out of 
war with Mexico" and has "avoided interference in 
Mexico." These are the words. 

The deeds have been: first, an unbroken course of 
more or less furtive meddling in the internal affairs of 
Mexico carried to a pitch which imposes on this nation a 
grave responsibility for the wrongdoing of the victorious 
factions; and, second, the plunging of this country into 
what was really a futile and inglorious little war with 
Mexico, a war entered into with no adequate object, and 
abandoned without the achievement of any object what- 
ever, adequate or inadequate. 

To say that we did not go to war with Mexico is a 
mere play upon words. A quarter of the wars of his- 
tory have been entered into and carried through without 
any preliminary declaration of war and often without 
any declaration of war at all. 

The seizure of the leading seaport city of another coun- 
try, the engagement and defeat of the troops of that coun- 
try, and the retention of the territory thus occupied for a 
number of months, constitute war; and denial that it is 
war can only serve to amuse the type of intellect which 
would assert that Germany has not been at war with 
Belgium because Germany never declared war on Bel- 
gium. President Wilson's war only resulted in the sac- 
rifice of a score of American lives and a hundred or two 
of the lives of Mexicans ; it was entirely purposeless, 
has served no good object, has achieved nothing, and 
has been abandoned by President Wilson without obtain- 
ing the object because of which it was nominally entered 
into; it can therefore rightly be stigmatized as a pe- 
culiarly unwise, ignoble and inefficient war; but it is war 
nevertheless. 

The writer is not in sympathy with the contents 
of this quotation. It is given merely to justify 
the statement that the Canal Zone was taken by 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 257 

force. The foregoing excerpt from the pen of 
Roosevelt warrants the conclusion that in order- 
ing five men-of-war to Colon and four to Panama 
in the fall of 1903 to protect the secession of the 
Province of Panama he made war on Colombia. 
He has told us that it was done for the purpose of 
protecting transit by rail between Colon and Pan- 
ama. But, as already indicated, he here merely 
uses words. There were no Isthmians under 
arms or prepared to bear arms. There was no 
interruption of transit impending excepting on 
the part of our marines. 

Senator Newlands introduced a resolution in 
the Senate at the time which states the views ol 
the writer. The portions of the resolution which 
are apropos read : 

1. The instructions of the United States to its naval 
forces not to permit the landing af the Colombian troops 
on the Isthmus, and the intervention of the armed forces 
of the United States to prevent such landing and the use 
of the Panama Railroad, and the display of power and 
force which overawed Colombia and prevented her from 
defending her sovereignty over the Isthmus, and thus 
secured the secession of Panama and the dismemberment 
of Colombia and the creation of a new sovereignty in 
Colombia's territory, sustained and supported only by 
the armed forces of the United States, constituted a dec- 
laration and prosecution of a successful war upon the 
part of the United States against Colombia. 

2. That such action constituted a breach of the Treaty 



258 America and the Canal Title 

of 1846 in this, that it denied Colombia's sovereignty 
over the Isthmus of Panama, expressly acknowledged 
by the Treaty of 1846. 

3. That it also violated the provision of the Treaty of 
1846, which declared that neither of the. two contracting 
parties should ordain or authorize any act of reprisal 
nor declare war against the other on complaint of in- 
juries or damages until the party considering itself of- 
fended should have laid before the other a statement of 
such injuries or damages verified by competent proofs, 
demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same should 
have been denied in violation of the laws and of inter- 
national right. 

5. That the armed intervention of the United States, 
as aforesaid, was making war against Colombia upon the 
part of the President of the United States without the 
sanction of the Congress of the United States, and was 
in violation of the provisions of the Constitution which 
gives to Congress alone the power to declare war. 

The section of the Constitution referred to by 
the Senator reads : 

Congress shall have power : To declare war . . . and 
make rules concerning captures on land and water. 

It will be recalled that we stated in Chapter IV 
that on November 2, 1903, there were no Isth- 
mians under arms. A new contingent of Colom- 
bian soldiers was about to arrive in order to as- 
sist in repelling a mythical invasion to oppose 
which General Huertas had dispatched the loyal 
Colombian troops on the Isthmus. The prospec- 
tive arrival of additional troops created consterna- 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 259 

tion among the separatists. They wired Bunau- 
Varilla in New York for help. He hastened to 
Washington. Our Administration sent the help 
immediately. 

Our statement that there was no uprising con- 
templated on the Isthmus is contradicted by an 
official document. It is claimed certain army of- 
ficers reported to Lieutenant-General Young what 
they saw as tourists on the Isthmus. The report 
is dated October 16, 1903. We are moved to ask 
if it is mere coincidence that this is the same date 
on which Bunau-Varilla gave Dr. Amador the as- 
surance that the United States would protect se- 
cession within forty-eight hours after the Decla- 
ration of Independence ? We will give the report 
of these officers as summarized by Roosevelt in 
his message to Congress dated January 4, 1904: 

That while on the Isthmus they became satisfied be- 
yond question that, owing largely to the dissatisfaction 
because of the failure of Colombia to ratify the Hay- 
Herran treaty, a revolutionary party was in course of 
organization having for its object the separation of the 
State of Panama from Colombia, the leader being Dr. 
Richard Arango, a former governor of Panama; that 
when they were on the Isthmus arms and ammunition 
were being smuggled into the city of Colon in piano 
boxes, merchandise crates, etc., the small arms received 
being principally the Gras French rifle, the Remington, 
and the Mauser; that nearly every citizen in Panama 
had some sort of rifle or gun in his possession, with am- 



26o America and the Canal Title 

munition therefor; that in the city of Panama there had 
been organized a fire brigade which was really intended 
for a revolutionary military organization; that there 
were representatives of the revolutionary organization 
at all important points on the Isthmus; that in Panama^ 
Colon, and the other principal places of the Isthmus po- 
lice forces had been organized which were in reality revo- 
lutionary forces; that the people on the Isthmus seemed 
to be unanimous in their sentiment against the Bogota 
Government, and their disgust over the failure of that 
Government to ratify the treaty providing for the 
construction of the canal, and that a revolution might be 
expected immediately upon the adjournment of the Co- 
lombian Congress without ratification of the treaty. 

This report is intended to prove that the Isth- 
mus was ''seething with revolution." Does it 
prove it ? Or, is the report an invention ? Let us 
see ! A report reaches the Isthmus that some two 
hundred Colombian soldiers will arrive about No- 
vember 3. It had been planned to declare inde- 
pendence the following day. Do they prepare to 
deal with the unwelcome troops on arrival ? No ! 
The request goes to Washington for help. Help 
arrives on November 2. The telegram calling for 
help is of record. It shows that there was not 
sufficient preparation on the Isthmus to deal with 
the expected two hundred fresh Colombian 
troops. Does this confirm the report of the offi- 
cers just quoted? ''Seething with revolution," 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 261 

yet shrieking for help to deal with a few fresh 
Colombian soldiers! 

The scheme required that the impression pre- 
vail throughout the United States that the Isth- 
mus was "seething with revolution/' A so-called 
report of the two army officers is placed on file 
for the purpose of showing it. Later events show 
that these officers could not possibly have seen on 
the Isthmus what they stated in the report. This 
at once arouses suspicion as to the source of the 
report and the purpose of it. It was clearly de- 
signed for the purpose of justifying the disposi- 
tion of the fleet. Numerous men-of-war were in 
striking distance of the Isthmus. Why this dis- 
position of the fleet ? To prevent Colombia from 
interfering with the secession movement. 

It is stated in Roosevelt's message of January 4, 
1904, that these army officers were on the Isthmus 
as tourists. The files of the war department show 
that they were on the Isthmus for the purpose of 
taking a military inventory for the use of our 
army should the taking of the Canal Zone lead 
to war. As the occasion for their being on the 
Isthmus is not correctly stated in the message in 
question, one is warranted in scrutinizing the 
foregoing excerpt from it. 



262 America and the Canal Title 

If the excerpt correctly stated Isthmian prepa- 
rations, why did not a motley array of insurgents 
rush to the assistance of alleged imperilled Amer- 
icans at Colon on November 4, 1903? Why did 
not the revolutionary police force of Colon come 
forward? Was it only a paper organization? 
Why was not the trained and equipped fire de- 
partment (441 revolutionists in disguise!) of 
Panama rushed to Colon to fight for freedom's 
cause ? Why did not insurgents pour in from the 
country around as in the days of Bunker Hill? 
None of these things happened. It was not on 
the tapis that they should happen. It was, how- 
ever, the day on which the Isthmus became free 
from Bogota rule. It was the day on which they 
are alleged to have declared themselves independ- 
ent. Yet no one rushed forward to protect the 
American men, women and children when threat- 
ened with being killed as described by Roosevelt, 
though they were innocent of any intent to wrong 
Colombia. Not one rushed to the side of the 
forty-two gallant American marines. 

The American marines were on hand for the 
purpose of protecting secession. The entire revo- 
lution as planned and executed was on our gun- 
boats. Had not the White House "seethed with 
revolution," the ripple on the Isthmus, created by 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 263 

a handful of financial and political adventurers, 
would have sunk into a state of innocuous desue- 
tude without even the sword being drawn in free- 
dom's cause. The report, summarized in the ex- 
cerpt, appears to be a frame-up. It does not ring 
true. It was conceived by amateurs. It is predi- 
cated on a degree of intelligence on the Isthmus 
that does not obtain anywhere in the world in a 
rural community or any other community. It is 
another striking evidence that history cannot be 
manufactured. It can only be recorded. 

As already indicated, three provinces did not 
succeed in the three years' revolution of 1899- 
1902. Now we are asked to believe that one of 
them planned a serious uprising less than twelve 
months thereafter. It carries with it its own 
refutation. 

Who paid for the munitions of war that were 
smuggled into Colon, according to the excerpt, for 
distribution on the Isthmus? Read Bunau-Va- 
rilla's account. There were none worthy of men- 
tion received or distributed. We have already 
shown that no such preparations for an uprising 
on the Isthmus were made or could have been 
made. 

We have direct knowledge as to the extent and 



264 America and the Canal Title 

character of Isthmian preparedness. It is found 
in part in the following excerpts from the testi- 
mony of Mr. Hall before the Committee of For- 
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives : 

In the cable codes you will find a provision for the 
sending of 50 revolvers of small caliber which the mem- 
bers of the fire department were to use in their early- 
morning arrests of any citizens loyal to Colombia. . . . 

The secret cable code between Amador and Bunau- 
Varilla and Joshua Lindo . . . tends strongly to cor- 
roborate the testimony of various Panamans that, so far 
as they knew, no arms, except 50 revolvers, were bought 
by Amador or his agent, Bunau-Varilla. 

It is to be noted that the Colombian garrison at 
Panama under General Huertas transferred its 
allegiance in a body to the new government, those 
loyal to Colombia having been dispatched to repel 
a mythical invasion from the north. This car- 
ried with it the transfer of the military supplies 
in the barracks. Rear Admiral Glass speaks of 
the preparedness of this garrison and of Isthmian 
preparedness in his report, dated November 16, 
1903, as follows: 

They are well armed with the Gras 45-caliber rifle, and 
are believed to have plenty of ammunition. As to the 
number of troops the Government of Panama could place 
in the field in the event of hostilities, the information 
received varies greatly, but it is probable that while be- 
tween 2,000 and 3,000 men are available, only 600 could 
at present be furnished with good arms. In this connec- 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 265 

tion, however, it is understood that a plentiful supply of 
arms and ammunition has been purchased and is ex- 
pected to arrive shortly. 

The information contained in the excerpts from 
official reports already mentioned corroborates 
and is corroborated by the following: 

The witnesses called to testify in Panama swore that 
no money was supplied before the revolution, and that 
the arms on which they depended in the event of being 
compelled to fight for their independence were none other 
than those in the barracks belonging to the Colombian 
Government, and that none were imported. 

It is only necessary to quote in addition to the 
foregoing excerpts from official reports, a para- 
graph from an able article by Henry C. Granger 
which appeared in the Independent on August 17, 
191 1, in order to dispose of the rubbish contained 
in the report of the officers. It reads : 

In view of the official telegrams quoted^ it is not neces- 
sary to say either when, or in presence of whom, or 
what United States naval officer at the Isthmus during 
the ''secession'' told me that ''the Panamanians were a 
set of sheep; our boys had to do it all." 

The condition of affairs reported to have ex- 
isted on the Isthmus as of October 16, 1903, by 
the army officers as described in the quotation 
from Roosevelt are also contradicted by later 
events. When words and later events conflict it 



266 America and the Canal Title 

is the words and not the events which suffer. 
The cautious investigator goes back of this report, 
and ascertains from other sources its truth or 
falsity. It has earmarks which show that it was 
invented. The desire for such a report must have 
been the inspiration and the guide of its authors. 

The report was necessary for home consump- 
tion. It has been given such extensive pubHcity 
that it has created a domestic atmosphere at vari- 
ance with truth. As has been shown, from the 
Isthmus came divers creditable newspaper and 
other reports which are of different import. The 
utterances of the inner circle of separatists (and 
they knew the facts) are also of a different tenor. 
The report is not only not corroborated but is 
buried under an avalanche of adverse observa- 
tions. The adverse observations match with es- 
tablished facts while the report does not. 

The writer rejects the report of the army offi- 
cers quoted by Roosevelt. When it is compared 
with the creditable newspaper reports already 
quoted in this volume and other reliable data, it 
looks like a crude invention. Roosevelt uses it 
to defend his Isthmian policy in his article en- 
titled, 'The Panama Blackmail Treaty," from 
which we take the following: 

After my interview with the army officers named, on 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 267 

October 16 I directed the Navy Department to issue in- 
structions to send ships to the Isthmus so as to protect 
American interests and the lives of American citizens if 
a revolutionary outbreak should occur. Most fortu- 
nately the United States steamer Nashville, under Com- 
mander Hubbard, in consequence of these orders, 
reached the Isthmus just in time to prevent a bloody 
massacre of American men, women and children. 
Troops from Bogota had already been landed in Colon 
on November 3, when the revolution broke out on the 
same day. On November 4, as Commander Hubbard 
officially reported, his marines were landed, in view of 
the fact that the American Consul had been notified by 
the officer commanding the Colombian troops that he in- 
tended to open fire on the town of Colon at 2 p. m. and 
kill every United States citizen in the place. Accord- 
ingly various men, women and children took refuge first 
in the shed of the Panama Railway Company, and then 
on a German steamer and a Panama Railway steamer 
which were at the dock. Commander Hubbard showed 
himself loyal to the best traditions of the American 
Navy. He brought the Nashville close up to the water- 
front, landed some of his men to garrison the shed of 
the Panama Railway Company, and although the Co- 
lombians outnumbered him ten to one, succeeded in pro- 
tecting the lives of the American citizens who were men- 
aced. Thanks to the firmness of himself and his men, 
he so impressed the Colombian commander that next 
day the latter reembarked and withdrew with his troops 
to Colombia. So far from there having been too much 
foresight about the treaty on the part of the American 
Government, this plain official account by a naval officer 
of what occurred on November 4 showed that the Amer- 
ican Government had, if anything, delayed too long its 
orders for the movement of American warships to Pan- 
ama, and that it was only the coolness and gallantry of 
forty-two marines and sailors in the face of ten times 
their number of armed foes that prevented the carrying 



268 America and the Canal Title 

out of the atrocious threat of the Colombian commander. 
In accordance with our settled principles of conduct we 
refused to allow the transportation of troops across the 
Isthmus by either the Colombians or the Panamanians, 
so as to prevent bloodshed and interference with traffic. 

There are ill-defined rumors of things that 
Dewey threatened to do in Manila Bay under less 
trying circumstances and under less provocation 
than those to which Colonel Torres of the Colom- 
bian expeditionary force was subjected on the oc- 
casion described in the quotation just given. Col- 
onel Torres was bluntly informed that the Prov- 
ince of Panama had seceded from Colombia, and 
that the United States had guaranteed to protect 
secession. He was urged to reembark his troops, 
on the ground that he was confronting over- 
whelming force. If he did actually threaten 
Americans in Colon, it was under the greatest of 
provocations. He was requested to submit to, 
and acquiesce in, Colombia's dismemberment. 

The information of the threat on the part of 
Colonel Torres was conveyed to the American 
consul at Colon by the provisional governor of the 
province in which Colon is located and was not 
sent, or intended to be sent, to the consul by the 
officer commanding the Colombian troops, as 
Roosevelt asserts in the foregoing quotation. 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 269 

Teague, a newspaper man, wrote about it at the 
time : . 

It was at this juncture that Governor Melendez exe- 
cuted a little coup of his own to which American inter- 
vention is directly traceable. Melendez invited Colonel 
Torres, the Colombian commander, to meet him in con- 
ference at the Hotel Washington. . . . 

Employing all his persuasive abilities, Melendez urged 
Colonel Torres to reembark his troops and sail away, 
leaving the Isthmus to pursue its own course. This line 
of argument only increased Torres' bitterness. He be- 
came more defiant, even bombastic, and at 12 130 made a 
vehement threat that if Generals Tovar and Amaya were 
not given their liberty by 2 o'clock he would turn his 
battalion loose and slaughter every American in Colon. 

The threat against Americans domiciled in 
Colon was only a conditional bluff, and warranted 
under the circumstances. Roosevelt does not cor- 
rectly state the situation. He seemingly forgets, 
in season or out of season, that half-truths are 
more misleading than falsehoods. Colonel Tor- 
res only demanded the release of the Colombians 
unlawfully imprisoned at Panama by the local au- 
thorities with the moral support of the American 
Government. What more natural than that he 
should have moved heaven and earth to free his 
colleagues? Who would not have resorted to a 
bluff — even such a one as Colonel Torres is 
charged with? It was an honorable bluff. No 



270 America and the Canal Title 

harm was done. The harm that is done consists 
in the deception of the American people. Scott, 
in his book entitled "The Americans in Panama" : 
has properly said : 

The Colombian troops on November 4th might have 
wiped out the American defense in Colon, swept over to 
Panama and crushed the Junta and street mob there, and 
so have summarily preserved sovereignty over the terri- 
tory. And had it done all this, it would have been 
squarely within its rights as a sovereign nation. But 
they knew that such a triumph would be transient. 
They realized it would bring down upon Colombia the 
whole devastating force of the mighty United States 
which the Spanish- American War so recently had shown 
was something truly to be feared. Hence, their with- 
drawal was prudent, though humiliating. 

As already stated, the presence of the Nashville 
determined the separatists to proceed with seces- 
sion. Its presence was for the purpose of giving 
tangible evidence that the United States had 
promised to protect secession. Therefore, had 
the Nashville not been at Colon, there would have 
been no provisional government or provisional 
governor at Colon. Its presence could not have 
been used as evidence that the United States was 
back of secession and so there would have been 
no occasion for the threat made by Colonel Tor- 
res. The Nashville did not prevent the murder 
of American men, women, and children, as Roose- 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 2yi 

velt alleges, but provoked the discord that oc- 
curred on the Isthmus. The Nashville prevented 
nothing— it induced secession. It was intended 
to do so. It was at Colon for that purpose. 

We will now sidestep the consideration of the 
report of the army officers to present a record of 
what occurred at conferences after the return of 
Dr. Amador to the Isthmus on October 2y, 1903. 
This record is taken from the testimony of Henry 
N. Hall of the New York World before the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Repre- 
sentatives. It shows that the so-called revolu- 
tion was to be on our gunboats and that the Roose- 
velt Administration had determined to take the 
Canal Zone by force under the pretext of quelling 
an Isthmian uprising. The portions of the testi- 
mony that are apropos follow: 

Amador, accompanied by Prescott, immediately went 
over to Panama. On the way over Amador told Pres- 
cott that everything was settled and that all the arrange- 
ments had been completed through Bunau-Varilla, who 
had promised to have American warships on hand to 
protect the revolutionists after they had declared their 
independence. Amador expressed to Prescott his most 
implicit confidence in the fulfillment of Bunau-Varilla's 
promise and did not seem to apprehend any doubts or 
liesitation on the part of his fellow conspirators. It had 
been decided that on Amador's arrival in Panama the 
revolutionary committee should meet the same evening 



2^2 America and the Canal Title 

at Federico Boyd's house on the Cathedral Plaza and 
receive Amador's report. 

The meeting" of the conspirators was held at Federico 
Boyd's house at 7 o'clock on the evening of the 27th. 
At it there were present all the members of the revolu- 
tionary committee, with the exception of Espinosa and 
Obarrio. Mr. Prescott was the only American present. 
Doctor Amador had outlined to his fellow conspirators 
the plan agreed upon between Bunau-Varilla and the 
authorities in Washington, which was to declare inde- 
pendent only the Canal Zone and the cities of Panama 
and Colon, and the United States warships and marines 
would be both at Colon and Panama to prevent the Co- 
lombian forces from attacking the Panamans, and that 
as soon as the government could be formed the United 
States would recognize the independence of Panama, 
which was to take its place among the nations of the 
world as the "Republic of the Isthmus." 

Amador then showed his fellow conspirators the flag 
of the new Republic. It was merely a silk American 
flag . . . with the jack cut out, and in its place, on a blue 
silk ground, two white stars joined by a narrow strip of 
white ribbon, symbolical of the canal. It had been de- 
signed by Madam Bunau-Varilla. 

When Amador pulled out this flag the impatience and 
disappointment of his hearers, which had been growing 
steadily throughout the narration, found vent in disap- 
proval of the proposed emblem, which was declared to 
be too much like the American flag. 

These Panamans really thought that Doctor Amador 
was coming back to them with some secret treaty signed 
by Mr. Hay or President Roosevelt, and the discussion 
of the merits of the emblem was interrupted by Ricardo 
Arias. . . . He made a strong speech in which he ridi- 
culed and denounced the plan to declare independent only 



i 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 273 

the narrow strip of land in the vicinity of the canal. He 
pointed out that he, in common with all the other sub- 
stantial men of Panama, had large estates and cattle in- 
terests throughout the entire department, and that they 
would all be ruined if their property was not protected 
from the Colombians. His remarks met with unanimous 
approval, and it was then and there agreed that if the 
movement were to take place at all, it must extend to the 
whole State of Panama. 



It was then decided by the conspirators to send men 
into the interior to initiate the revolutionary propaganda, 
which until then had been confined solely to those few 
people in the City of Panama, and was not even known 
to the men who later led the movement in Colon, and to 
let the other towns know that a movement was in prog- 
ress. Amador said that the proposal that he had laid 
before them was only what had been urged by Bunau- 
Varilla. He did not want to tell his fellow conspirators 
he had agreed to sacrificing their interests. Mr. Bunau- 
Varilla says that Amador had agreed they should only 
declare independent the 50-mile strip, but Doctor Ama- 
dor told his fellow conspirators — and they are all agreed 
on this point — that pledges given by the American Gov- 
ernment in Washington to Mr. Bunau-Varilla were such 
that no Colombian troops would be allowed to attack the 
Panamans anywhere after they had once declared their 
independence, and that the agreement with the American 
authorities was such as to cover whatever action they 
might take, if they declared a larger or smaller portion 
of the Isthmus independent. Thomas Arias and Fede- 
rico Boyd, two of the Junta, however, voiced the un- 
easiness of the conspirators, who, with the exception of 
Prescott, had expected that Amador would bring back 
with him some secret treaty signed by the United States. 
They were, on the whole, much disappointed, and said so 
in unmistakable terms, because Amador had absolutely 



274 America and the Canal Title 

nothing to show them in writing from either Mr. Roose- 
velt or Mr. Hay. 

This quoted testimony further shows that our 
forces were to be the revolution. Our compensa- 
tion was to be an untrammeled title to the Canal 
Zone. Yet we are told that the Isthmians longed 
to fight for freedom. Note the following from 
a message of Roosevelt, quoting a native : 

We looked upon the building of the canal as a matter of 
life or death to us. We wanted that because it meant, 
with the United States in control of it, peace and pros- 
perity for us. President Marroquin appointed an Isth- 
mian to be governor of Panama; and we looked upon 
that as of happy augury. Soon we heard that the canal 
treaty was not likely to be approved at Bogota; next we 
heard that our Isthmian governor, Obaldia, who had 
scarcely assumed power, was to be superseded by a sol- 
dier from Bogota. . . . 

Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of 
in the way of revenues, she did not bridge for us a single 
river, nor make a single roadway, nor erect a single col- 
lege where our children could be educated, nor do any- 
thing at all to advance our industries. . . . Well, when 
the new generals came we seized them, arrested them, 
and the town of Panama was in joy. Not a protest was 
made, except the shots fired from the Colombian gunboat 
Bogota, which killed one Chinese lying in his bed. We 
were willing to encounter the Colombian troops at Colon 
and fight it out; but the commander of the United States 
cruiser Nashville forbade Superintendent Shaler to allow 
the railroad to transport troops for either party. That 
is our story. 

So an Isthmian tells us : "We were willing to 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 2y^ 

encounter the Colombian troops at Colon and fight 
it out." Is this bemoaning of a cruel fate sin- 
cere ? Transportation of Colombian soldiers was 
prevented by the Commander of the Nashville! 
They could have met the Colombian troops at 
Colon if they had refrained from sending for 
help. This help was asked for on October 29, 
1903, and dispatched to Colon on October 30. At 
the time help was asked, there was no Nashville 
at Colon to prevent the transit of troops from 
Panama to Colon. It arrived on November 2, 
1903, and was asked for in order to do just what 
it did. The Isthmians were not prevented from 
fighting it out with the new contingent of Colom- 
bian soldiers. They asked for American gun- 
boats to do it. The Nashville and eight others 
were sent there for the purpose. When the cry 
for help reached Bunau-Varilla on October 29, he 
hastened to Washington. Forthwith help was 
speeding to Colon. Prevented from fighting it 
out with the Colombian troops at Colon! Of 
course we are not expected to see the staging of 
the play (vaudeville performance) that was acted 
far from home — on the Isthmus. It was in- 
tended to hoodwink the American people. Light 
is, however, dawning and we are seeing the epi- 
sode as it really was. 



276 America and the Canal Title 

Roosevelt has taught us in the excerpt at the 
beginning of this chapter not to be guided by 
words, but by deeds. Deeds are the real thing. 
We will now follow his instructions, and apply 
them to his words and deeds as to how he secured 
the Canal Zone. Of course he did not mean it 
just that way. We should look at deeds as he 
describes them where President Wilson is con- 
cerned, and we should accept Roosevelt's words 
as a correct representation of his deeds in so far 
as he is concerned. Unfortunately we have 
found that his words as to what were his deeds 
and his deeds do not match, and that his deeds 
speak for themselves. 

The City of Panama is reported to have had a 
fire department of 441 men. We do not hear of it 
in any way except that we are assured that it had 
a de facto existence. We are not told that it was 
held in readiness to act when Colombia's new con- 
tingent of soldiers arrived at Colon. There was 
ample time for them to have been transported to 
Colon before the arrival of the Nashville. Forty- 
two American marines were, however, left to face 
474 Colombian troops, and that on an Isthmus 
"seething with revolution !" Does this look like 
willingness to fight it out with Colombia? 



( 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 277 

We will let Roosevelt tell us about his instruc- 
tions to the Navy Department based on the report 
of the army officers : 

In view of all these facts I directed the Navy Depart- 
ment to issue instructions such as would insure our hav- 
ing ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event 
of need arising. Orders were given on October 19 to 
the Boston to proceed to San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua; 
to the Dixie to prepare to sail from League Island; and 
to the Atlanta to proceed to Guantanamo. On October 
30 the Nashville was ordered to proceed to Colon. On 
November 2, v/hen, the Colombian Congress having ad- 
journed, it was evident that the outbreak was imminent, 
and when it was announced that both sides were making 
ready forces whose meeting would mean bloodshed and 
disorder, the Colombian troops having been embarked on 
vessels, the following instructions were sent to the com- 
manders of the Boston, Nashville, and Dixie: 

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If inter- 
ruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of 
railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hos- 
tile intent, either government or insurgent, either at 
Colon, Porto Bello, or other point. Government force 
reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent 
their landing if in your judgment this would precipitate 
a conflict. 

It would have been nearer the truth had the 
foregoing telegram to the Nashville and Dixie 
and a similar one to the Boston read: Prevent 
Colombia from landing troops within 50 miles 
of Panama on the west coast, and at Colon, Porto- 



278 America and the Canal Title 

Bello or any other point on the east coast if their 
landing will interfere with the establishing of a 
Republic of Panama in the Province of Panama. 
The essence of the paraphrased telegram is con- 
tained in the speech delivered by Roosevelt at 
Berkeley, CaHfornia, on March 2'^, 191 1 : 

I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
it. If I had followed traditional conservative methods I 
should have submitted a dignified state paper of prob- 
ably two hundred pages to the Congress, and the debate 
would have been going on yet. But / took the Canal 
Zone and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes 
on, the Canal does also. 

We have shown that Roosevelt waged war 
against Colombia in the fall of 1903. The war 
was to be waged solely by our marines. There- 
fore, there was no need for military preparation 
on the Isthmus and events as of that time show 
that there were none. The so-called Republic of 
Panama, however, is a fact, and we are possessed 
of a title to the Canal Zone. 

''No Colombian blood must be shed!" By 
whom? By the American marines. America 
would not stand for the shedding of Colombian 
blood to secure the Canal Zone. Therefore, there 
must be overwhelming force on hand to overawe 
Colombia, and nine American gunboats were in 
Isthmian waters. This incidental statement by 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 279 

Dr. Amador tells the story. It is not invented. 
It fits in, with the events that transpired on the 
Isthmus. It shows that an understanding existed 
between the Roosevelt Administration and the 
separatists on the Isthmus. This understanding 
provided for the wresting of the Province of 
Panama from Colombia by force. Even the Ger- 
man soldier and writer, Von Bernhardi, now 
taunts us : 

Your seizure of Panama was only justifiable on the 
ground that the future interests of the American people 
are higher and greater than the abstract principles of 
international law. 

What else can this mean than that we secured 
the Canal Zone by force? Dr. Amador's letter 
to his son, dated October 18, 1903, about two 
weeks before the Declaration of Independence, 
tells the story. The part which is apropos reads : 

I received your telegram that you are not coming, as 
they have refused you permission. . . . 

The reason for your coming was for you to meet 
Bunau-Varilla, to whom I have spoken of you. He said 
that if all turns out well, you shall have a good place on 
the medical commission, which is the first that will begin 
work ; that my name is in Hay's office and that certainly 
nothing will be refused you. 

The plan seems to me good. A portion of the Isthmus 
declares itself independent and that portion the United 
States will not allow any Colombian forces to attack. 
An assembly is called and this given authority to a 



28o America and the Canal Title 

minister to be appointed by the new Government in order 
to make a treaty without need of ratification by that 
assembly. The treaty being approved by both parties, 
the new RepubHc remains under the protection of the 
United States and to it are added the other districts of 
the Isthmus which do not already form part of the new 
Republic and these also remain under the protection of 
the United States. 

The movement will be delayed a few days. We want 
to have here the minister who is going to be named, so 
that once the movement is made he can be appointed by 
cable and take up the treaty. In 30 days everything will 
be concluded. 

We have some resources on the movement being made, 
and already this has been arranged with a bank. 

As soon as everything is arranged I will tell B. V. to 
look out for you. 

He says if you do not wish to go he will look out for a 
position for you in New York. He is a man of great 
influence. . . . 

As already seen, a revolution in three provinces 
in 1 899- 1 902 did not succeed. But in 1903 a 
revolution in one of these three provinces was to 
succeed in thirty days. We are told the reason 
in this letter. Our Government had agreed to 
protect secession. 

Dr. Amador's talk to the soldiers of Colombia 
at Panama on November 4, 1904, is further evi- 
dence that protection was promised by our Gov- 
ernment. The talk which follows was delivered 
from written notes, and taken down by an eye wit- 
ness : 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 281 

Boys, at last we have carried through our splendid 
work. The world is astounded at our heroism. Yester- 
day we were but the slaves of Colombia; to-day we are 
free. Have no fears. Here we have the proof [hold- 
ing up some sheets of paper on which was the American 
coat of arms] that our agent in the United States, Sefior 
Bunau-Varilla, gave us. Panama is free. The cup of 
gold for Bogota has been drained; therefore the United 
States are aiding us. Here you have proof of their word. 
President Roosevelt has made good, for there, you know, 
are the cruisers which defend us and prevent any action 
by Colombia. They have worked skillfully in order to 
avoid shedding Colombian blood, for in no other way 
could the American Government aid us. Free sons of 
Panama, I salute you. Long live the Republic of 
Panama! Long live President Roosevelt! Long live 
the American Government! 

On November 3, 1903, Dr. Amador urged Gen- 
eral Huertas to stick to the agreement then exist- 
ing between him and the separatists. It is claimed 
that the following is a verbatim report of what 
Dr. Amador said: 

Huertas, what you are to-day you owe to Panama. 
From Bogota you can hope for nothing. I am old and 
tired of life; it is of no importance to me to die. If you 
will aid us, we shall reach to immortality in the history 
of the new Republic. Here you will have four American 
warships. There will be the same number in Colon. 
[That turned out to be absolutely true.] You and your 
battalion can accomplish nothing against the superior 
force of the cruisers, which have their orders. Choose 
here, glory and riches ; in Bogota, misery and ingratitude. 

Immediately thereafter General Huertas sent a 



282 America and the Canal Title 

letter to Commander Leoncio Tascon at Peno- 
nome. The following excerpt from this letter has 
a bearing on our argument : 

There having broken out to-day a movement for the 
independence of the Isthmus, which has been carried into 
effect without the shedding of a single drop of blood, the 
Government which now holds sway here has been recog- 
nized. By necessity, in order to avoid their taking me a 
prisoner I was obliged to commit to prison some of my 
superior officers. You must prepare with the men you 
have with you to come here as soon as you receive this, 
my order. . . . 

You are hereby appointed chief of the battalion. I re- 
peat that you are to accept no orders except from me or 
those sent to you by Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero. 

In Colon there are two American warships which have 
disembarked forces, and to-morrow morning two more 
are to arrive here. Thus this movement is supported to 
overflowing by the Americans. Any effort would have 
been a useless sacrifice. Therefore we have decided, 
after careful consideration, to recognize the Government 
of the Isthmus. 

General Huertas' statement to his soldiers the 
following morning shows that he firmly believed 
that our Government had agreed to protect seces- 
sion. This statement was preliminary to giving 
fifty dollars to each soldier. His speech, as re- 
ported, contained the following : 

We are free ! The cruisers which are here remove all 
our fears. Colombia may battle with the weak, but she 
holds her peace in the presence of the United States. 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 283 

It is now evident that secession was undertaken 
because the separatists had been assured protec- 
tion by our Government. To conceal it, publicity- 
was given to an impending revolution. Excerpts 
from inspired newspaper articles could be used to 
explain the presence of American warships within 
striking distance of Isthmian waters. It was 
staging, and many were deceived by it, including 
the writer. Yet it is now clear that our men-of- 
war would not have been in Isthmian waters in 
such force if it had not been agreed that we would 
take the Canal Zone by force. Our Govern- 
ment had decided to close the canal negotia- 
tions — 

Upon the simple plan, 

That they should take who have the power. 

And they should keep who can. 

It must not be forgotten that the separatists 
were guilty of treason from the viewpoint of the 
sovereign. Under what conditions do men em- 
bark on such a grave venture? Adequate local^ 
preparation, or assurance of protection from a 
power strong enough to furnish it. There was 
no local preparation. No evidence of any ap- 
peared in the strenuous days of November 3-6, 
1903, on which later date the independence of 
Panama was recognized. This recognition by the 



284 America and the Canal Title 

United States was construed to assure the sep- 
aratists the protection of the Treaty of 1846. All 
newspaper reports of the time show that the 
Isthmians relied on protection from the United 
States and not on self-protection. Complete ab- 
sence of local military activity between October 
29 and November 6 conclusively shows that the 
separatists had assurance of protection from the 
United States. It also shows that our Adminis- 
tration ''took" the Canal Zone at the point of the 
bayonet. It is stolen. 

Maladministration of Panama by Colombia is 
given by Roosevelt as an excuse for intervention. 
If it did exist, then there is an ineffaceable stain 
on his Administration for having interfered with 
the revolution on the Isthmus twelve months 
earlier. Unrest is not always the sign of malad- 
ministration in Spanish-America. If it is, then 
Panama is now badly governed, and our interven- 
tion did not result in good government. We read 
in Scott's "The Americans in Panama" : 

On three occasions already the Americans have pre- 
vented the disruption of the RepubHc. In 1904, Gen. 
Huertas, who had assisted the Junta, became dissatisfied 
with his rewards, and started to overturn the adminis- 
tration by force. The American marines had to disarm 
his small army. In 1908 the United States had to inter- 
fere to insure a fair election, and in 1912 this writer sawi 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 285 

the presidential campaign reach a point where the 
American marines and infantry had to be placed at the 
Panama polls to prevent rioting and fraud. It was ob- 
vious that if the United States had not been present in 
armed force, the usual Central American method of 
changing Administrations by a revolution would have 
been employed. 

Colombia has had stability of administration 
since the secession of the Province of Panama. 
Since 1904, the American marines have thrice in- 
tervened to prevent the forcible overthrow of 
those in lawful authority in the Republic of Pan- 
ama. It is thus clear that the earlier Isthmian 
disturbances were not due to maladministration 
on the part of Colombia, but to the ambitions of 
local political and financial adventurers. There- 
fore, the indictment hurled at Colombia by Roose- 
velt should have been hurled instead at the Isth- 
mians. For him to continue reviling Colombia 
after the crushing disproof of his indictment 
based on maladministration blends his acts with 
those we associate with moral cowardice. 

As already stated, unrest in Spanish- America is 
not always a sign of maladministration, but may 
be the outward expression of rival ambitions for 
control. It may even have been inspired by a 
corporation seeking privilege, and have been 
financed by it. When Roosevelt alleges malad- 



286 America and the Canal Title 

ministration by Colombia, he gives no bill of par- 
ticulars. 

The United States terminated the revolution 
in Colombia in 1902 and reestablished Colombian 
sovereignty on the Isthmus. We v^ere to guaran- 
tee its sovereignty of the Isthmus in perpetuity in 
the Hay-Herran treaty. Therefore, the seces- 
sion of Panama in 1903 and our recognition of its 
independence two days later cannot have been 
due to maladministration. The reason for our 
action was other than misgovernment of Panama 
by Colombia. It was the refusal of Colombia to 
ratify the Hay-Herran treaty and that alone. It 
was for the sole purpose of abridging the time 
that would be required to secure title to the Canal 
Zone by the slow process of diplomacy. 

The proof of this consists in our mediation to 
end the three-year revolution in 1902. Our Min- 
ister to Colombia sent the following communica- 
tion to our Department of State, September 11, 
1902 : 

Minister for foreign affairs desires me to inform you 
that his Government would appreciate your good offices 
to bring about peace in the country, especially on the 
Isthmus, where the revolution is strong. . . . Minister for 
foreign affairs added: "Not only is the question of 
humanity involved, but so long as the war lasts Congress 
will not be convened, and therefore the continuance of 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 287 

war will delay submission of the Canal matter to the 
Congress." 

This message indicated that continuance of the 
revolution would delay action on the treaty. 
Further, intervention would put Colombia under 
obligations to us which she would be expected to 
pay through a canal concession. Therefore, no 
time was to be lost. On September 16, 1902, the 
Department of State informed the Secretary of 
the Navy that mediation had been agreed upon. 
The communication reads : 

I have received from the President a telegram approv- 
ing of my suggestion as to intrusting such a mission to 
the Commander of the Cincinnati. 

The precedents in which our naval commanders have 
lent their good offices to bring about peace in Central 
America during the past years will serve \o guide Com- 
mander McLean in the execution of such instructions as 
you may deem proper to give him in this regard. 

While Isthmian affairs were in this unsettled 
condition, the United States representatives pro- 
hibited the use of the Panama railroad for the 
transportation of contraband of war. This was 
a departure from the traditional American policy. 
They, however, did not prohibit the sovereign 
from landing troops on the Isthmus. That step 
was reserved for 1903. Until 1902, none of the 
American acts were predicated on a right that 



288 America and the Canal Title 

took precedence over those of the sovereign. Co- 
lombia promptly protested against the action 
named, and the order of the United States was 
modified. Rear-Admiral Casey sent the protest 
to the Secretary of the Navy, who in turn remitted 
it to Secretary Hay. The communication is dated 
October 5, 1902, and reads: 

Governor Salazar returned my call yesterday and 
strongly protested against any restriction of Colombian 
Government use of road as an invasion of sovereign 
and treaty rights, and requested transportation of con- 
signment arms and ammunition, Colon to Panama, re- 
ceived by steamer and loaded on cars before my order 
prohibiting such transportation. 

President Marroquin simultaneously lodged a 
protest with our Minister to Colombia. As just 
stated, the order of Rear-Admiral Casey was not 
in accordance with our settled policy. It was a 
departure and was resented by Colombia. It bore 
its natural fruit when the Hay-Herran Treaty 
was under consideration in the Colombian Con- 
gress as well as earlier during its negotiation. 
But the protest was made while the United States 
was preparing to use its good offices to effect peace 
on the Isthmus. The state of the revolution at 
the time is shown in a note of Rear Admiral 
Casey, dated October 20, 1902, and written only 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 289 

eight days before the insurgents submitted to 
American pressure: 

Judging from conditions now existing and from infor- 
mation I am able to obtain, there seems little prospect 
of a speedy termination of this strife. Panama and 
Colon are practically besieged: troops at neither place 
dare to go beyond their intrenchments. 

I firmly believe if our men were removed from shore, 
the insurgents would be in Panama in forty-eight hours. 
I think the Government, therefore, is very willing that 
they should remain, making occasional mild objections, 
which really it does not mean shall be taken seriously. 

If Panama was misgoverned by Colombia, the 
United States was nevertheless willing to con- 
tribute to its continuance for uninterrupted tran- 
sit on the Isthmus. In condemning Colombia it 
condemns itself. But we must proceed with the 
project for mediation which was to prolong mal- 
administration in Panama because we had to 
hasten greater transit convenience — the Canal! 
Accordingly Rear-Admiral Casey addressed 
Herrera, chief of the revolutionary forces, as fol- 
lows : 

I have the honor to inform you that I have been 

authorized by my Government to offer my friendly serv- 
ices to the leaders of the contending parties in the Re- 
public of Colombia, with a view to bringing about a 
friendly meeting between them, and a discussion of their 
differences, to the end that they mutually agree upon 
such terms as will put an end to the strife and restore 
peace and tranquillity in the Republic. . . . 



290 America and the Canal Title 

I have the honor and pleasure to offer you my good 
offices [Governor Salazar had accepted] for a friendly 
meeting and discussion with Governor Salazar, and 
would be most pleased to have you meet on board my 
flagship Wisconsin, at anchor off Panama. 

The final reply of Herrera is dated November 
3, 1902, and reads: 

I wish to thank you very much for the interest you 
manifest in the well-being, the peace, and the tranquillity 
of Colombia, of which you have given undoubted proofs 
in your former actions and in the contents of your kind 
communication of October 28, which I have just received. 

In a note dated to-day I express to Gen. Victor M. 
Salazar my wish to confer on the subject of peace on 
board the battleship Wisconsin in accordance with the 
kind invitation you have extended to us, and I am in 
hopes that he will make the necessary arrangements for 
my transport to Panama Bay. 

The revolutionists submitted. America's rep- 
resentatives tendered only their good offices. But 
both in the background and in the foreground was 
''the big stick/' An apparently interminable con- 
flict was quelled in a few days by the tendering of 
good offices. The venerable Senator Morgan 
later commented on these events as follows : 

On the return of the victorious liberals from Aqua 
Dulce, fighting occurred on the railroad between Mata- 
chin and Colon. 

As the trains would pass the battle was suspended. 
A party of liberals occupied Colon without any disturb- 
ance of the people. 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 291 

The French and American naval commanders agreed 
that they must be removed from Colon, and after con- 
ferring with General de la Rosa, their commander, and 
a display of force, he surrendered to General Alban, 
commanding Marroquin's forces. 

This was the first party that surrendered under the 
policy adopted by our Government. . . . 

We destroyed the liberal army in Panama in 
November, 1902, to keep Marroquin in power until the 
Hay-Herran treaty could be ratified, and failing in that 
we destroyed Marroquin and Colom.bia in November, 
1903, for the purpose of getting a canal concession on the 
Isthmus. 

If the American policy just described is not 
getting the Canal Zone by force, what is it ? The 
objective seemingly in all acts of our Administra- 
tion was the Canal Zone on our own terms and not 
better government on the Isthmus. In short, the 
United States was ready to rivet Colombian 
sovereignty on the Province of Panama in per- 
petuity for an easement to the Canal Zone. 
When it failed to secure that easement as rapidly 
as desired, Colombian government on the Isthmus 
became simultaneously in the mind of our then 
chief executive so bad that it had to be destroyed. 
It would seem that the Roosevelt Administration 
wrested victory from Herrera in 1902 and sus- 
tained Marroquin in the hour of defeat in order 
to make possible the negotiation of the Hay-Her- 
ran treaty. That there existed such an under- 



292 America and the Canal Title 

standing seems to be all but established. When 
the treaty was later rejected by the Colombian 
Senate, the sting of ingratitude, pictured by 
Shakespeare in the immortal King Lear, was felt. 
If Roosevelt's characterization of misgovern- 
ment of Panama by Colombia is true, then his in- 
terference with the course of the 1 899-1 902 revo- 
lution when it was at the height of its military 
activity is a political crime so base that one would 
have to search the English language to find a 
term sufficiently descriptive to characterize it. If 
Roosevelt really believed that Panama was as 
thoroughly misgoverned by Colombia as he al- 
leges in an excerpt already given, then he com- 
mitted a political crime in 1902 when he restored 
Colombia's tottering sovereignty over the three 
provinces then in formidable revolt. If he did not 
believe what he asserted, then the dismemberment 
of Colombia in the following year was a political 
crime without an extenuating circumstance. The 
conduct of Roosevelt in the pursuit of the title to 
the Canal Zone has stained American diplomacy. 

Roosevelt is interesting even though inaccurate. 
In his article entitled, ''The Panama Blackmail| 
Treaty," occurs a paragraph which is now apro- 
pos: 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 293 

There were . . . various revolutionary movements on 
foot in the Isthmus, and it was my understanding that 
there was considerable jealousy among the instigators of 
these movements as to which one would come off first 
and would be effective. On information received after 
the event, I believed then, and believe now, that the 
revolutionary movement which actually succeeded was 
the one with which Mr. Bunau-Varilla was connected. 
He was sent by the Government of Panama as Minister 
to this country as soon as Panama became an independent 
state, and he then made no secret of the fact that he had 
been one of those who had organized the successful 
revolution; precisely as was the case with the President 
and other officials of the new republic. Neither did Mr. 
Bunau-Varilla make any secret of the fact that in acting 
as he did he was influenced both by his indignation as a 
resident of Panama at the Colombian treatment of 
Panama, and also by his indignation as a Frenchman at 
the Colombian proposal to blackmail the company, and 
if it would not submit to blackmail, then to confiscate its 
possessions. In view of this double attitude of the 
Colombian Government, an attitude of tyranny toward 
Panama and of robbery toward the French company, 
Mr. Bunau-Varilla conceived it to be his duty to do all 
he could to aid the natives of Panama in throwing off the 
yoke of Colombia. I believe his attitude was entirely 
proper, alike from the standpoint of his duty as a resi- 
dent of Panama, from the standpoint of his duty as a 
Frenchman to the investors and property holders ^ of the 
French company, and from the standpoint of his duty 
as a citizen of the world. But until after the event I had 
no knowledge of his activities save the knowledge pos- 
sessed by all intelligent men who had studied the affairs 
of the Isthmus. I gave him no aid or encouragement. 

We will let the late Senator Carmack reply to 
this eulogy of Bunau-Varilla. Carmack's char- 



294 America and the Canal Title 

acterization is based on French court records, and 
reads : 

Bunau-Varilla, now [February 9, 1904] Minister from 
the State of Panama, but a citizen of France, was one of 
the earliest and most active supporters of this conspiracy 
against the integrity of Colombia. This much we know. 
This man was connected with the old Panama Canal 
Company, and the official records of his own country, 
including the reports of the Minister of Justice, show 
that he was one of the worst of the crew whose thiev- 
ing operations bankrupted that concern^ brought the gray 
hairs of De Lesseps in shame and sorrow to the grave, 
and covered the French Government itself with odium 
and disgrace. 

The views of the writer are in complete accord 
with those of the quotation as to the real character 
of Bunau-Varilla. It is as respectable as that of 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and there exists no evi- 
dence that there was an attempt on the part of 
our Administration to deal with the doctor while 
loathing the mister. In an earlier chapter we 
have shown that his character is rather like that 
of one of Dickens' characters known as Uriah 
Heap. Yet this Ishmaelite among respectable 
people is accorded a certificate of character by 
Roosevelt in order to bolster up his tottering de- 
fense of the rape of Colombia. 

This good and great Frenchman of exalted 
moral purpose, according to the last excerpt from 



I 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 295 

Roosevelt, and of the penitentiary crowd accord- 
ing to French official court records, has told us 
that he knew that the United States would protect 
secession within forty-eight hours after the 
Declaration of Independence by the Province of 
Panama. And, being good, great and of exalted 
moral purpose, according to Roosevelt, he must 
have told the truth ! He informed the separatists 
that the United States would protect secession and 
they acted on his information — ^he and they have 
said so. This assurance enabled the separatists 
to dispense with preparations for military opera- 
tions. They were to be on our gunboats. These 
gunboats were in Isthmian waters in overwhelm- 
ing force. They overawed Colombia. Roose- 
velt was accurate when he said: ''I took the 
Canal Zone!' 

We are told, however, that there were a num- 
ber of revolutionary movements on the Isthmus 
at the time, and that there was rivalry as to who 
should lead the revolt of the now famous seven 
with an attenuated and indefinite outer circle of 
hangers on in a province of some 300,000 people 
against an armed nation of some 5,000,000. 
There was, however, only a single movement com- 
posed of a few financial and political adventurers 
with Cromwell as their first intermediary. 



296 America and the Canal Title 

Warnings from Colombia caused him to seem- 
ingly sever his connection with the movement. 
Bunau-Varilla was accordingly summoned to suc- 
ceed Cromwell as intermediary. Colombia had 
rejected the Hay-Herran treaty when he arrived 
on the scene. It was the psychological moment 
— the time for action. 

It was, however, the same group of separatists 
with only a new intermediary. Soon after his 
arrival Bunau-Varilla assured Dr. Amador that 
the United States would protect secession and 
urged him to hasten to Panama and clear the deck 
for action. This assurance and the presence of 
the Nashville as tangible evidence of good faith 
set the machinery in motion which created the so- 
called Republic of Panama for the purpose of 
transferring to us the Canal Zone. 

On November 6, 1903, our Government recog- 
nized the independence of its own offspring, the 
so-called Republic of Panama. This was two 
days before the news of secession reached Bogota. 
The following communication was, on November 
6, addressed to our Minister to Colombia, to be 
by him officially conveyed to the Government of 
Colombia : 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 2gy 

The people of Panama having by an apparently 
unanimous movement dissolved their political connection 
with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their inde- 
pendence, and having adopted a government of their own, 
republican in form, with which the Government of the 
United States of America has entered into relations, the 
President of the United States in accordance with the 
ties of friendship which have so long and so happily 
existed between the respective nations, most earnestly 
commends to the Governments of Colombia and of 
Panama the peaceful and equitable settlement of all ques- 
tions at issue between them. He holds that he is bound, 
not merely by treaty obligations, but by the interests of 
civilization, to see that the peaceable traffic of the world 
across the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be dis- 
turbed by a constant succession of unnecessary and 
wasteful civil wars. 

We have already commented on the statement 
that it was a * 'unanimous movement." It would 
have been nearer the truth if the telegram had 
said that it was a unitary movement outside of 
the Province of Panama in collusion with a few 
financial adventurers on the Isthmus. It is al- 
most unbelievable that a Washington Administra- 
tion would stoop to this level for a mess of pottage 
— abridgment by a few months, or perhaps by a 
year, of the beginning of the construction of an 
Isthmian canal. 

Leander T. Chamberlain properly describes the 
so-called Republic of Panama which was snap- 



^9^ America and the Canal Title 

shotted into existence, and then precipitately 
recognized by the Roosevelt Administration. It 
is so apropos that we adopt it as our own : 

A popular uprising, at a single point, of less than one- 
tenth of the population of the Province of Panama; no 
revolutionary committee representing the other five dis- 
tricts of the province; no formulated statement of 
grievances; no congress, no army, no navy, no courts of 
justice, no financial stability, evidently unable to with- 
stand the forces of the parent country; yet an admission 
to the great sisterhood of nations ! Admitted in less time 
than measures two revolutions of the earth on its axis! 
It is ample cause for thankfulness that the annals of 
civilization are sullied by no sustaining precedent. 

The notice quoted above was dispatched to our 
Minister in Colombia two days before Bogota 
learned of the secession of the Province of Pan- 
ama. It was sent to a nation with whom we had 
a solemn engagement of amity and friendship 
in the Treaty of 1846. This solemn engagement 
provided : 

If unfortunately any of the articles contained in this 
treaty should be violated or infringed in any way what- 
ever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two 
contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of 
reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other on com- 
plaints of injuries or damages, until the said party con- 
sidering itself offended shall have laid before the other a 
statement of such injuries or damages, verified by 
competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, 
and the same shall have been denied, in violation of the 
laws and of international right. 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 299 

The notice was sent to a nation whose sov- 
ereignty, of the Isthmus we had guaranteed in a 
solemn engagement. By this solemn engagement 
we were estopped from destroying Colombian 
sovereignty over the Isthmus. The notice quoted 
virtually informed Colombia that we had done 
what the treaty forbade, and that we would de- 
fend our act by force. It was sent while a treaty 
gasped and international law averted her aston- 
ished gaze. Yet Roosevelt asks us to believe 
that: 

The United States has many honorable chapters in its 
history, but no more honorable chapter than that which 
tells of the way in which the right to dig the Panama 
Canal was secured. 

Honorable! May we be delivered from any 
more honorable chapters in our history like this ! 
Such a statement adds hypocrisy to national dis- 
grace. There is no more unsavory chapter in 
American diplomatic history than the one which 
tells how we secured the right to dig the Panama 
Canal. 

It automatically reminds one of the exclama- 
tion of the venerable Senator Hoar as re- 
corded in the Autobiography of the late Senator 
Cullom : 

I HOPE I MAY NEVER LIVE TO SEE THE DAY WHEN 



300 America and the Canal Title 

THE INTERESTS OF MY COUNTRY ARE PLACED ABOVE 
ITS HONOR. 

The opera bouffe performance on the Isthmus 
did not attain the dignity of a made-to-order revo- 
lution. It was a sham. There was not a scintilla 
of respectability to it. Financial buccaneers and 
political adventurers did essay to create a repub- 
lic out of the Province of Panama so that they 
might become the venders of a canal title. Uncle 
Sam granted them the needed protection in the 
undertaking. This assured the success of the 
venture, and, because of this assurance, it was 
undertaken. 

We are clearly warranted in characterizing the 
foregoing note to Colombia as one of the most 
untruthful diplomatic documents known to mod- 
ern history. It is a communication such as 
Machiavelli and Bismarck were wont to send as 
occasion arose, but there is not another like it in 
the files of our Department of State. It is grossly 
insulting, and stands as a continuing insult to 
Colombia. It must be disowned in order to re- 
store our national honor. 

This note was not sent to Colombia for the pur- 
pose of welcoming into the sisterhood of sover- 
eign states a people that had thrown off the yoke 
of oppression, nor of requesting her to acquiesce 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 301 

in what had been determined by the sword. It 
was sent for the purpose of protecting the seces- 
sion that had been abetted by our Government. 
It virtually informed Colombia that the United 
States would maintain by force what had been 
accomplished by the display of force. Its pur- 
pose was intimidation. Its tone was offensive. 
It was the crowning act of a political crime. It 
added insult to injury. Our course on the Isth- 
mus belongs to the same class, and is of the same 
character as the rape of Belgium by Germany. 
Colombia did not resist, and therefore the loss of 
life and property are not in evidence — thanks to 
Colombia and not to our Administration. 

Notice of the recognition of the independence 
of the so-called Republic of Panama to be com- 
municated to the latter, was sent to our Consul 
at Panama. It reads : 

The people of Panama have, by an apparently unani- 
mous movement, dissolved their political connectioa 
with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their inde- 
pendence. When you are satisfied that a de facto 
government, republican in form, and without substantial 
opposition from its own people, has been established in 
the State of Panama, you will enter into relations with it 
as the responsible government of the territory and look 
to it for all due action to protect the persons and property 
of citizens of the United States and to keep open the 
isthmian transit in accordance with the obligations of 



302 America and the Canal Title 

existing treaties governing the relation of the United 
States to that territory. 

We ask again, was it such a unanimous move- 
ment? Let us see! If the whole Isthmus was 
"seething with revolution/' if there was no an- 
tecedent understanding with our Government, 
why were there not enough Isthmians bearing 
arms on November 4, 1903, to deal with the new 
contingent of a few hundred Colombian soldiers 
which arrived on the previous day ? Only a few 
marines of the Nashville dealt with them. There 
was not an Isthmian there to help! There was 
not an Isthmian prepared to help ! Yet it was the 
day on which they declared their independence. 
Shortly thereafter more Colombian soldiers 
would naturally appear. And yet no military 
preparation whatsoever was in progress. There 
was none even in contemplation! The Isthmian 
facts show that an understanding existed with 
the power that supplied the force to protect seces- 
sion. These are facts — established facts. They 
cannot be consigned to the scrap basket by unc- 
tuous statements. It is the unctuous statements 
which are the scrap. The Isthmians were not 
fools. Dr. Amador has assured us of that. 
They knew where help was to come from. They 
could have known only by having been told. Yet 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 303 

we are asked to believe that the whole Isthmus 
was ^'seething with revolution !" As if they arose 
as one man against the oppressor ! But, as a mat- 
ter of fact, not one Isthmian arose in Colon on 
the day that independence was declared to assist 
the American marines under trying circum- 
stances. Does this look like a popular Isthmian 
uprising? Or, does it look like an event effected 
by an inner circle in collaboration with our Ad- 
ministration ? 

We will now offer additional evidence in sup- 
port of our contention that the Canal Zone was 
taken by force. This additional evidence is found 
in the telegrams which were sent to our Gov- 
ernment by the committee which constituted the 
executive board of the new republic. The first 
was sent before independence was declared. It 
reads : 

We take the liberty of bringing to the knowledge of 
your Government that on yesterday afternoon, in conse- 
quence of a popular and spontaneous movement of the 
people of this city, the independence of the Isthmus was 
proclaimed and, the Republic of Panama being instituted, 
its provisional government organized an [executive] 
board consisting of ourselves, who are assured of the 
military strength necessary to carry out our determina- 
tion. 

The second is dated November 6, 1903, and 
reads : 



304 America and the Canal Title 

The board of provisional government of the Republic 
of Panama has appointed Seiior Philippe Bunau-Varilla 
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary near 
your Government with full powers to conduct diplomatic 
and financial negotiations. Deign to receive and heed 
him. 

No such telegrams or telegrams of a similar 
nature were sent to our Government at any previ- 
ous uprising. There was no feeling of the way 
in these telegrams. The tone of the telegrams is 
that of foreknowledge as to how they would be 
received. They are mute evidence that an un- 
derstanding existed between the separatists of 
Panama and the Roosevelt Administration. 

The communication of Bunau-Varilla as Min- 
ister of Panama to Secretary Hay dated Novem- 
ber 7, 1903, tells the story of a prior understand- 
ing as clearly as though it had been committed to 
parchment. No such communication would have 
been written without its author knowing more 
than he tells. He did not become enlightened, 
November 4-7, while reading uncertain press dis- 
patches from the Isthmus. He had the light 
from which the events from November 4-7 
sprang. Therefore, he was in a position to pen 
the contents of a note from which the following 
excerpt is taken: 

I congratulate myself, sir, that my first official duty 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 305 

should be to respectfully request you to convey to His 
Excellency the President of the United States on behalf 
of the people of Panama an expression of th« grateful 
sense of their obligation to his Government. In extend- 
ing her generous hand so spontaneously to her latest born, 
the Mother of the American Nations is prosecuting her 
noble mission as the liberator and the educator of the 
peoples. In spreading her protecting wings over the 
territory of our Republic the American Eagle has sancti- 
fied it. It has rescued it from the barbarism of un- 
necessary and wasteful civil wars to consecrate it to the 
destiny assigned to it by Providence, the service of 
humanity, and the progress of civilization. 

The official documents from the fateful tele- 
grams of November 2, 1903, to and including the 
communications of the provisional government of 
Panama were all penned with the antecedent un- 
derstanding (not of record) in the background, 
and they unmistakably disclose its existence. 
They match too perfectly. Those of the pro- 
visional government are communicated with so 
much confidence that they tell a story not ex- 
pressed. They are without a parallel when there 
were bona Ude uprisings. The critical student of 
history finds in them absolute proof that our Gov- 
ernment collaborated with some Isthmian adven- 
turers to effect the dismemberment of Colombia. 

We have seen that there were no preparations 
for revolt on the Isthmus and that the charge of 
maladministration of Panama by Colombia is 



3o6 America and the Canal Title 

without merit. We are, therefore, compelled to 
conclude that brute force was invoked — stood 
guard while a protectorate of the United States 
called the Republic of Panama was organized. 
This is conduct that one would expect of a nation 
of brigands but not of the United States. Uncle 
Sam can disavow it and redeem his honor by mak- 
ing reparation to Colombia, or he can decline to 
make reparation, leave his honor in pawn and 
appropriate the advantages which accrue from his 
stolen canal title. What will he do? Will he 
make reparation to Colombia and remain faithful 
to the ideals of civilization, or will he treat with 
silent contempt the clarion voice of justice? 

In order to more fully establish the argument 
that our Government abandoned its traditional 
policy in order to take the Canal Zone, we will set 
over against each other two official documents. 
Both belong to the Roosevelt Administration. 
Both were penned by members of the Cabinet, one 
in 1902 ; the other in 1903. They speak for them- 
selves. They tell whether the wresting of the 
Province of Panama from Colombia was as cred- 
itable an act as is recorded in American history, 
or whether it was a dastardly political crime. 
The first was addressed by Secretary Hay to 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 2Py 

Secretary Moody, and is dated October lo, 
1902: . 

I have the honor to acknowledge tne receipt of your 
letter of the 6th instant, communicating copy of a 
telegram from Rear-Admiral Casey, dated Panama, 
October 5, in relation to the protest of the Colombian 
commander, General Salazar, against any restriction of 
the use of the Panama Railway by the Government of 
Colombia for transporting troops and munitions of 
war. ... 

Inasmuch as the rights of the United States upon the 
Isthmus in respect to open and uninterrupted transit 
are specific and conventional, derived from a treaty be- 
tween the Governments of the United States and 
Colombia as principals, I am of the opinion that Admiral 
Casey should be instructed to refrain from any restric- 
tion of the right of Colombia to use the road for military 
transportation up to the point where such use may 
occasion actual and imminent hostilities on the line of the 
road, or so nearly adjacent as to cause or immediately 
threaten interruption of transit. 

According to this communication, only the 
transit was to be maintained unobstructed. 
There was to be no unnecessary hampering of 
the sovereign in restoring order. The Govern- 
ment was not forbidden to land forces on the 
Isthmus. No such right was claimed by the 
Roosevelt Administration in 1902. The use of 
the railroad for conveying contraband was re- 
strained only as far as was necessary to main- 
tain uninterrupted transit. Compare the fore- 



3o8 America and the Canal Title 

going with the following telegram of Acting-Sec- 
retary Darling to the Commander of the Boston, 
dated November 2, 1903 : 

Proceed with all possible dispatch to Panama. . . . 
Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption 
is threatened by armed force occupy the line of railroad. 
Prevent landing of any armed force, either Government 
or insurgent, with hostile intent at any point within 50 
miles of Panama. If doubtful as to the intention of any 
armed force, occupy Ancon Hill strongly with artil- 
lery. . . . Government force reported approaching the 
Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if in your 
judgment landing would precipitate a conflict. 

The first communication was clearly designed 
to reduce interference with traffic to a minimum. 
The second and those of similar import were 
clearly sent for the purpose of protecting seces- 
sion. The first recognized the superior right of 
the sovereign. The second disregarded the 
fundamental right of sovereignty. It and others 
similar to it dispatched marines to the Isthmus to 
take the Canal Zone. This conclusion matches 
with Roosevelt's assertion at Berkeley, California, 
*""/ took the Canal Zone" 

When one country wrests property (territory) 
from another by force, it has been called conquest, 
and the actors have been called patriots. The 
chief actor has been given political preferment 



Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 309 

and has received the adulation of the populace. 
When an individual wrests property (land) from 
another, we call it theft, and send the actor to the 
penitentiary. America ought to lead the way in 
the development of a tradition which will make 
the former as abhorrent as the latter. To do so 
it must clear its title to the Canal Zone of its 
stain by paying to Colombia an amount deter- 
mined by due process of law. 



Chapter VII 

Acting as the Mandatory of Civilisation 

Criticism of the method adopted to secure the 
Canal Zone has not abated. Accumulation of re- 
liable data has converted suspicion into convic- 
tion that it was not in harmony with the Golden 
Rule. The sifting and weighting of evidence is 
not yet complete. It has proceeded far enough, 
however, to show that a perfect understanding 
existed between the Roosevelt Administration and 
the separatists of Panama through Bunau-Varilla 
as the intermediary. We will set over against 
this conclusion the testimony of Roosevelt. In 
the Outlook of October 7, 191 1, he writes in de- 
fense of the course he pursued : 

Not only was the course followed as regards Panama 
right in every detail and at every point, but there could 
have been no variation from this course except for the 
worse. We not only did what was technically justifiable, 
but we did what was demanded by every ethical con- 
sideration, national and international. We did our duty 
by the world, we did our duty by the people of Panama, 
we did our duty by ourselves. We did harm to no one 
save as harm is done to a bandit by a policeman who de- 

310 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 311 

prives him of his chance for blackmail. The United 
States has many honorable chapters in its history, but no 
more honorable chapter than that which tells of the way 
in which our right to dig the Panama Canal was secured. 

Roosevelt felt grieved that the course his Ad- 
ministration pursued to secure title to the Canal 
Zone provoked a storm of criticism. He clearly 
expected his course to be approved. In this he 
was disappointed. Consequently, his writings on 
the subject show an increasing bitterness towards 
his critics. In his message to Congress on Jan- 
uary 4, 1904, he voices his resentment as follows: 

I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which 
have been made of complicity by this Government in the 
revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as desti- 
tute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for 
my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons 
might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self- 
respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one 
connected with this Government had any part in pre- 
paring, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the 
Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the reports of 
our military and naval officers, given above, no one con- 
nected with this Government had any previous knowl- 
edge of the revolution except such as was accessible to 
any person of ordinary intelligence who read the news- 
papers and kept up a current acquaintance with public 
affairs. 

We know that the Roosevelt Administration 
was prepared to dismember Colombia before the 
event and only those who have planned to do a 



312 America and the Canal Title 

thing can be prepared to do it. There were 
several times as many men-of-war in Isthmian 
waters in November, 1903, as in 1902 when there 
was a formidable revolt in three provinces. 
Therefore, we know that his Administration had 
planned to do what it did. In his speech at Berke- 
ley, California, he boastfully said: '7 took the 
Canal Zone!' He has not told us the antece- 
dents. They are, however, evident to a critical 
student of this chapter of American history. 

Can the method employed to secure the Canal 
Zone be defended if it should appear that our Ad- 
ministration acted as the mandatory of civiliza- 
tion ? Is such a defense possible ? The defenses 
based on this standpoint predicate a system of 
facts other than those that history is recording 
with unerring accuracy. Roosevelt boldly claims 
that his Administration acted as the mandatory 
of civilization. In his message to the Congress, 
he expresses it as follows: 

The possession of a territory fraught with such 
peculiar capacities as the Isthmus in question carries with 
it obligations to mankind. The course of events has 
shown that this canal can not be built by private enter- 
prise, or by any other nation than our own ; therefore it 
must be built by the United States. 

Every effort has been made by the Government of the 
United States to persuade Colombia to follow a course 
which was essential not only to our interests and to the 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 313 

interests of the world, but to the interests of Colombia 
itself. These efforts have failed; and Colombia, by her 
persistence' in repulsing the advances that have been 
made, has forced us, for the sake of our own honor, and 
of the interest and well-being, not merely of our own 
people, but of the people of the Isthmus of Panama and 
the people of the civilized countries of the world, to take 
decisive steps to bring to an end a condition of affairs 
which had become intolerable. 

Roosevelt's claim that his Administration acted 
as the mandatory of civilization is specifically ex- 
pressed in the following : 

If ever a Government could be said to have received a 
mandate from civilization to effect an object the accom- 
plishment of which was demanded in the interest of 
mankind, the United States holds that position with re- 
gard to the interoceanic canal. Since our purpose to 
build the canal was definitely announced, there have 
come from all quarters assurances of approval and en- 
couragement, in which even Colombia herself at one time 
participated; and to general assurances were added 
specific acts and declarations. In order that no obstacle 
might stand in our way. Great Britain renounced im- 
portant rights under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and 
agreed to its abrogation, receiving in return nothing but 
our honorable pledge to build the canal and protect it as 
an open highway. 

Another observation is now apropos. Our 
Government took the position that no old-world 
power should build the Canal. When it was pur- 
posed in France to come to the aid of the Canal 
Company, the United States Senate passed the 
following resolution: 



314 America and the Canal Title 

That the Government of the United States will look 
with serious concern and disapproval upon any connec- 
tion of any European Government with the construction 
or control of any ship canal across the Isthmus of Darien 
or across Central America, and must regard any such 
connection or control as injurious to the just rights and 
interests of the United States and as a menace to their 
welfare. 

This obligated the United States to build the 
canal. It did not obligate her to secure title to 
the Canal Zone by force if the orderly processes 
of diplomacy did not secure it as promptly as she 
desired. The obligation to build the canal is 
stated by Roosevelt in the following : 

Under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty it was explicitly 
provided that the United States should control, police, 
and protect the canal which was to be built, keeping it 
open for the vessels of all nations on equal terms. The 
United States thus assumed the position of guarantor of 
the canal and of its peaceful use by all the world. The 
guaranty included as a matter of course the building of 
the canal. The enterprise was recognized as responding 
to an international need. 

The Roosevelt Administration "took'' the ter- 
ritory in which the canal is located. We are 
solemnly told, however, that, in so doing, it acted 
as the mandatory of civilization. Acting as a 
mandatory is acting as a trustee. A trustee acts 
within the circle prescribed by law. Colombia 
acted as a mandatory of civilization when she of- 

i 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 315 

f ered to accept the compensation awarded by civ- 
ilization." By refusing to accept the award of an 
arbitral tribunal the Roosevelt Administration 
violated the rules prescribed by civilization for a 
mandatory. A peaceful state cannot be disrupted 
by one acting as the mandatory of civilization as 
was Colombia. The Canal Zone belonged to 
Colombia. Civilization could only demand rights 
therein by paying the price imposed by an impar- 
tial tribunal. That is all Colombia asked. 
^'Mandatory" cannot be used as a cloak to con- 
ceal the theft of the Canal Zone. 

Roosevelt attempted to justify his summary 
procedure on the Isthmus on the theory that civil- 
ization had the right of transit across this 
strategic zone on reasonable terms. This is not 
denied. Colombia has not denied it. In short, 
Colombia solemnly affirmed it. She merely de- 
nied the right of Theodore Roosevelt to fix the 
terms. She was ready — she offered to acquiesce 
in the terms fixed by an impartial tribunal. Civil- 
ization had the alleged right but its corollary is 
the right to fix the terms as in the case of domestic 
eminent domain. Civilization, however, had a 
right paramount to this and that is to have its 
treaties obeyed until properly abrogated. This 
defense has no merit whatsoever. 



3i6 America and the Canal Title 

If our then Government had acted as the man- 
datory of civilization, it would have invoked the 
aid of civilization to determine the compensation 
to be paid to Colombia for the right of way. But 
Colombia proposed that the compensation for the 
right of way be determined in this way. There- 
fore, Colombia and not our Government acted as 
the mandatory of civilization in this instance. If 
the Roosevelt Administration acted as the manda- 
tory of civilization in the canal venture, as al- 
leged, civilization must be given something to 
say in the fixing of the terms for its use. Those 
who act as mandatory for a state in the above 
sense (public service corporations) must con- 
form to the terms imposed by the state as to rate 
and service and as to the terms to be paid for the 
exercise of the right of eminent domain. Colom- 
bia agreed in advance to accept such terms. 
Therefore our Administration did not act as the 
mandatory of civilization. 

If action as the mandatory of civilization is 
warranted, who is to determine the rights of the 
nations in interest ? Is it to be determined by the 
nation that is powerful or by an arbitral tribunal 
impartially selected? To ask the question is t( 
answer it. Our Government did not act as th( 
mandatory of civilization. The fact that Roose- 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 317 

velt supported tolls-exemption for our inter- 
coastal trade proves it. The tolls-exemption pro- 
vision of the Panama Canal Act violated the 
fundamental provision of that trusteeship which 
acting as the mandatory of civilization predicates, 
that is, a non-discriminatory rate in the commer- 
cial use of the canal. In short, our Government 
essayed to practice in its administration of an in- 
ternational utility what it has made criminal if 
practiced in the management of a domestic util- 
ity. Roosevelt supported a policy in the case of 
tolls-exemption that is the very antithesis of con- 
duct that is required of a mandatory of civiliza- 
tion. 

Acting as the mandatory of civilization! It 
sounds exalted ! It is exalted if the Administra- 
tion that makes the pledge is inspired with moral 
fervor. Such an Administration does not take a 
Canal Zone by force but obtains it by due process 
of law. Nor do those who controlled the policy 
of such an Administration advocate the grant- 
ing of a rebate or of a rake-off to our inter- 
coastal shipping in the form of free tolls. Clearly 
the claim that the then Administration acted as 
mandatory for civilization is pretense. The 
method adopted for fixing the price of the privi- 
lege was not that of a mandatory — had absolutely 



3i8 America and the Canal Title 

nothing in common with it. In the Outlook of 
January i8, 1913, Roosevelt comments on the sub- 
mission of the tolls-exemption provisions of the 
Panama Canal Act to arbitration as follows : 

I quite admit that it would be a difficult thing to get an 
arbitral tribunal which will not have some bias against 
us. Switzerland is almost the only community which 
has not some commercial interest in the Panama Canal. 

If in a little country with a little commercial in- 
terest there is not to be found a citizen who will 
be just to us in the matter of tolls, how could the 
author of the foregoing arrogate to himself the 
capacity to be just when his country had an in- 
finitely larger interest at stake? In short, it 
would seem that he held that he was the vicegerent 
of the Lord — anointed to dispense righteousness 
— but that in the wide, wide world there was not 
another like unto him. Therefore, his is the 
privilege to treat a treaty as a scrap of paper, to 
kick the Constitution into the backyard, to treat 
international and statute law as forgotten lore 
and to consign to the Ananias Club those who 
differ with him. 

Scott, a critical and impartial writer, says in 
his book on "The Americans in Panama" : 

We have the admission of the President himself that 
he abandoned the regular diplomatic methods of securing 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 319 

the territory needed for building a canal in favor of the 
primitive method of taking it by force. This leads to 
the admission that we set up the Republic of Panama 
merely to make an otherwise bald steal appear to bear 
some evidence of justification. . . . 

President Roosevelt exerted the full capfacity of his 
versatile mind to cloud the situation, so that the moral 
sense of the people would not be aroused, until it would 
be too late to undo his act. 

He pretended that the treatment Panama had received, 
as a kind of stepchild of Colombia, warranted the same 
kind of action we took in Cuba. His Secretary of State 
advanced the strained construction of our solemn treaty 
with Colombia that we were under obligations to main- 
tain the neutrality of the Panama Railroad, and so pre- 
vent the soldiers of Colombia from striking down the 
revolution. The President further recognized the inde- 
pendence of the Republic, and insisted that it was an act 
as disinterested, for instance, as our recognition of the 
new Republic of China. In truth, they bear no similarity 
of feature. . . . 

In Panama the masses of the people not only did not 
know about the revolution until it had passed, but no 
more than an ordinary mob, such as may be aroused on 
an hour's notice in any city, participated in it. 

It was not necessary that the people of Panama should 
know about it. The United States had agreed to stand 
between the clique of Panaman financiers and any offen- 
sive act Colombia might undertake. Undoubtedly there 
had been popular uprisings against Colombia in Panama, 
but the revolution of November 3, 1903, was not one of 
them. ... 

The rightful owner of the territory we desired for a 
canal was Colombia. When we took that territory we 
took it from Colombia. The way we took it was to 
participate in a bogus revolution, engineered by a Junta 
of wealthy Panaman business and professional men. It 
turned out that the part they played in making the revo- 



320 America and the Canal Title 

lution a success was farcical, while the part the United 
States marines played was vital. . . . 

If any American railroad should desire property for 
a right of way and, instead of condemning it by due proc- 
ess of law, should connive with a neighbor to falsely 
claim possession of the property and then buy the prop- 
erty from the illegal owner, the action not only would 
not stand in law, but it would outrage public opinion. 
That precisely is the course we followed at Panama. 
President Roosevelt did not dare to take the property out- 
right from Colombia, the compensation to be fixed by 
due process afterwards, but connived with a revolu- 
tionary Junta, through his Secretary of State, to have 
the property claimed by a Republic to be set up specific- 
ally for that purpose, which Republic would sell the 
property to the United States. . . . 

But it ought to be set down as a maxim of canal 
management, if not of national policy, that no neighbor 
of the canal should be allowed to remain on bad terms 
with the Americans. It is not good that a nation so 
near as Colombia should be in a hostile frame of mind 
toward the United States. This is true, not so much for 
what a sense of injustice rankling in the minds of her 
citizens might precipitate, but because, if anything 
happened to the canal, Colombia, in the event blame was 
not promptly fixed, inevitably would have to bear the 
burden of our suspicion. 

But, ultimately, the question of reparation must rest 
squarely upon a moral issue. It is not so much the 
rights of Colombia that should impel us to an act of 
reparation as a desire to live up to our own best instincts. 
The American ideal is something far different from law- 
compelled righteousness; it rises to the grandeur of 
righteousness for the sake of righteousness. Colombia 
suffered materially by our act, and an enlightened judg- 
ment would be that we suffer most. 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 321 

Is it compatible with the dignity of a great nation like 
the United States to reverse its position by making 
reparation? This question more properly should read, 
Is it compatible with the pride of a great nation like the 
United States to make reparation? The answer is: 
The United States has no dignity to uphold. It may 
restore its dignity and sense of righteousness only by 
reversing its willful and headstrong action. We merely' 
play the ostrich in sticking our head in the sand of the 
Panama revolution and fancy our action is hid. . . . 

Those Americans who balk at the prospect of a large 
money indemnity to Colombia, for taking Panama, 
should ask themselves whether any mere love of lucre 
should stand between us and a clear conscience. The 
situation in which w^e are involved may cost dearly to 
straighten out, but that is the inevitable price, in the 
individual or national life, of walking in the paths of 
unrighteousness. The Colombian claim is a call to arms 
between the forces of good and evil in the American 
national character. Do we stand at Armageddon, and 
do we battle for the Lord? 

Our action in the matter of reparation to 
Colombia will tell where we stand. We may 
preach righteousness from the housetops and 
chant holy — holy, but if we do not repent of the 
wrong we did Colombia, we do not stand at 
Armageddon and battle for the Lord. 

American public opinion would have insisted 
that we secure the Canal Zone by lawful means 
instead of by warships if it had been consulted. 
It would now demand that adequate reparation 



2^22 America and the Canal Title 

be made to Colombia if it were informed — if it 
knew that our Administration actually sand- 
bagged Colombia and wrested the Province of 
Panama from her by force. 

There are wrongs, however, which cannot be 
righted. This is one of them. The strategic 
Isthmus wrested from Colombia by the display of 
force cannot be restored to her. Too many newly 
created vested interests forbid. We must, how- 
ever, atone for the political crime of the Roose- 
velt Administration by paying the penalty im- 
posed by an impartial tribunal. 

What we did on the Isthmus cannot be undone. 
There can be no adequate reparation for the wil- 
ful dismemberment of another country if the part 
wrested from her is set up as an independent 
State. There can, however, be disavowal of the 
act and compensation for loss suffered. 

If the Roosevelt Administration did not wrong 
Colombia, why not let an impartial arbitral 
tribunal record the fact ? That would be conduct 
becoming a mandatory of civilization. If wrong 
is done it is nobler to make reparation than to let 
history record it as an unrequited injury done to 
a small state by one pretending disinterestedness 
and exalted moral purpose. We are in full ac- 
cord with the following excerpt from an editorial 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 323 

which appeared in the New York World on Jan- 
uary 2y, J912: 

If Colombia has no claim to indemnity, that fact will 
be established by a full and fair investigation. If 
Colombia has a claim, that claim ought to be satisfied. 
No other course is compatible with the honor and 
integrity of the American people. Whether the contro- 
versy is to be settled by a congressional investigation or 
referred to The Hague tribunal is a matter of detail. 
The important thing is that this international scandal be 
disposed of for all time before the canal is opened, and 
that no stain be left upon the American title. Congress 
owes that to the country, and the country owes that to 
itself. 

Colombia is embittered — is estranged. Sus- 
picion and coldness are now enthroned where con- 
fidence dwelt. It is difficult to" restore the former 
cordial relations. It could easily have been main- 
tained. It merely required that our Government 
act within the circle prescribed by the law of na- 
tions to secure the Canal Zone. This it failed to 
do. It has lowered our standing in the family of 
nations. 

In the parliament of nations, influence is more 
and more being determined by character. Char- 
acter is the product of material and spiritual de- 
velopment. It is stained by robbing others under 
the pretext of an opera houife revolution. Our 
Administration will be held responsible when this 



324 America and the Canal Title 

dark chapter of American diplomatic history is 
fully recorded. It behooves such Americans as 
love truth and justice to demand that we officially 
disavow this act and make reparation to Colom- 
bia. 

In 1906, Secretary Root visited La tin- American 
countries. One of the purposes of this visit was 
to make: 

A frank avowal of national policy and sentiment in the 
relations of the United States with the countries of Latin 
America, to remove the unfavorable impressions at that 
time widely prevaiHng and so bring about unity of 
thought and feeling among all the nations of this 
continent. 

If this visit had been preceded by an act of jus- 
tice to Colombia, the reception would not have 
been dimmed by misgivings. Latin America 
would have known that the profession of good- 
will was backed by deeds. As it was, they knew 
that Uncle Sam could bear the visage of a parson 
while playing the role of a bandit. We have an 
observation concerning the visit to the Argentine 
Republic in the following: 

After his first public utterances in the capital of the 
Argentine Republic, it became evident that the ex- 
planation of the presence of the Secretary of State of the 
United States was to be found in the simple desire of his 
country to cultivate closer and more friendly intercourse 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 325 

with the other independent States of America. It was 
seen that Secretary Root represented that America of 
which the Argentine people had seen Httle and heard less ; 
the America that thinks on the lines laid down by the Pil- 
grim Fathers ; the America that is not all push and com- 
mercial activity but .... a powerful section o-f the vast 
population governed by nobler impulses and the higher 
ranges of thought. An entire revulsion of feeling set in 
and one of the greatest triumphs of diplomacy of modem 
times was achieved. 

International good-will cannot be called into 
being with a magician's wand. Legerdemain 
cannot create it. Mere professions of a distin- 
guished visitor cannot blot out an unrepented and 
unrequited crime. Good-will is the product of 
just conduct — of square dealing — of actual deeds 
and not of professions. It is the product of in- 
sight — of correct conduct based on insight. Only 
by correct conduct can we restore our prestige in 
Spanish- America. 

In 1903, our Administration took the Canal 
Zone by the prerogative of acting outside of the 
law of nations in order to expedite an enterprise 
which would be of inestimable benefit to collective 
civilization. Spanish-America knew it at the 
time of the Root sojourn among them. They 
knew that the Administration of which he was 
then a part had treated an international covenant 
as a scrap of paper. 



326 America and the Canal Title 

We should square our conduct with our profes- 
sions before proffering friendship to Spanish- 
America. Until we atone for the rape of Colom- 
bia, our proffer of friendship is an affront. It 
retards the growth of public law. Every country 
is menaced when obedience to public law is flouted 
by the strong. It imperils the ''age's slow-bought 
gain." Obedience to public law is not altruism 
— the world's interest is our interest. Solidarity 
is a growing fact. Gains therefrom are recipro- 
cal. The United States ought to practice obedi- 
ence to public law and solemn engagements. Then 
she will be in a position to carry the message of 
good-will to Spanish-America without an affront 
to its intelligence. 

Never before had an American Administration 
acted on the principle that its own convenience 
took precedence of a solemn engagement and of 
the law of nations. The international situation 
produced thereby cannot be permitted to become 
immutable history. To do so is to affirm the prin- 
ciple that a weak nation has no rights that a strong 
nation need respect if it contravenes the latter's 
convenience. It is the negation of the finest fruit 
of civilization. 

In order that a treaty may be a vital force, it 
must be conformed to in letter and in spirit. Not 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 2>^7 

only no way of escape from its plain intent must 
be sought but the parties in interest must so act 
that other peoples cannot misconstrue their intent. 
It is not enough that motives be right. The 
United States ought to act so that others cannot 
mistake its righteous purpose. This the United 
States failed to do in her pursuit of a title to the 
Canal Zone. It avails her nothing to pretend to 
be guided by the morals of a parson until she has 
repented of her conduct as a bandit. 

There can be no doubt in the mind of informed 
persons that the Roosevelt Administration col- 
laborated with separatists in Panama to dismem- 
ber Colombia for the purpose of securing a degree 
of control over the Canal Zone that Colombia was 
loath to grant. In this she violated those rules of 
fairness, reason, and justice which are the crown- 
ing achievement of modern civilization. It was 
the act of their agent and not the will of the 
American people. Unless the act is repudiated 
and reparation is made to Colombia, it will, how- 
ever, become their act. 

Senor S. Perez Triana, in a letter addressed to 
President Concha of Colombia, published in the 
New York Times of December 13, 19 14, states 
the position of Spanish-America with clearness 
and force. We will quote from it at length : 



328 America and the Canal Title 

The United States, while preventing the conquest of 
American territory by European nations, has not been 
logical nor honest; it has not respected the essential 
equity of the principle, for it has conquered territory by 
violating the sovereignty of other American nations. 

In the policy of the White House there has become 
apparent a marked change regarding Latin America. A 
good man has come into power, one whose honest 
conscience makes no compromises with iniquity and re- 
fuses to bow to the historical and universal doctrine that 
it is allowable for a nation to do collectively what for an 
individual would be criminal. 

Mr. Wilson has proclaimed from the lofty position 
which he occupies that the moral law for a statesman, as 
for the individual, should be justice, not expediency. 
The statesman of the entire world, shackled to the Gov- 
ernmental tradition of all historical epochs and stupefied 
before such audacity, called him a dreamer, not daring 
to call him a traitor. 

President Wilson has not confined himself to words; 
he has passed, on to action. He gave proof of this to his 
fellow-citizens when, appealing to the national honor, he 
obtained the repeal of the law regarding Panama tolls, 
which was based on expediency, not justice. And it was 
the same in Colombia with the treaty of April 6 of this 
year, which made good the injury done to the Republic 
of Colombia by the Administration of Roosevelt in so 
far as it lay within human power so to do. 

The Monroe Doctrine, which has been our defense 
against European conquest, did not prevent 'our 
spoliation. Up to now the United States has not carried 
this doctrine to its extreme limit of logical development, 
viz. the prohibition of conquest, which is robbery and 
spoliation, explicitly as such, no matter who may perpe- 
trate it — an American republic, a European monarchy, 
or a European republic. 

Already things are changing. At Mobile, in October 
of last year, President Wilson declared, in the name of 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 329 

the United States, that the latter would not in future 
acquire territory on the American continent by means of 
war or conquest. Wilson has as good a right to speak 
in behalf of his country as had Monroe. The value of 
this promise of Wilson, its transcendental importance, 
what it means as a victory for the principles of inter- 
national justice, may be measured, just as temperature 
is measured by a thermometer, by the hysterical and 
clam.orous rage which it aroused in Roosevelt, the apostle 
of imperialism, the butcher of Colombia. 

The opportunity which now presents itself is pro- 
pitious for obtaining from the United States a solemn 
ratification of the principle laid down by President 
W^ilson at Mobile. If anywhere there is ill-feeling 
toward the United States on account of the past, to allow 
it to impair judgment would be an unpardonable mistake, 
now that Wilson has erased the past. If the personal 
and historical elements offered by the present time are 
not utilized a deplorable error, whose results are beyond 
calculation, will have been committed. 

A Monroe Doctrine carried to the extreme limit of its 
logical development, which will defend the continent, as 
it has in the past, against the voracity of Europe, which 
will tie the hands both of Yankee imperialism and of the 
shameful and treacherous imperialisms already arising 
in Latin America — there would be an element of tre- 
mendous import in achieving peace and progress for all 
the American Continent. 

This end can be achieved at the Pan-American 
Congress about to meet at Santiago de Chile; there the 
necessary agreement between the nations of America 
should be adopted. Without doubt it will be necessary 
to ratify this by means of special agreements among the 
various Governments. Some nations — let us hope not — 
might -oppose the moral guaranteeing of the territorial 
inviolability of each and all of the American nations by | 
each and all of the rest. This would reveal the existence, 
in the countries making such opposition, of brands of 



330 America and the Canal Title 

greed and cupidity which it would be well at all events 
to lay bare. 

The personal elements of the present hour are de- 
cisive; the delegates from the United States to the Pan- 
American Congress cannot contradict nor fail to support 
the principles so gallantly proclaimed before the world 
by President Wilson at Mobile. The ratification of this 
in the form set forth above would be an obstacle in the 
path of imperialistic attempts in case the old tendency 
should again gain the upper hand in the United States 
under Roosevelt or some other like him. 

The Latin-American nations proclaiming the principle 
of international justice — that the sovereignty of the 
Latin-American nations cannot be violated by another or 
others of these nations, nor by the nations of other 
continents — dignifying thus the Monroe Doctrine and 
completing its moral integrity would, I hold, do a great 
work in the cause of justice, liberty, and democracy, so 
grievously threatened in this black and turbulent hour of 
war and extermination in Europe. 

I respectfully ask that you raise the banner of this 
noble idea in order that the delegates from Colombia may 
present it, in the name of our country, before the coming 
Pan-American Congress. 

There will be some, and you will hear them, Mr. Presi- 
dent, who will tell you and the republic that the most that 
may be attained will be a treaty signed by all the nations 
of North, Central, and South America, but that this will 
not benefit us in the least, because, when it may suit the 
convenience of the strong in the future, that treaty will 
be torn to bits just as was the treaty between Colombia 
and the United States. They will tell you that to put 
faith in written words and in signatures of nations, after 
Germany has ground under her horses' heels the com- 
pacts, signed by all Europe, making Luxemburg and 
Belgium neutral, and called them "scraps of paper," is 
an unpardonable piece of childishness. They will tell 
you that the only strength is that of the sword, that the 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 331 

only voice to which the Vv^orld listens is the voice of 
cannon. To such men I make answer that theirs is the 
eternal doctrine of Draconians and demagogues for ob- 
structing the evolution of justice. 

We, the weak, have only right for a shield ; if we our-» 
selves make haste to discredit right we play into the hands 
of its violators and show them the road. If right is van- 
quished, it is not for us to cover it with the mud of vitu- 
peration and mockery, but to raise it up from the dust 
high, very high, as the Redeemer raised His Cross, so that 
it may be a beacon lighting up men's consciences. 

To submit voluntarily and prematurely to deceit and 
violence is to make ourselves deserving of the yoke of 
slavery ; it is, moreover, a crime against our native land. 
We have not the right to be cowards in advance. 

We have neither sword nor cannon; let us then rally 
to the right, in the firm conviction that right must 
triumph in the end. 

This shows how Colombia feels. It also shows 
that the feeling of apprehension on the part of the 
small Latin-American states is warranted. It 
can only be allayed by voluntarily making repara- 
tion to Colombia. Will the people of the United 
States deny justice to Colombia because they have 
the physical prowess to resist the promptings of 
the still small voice within which urges them to 
repent ? 

The United States should cooperate whole 
heartedly in carrying out the foregoing sugges- 
tion that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine 
be made Pan-American. Our country can not 



332 America and the Canal Title 

expect to be as influential as it would be in cre- 
ating a tradition favorable to peace and justice in 
the Western Hemisphere if it insists on exclusive 
responsibility for the maintenance of the afore- 
mentioned policy. 

The United States ought to do right because 
it is right and not because it pays. If to do right 
also pays, the argument for justice is reenforced. 
To grant justice to Colombia will pay. , We quote 
from Granger's article in the Independent, "The 
Stain of Our Flag" : 

As Mr. Barrett said, settlement with Colombia would 
be simply bread cast on the waters of Latin-American 
trade, which would come back to us in short order in the 
increased commerce that would result from the good feel- 
ing engendered. 

Since the '"secession" Colombia has had as its motto 
*Teace and Work." Its government is representative of 
both political parties. Reyes began its regeneration — 
he doubled the price of Colombia's bonds on the London 
Exchange, put the army to work on the roads, and paid 
the salaries of the employees, as well as trebling the 
number of schools. Gonzales Valencia, who succeeded 
Reyes, kept up the good work. Now President Restrepo 
has placed the country's credit higher than ever and 
shown a most creditable record. 

Colombia's worst drawback is her fiat money, a relic 
of the days of the civil war (1899-1902) that all agree 
shall be her last. With this redeemed and the currency 
on a gold basis, she would soon be prosperous indeed. 
Colombia is a country of infinite natural resources and 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 333 

industrious inhabitants, and a brilliant future awaits her 
as soon as the curse of valueless paper is removed. The 
prosperity which resulted in Argentina when the basic 
element of circulating medium was supplied will follow 
as surely in Colombia. 

A payment to Colombia of $25,000,000 and a new 
treaty of friendship and commerce, would be an excellent 
investment for us, and would completely wipe out the 
smirch on our honor. 

Granger quotes a New York merchant as fol- 
lows : 

On account of the feeling against us in Latin America 
because of the Panama affair we have lost in trade more 
than the whole canal will cost. 

The views of the writer are clearly expressed 
in the following taken from a metropolitan daily : 

Our people have not yet appreciated how much we 
need, and would profit by closer friendship and fuller 
understanding with the peoples of the other American 
republics. Every one of the efforts now being made to 
bring those peoples nearer to us, to understand more 
completely their point of view, their history, their litera- 
ture, their institutions, and every effort to break down 
the barrier of language which separates us, deserves the 
heartiest support. The relation we seek with them is not 
a relation in which we are to exercise power, but one in 
which we and they together are to exercise an influence 
that is higher and better than mere power, because it is 
the outgrowth of our common devotion to democratic 
institutions and our complete and sympathetic under- 
standing of what the very word "America" typifies and 
signifies. 



334 America and the Canal Title 

Our Government should not leave a word un- 
said or an act undone that is necessary to make 
full, complete, and ungrudging reparation to Co- 
lombia. It would give us that influence in the 
councils of the Western Hemisphere to which we 
should aspire. Last and least it would pay in dol- 
lars and cents. Latin America will soon have a 
population of 100,000,000. Their growth in pop- 
ulation will continue. Their respect, esteem, and 
confidence is worth more than its pecuniary cost. 
Ex-Minister Du Bois has well said: 

The time is not distant when Latin America will have 
a hundred million of people, inspired by new conditions 
of national and commercial life. Those now living feel 
that the Panama incident is the only real injustice com- 
mitted by the United States against the Latin-American 
people. The Treaty will correct that feeling and greatly 
change the sentiment that is now running heavily against 
us in all South America, and place this country and 
Colombia upon that friendly footing so greatly desired 
by the people of both nations. 

Spanish-America is suspicious of ultimate 
American intentions. It is not without reason. 
It is well expressed in the following newspaper 
clipping which was taken from Eder's book on 
Colombia : 

Even in this enlightened age every nation seems to 
have a bugaboo of an impending foreign enemy — 
England, Germany; the United States, Japan, and so 
forth. So Colombians dread a Yankee attempt, sooner 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 335 

or later, to overpower South America and believe their 
land to be jthe outpost which will be first attacked. They 
have already felt the talon of the Eagle ; they have a hys- 
terical dread that the voracious bird will again swoop 
down upon their country. Hysterical is the only word. 
Suspicion of the designs of the American Government is 
carried to absurd limits; innocent provisions for coaling 
rights; a proposed treaty, or steps by American com- 
panies to acquire tracts of land for timber or mining in 
certain sections, or purely commercial, railroad or bank- 
ing projects are misconstrued to be an opening wedge; 
even prospecting American engineers have been suspected 
of being secret spies. 

And Americans have only themselves to blame. Ever 
since the annexation of Texas, and the Mexican War, 
there has been latent fear of Yankee aggression among 
the Latin-American peoples and a certain dislike of the 
Gringos. The events of 1903, in the ruthless seizure 
by President Roosevelt of the coveted Panama Canal 
strip and Colombia's humiliation at having her protests 
and demands for redress ignored have carried this fear 
and this dislike to a high pitch. . . . 

The United States has been almost blind to the disas- 
trous consequences to itself, both political and commer- 
cial, of the gross injustice that was committed and the 
policy of indifference it has since pursued. It is not Co- 
lombia alone that has been affected ; the shock of the tak- 
ing of Panama was felt throughout Spanish America; a 
quiver of indignation ran through the southern conti- 
nent, causing spasmodic outbursts of anti-American feel- 
ing which have proved detrimental to the best commer- 
cial interests of the United States and favorable to Euro- 
pean trade, and which have hampered American diplo- 
macy. 

Shall we have an ''Italia Irredenta'' bordering 
the canal littoral? Shall we allow an Alsace- 



336 America and the Canal Title 

Lorraine revanche festering to the south of this 
beneficent enterprise ? It is for our Senate to de- 
termine. We read in the Norfolk Landmark: 

The Republic of Colombia has adopted as an official 
history a work which accuses the United States of crim- 
inal intent in procuring the secession of Panama. . . . 

It is said that each child in the Colombian public 
schools will be required to memorize the chapter dealing 
with the secession of Panama. This will mean that the 
republic will foster for years, if not forever, a spirit of 
antagonism toward the United States. This country 
cannot afford to have such enmities in South America. 
Panama itself is hardly worth the price. 

Elsewhere we find the very essence of Colom- 
bia's indictment of our moral perfidy and how it 
is propagated. It reads: 

The Colombian Republic was physically unable to pre- 
vent the success of the conspiracy by which Uncle Sam 
deprived it of the state of Panama. But it is apparently 
intelligent enough to understand the modus operandi of 
the game, and nervy enough to tell about it upon all 
proper occasions. It has even recently gone to the length 
of providing its public schools with histories which teach 
and thoroughly expose the wretched part played by the 
Washington administration In fomenting a fake rebel- 
lion on the Isthmus, and in treacherously lending Its war- 
ships to the service of the seceders. Not only this, but 
in terms and by name do these school books outline the 
perfidy of Theodore Roosevelt, who, as President, was 
responsible for the fact, and who outraged the first prin- 
ciple of international comity, and far exceeded his right- 
ful jurisdiction by actively exerting himself in aid of the 
shameless robbery of a sister Republic. 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 337 

Colombia's wrongs cry to heaven for redress. 
They must not be perpetuated. Right should be 
the unsullied watchword of the United States. 
Colombia asks for justice. She does not ask for 
the impossible. Her people do not blame the peo- 
ple of the United States. Her statesmen respect 
our statesmen and admire Woodrow Wilson. 
They blame Roosevelt. They know that he and 
not the American people willed Colombia's hu- 
miliation. They merely ask for justice. If this 
is granted, they will again extend to us the right 
hand of fellowship. It is well expressed by one 
of her great men, Triana. The New York Times 
of June 6, 191 5, printed portions of an address of 
his with the following summary of it : 

During the recent Pan-American Conference at Wash- 
ington Mr. Santiago Perez Triana of Colombia delivered 
an address on the necessity for Americans, North and 
South, letting the rest of the world understand plainly 
that the Western Hemisphere is to he retained by Ameri- 
cans and is not to be permitted to be made the victim of 
territory grabbing by European powers — such an exten- 
sion of the Monroe Doctrine that each South and Cen- 
tral American republic will adopt that doctrine for itself. 

Excerpts from this noteworthy address which 
are germane at this point of our discussion read : 

The hour of watchfulness for us Americans of all sec- 
tions has only just begun, and we would be unworthy of 
the men who achieved our emancipation and who 



i^^^S America and the Canal Title 

founded our nationalities if through neglect or sordid 
temporizing we were to jeopardize the patrimony of free- 
dom of the coming generations. The first element for 
the protection of the continent is universal harmony 
and efficient cooperation. Financial relationships which 
signify the lifeblood of industry and commerce are of 
paramount importance in this connection, but there are 
other indispensable steps rendered necessary by the reve- 
lation of the present hour. 

All feelings of fear or of distrust must disappear. It 
is necessary that all the nations of the continent should 
declare in a solemn manner that the era of conquest of 
territory has come to an end on the American continent, 
alike from outsiders as from other nations on the conti- 
nent, and that redress whenever it can be accomplished 
should be carried out; but it is often impossible to re- 
trace steps of history, and in such cases bygones will have 
to be bygones, and the dead past will have to bury its 
dead. The attempt to straighten the course of history, 
following the current up the stream toward its source, 
would be idle and futile. 

It is the future that concerns us. The microbe of im- 
perialism is one of easy grow^th. Men assembled in col- 
lectivities called nations have been accustomed, when 
occasion has arisen, throughout all history, to accept in- 
iquity as their guiding principle, and the honest man who, 
single-handed, would not take an ear of corn from his 
neighbor's field, as soon as he finds himself armed with a 
collective conscience, will not only take the ear of corn, 
but the whole field, and the life of his neighbor and of his 
neighbor's family to boot. And then he will present 
himself, demanding the crown of patriotism and the halo 
of glory in recognition from the future generations. 

The microbe must be extirpated from the continent. 
It has been proclaimed within recent days from the high- 
est summit of executive power in this land that honesty 
and justice and not convenience should be the guiding 
principle of life, alike individual and national. 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 339 

That utterance should stand, as it were, as the pennant 
of our hopes and our endeavors. The inviolability of 
the continent has been effective for outsiders, but not so 
for some nations of the continent. I do not speak in a 
spirit of complaint or of censure; I simply state facts. 
Thus a spirit of distrust has been created which it is 
indispensable to eliminate. The atmosphere of cordiality 
throughout the continent must be diaphanous, without a 
single shadow on the horizon. 

The disappearance of distrust will permit of the real 
union in sentiment of all the nations of America, and that 
union will mean strength for the protection of the con- 
tinent and of the ideals of liberty and democracy to 
which it is dedicated. . . . 

It becomes of paramount and vital importance for the 
nations of America that it should be known that through- 
out the breadth and length of the continent they are 
unanimous in sentiment; that the continent will be in- 
violate from conquest or political colonization; that it is 
open and free to the wandering and peaceful multitudes, 
but that it is closed to the conquering flags. 

The feeling in Colombia and to a certain extent 
the feeling in Spanish-America is indicated in a 
petition signed by representatives of seventy-six 
New York importing houses praying that the Co- 
lombian treaty be ratified. The petition ad- 
dressed to Chairman Stone of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate reads as follows : 

The enormous opportunities for the expansion of our 
Latin trade that have been opened to American enter- 
prise by the European war make it imperative that the 
antipathy and distrust which have unfortunately grown 
out of the secession of Panama be removed at once. 

We believe this can be best achieved by the immediate 



340 America and the Canal Title 

ratification of the Colombian treaty, which would insure 
the restoration of the century-old friendship formerly 
existing between our two countries and virtually give the 
United States the foreign trade of Colombia. 

The facts that Colombia is the nearest of the South 
American republics, and the only one having coasts on 
both oceans; that rapid and direct steamship communi- 
cations already exist, and that in natural wealth and un- 
developed resources she surpasses all her neighbors may 
be mentioned to show that every consideration of expedi- 
ency and self-interest is added to those of justice and in- 
ternational good will involved in the final settlement of 
Colombia's claims. 

With every confidence in the far-seeing statesmanship 
and true patriotism of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, the undersigned merchants doing business with 
Colombia beg most respectfully to urge the prompt rati- 
fication of the treaty signed at Bogota on April 6, 1914, 
between the United States and the Republic of Colombia. 

This done, then the Congress should investi- 
gate through an expert committee the compensa- 
tion actually due Colombia and voluntarily grant 
Colombia the full measure of justice due her. It 
would exalt the United States in Latin America. 
It would transform suspicion into confidence. 
Can the United States, which, from humanitarian 
motives, returned twelve million dollars to China 
and spent a hundred million to free Cuba, refuse 
equitably to compensate Colombia? 

In a memorandum dated May 3, 191 3, ad- 
dressed to Secretary Bryan by the then Minister 
of Colombia occurs the following: 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 341 

Both the People and the Government of Colombia 
have felt a deep satisfaction on learning of the very noble 
resolution Your Excellency has formed to cultivate rela- 
tions of sincere friendship with the Republics of Latin 
America by means of a high-minded and just policy; the 
note in which Your Excellency has already struck in that 
beautiful thought: — 

"The Lord has made us neighbors; 
Let Justice make us friends." 

Who can deny that the beginning o£ a new era of 
justice should be marked by giving to my country that 
reparation which is her due? Her cause is eminently 
just. Colombia asks for the fulfillment of sacred obli- 
gations entered into by solemn treaty, the Treaty of 1846, 
and she bases this appeal on a fundamental axiom of the 
Law of Nations, which declares that all States, great or 
small, are equal in the family of nations. It can be said 
that the case of Colombia is a leading case in the inter- 
national life of the New World; because the manner in 
which it will be decided will show whether the Great Re- 
public, in its dealings with the nations of America, in- 
tends or does not intend to abide by the fundamental 
principles of international law. 

This simple and direct appeal for justice by 
Colombia is naturally followed here by an ob- 
servation of Viscount James Bryce on the present 
European situation. It is so apropos that it might 
have been addressed to us : 

In the judgment which history will hereafter pass upon 
the forty centuries of recorded progress toward civiliza- 
tion that now lie behind us, what are the tests it will 
apply to determine the true greatness of a people ? 

Not population, not territory, not wealth, not military 



342 America and the Canal Title 

power. Rather will history ask: What examples of 
lofty character and unselfish devotion to honor and duty 
has a people given? What has it done to increase the 
volume of knowledge? What thoughts and what ideals 
of permanent value and unexhausted fertility has it be- 
queathed to mankind? What works has it produced in 
poetry, music, and the other arts to be an unfailing 
source of enjoyment to posterity? . . . 

Each- race has something to give, each something to 
learn; and when their blood is blended the mixed stock 
may combine the gifts of both. . . . 

The mark of an advancing civilization has been the 
substitution of friendship for hatred and of peaceful for 
warlike ideals. That small peoples have done and can 
do as much for the common good of humanity as large 
peoples. That Treaties must be observed, for what are 
they but records of national faith solemnly pledged, and 
what could bring mankind more surely and swiftly back 
to that reign o.f violence and terror from which it has 
been slowly rising for the last ten centuries than the de- 
struction of trust in the plighted faith of nations? 

To conciliate Colombia for the loss of Panama 
the Taft Administration made overtures for a 
concession of the Atrato canal route and the per- 
petual lease of certain islands for coaling stations 
and other purposes and actually offered for them 
$10,000,000! An offer of a mere pittance for 
valuable concessions to right a colossal wrong! 
President Restrepo promptly replied in words that 
ought to bring the blush of shame to self-respect- 
ing Americans : 

President Roosevelt took Panama, our richest asset, 
and now you are sent here to take our islands, and the 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 343 

only canal route we have left. Is there anything else 
that the northern Colossus would like to separate us 
from ? 

Read the foregoing reply by President Restrepo 
again and then determine for yourself whether 
the Roosevelt Administration acted as the manda- 
tory of civilization when it "took" the Canal Zone 
by force, and, in so doing, rent asunder the Re- 
public of Colombia, an ally of the United States 
by the Treaty of 1846. 

This action of the Roosevelt Administration 
was a challenge to civilization — a determination 
to secure outside of the methods forged by civil- 
ization an opportunity to prosecute a great un- 
dertaking without paying the price that civiHza- 
tion would impose by due process of law. The act 
was anti-social. It was the negation of social 
justice. Professor Johnson of Denison Univer- 
sity, m his criticism of German lawlessness in the 
war, has expressed the views that the writer holds 
concerning the lawless method employed to se- 
cure the Canal Zone. It reads : 

This is no more nor less than a challenge to civilization 
itself. Civilization in smaller groups is the habit, or art, 
of living together as individuals, with such recognition 
of the interests and welfare of others, such restraint 
upon the promptings of mere self-interest, as is necessary 
to make organized society possible, and to conduce to the 
greatest feasible happiness and prosperity of all who are 



344 America and the Canal Title 

willing to recognize the doctrine of mutual rights and 
obligations. Such a society, of course, requires definite 
assent to a certain amount of restraint, which must take 
the form of "law." The man who refuses to live in ac- 
cordance with this, after it has been duly agreed upon, is 
an outlaw, and cannot be called ''civilized" in any right 
sense of that term. 

Civilization in the larger group, where the nation or 
State is the individual, is essentially the same. Human 
progress had not gone very far when it was clearly real- 
ized that continued progress was possible only as indi- 
vidual States would recognize a theory of mutual rights 
and obligations in their relations with each other. A 
"jus gentium" began to grow up in the Mediterranean 
basin, where civilization, achieved its earlier growth, and 
the best moral sentiment in all nations began to condemn 
as imperfectly civilized, even by the crude standards of 
that day, any individual nation which deliberately and 
knowingly violated this "jus gentium," or Law of Na- 
tions. And from the days of the Greeks and Romans 
until to-day, that feeling of condemnation has been 
strongest wherever and whenever the roots of a really 
sound moral and intelligent civilization have struck deep- 
est. 

President Wilson undoubtedly expressed the 
sentiment of the great majority of the American 
people when he said : 

We want no nation's property; we wish to question 
no nation's honor; we wish to stand selfishly in the way 
of the development of no nation; we want nothing that 
we cannot get by our own legitimate enterprise and by 
the inspiration of our own example; and standing for 
these things, it is not pretension on our part to say that 
we are privileged to stand for what every nation would 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 345 

wish to stand for, and speak for those things which all 
humanity must desire. 

It is entirely apropos from the lips of our uni- 
versally esteemed President. He secured the re- 
peal of the tolls-exemption provisions of the Pan- 
ama Canal Act and thus restored our plighted 
word embodied in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. 
He has negotiated a treaty with Colombia which 
makes reparation to that country for a wrong 
done by a former Administration. He is putting 
into practice what he, as the spokesman of the 
American people, preaches as their exalted aim. 

The United States took the Canal Zone by force 
and, in so doing, despoiled Colombia of her most 
valuable province. This done, she proceeded to 
despoil collective civilization of its inherent right 
to a non-discriminating and reasonable charge 
for the commercial use of the Panama Canal. 
In repeaHng the tolls-exemption provisions of the 
Panama Canal Act she abandoned the projected 
spoliation of collective civiHzation. If the Sen- 
ate ratifies the pending treaty negotiated with 
Colombia, our Government will have made some 
reparation to that Republic for the province our 
agent wrested from her. 

The voluntary repeal of the tolls-exemption 
provision of the Panama Canal Act was credit- 



346 America and the Canal Title 

able. But Great Britain was strong. Colombia 
is weak. Reparation to Colombia will be more 
creditable. It will restore our national honor and 
will vindicate our claim to be guided by exalted 
moral purpose. 

When Wilson became President, he found -our 
national honor in pawn — twice pawned. One 
ticket has been redeemed. The tolls-exemption 
provision of the Panama Canal Act has been re- 
pealed. Let us redeem the other ticket. It can 
be done by making substantial reparation to 
Colombia. This done, the United States will 
start the new era of world-history, which will 
follow the war, with a clean slate. President 
Wilson has done his part. He is a President 
whom all Americans of high character delight to 
honor, to whom the crowned heads of Europe 
doff their hat, and in whom Spanish- America has 
reposed confidence. Let us cooperate with him 
to secure some measure of justice to Colombia by 
inducing our Senate to ratify the treaty negoti- 
ated with Colombia, dated Bogota, April 6, 1914. 
If the American people can be sufficiently inter- 
ested to inform themselves concerning the manner 
in which we secured the Canal rights that we pos- 
sess, they will repudiate the duplicity, cunning and 
arrogance whereby they were secured and, being 



Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 347 

sound of heart and steadfast of soul, they will 
make adequate reparation to Colombia. That 
will be acting as the mandatory of civilization. 

Henry W. Hall, staff correspondent of the New 
York World, stated in his testimony before the 
House Committee on Foreign Relations : 

I have seen the whole face of the Isthmus changed by 
the labor of American Army engineers, who are building 
the Panama Canal. It is the greatest piece of engineer- 
ing work ever accomplished anywhere in the world, and 
it is being done in a manner which reflects the utmost 
credit upon Colonel Goethals and everybody who is con- 
nected with it. The Panama Canal, the great American 
highway through which ships of all nations will soon 
carry the commerce of the world, stands for all time as 
a monument to the constructive genius of the American 
people. It is a thing to be proud of; an achievement 
wherein the people of this country have succeeded after 
others have failed. It should be without stain. It 
should be born into its usefulness and given to the com- 
merce of the world without the bar sinister of rape and 
lawlessness. 

The writer is convinced that whenever the 
United States is ready to admit the truth, to pro- 
mulgate the truth, and to deal with Colombia on 
a basis of truth and law, the differences between 
the two countries will be satisfactorily composed. 
In the White House is a just man, an honest man, 
a truthful man, and a wise man. He has done his 
duty. The Colombian Government has negoti- 
ated with his Administration a treaty to compose 



348 America and the Canal Title 

their differences with us. The Colombian Con- 
gress has ratified it. It is now only necessary for 
our Senate to ratify this treaty to reestablish 
friendly relations with Colombia. Will our Sen- 
ate do its duty? 

Until it does Spanish-America inaudibly says 
to us : We will have faith in you only when you 
yourselves restore to us the lost grounds which 
made possible such faith. In order to do this you 
must repent as a nation, and bring forth fruits 
meet for repentance. 

Ungrudging disavowal of "I took the Canal 
Zone" is fruit meet for repentance if accompanied 
by unstinted compensation to Colombia for loss 
suffered. This done, Spanish-America will re- 
store to us the legacy of faith-keeping which is 
the ideal of all Americans of high character. 
Reparation to Colombia would be an act becoming 
a mandatory of civilization. 



APPENDICES 



I 

FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE 
TO CONGRESS — DECEMBER 7, 1903 

By the act of June 28, 1902, the Congress authorized 
the President to enter into treaty with Colombia for the 
building of the canal across the Isthmus of Panama; it 
being provided that in the event of failure to secure such 
treaty after the lapse of a reasonable time, recourse should 
be had to building a canal through Nicaragua. It has not 
been necessary to consider this alternative, as I am en- 
abled to lay before the Senate a treaty providing for the 
building of the canal across the Isthmus of Panama. 
This was the route which commended itself to the de- 
liberate judgment of the Congress, and we can now ac- 
quire by treaty the right to construct the canal over this 
route. The question now, therefore, is not by which 
route the Isthmian Canal shall be built, for that question 
has been definitely and irrevocably decided. The ques- 
tion is simply whether or not we shall have an Isthmian 
Canal. 

When the Congress directed that we should take the 
Panama route under treaty with Colombia, the essence 
of the condition, of course, referred not to the govern- 
ment which controlled that route, but to the route itself ; 
to the territory across which the route lay, not to the 

351 



352 Appendices 

name which for the moment the territory bore on the map. 
The purpose of the law was to authorize the President 
to make a treaty with the pov/er in actual control of the 
Isthmus of Panama. This purpose has been fulfilled. 

In the year 1846 this Government entered into a treaty 
with New Granada, the predecessor upon the Isthmus of 
the Republic of Colombia and of the present Republic 
of Panama, by which treaty it was provided that the Gov- 
ernment and citizens of the United States should always 
have free and open right of way or transit across the 
Isthmus of Panama by any modes of communication that 
might be constructed, while in return our Government 
guaranteed the perfect neutrality of the above-mentioned 
Isthmus with the view that the free transit from the one 
to the other sea might not be interrupted or embarrassed. 
The treaty vested in the United States a substantial prop- 
erty right carved out of the rights of sovereignty and 
property which New Granada then had and possessed 
over the said territory. The name of New Granada has 
passed away and its territory has been divided. Its suc- 
cessor, the Government of Colombia, has ceased to own 
any property in the Isthmus. A new republic, that of 
Panama, which was at one time a sovereign state, and at 
another time a mere department of the successive con- 
federations known as New Granada and Colombia, has 
now succeeded to the rights which first one and then the 
other formerly exercised over the Isthmus. But as long 
as the Isthmus endures, the mere geographical fact of 
its existence, and the peculiar interest therein which is 
required by our position, perpetuate the solemn contract 
which binds the holders of the territory to respect our 



Appendices 353 

right to freedom of transit across it, and binds us in re- 
turn to safeguard for the Isthmus and the world the ex- 
ercise of that inestimable privilege. The true interpreta- 
tion of the obligations upon which the United States 
entered in this Treaty of 1846 has been given repeatedly 
in the utterances of Presidents and Secretaries of State. 
Secretary Cass in 1858 officially stated the position of this 
Government as follows: 

The progress of events has rendered the inter-oceanic route 
across the narrow portion of Central America vastly important to 
the commercial world, and especially to the United States, whose 
possessions extend along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and de- 
mand the speediest and easiest modes of communication. While 
the rights of sovereignty of the states occupying this region should 
always be respected, we shall expect that these rights be exercised 
in a spirit befitting the occasion and the wants and circumstances 
that have arisen. Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, 
and none of these local governments, even if administered with 
more regard to the just demands of other nations than they have 
been, would be permitted, in a spirit of Eastern isolation, to close 
the gates of intercourse on the great highways of the world, and 
justify the act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and 
travel belong to them and that they choose to shut them, or, what 
is almost equivalent, to encumber them with such unjust relations 
as would prevent their general use. 

Seven years later, in 1865, Mr. Seward in different 
communications took the following position : 

The United States have taken and will take no interest in any 
question of internal revolution in the State of Panama, or any 
State of the United States of Colombia, but will maintain a per- 
fect neutrality in connection with such domestic altercations. The 
United States will, nevertheless, hold themselves ready to protect 
the transit trade across the Isthmus against invasion of either 
domestic or foreign disturbers of the peace of the State of Pan- 
ama. . . . Neither the text nor the spirit of the stipulation in that 
article by which the United States engages to preserve the neu- 



354 Appendices 

trality of the Isthmus of Panama imposes an obligation on this 
Government to comply with the requisition [of the President of 
the United States of Colombia for a force to protect the Isthmus 
of Panama from a body of insurgents of that country]. The pur- 
pose of the stipulation was to guarantee the Isthmus against 
seizure or invasion by a foreign power only. 

Attorney- General Speed, under date of November 7, 
1865, advised Secretary Seward as follows: 

From this .treaty it cannot be supposed that New Granada in- 
vited the United States to become a party to the intestine troubles 
of that government, nor did the United States become bound to 
take sides in the domestic broils of New Granada. The United 
States did guarantee New Granada in the sovereignty and prop- 
erty over the territory. This was as against other and foreign 
governments. 

For four hundred years, ever since shortly after the 
discovery of this hemisphere, the canal across the Isthmus 
has been planned. For two score years it has been worked 
at. When made it is to last for the ages. It is to alter 
the geography of a continent and the trade routes of the 
world. We have shown by every treaty we have nego- 
tiated or attempted to negotiate with the peoples in con- 
trol of the Isthmus and with foreign nations in reference 
thereto our consistent good faith in observing our ob- 
ligations ; on the one hand to the peoples of the Isthmus, 
and on the other hand to the civilized world whose com- 
mercial rights we are safeguarding and guaranteeing by 
our action. We have done our duty to others in letter 
and in spirit, and we have shown the utmost forbearance 
in exacting our own rights. 

Last spring, under the act above referred to, a treaty 
concluded between the representatives of the Republic 
of Colombia and of our Government was ratified by the 



Appendices 355 

Senate. This treaty was entered into at the urgent solici- 
tation of the people of Colombia and after a body of 
experts appointed by our Government especially to go into 
the matter of the routes across the Isthmus had pro- 
nounced unanimously in favor of the Panama route. In 
drawing up this treaty every concession was made to the 
people and to the Government of Colombia. We were 
more than just in dealing with them. Our generosity 
was such as to make it a serious question whether we had 
not gone too far in their interest at the expense of our 
own ; for in our scrupulous desire to pay all possible heed, 
not merely to the real but even to the fancied rights of 
our weaker neighbor, who already owed so much to our 
protection and forbearance, we yielded in all possible ways 
to her desires in drawing up the treaty. Nevertheless 
the Government of Colombia not merely repudiated the 
treaty, but repudiated it in such manner as to make it 
evident by the time the Colombian Congress adjourned 
that not the scantiest hope remained of ever getting a 
satisfactory treaty from them. The Government of Co- 
lombia made the treaty, and yet when the Colombian 
Congress was called to ratify it the vote against ratifica- 
tion was unanimous. It does not appear that the govern- 
ment made any real effort to secure ratification. 

Immediately after the adjournment of the Congress a 
revolution broke out in Panama. The people of Panama 
had long been discontented with the Republic of Colom- 
bia, and they had been kept quiet only by the prospect 
of the conclusion of the treaty, which was to them a 
matter of vital concern. When it became evident that 
the treaty was hopelessly lost, the people of Panama rose 



356 Appendices 

literally as one man. Not a shot was fired by a single 
man on the Isthmus in the interest of the Colombian 
Government. Not a life was lost in the accomplishment 
of the revolution. The Colombian troops stationed on 
the Isthmus, who had long been unpaid, made common 
cause with the people of Panama, and with astonishing 
unanimity the new republic was started. The duty of 
the United States in the premises was clear. In strict 
accordance with the principles laid down by Secretaries 
Cass and Seward in the official documents above quoted, 
the United States gave notice that it would permit the 
landing of no expeditionary force, the arrival of which 
would mean chaos and destruction along the line of the 
railroad and of the proposed canal, and an interruption 
of transit as an inevitable consequence. The de facto 
Government of Panama was recognized in the following 
telegram to Mr. Ehrman: 

The people of Panama have, by apparently unanimous move- 
ment, dissolved their political connection with the Republic of 
Colombia and resumed their independence. When you are satis- 
fied that a de facto government, republican in form and without 
substantial opposition from its own people, has been established in 
the State of Panama, you will enter into relations with it as the 
responsible government of the territory and look to it for all due 
action to protect the persons and property of citizens of the 
United States and to keep open the Isthmian transit, in accordance 
with the obligations of existing treaties governing the relations 
of the United States to that territory. 

The Government of Colombia was notified of our action 
by the following telegram to Mr. Beaupre: 

The people of Panama having, by an apparently unanimous 
movement, dissolved their political connection with the Republic 
of Colombia and resumed their independence, and having adopted 



Appendices 357 

a government of their own, republican in form, with which the 
Government of the United States of America has entered into re- 
lations, the President of the United States, in accordance with the 
ties of friendship which have so long and so happily existed be- 
tween the respective nations, most earnestly commends to the Gov- 
ernments of Colombia and of Panama the peaceful and equitable 
settlement of all questions at issue between them. He holds that 
he is bound not merely by treaty obligations, but by the interests 
of civilization, to see that the peaceful traffic of the world across 
the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be disturbed by a con- 
stant succession of unnecessary and wasteful wars. 

When these events happened, fifty-seven years had 
elapsed since the United States had entered into its treaty 
with New Granada. During that time the Governments 
of New Granada and of its successor, Colombia, have 
been in a constant state of flux. The following is a 
partial list of the disturbances on the Isthmus of Panama 
during the period in question, as reported to us by our 
consuls. It is not possible to give a complete list, and 
some of the reports that speak of ''revolutions" must 
mean unsuccessful revolutions. 

May 22, 1850. — Outbreak; two Americans killed. 
War vessel demanded to quell outbreak. 

October, 1850. — Revolutionary plot to bring about in- 
dependence of the Isthmus. 

July 22, 1 85 1. — Revolution in four Southern provinces. 

November 14, 185 1. — Outbreak at Chagres. Man-of- 
war requested for Chagres. 

June 2y, 1853. — Insurrection at Bogota, and consequent 
disturbance on Isthmus. War vessel demanded. 

May 23, 1854. — Political disturbances; war vessel re- 
quested. 

June 28, 1854. — Attempted revolution. 



358 Appendices 

October 24, 1854. — Independence of Isthmus demanded 
by provincial legislature. 

April, 1856. — Riot, and massacre of Americans. 

May 4, 1856.— Riot. 

May 18, 1856.— Riot. 

June 3, 1856. — Riot. 

October 2, 1856. — Conflict between two native parties. 
United States forces landed. 

December 18, 1858. — Attempted secession of Panama. 

April, 1859. — Riots. 

September, i860. — Outbreak. 

October 4, i860. — Landing of United States forces in 
consequence. 

May 2^, 1 86 1. — Intervention of the United States forces 
required, by intendente. 

October 2, 1861. — Insurrection and civil war. 

April 4, 1862. — Measures to prevent rebels crossing 
Isthmus. 

June 13, 1862. — Mosquera's troops refused admittance 
to Panama. 

March, 1865. — Revolution, and United States troops 
landed. 

August, 1865. — Riots; unsuccessful attempt to invade 
Panama. 

March, 1866. — Unsuccessful revolution. 

April, 1867. — Attempt to overthrow Government. 

August, 1867. — Attempt at revolution. 

July 5, 1868. — Revolution ; provisional government in- 
augurated. 

August 29, 1868. — -Revolution ; provisional government 
overthrown. 



Appendices 359 

April, 1871. — Revolution; followed apparently by 
counter revolution. 

April, 1873. — Revolution and civil war which lasted 
to October, 1875. 

August, 1876. — Civil war which lasted until April, 
1877. 

July, 1878.— Rebellion. 

December, 1878. — Revolt. 

April, 1879. — Revolution. 

June, 1879. — Revolution. 

March, 1883.— Riot. 

May, 1883.— Riot. 

June, 1884. — Revolutionary attempt. 

December, 1884. — Revolutionary attempt. 

January, 1885. — Revolutionary disturbances. 

March, 1885. — Revolution. 

April, 1887. — Disturbance on Panama Railroad. 

November, 1887. — Disturbance on line of canal. 

January, 1889. — Riot. 

January, 1895. — Revolution which lasted until April. 

March, 1895. — Incendiary attempt. 

October, 1899. — Revolution. 

February, 1900, to July, 1900. — Revolution. 

January, 1901. — Revolution. 

July, 1901. — Revolutionary disturbances. 

September, 1901. — City of Colon taken by rebels. 

March, 1902. — Revolutionary disturbances. 

July, 1902. — Revolution. 

The above is only a partial list of the revolutions, re- 
bellions, insurrections, riots, and other outbreaks that have 
occurred during the period in question ; yet they number 



360 Appendices 

53 for the 57 years. It will be noted that one of them 
lasted for nearly three years before it was quelled, another 
for nearly a year. In short, the experience of over half 
a century has shown Colombia to be utterly incapable of 
keeping order on the Isthmus. Only the active inter- 
ference of the United States has enabled her to preserve 
so much as a semblance of sovereignty. Had it not been 
for the exercise by the United States of the police power 
in her interest, her connection with the Isthmus would 
have been sundered long ago. In 1856, in i860, in 1873, 
in 1885, in 1901, and again in 1902, sailors and marines 
from United States warships were forced to land in order 
to patrol the Isthmus, to protect life and property, and 
to see that the transit across the Isthmus was kept open. 
In 1861, in 1862, in 1885, and in 1900, the Colombian 
Government asked that the United States Government 
land troops to protect its interests and maintain order on 
the Isthmus. Perhaps the most extraordinary request is 
that which has just been received and which runs as fol- 
lows : 

Knowing that revolution has already commenced in Panama [an 
eminent Colombian] says that if the Government of the United 
States will land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty, and 
the transit, if requested by Colombian charge d'affaires, this gov- 
ernment will declare martial law; and, by virtue of vested con- 
stitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, will approve 
by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed ; or, if the 
Government of the United States prefers, will call extra session 
of the Congress — with new and friendly members — next May to 
approve the treaty, [An eminent Colombian] has the perfect con- 
fidence of vice-president, he says, and if it became necessary will 
go to the Isthmus or send representative there to adjust matters 
along above lines to the satisfaction of the people there. 

This dispatch is noteworthy from two standpoints. 



Appendices 361 

Its offer of immediately guaranteeing the treaty to us 
is in sharp .contrast with the positive and contemptuous 
refusal of the Congress which has just closed its sessions 
to consider favorably such a treaty ; it shows that the gov- 
ernment which made the treaty really had absolute con- 
trol over the situation, but did not choose to exercise this 
control. The dispatch further calls on us to restore order 
and secure Colombian supremacy in the Isthmus from 
which the Colombian Government has just by its action 
decided to bar us by preventing the construction of the 
canal. 

The control, in the interest of the commerce and traffic 
of the whole civilized world, of the means of undisturbed 
transit across the Isthmus of Panama has become of 
transcendent importance to the United States. We have 
repeatedly exercised this control by intervening in the 
course of domestic dissension, and by protecting the ter- 
ritory from foreign invasion. In 1853 Mr. Everett as- 
sured the Peruvian minister that we should not hesitate 
to maintain the neutrality of the Isthmus in the case of 
war between Peru and Colombia. In 1864 Colombia, 
which has always been vigilant to avail itself of its 
privileges conferred by the treaty, expressed its expecta- 
tion that in the event of war between Peru and Spain the 
United States would carry into effect the guarantee of 
neutrality. There have been few administrations of the 
State Department in which this treaty has not, either by 
the one side or the other, been used as a basis of more 
or less important demands. It was said by Mr. Fish in 
1871 that the Department of State had reason to believe 
that an attack upon Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus 



362 Appendices 

had, on several occasions, been averted by warning from 
this Government. In 1886, when Colombia was under the 
menace of hostilities from Italy in the Cerruti case, Mr. 
Bayard expressed the serious concern that the United 
States could not but feel that a European power should 
resort to force against a sister republic of this hemi- 
sphere, as to the sovereign and uninterrupted use of a 
part of whose territory we are guarantors under the 
solemn faith of a treaty. 

The above recital of facts establishes beyond question : 
First, that the United States has for over half a century 
patiently and in good faith carried out its obligations 
under the Treaty of 1846; second, that when for the first 
time it became possible for Colombia to do anything in 
requital of the services thus repeatedly rendered to it 
for fifty-seven years by the United States, the Colombian 
Government peremptorily and offensively refused thus to 
do its part, even though to do so would have been to its 
advantage and immeasurably to the advantage of the 
State of Panama, at that time under its jurisdiction; 
third, that throughout this period revolutions, riots, and 
factional disturbances of every kind have occurred one 
after the other in almost uninterrupted succession, some 
of them lasting for months and even for years, while the 
central government was unable to put them down or to 
make peace with the rebels; fourth, that these disturb- 
ances instead of showing any sign of abating have tended 
to grow more numerous and more serious in the im- 
mediate past ; fifth, that the control of Colombia over the 
Isthmus of Panama could not be maintained without the 
armed intervention and assistance of the United States. 



Appendices 363 

In other words, the Government of Colombia, though 
wholly ung.ble to maintain order on the Isthmus, has 
nevertheless declined to ratify a treaty the conclusion of 
which opened the only chance to secure its own stability 
and to guarantee permanent peace on, and the construc- 
tion of a canal across, the Isthmus. 

Under such circumstances, the Government of the 
United States would have been guilty of folly and weak- 
ness, amounting in their sum to a crime against the Na- 
tion, had it acted otherwise than it did when the revolu- 
tion of November 3 last took place in Panama. This 
great enterprise of building the interoceanic canal can not 
be held up to gratify the whims, or out of respect to the 
governmental impotence, or to the even more sinister and 
evil political peculiarities, of people who, though they 
dwell afar off, yet, against the wish of the actual dwellers 
on the Isthmus, assert an unreal supremacy over the ter- 
ritory. The possession of a territory fraught with such 
peculiar capacities as the Isthmus in question carries with 
it obligations to mankind. The course of events has 
shown that this canal can not be built by private enter- 
prise, or by any other nation than our own; therefore it 
must be built by the United States. 

Every effort has been made by the Government of the 
United States to persuade Colombia to follow a course 
which was essential not only to our interests and to the 
interests of the world, but to the interests of Colombia 
itself. These efforts have failed; and Colombia, by her 
persistence in repulsing the advances that have been made, 
has forced us, for the sake of our own honor, and of the 
interest and well-being, not merely of our own people, 



364 Appendices 

but of the people of the Isthmus of Panama and the 
people of the civilized countries of the world, to take 
decisive steps to bring to an end a condition of affairs 
which had become intolerable. The new Republic of 
Panama immediately offered to negotiate a treaty with 
us. This treaty I herewith submit. By it our interests 
are better safeguarded than in the treaty with Colombia 
which was ratified by the Senate at its last session. It 
is better in its terms than the treaties offered to us by the 
Republics of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. At last the 
right to begin this great undertaking is made available. 
Panama has done her part. All that remains is for the 
American Congress to do its part and forthwith this Re- 
public will enter upon the execution of a project colossal 
in its size and of well-nigh incalculable possibilities for 
the good of this country and the nations of mankind. 

By the provisions of the treaty the United States 
guarantees and will maintain the independence of the 
Republic of Panama. There is granted to the United 
States in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of 
a strip ten miles wide and extending three nautical miles 
into the sea at either terminal, with all lands lying out- 
side of the zone necessary for the construction of the 
canal or for its auxiliary works, and with the islands in 
the Bay of Panama. The cities of Panama and Colon 
are not embraced in the canal zone, but the United States 
assumes their sanitation and, in case of need, the main- 
tenance of order therein ; the United States enjoys within 
the granted limits all the rights, power, and authority 
which it would possess were it the sovereign of the ter- 
ritory to the exclusion of the exercise of sovereign rights 



Appendices 365 

by the republic. All railway and canal property rights 
belonging to Panama and needed for the canal pass to 
the United States, including any property of the respec- 
tive companies in the cities of Panama and Colon; the 
works, property, and personnel of the canal and railways 
are exempted from taxation as well in the cities of 
Panama and Colon as in the canal zone and its depend- 
encies. Free immigration of the personnel and importa- 
tion of supplies for the construction and operation of the 
canal are granted. Provision is made for the use of mili- 
tary force and the building of fortifications by the United 
States for the protection of the transit. In other details, 
particularly as to the acquisition of the interests of the 
New Panama Canal Company and the Panama Railway 
by the United States and the condemnation of private 
property for the uses of the canal, the stipulations of the 
Hay-Herran treaty are closely followed, while the com- 
pensation to be given for these enlarged grants remains 
the same, being ten millions of dollars payable on ex- 
change of ratifications ; and, beginning nine years from 
that date, an annual payment of $250,000 during the life 
of the convention. 



II 

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE TO THE 
CONGRESS— JANUARY 4, 1904. 

I lay before the Congress for its information a state- 
ment of my action up to this time in executing the act 
entitled "An act to provide for the construction of a canal 
connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans," 
approved June 28, 1902. 

By the said act the President was authorized to secure 
for the United States the property of the Panama Canal 
Company and the perpetual control of a strip six miles 
wide across the Isthmus of Panama. It was further 
provided that "should the President be unable to obtain 
for the United States a satisfactory title to the property 
of the New Panama Canal Company and the control of 
the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia . . . 
within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then 
the President" should endeavor to provide for a canal by 
the Nicaragua route. The language quoted defines with 
exactness and precision what was to be done, and what as 
a matter of fact has been done. The President was 
authorized to go to the Nicaragua route only if within a 
reasonable time he could not obtain "control of the nec- 
essary territory of the Republic of Colombia." This con- 
trol has now been obtained ; the provision of the act has 

366 



Appendices 367 

been complied with ; it is no longer possible under exist- 
ing legislation to go to the Nicaragua route as an alterna- 
tive. 

This act marked the climax of the effort on the part 
of the United States to secure, so far as legislation was 
concerned, an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus. The 
effort to secure a treaty for this purpose with one of the 
Central American republics did not stand on the same 
footing with the effort to secure a treaty under any 
ordinary conditions. The proper position for the United 
States to assume in reference to this canal, and there- 
fore to the governments of the Isthmus, had been clearly 
set forth by Secretary Cass in 1858. In my Annual Mes- 
sage I have already quoted what Secretary Cass said ; but 
I repeat the quotation here, because the principle it states 
is fundamental: 

While the rights of sovereignty of the States occupying this re- 
gion (Central America) should always be respected, we shall ex- 
pect that these rights be exercised in a spirit befitting the oc- 
casion and the wants and circumstances that have arisen. 
Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, and none of these 
local governments, even if administered with more regard to 
the just demands of other nations than they have been, would be 
permitted, in a spirit of Eastern isolation, to close the gates of 
intercourse on the great highways of the world, and justify the 
act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and travel be- 
long to them and that they choose to shut them, or, what is al- 
most equivalent, to encumber them with such unjust relations 
as would prevent their general use. 

The principle thus enunciated by Secretary Cass was 
sound then and it is sound now. The United States has 
taken the position that no other government is to build 
the canal. In 1889, when France proposed to come to the 
aid of the French Panama Company by guaranteeing their 



368 Appendices 

bonds, the Senate of the United States in executive ses- 
sion, with only some three votes dissenting, passed a reso- 
lution as follows: 

That the Government of the United States will look with 
serious concern and disapproval upon any connection of any Euro- 
pean government with the construction or control of any ship 
canal across the Isthmus of Darien or across Central America, 
and must regard any such connection or control as injurious to 
the just rights and interests of the United States and as a menace 
to their welfare. 

Under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty it was explicitly 
provided that the United States should control, police, 
and protect the canal which was to be built, keeping it 
open for the vessels of all nations on equal terms. The 
United States thus assumed the position of guarantor 
of the canal and of its peaceful use by all the world. 
The guarantee included as a matter of course the build- 
ing of the canal. The enterprise was recognized as re- 
sponding to an international need; and it would be the 
veriest travesty on right and justice to treat the govern- 
ments in possession of the Isthmus as having the right, 
in the language of Mr. Cass, ''to close the gates of in- 
tercourse on the great highways of the world, and justify 
the act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and 
travel belong to them and that they choose to shut them." 

When this Government submitted to Colombia the Hay- 
Herran treaty three things were, therefore, already set- 
tled. 

One was that the canal should be built. The time for 
delay, the time for permitting the attempt to be made by 
private enterprise, the time for permitting any govern- 
ment of anti-social spirit and of imperfect development 



Appendices 369 

to bar the work, was past. The United States had as- 
sumed in connection with the canal certain responsibihties 
not only to its own people, but to the civilized world, 
which imperatively demanded that there should no longer 
be delay in beginning the work. 

Second. While it was settled that the canal should be 
built without unnecessary or improper delay, it was no 
less clearly shown to be our purpose to deal not merely 
in a spirit of justice but in a spirit of generosity with 
the people through whose land we might build it. The 
Hay-Herran treaty, if it erred at all, erred in the direc- 
tion of an overgenerosity toward the Colombian Govern- 
ment. In our anxiety to be fair we had gone to the very 
verge in yielding to a weak nation's demands what that 
nation was helplessly unable to enforce from us against 
our will. The only criticisms made upon the Administra- 
tion for the terms of the Hay-Herran treaty were for 
having granted too much to Colombia, not for failure to 
grant enough. Neither in the Congress nor in the public 
press, at the time that this treaty was formulated, was 
there complaint that it did not in the fullest and amplest 
manner guarantee to Colombia everything that she could 
by any color of title demand. 

Nor is the fact to be lost sight of that the rejected 
treaty, while generously responding to the pecuniary de- 
mands of Colombia, in other respects merely provided 
for the construction of the canal in conformity with the 
express requirements of the act of the Congress of June 
28, 1902. By that act, as heretofore quoted, the Presi- 
dent was authorized to acquire from Colombia, for the 
purposes of the canal, "perpetual control" of a certain 



370 Appendices 

strip of land; and it was expressly required that the 
"control" thus to be obtained should include ''jurisdic- 
tion" to make police and sanitary regulations and to es- 
tablish such judicial tribunals as might be agreed on for 
their enforcement. These were conditions precedent pre- 
scribed by the Congress ; and for their fulfillment suitable 
stipulations were embodied in the treaty. It has been 
stated in public prints that Colombia objected to these 
stipulations, on the ground that they involved a relinquish- 
ment of her ''sovereignty" ; but in the light of what has 
taken place, this alleged objection must be considered as 
an afterthought. In reality, the treaty, instead of re- 
quiring a cession of Colombia's sovereignty over the canal 
strip, expressly acknowledged, confirmed, and preserved 
her sovereignty over it. The treaty in this respect simply 
proceeded on the lines on which all the negotiations lead- 
ing up to the present situation have been conducted. In 
those negotiations the exercise by the United States, sub- 
ject to the paramount rights of the local sovereign, of a 
substantial control over the canal and the immediately 
adjacent territory, has been treated as a fundamental part 
of any arrangement that might be made. It has formed 
an essential feature of all our plans, and its necessity is 
fully recognized in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The 
Congress, in providing that such control should be secured, 
adopted no new principle, but only incorporated in its 
legislation a condition the importance and propriety of 
which were universally recognized. During all the years 
of negotiation and discussion that preceded the conclusion 
of the Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never intimated that 
the requirement by the United States of control over the 



Appendices 371 

canal strip would render unattainable the construction of 
a canal by way of the Isthmus of Panama ; nor were we 
advised, during the months when legislation of 1902 was 
pending before the Congress, that the terms which it 
embodied would render negotiations with Colombia im- 
practicable. It is plain that no nation could construct 
and guarantee the neutrality of the canal with a less 
degree of control than was stipulated for in the Hay- 
Herran treaty. A refusal to grant such degree of con- 
trol was necessarily a refusal to make any practicable 
treaty at all. Such refusal therefore squarely raised the 
question whether Colombia was entitled to bar the transit 
of the world's traffic across the Isthmus. 

That the canal itself was eagerly demanded by the 
people of the locality through which it was to pass, and 
that the people of this locality no less eagerly longed for 
its construction under American control, are shown by 
the unanimity of action in the new Panama Republic. 
Furthermore, Colombia, after having rejected the treaty 
in spite of our protests and warnings when it was in her 
power to accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness 
to accept the same treaty if only the status quo could be 
restored. One of the men standing highest in the official 
circles of Colombia, on November 6, addressed the Ameri- 
can minister at Bogota, saying that if the Government of 
the United States would land troops to preserve Colom- 
bian sovereignty and the transit, the Colombian Govern- 
ment would "declare martial law ; and, by virtue of vested 
constitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, 
[would] approve by decree the ratification of the canal 
treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United 



'^^'j2 Appendices 

States prefers, [would] call extra session of the Congress 
— with new and friendly members — next May to approve 
the treaty." Having these facts in view, there is no 
shadow of question that the Government of the United 
States proposed a treaty which was not merely just, but 
generous to Colombia, which our people regarded as 
erring, if at all, on the side of overgenerosity ; which was 
hailed with delight by the people of the immediate locality 
through which the canal was to pass, who were most con- 
cerned as to the new order of things, and which the 
Colombian authorities now recognize as being so good 
that they are willing to promise its unconditional ratifica- 
tion if only we will desert those who have shown them- 
selves our friends and restore to those who have shown 
themselves unfriendly the power to undo what they did. 
I pass by the question as to what assurance we have that 
they would now keep their pledge and not again refuse 
to ratify the treaty if they had the power ; for, of course, 
I will not for one moment discuss the possibility of the 
United States committing an act of such baseness as to 
abandon the new Republic of Panama. 

Third. Finally the Congress definitely settled where 
the canal was to be built. It was provided that a treaty 
should be made for building the canal across the Isthmus 
of Panama; and if, after reasonable time, it proved im- 
possible to secure such treaty, that then we should go to 
Nicaragua. The treaty has been made; for it needs no 
argument to show that the intent of the Congress was to 
ensure a canal across Panama, and that whether the re- 
public granting the title was called New Granada, Colom- 
bia, or Panama mattered not one whit. As events turned 



Appendices 373 

out, the question of "reasonable time" did not enter into 
the matter at all. Although, as the months went by, it 
became increasingly improbable that the Colombian Con- 
gress would ratify the treaty or take steps which would 
be equivalent thereto, yet all chance for such action on 
their part did not vanish until the Congress closed at the 
end of October ; and within three days thereafter the rev- 
olution in Panama had broken out. Panama became an 
independent state, and the control of the territory neces- 
sary for building the canal then became obtainable. The 
condition under which alone we could have gone to Nica- 
ragua thereby became impossible of fulfillment. If the 
pending treaty with Panama should not be ratified by the 
Senate this would not alter the fact that we could not go 
to Nicaragua. The Congress has decided the route, and 
there is no alternative under existing legislation. 

When in August it began to appear probable that the 
Colombian Legislature would not ratify the treaty, it be- 
came incumbent upon me to consider well what the situa- 
tion was and to be ready to advise the Congress as to what 
were the various alternatives of action open to us. There 
were several possibilities. One was that Colombia would 
at the last moment see the unwisdom of her position. 
That there might be nothing omitted, Secretary Hay, 
through the minister at Bogota, repeatedly warned Colom- 
bia that grave consequences might follow from her rejec- 
tion of the treaty. Although it was a constantly diminish- 
ing chance, yet the possibility of ratification did not wholly 
pass away until the close of the session of the Colombian 
Congress. 

A second alternative was that by the close of the session 



374 Appendices 

on the last day of October, without the ratification of the 
treaty by Colombia and without any steps taken by 
Panama, the American Congress on assembling early in 
December would be confronted with a situation in which 
there had been a failure to come to terms as to building 
the canal along the Panama route, and yet there had not 
been a lapse of reasonable time — using the word reason- 
able in any proper sense — such as would justify the Ad- 
ministration going to the Nicaragua route. This situa- 
tion seemed on the whole the most likely, and as a matter 
of fact I had made the original draft of my Message to 
the Congress with a view to its existence. 

It was the opinion of eminent international jurists that 
in view of the fact that the great design of our guarantee 
under the treaty of 1846 was to dedicate the Isthmus to 
the purposes of interoceanic transit, and above all to 
secure the construction of an interoceanic canal, Colom- 
bia could not under existing conditions refuse to enter 
into a proper arrangement with the United States to that 
end, without violating the spirit and substantially repudiat- 
ing the obligations of a treaty the full benefits of which 
she had enjoyed for over fifty years. My intention was 
to consult the Congress as to whether under such cir- 
cumstances it would not be proper to announce that the 
canal was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the 
terms that we had offered and no others ; and that if such 
terms were not agreed to we would enter into an arrange- 
ment with Panama direct, or take what other steps were 
needful in order to begin the enterprise. 

A third possibility was that the people of the Isthmus, 
who had formerly constituted an independent state, and 



Appendices 375 

who until recently were united to Colombia only by a 
loose tie of federal relationship, might take the protec- 
tion of their own vital interests into their own hands, 
reassert their former rights, declare their independence 
upon just grounds, and establish a government competent 
and willing to do its share in this great work for civiliza- 
tion. This third possibility is what actually occurred. 
Every one knew that it was a possibility, but it was not 
until toward the end of October that it appeared to be 
an imminent probability. Although the Administration, 
of course, had special means of knowledge, no such means 
were necessary in order to appreciate the possibility, and 
toward the end the likelihood, of such a revolutionary 
outbreak and of its success. It was a matter of common 
notoriety. Quotations from the daily papers could be 
indefinitely multiplied to show this state of affairs ; a very- 
few will suffice. From Costa Rica on August 31a special 
was sent to the Washington Post, running as follows : 

San Jose, Costa Rica, 
August 31 

Travelers from Panama report the Isthmus alive with fires 
of a new revolution. It is inspired, it is believed, by men who, 
in Panama and Colon, have systematically engendered the pro- 
American feeling to secure the building of the Isthmian Canal 
by the United States. 

The Indians have risen, and the late followers of Gen. Ben- 
jamin Herrera are mustering in the mountain villages, prepara- 
tory to joining in an organized revolt, caused by the rejection 
of the canal treaty. 

Hundreds of stacks of arms, confiscated by the Colombian Gov- 
ernment at the close of the late revolution, have reappeared 
from some mysterious source, and thousands of rifles that look 
suspiciously like the Mausers the United States captured in Cuba 
are issuing to the gathering forces from central points of dis- 
tribution. With the arms goes ammunition, fresh from fac- 



37^ Appendices 

torles, showing the movement is not spasmodic, but is carefully 
planned. 

The government forces in Panama and Colon, numbering less 
than 1,500 men, are reported to be a little more than friendly 
to the revolutionary spirit. They have been ill paid since the 
revolution closed, and their only hope of prompt payment is 
another war. 

General Huertes, commander of the forces, who is ostensibly 
loyal to the Bogota Government, is said to be secretly friendly 
to the proposed revolution. At least, all his personal friends are 
open in denunciation of the Bogota Government and the failure 
of the Colombian Congress to ratify the canal treaty. 

The consensus of opinion gathered from late arrivals from 
the Isthmus is that the revolution is coming, and that it will suc- 
ceed. 

A special dispatch to the Washington Post, under date 
of New York, September i, runs as follows : 

B. G. Duque, editor and proprietor of the Panama Star and 
Herald, a resident of the Isthmus during the past twenty-seven 
years, who arrived to-day in New York, declared that if the canal 
treaty fell through a revolution would be likely to follow. 

"There is a very strong feeling in Panama," said Mr, Duque, 
"that Colombia, in negotiating the sale of a canal concession in 
Panama, is looking for profits that might just as well go to 
Panama herself. 

"The Colombian Government, only the other day, suppressed a 
newspaper that dared to speak of independence for Panama. A 
while ago there was a secret plan afoot to cut loose from Co- 
lombia and seek the protection of the United States." 

In the New York Herald of September 10 the follow- 
ing statement appeared : 

Representatives of strong interests on the Isthmus of Panama, 
who make their headquarters in this city, are considering a plan 
of action to be undertaken in cooperation with men of similar 
views in Panama and Colon to bring about a revolution and 
form an independent government in Panama opposed to that in 
Bogota. 



Appendices 2>77 

There is much indignation on the Isthmus on account of the 
failure of the canal treaty, which is ascribed to the authorities at 
Bogota. This opinion is believed to be shared by a majority 
of the Isthmians of all shades of political belief, and they think 
it is to their best interest for a new republic to be formed on the 
Isthmus, which may negotiate directly with the United States a 
new treaty which will permit the digging of the Panama Canal 
under favorable conditions. 

In the New York Times, under date of September 13, 
there appeared from Bogota the following statement : 

A proposal made by Sefior Perez y Sotos to ask the Executive 
to appoint an anti-secessionist governor in Panama has been ap- 
proved by the Senate. Speakers in the Senate said that Sehor 
Obaldia, who was recently appointed Governor of Panama, and 
who is favorable to a canal treaty, was a menace to the national 
integrity. Senator Marroquin protested against the action of the 
Senate. 

President Marroquin succeeded later in calming the Congress- 
men. It appears that he was able to give them satisfactory rea- 
sons for Governor Obaldia's appointment. He appears to realize 
the imminent peril of the Isthmus of Panama declaring its in- 
dependence. 

Senor Deroux, representative for a Panama constituency, re- 
cently delivered a sensational speech in the House. Among other 
things he said : 

"In Panama the bishops, governors, magistrates, military chiefs, 
and their subordinates have been and are foreign to the depart- 
ment. It seems that the government, with surprising tenacity, 
wishes to exclude the Isthmus from all participation in public af- 
fairs. As regards international dangers in the Isthmus, all I can 
say is that if these dangers exist they are due to the conduct of 
the national government, which is in the direction of reaction. 

"If the Colombian Government will not take action with a view 
to preventing disaster, the responsibility will rest with it alone." 

In the New York Herald of October 26 it was reported 
that a revolutionary expedition of about 70 men had 
actually landed on the Isthmus. In the Washington 
Post of October 29 it was reported from Panama that in 



3/8 Appendices 

view of the impending trouble on the Isthmus the Bogota 
Government had gathered troops in sufficient numbers to 
at once put down an attempt at secession. In the New 
York Herald of October 30 it was announced from 
Panama that Bogota was hurrying troops to the Isthmus 
to put down the projected revolt. In the New York 
Herald of November 2 it was announced that in Bogota 
the Congress had indorsed the energetic measures taken 
to meet the situation on the Isthmus and that 6,000 men 
were about to be sent thither. 

Quotations like the above could be multiplied indefi- 
nitely. Suffice it to say that it was notorious that revolu- 
tionary trouble of a serious nature was impending upon 
the Isthmus. But it was not necessary to rely exclusively 
upon such general means of information. On October 
15 Commander Hubbard, of the navy, notified the Navy 
Department that, though things were quiet on the Isthmus, 
a revolution had broken out in the State of Cauca. On 
October 16, at the request of Lieutenant-General Young, 
I saw Capt. C. B. Humphrey and Lieut. Grayson Mallet- 
Prevost Murphy, who had just returned from a four 
months' tour through the northern portions of Venezuela 
and Colombia. They stopped in Panama on their return 
in the latter part of September. At the time they were 
sent down there had been no thought of their going to 
Panama, and their visit to the Isthmus was but an un- 
premeditated incident of their return journey; nor had 
they been spoken to by any one at Washington regarding 
the possibility of a revolt. Until they landed at Colon 
they had no knowledge that a revolution was impending, 
save what they had gained from the newspapers. What 



Appendices 379 

they saw in Panama so impressed them that they reported 
thereon . to Lieutenant-General Young, according to his 
memorandum — • 

that while on the Isthmus they became satisfied beyond question 
that, owing largely to the dissatisfaction because of the failure 
of Colombia to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty, a revolutionary 
party was in course of organization having for its object the 
separation of the State of Panama from Colombia, the leader 
being Dr. Richard Arango, a former governor of Panama; that 
when they were on the Isthmus arms and ammunition were being 
smuggled into the city of Colon in piano boxes, merchandise 
crates, etc., the small arms received being principally the Gras 
French rifle, the Remington, and the Mauser; that nearly every 
citizen in Panama had some sort of rifle or gun in his possession, 
with ammunition therefor; that in the city of Panama there had 
been organized a fire brigade which was really intended for a 
revolutionary military organization; that there were representa- 
tives of the revolutionary organization at all important points on 
the Isthmus ; that in Panama, Colon, and the other principal 
places of the Isthmus police forces had been organized which 
were in reality revolutionary forces ; that the people on the 
Isthmus seemed to be unanimous in their sentiment against the 
Bogota Government, and their disgust over the failure of that 
government to ratify the treaty providing for the construction of 
the canal, and that a revolution might be expected immediately 
upon the adjournment of the Colombian Congress without rati- 
fication of the treaty. 

Lieutenant-General Young regarded their report as of 
such importance as to make it advisable that I should 
personally see these officers. They told me what they 
had already reported to the Lieutenant-General, adding 
that on the Isthmus the excitement was seething, and that 
the Colombian troops were reported to be disaffected. 
In response to a question of mine they informed me that 
it was the general belief that the revolution might break 
out at any moment, and if it did not happen before, would 



380 Appendices 

doubtless take place immediately after the closing of the 
Colombian Congress (at the end of October) if the canal 
treaty were not ratified. They were certain that the revo- 
lution would occur, and before leaving the Isthmus had 
made their own reckoning as to the time, which they had 
set down as being probably from three, to four weeks 
after their leaving. The reason they set this as the prob- 
able inside limit of time was that they reckoned that it 
would be at least three or four weeks — say not until 
October 20 — before a sufficient quantity of arms and 
munitions would have been landed. 

In view of all these facts I directed the Navy Depart- 
ment to issue instructions such as would ensure our hav- 
ing ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event 
of need arising. Orders were given on October 19 to 
the Boston to proceed to San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua; 
to the Dixie to prepare to sail from League Island ; and 
to the Atlanta to proceed to Guantanamo. On October 
30 the Nashville was ordered to proceed to Colon. On 
November 2, when, the Colombian Congress having ad- 
journed, it was evident that the outbreak was imminent, 
and when it was announced that both sides were making 
ready forces whose meeting would mean bloodshed and 
disorder, the Colombian troops having been embarked on 
vessels, the following instructions were sent to the com- 
manders of the Boston^ Nashville, and Dixie: 

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is 
threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent 
landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government 
or insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama. Govern- 
ment force reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Pre- 
vent their landing if, in your judgment, the landing would pre- 
cipitate a conflict. 



Appendices 381 

These orders were delivered in pursuance of the policy 
on whiph our Government had repeatedly acted. This 
policy was exhibited in the following orders, given under 
somewhat similar circumstances last year, and the year 
before, and the year before that. The first two tele- 
grams are from the Department of State to the consul at 
Panama : 

July 25, 1900 
You are directed to protest against any act of hostility which 
may involve or imperil the safe and peaceful transit of persons 
or property across the Isthmus of Panama. The bombardment 
of Panama would have this effect, and the United States must 
insist upon the neutrality of the Isthmus as guaranteed by the 
treaty. 

November 20, 1901 
Notify all parties molesting or interfering with free transit 
across the Isthmus that such interference must cease and that the 
United States will prevent the interruption of traffic upon the rail- 
road. Consult with captain of the Iowa, who will be instructed 
to land marines, if necessary, for the protection of the railroad, 
in accordance with the treaty rights and obligations of the United 
States. Desirable to avoid bloodshed, if possible. 

The next three telegrams are from and to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy: 

September 12, 1902. 
Ranger, Panama: 

United States guarantees perfect neutrality of Isthmus and that 
a free transit from sea to sea be not interrupted or embar- 
rassed. . . . Any transportation of troops which might contravene 
these provisions of treaty should not be sanctioned by you nor 
should use of road be permitted which might convert the line of 
transit into theater of hostility. Moody. 

Colon, September 20, 1902. 

Secretary Navy, Washington: 

Everything is conceded. The United States guards and guar- 
antees traffic and the line of transit. To-day I permitted the ex- 



382 Appendices 

change of Colombian troops from Panama to Colon, about 1,000 
men each way, the troops without arms in train guarded by Amer- 
ican naval force in the same manner as other passengers; arms 
and ammunition in separate train, guarded also by naval force in 
the same manner as other freight. 

McLean. 

Panama, October 3, 1902. 
Secretary Navy, Washington, D. C. : 

Have sent this communication to the American consul at Pan- 
ama: 

Inform Governor while trains running under United States pro- 
tection I must decline transportation any combatants, ammunition, 
arms, which might cause interruption traffic or convert line of 
transit into theater hostilities. 

Casey. 

On November 3 Commander Hubbard responded to 
the above-quoted telegram of November 2, 1903, saying 
that before the telegram had been received 400 Colom- 
bian troops from Cartagena had landed at Colon; that 
there had been no revolution on the Isthmus, but that the 
situation was most critical if the revolutionary leaders 
should act. On this same date the Associated Press in 
Washington received a bulletin stating that a revolu- 
tionary outbreak had occurred. When this was brought 
to the attention of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. 
Loomis, he prepared the following cablegram to the con- 
sul-general at Panama and the consul at Colon: 

Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly 
and fully informed. 

Before this telegram was sent, however, one was re- 
ceived from Consul Malmros at Colon, running as fol- 
lows : 

Revolution imminent. Government force on the Isthmus about 
500 men. Their official promised support revolution. Fire de- 



Appendices 383 

partment, Panama, 441, are well organized and favor revolution. 
Government vessel, Cartagena, with about 400 men, arrived early 
to-day with new commander-in-chief, Tobar. Was not expected 
until November 10. Tobar's arrival is not probable to stop revolu- 
tion. 

This cablegram was received at 2.35 p. m._, and at 3.40 
p. M. Mr. Loomis sent the telegram which he had already 
prepared to both Panama and Colon. Apparently, how- 
ever, the consul-general at Panama had not received the 
information embodied in the Associated Press bulletin, 
upon which the Assistant Secretary of State based his 
dispatch ; for his answer was that there was no uprising, 
although the situation was critical, this answer being re- 
ceived at 8.15 p. M. Immediately afterward he sent an- 
other dispatch, which was received at 9.50 p. m., saying 
that the uprising had occurred, and had been successful, 
with no bloodshed. The Colombian gunboat Bogota next 
day began to shell the city of Panama, with the result of 
killing one Chinaman. The consul-general was directed 
to notify her to stop firing. Meanwhile, on November 
4, Commander Hubbard notified the Department that he 
had landed a force to protect the lives and property of 
American citizens against the threats of the Colombian 
soldiery. 

Before any step whatever had been taken by the United 
States troops to restore order, the commander of the 
newly landed Colombian troops had indulged in wanton 
and violent threats against American citizens, which cre- 
ated serious apprehension. As Commander Hubbard re- 
ported in his letter of November 5, this officer and his 
troops practically began war against the United States, 
and only the forbearance and coolness of our officers and 



384 Appendices 

men prevented bloodshed. The letter of Commander 
Hubbard is of such interest that it deserves quotation in 
full, and runs as follows: 

U. S. S. Nashville, Third Rate, 
Colon, U. S. Colombia, November 5, 1903 
Sir: Pending a complete report of the occurrences of the last 
three days in Colon, Colombia, I most respectfully invite the De- 
partment's attention to those of the date of Wednesday, Novem- 
ber 4, which amounted to practically the making of war against 
the United States by the officer in command of the Colombian 
troops in Colon. At i o'clock p. m. on that date I was summoned 
on shore by a preconcerted signal, and on landing met the United 
States consul, vice-consul, and Colonel Shaler, the general super- 
intendent of the Panama Railroad. The consul informed me that 
he had received notice from the officer commanding the Colombian 
troops, Colonel Torres, through the prefect of Colon, to the effect 
that if the Colombian officers, Generals Tobal and Amaya, who 
had been seized in Panama on the evening of the 3d of November 
by the Independents and held as prisoners, were not released by 
2 o'clock p. M., he, Torres, would open fire on the town of Colon 
and kill every United States citizen in the place, and my advice 
and action were requested. I advised that all the United States 
citizens should take refuge in the shed of the Panama Railroad 
Company, a stone building susceptible of being put into good state 
for defense, and that I would immediately land such body of men 
with extra arms for arming the citizens, as the complement of the 
ship would permit. This was agreed to, and I immediately re- 
turned on board, arriving at 1.15 p. m. The order for landing 
was immediately given, and at 1.30 p. m. the boats left the ship 
with a party of 42 men under the command of Lieut.-Commander 
H. M. Witzel, with Midshipman J. P. Jackson as second in com- 
mand. Time being pressing I gave verbal orders to Mr. Witzel to 
take the building above referred to, to put it into the best state 
of defense possible, and protect the lives of the citizens assembled 
there — not firing unless fired upon. The women and children took 
refuge on the German steamer Marcomania and Panama Railroad 
steamer City of Washington, both ready to haul out from dock 
if necessary. The Nashville I got under way and patrolled with 
her along the water front close in and ready to use either small- 
arm or shrapnel fire. The Colombians surrounded the building 



Appendices 385 

of the railroad company almost immediately after we had taken 
possession, and for about one and a half hours their attitude was 
most threatening, it being seemingly their purpose to provoke an 
attack. Happily our men were cool and steady, and, while the 
tension was very great, no shot was fired. At about 3.15 p. m. 
Colonel Torres came into the building for an interview and ex- 
pressed himself as most friendly to Americans, claiming that the 
whole affair was a misapprehension and that he would like to send 
the alcalde of Colon to Panama to see General Tobal and have 
him direct the discontinuance of the show of force. A special 
train was furnished and safe conduct guaranteed. At about 5.30 
p. M. Colonel Torres made the proposition of withdrawing his 
troops to Monkey Hill, if I would withdraw the Nashville's force 
and leave the town in possession of the police until the return of 
the alcalde on the morning of the 5th. After an interview with 
the United States consul and Colonel Shaler as to the probability 
of good faith in the matter, I decided to accept the proposition 
and brought my men on board, the disparity in numbers between 
my force and that of the Colombians, nearly ten to one, making 
me desirous of avoiding a conflict so long as the object in view, 
the protection of American citizens, was not imperiled. 

I am positive that the determined attitude of our men, their 
coolness and evident intention of standing their ground, had a 
most salutary and decisive effect on the immediate situation, and 
was the initial step in the ultimate abandoning of Colon by these 
troops and their return to Cartagena the following day, Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Witzel is entitled to much praise for his ad- 
mirable work in command on the spot. 

I feel that I can not sufficiently strongly represent to the De- 
partment the grossness of this outrage and the insult to our dig- 
nity, even apart from the savagery of the threat. 
Very respectfully, 

John Hubbard, 
Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

In his letter of November 8 Commander Hubbard sets 
forth the facts more in detail : 



386 Appendices 

U. S. S. Nashville, Third Rate, 
Porto Bello, U. S. Colombia, November 8, 1903 

Sir: I. I have the honor to make the following report of the 
occurrences which took place at Colon and Panama in the interval 
between the arrival of the Nashville at Colon on the evening of 
November 2, 1903, and the evening of November 5, 1903, when by 
the arrival of the U. S. S. Dixie at Colon I was relieved as senior 
officer by Commander F. H. Delano, U. S, Navy. 

2. At the time of the arrival of the Nashville at Colon at 5.30 
p. M. on November 2, everything on the Isthmus was quiet. There 
was talk of proclaiming the independence of Panama, but no 
definite action had been taken and there had been no disturbance 
of peace and order. At daylight on the morning of November 3, 
it was found that a vessel which had come in during the night 
was the Colombian gunboat Cartagena carrying between 400 and 
500 troops. I had her boarded and learned that these troops were 
for the garrison at Panama. Inasmuch as the Independent party 
had not acted and the Government of Colombia was at the time 
in undisputed control of the Province of Panama, I did not feel, 
in the absence of any instructions, that I was justified in pre- 
venting the landing of these troops, and at 8.30 o'clock they were 
disembarked. The commanding officers, Generals Amaya and 
Tobal, with four others, immediately went over to Panama to 
make arrangements for receiving and quartering their troops, 
leaving the command in charge of an officer whom I later learned 
to be Colonel Torres. The Department's message addressed to 
the care of the United States consul I received at 10.30 a. m. ; it 
was delivered to one of the ship's boats while I was at the con- 
sul's and not to the consul as addressed. The message was said 
to have been received at the cable office at 9.30 a. m. Immediately 
on deciphering the message I went on shore to see what arrange- 
ments the railroad company had made for the transportation of 
these troops to Panama, and learned that the company would not 
transport them except on request of the Governor of Panama, 
and that the prefect at Colon and the officer left in command of 
the troops had been so notified by the general superintendent of 
the Panama Railroad Company. I remained at the company's 
office until it was sure that no action on my part would be needed 
to prevent the transportation of the troops that afternoon, when 
I returned on board and cabled the Department the situation of 
affairs. At about 5.30 p. m. I again went on shore, and received 
notice from the general superintendent of the railroad that he 



Appendices 387 

had received the request for the transportation of the troops and 
that they would leave on the 8 a. m. train on the following day. I 
immediate;ly went to see the general superintendent, and learned 
that it had just been announced that a provisional government 
had been established at Panama — that Generals Amaya and Tobal, 
the Governor of Panama, and four officers, who had gone to 
Panama in the morning, had been seized and were held as prison- 
ers ; that they had an organized force of 1,500 troops and wished 
the government troops in Colon to be sent over. This I declined 
to permit, and verbally prohibited the general superintendent from 
giving transportation to the troops of either party. 

It being then late in the evening, I sent early in the morning 
of November 4 written notification to the general superintendent 
of the Panama Railroad, to the prefect of Colon, and to the officer 
left in command of the Colombian troops, later ascertained to be 
Colonel Torres, that I had prohibited the transportation of troops 
in either direction, in order to preserve the free and uninterrupted 
transit of the Isthmus. Copies of these letters are hereto ap- 
pended ; also copy of my notification to the consul. Except to a 
few people, nothing was known in Colon of the proceedings in 
Panama until the arrival of the train at 10.45 on the morning of 
the 4th, Some propositions were, I was later told, made to Col- 
onel Torres by the representatives of the new Government at 
Colon, with a view to inducing him to reembark in the Cartagena 
and return to the port of Cartagena, and it was in answer to this 
proposition that Colonel Torres made the threat and took the ac- 
tion reported in my letter No. 96, of November 5, 1903. The 
Cartagena left the port just after the threat was made, and I did 
not deem it expedient to attempt to detain her, as such action 
would certainly, in the then state of affairs, have precipitated a 
conflict on shore which I was not prepared to meet. It is my un- 
derstanding that she returned to Cartagena. After the with- 
drawal of the Colombian troops on the evening of November 4, 
and the return of the Nashville's force on board, as reported in 
my letter No. 96, there was no disturbance on shore, and the night 
passed quietly. On the morning of the 5th I discovered that the 
commander of the Colombian troops had not withdrawn so far 
from the town as he had agreed, but was occupying buildings near 
the outskirts of the town. I immediately inquired into the matter 
and learned that he had some trivial excuse for not carrying out 
his agreement, and also that it was his intention to occupy Colon 
again on the arrival of the alcalde due at 10.45 ^' ^i-> unless Gen- 



388 Appendices 

eral Tobal sent word by the alcalde that he, Colonel Torres, should 
withdraw. That General Tobal had declined to give any in- 
structions I was cognizant of, and the situation at once became 
quite as serious as on the day previous. I immediately landed an 
armed force, reoccupied the same building; also landed two i- 
pounders and mounted them on platform cars behind protection of 
cotton bales, and then in company with the United States consul 
had an interview with Colonel Torres, in the course of which I 
informed him that I had relanded my men because he had not 
kept his agreement ; that I had no interest in the affairs of either 
party; that my attitude was strictly neutral; that the troops of 
neither side should be transported ; that my sole purpose in land- 
ing was to protect the lives and property of American citizens if 
threatened, as they had been threatened, and to maintain the free 
and uninterrupted transit of the Isthmus, and that purpose I 
should maintain by force if necessary. I also strongly advised 
that in the interests of peace, and to prevent the possibility of a 
conflict that could not but be regrettable, he should carry out his 
agreement of the previous evening and withdraw to Monkey Hill- 

Colonel Torres's only reply was that it was unhealthy at Monkey 
Hill, a reiteration of his love of Americans, and persistence in 
his intention to occupy Colon, should General Tobal not give him 
directions to the contrary. 

On the return of the alcalde at about 11 a.m. the Colombian 
troops marched into Colon, but did not assume the threatening de- 
meanor of the previous day. The American women and children 
again went on board the Marcomania and City of Washington, 
and through the British vice-consul I offered protection to British 
subjects as directed in the Department's cablegram. A copy of 
the British vice-consul's acknowledgment is hereto appended. The 
Nashville I got under way as on the previous day and moved close 
in to protect the water front. During the afternoon several 
propositions were made to Colonel Torres by the representatives 
of the new government, and he was finally persuaded by them to 
embark on the Royal Mail steamer Orinoco with all his troops and 
return to Cartagena. The Orinoco left her dock with the troops 
— 474 all told — at 7.35 p. M. The Dixie arrived and anchored at 
7.05 p. M., when I went on board and acquainted the commanding 
officer with the situation. A portion of the marine battalion was 
landed and the Nashville's force withdrawn. 

3. On the evening of November 4 Major William M. Black 
and Lieut. Mark Brooke, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, came 



Appendices 389 

to Colon from Culebra and volunteered their services, which were 
accepted, and they rendered very efficient help on the following 
day. 

4. I beg to assure the Department that I had no part whatever 
in the negotiations that were carried on between Colonel Torres 
and the representatives of the provisional government; that I 
landed an armed force only when the lives of American citizens 
were threatened, and withdrew this force as soon as there seemed 
to be no grounds for further apprehension of injury to American 
lives or property; that I relanded an armed force because of the 
failure of Colonel Torres to carry out his agreement to withdraw 
and announced intention of returning, and that my attitude 
throughout- was strictly neutral as between the two parties, my 
only purpose being to protect the lives and property of American 
citizens and to preserve the free and uninterrupted transit of the 
Isthmus. 

Very respectfully, 

(Signed) John HubbasD;, 

Commander^ U. S. Navy, Commanding. 
The Secretary of the Navy^ 

Bureau of Navigation, 'Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C. 

This plain official account of the occurrences of No- 
vember 4 shows that, instead of there having been too 
much prevision by the American Government for the 
maintenance of order and the protection of life and prop- 
erty on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of the 
American warships had been too long delayed; so long, 
in fact, that there were but forty-two marines and sailors 
available to land and protect the lives of American men 
and women. It was only the coolness and gallantry with 
which this little band of men wearing the American uni- 
form faced ten times their number of armed foes, bent 
on carrying out the atrocious threat of the Colombian 
commander, that prevented a murderous catastrophe. At 
Panama, when the revolution broke out, there was no 



390 Appendices 

American man-of-war and no American troops or sailors. 
At Colon, Commander Hubbard acted with entire impar- 
tiality toward both sides, preventing any movement, 
whether by the Colombians or the Panamans, which 
would tend to produce bloodshed. On November 9 he 
prevented a body of the revolutionists from landing at 
Colon. Throughout he behaved in the most creditable 
manner. In the New York Evening Post, under date of 
Panama, December 8, there is an article from a special 
correspondent, which sets forth in detail the unbearable 
oppression of the Colombian Government in Panama. In 
this article is an interesting interview with a native Pana- 
man, which runs in part as follows : 

We looked upon the building of the canal as a matter o£ 
life or death to us. We wanted that because it meant, with the 
United States in control of it, peace and prosperity for us. Presi- 
dent Marroquin appointed an Isthmian to be governor of Panama ; 
and we looked upon that as of happy augury. Soon we heard that 
the canal treaty was not likely to be approved at Bogota ; next we 
heard that our Isthmian Governor, Obaldia, who had scarcely 
assumed power, was to be superseded by a soldier from 
Bogota. . . . 

Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of in the 
way of revenues, she did not bridge for us a single river, nor 
make a single roadway, nor erect a single college where our 
children could be educated, nor do anything at all to advance 
our industries. . . . Well, when the new generals came we seized 
them, arrested them, and the town of Panama was in joy. Not 
a protest was made, except the shots fired from the Colombian 
gunboat Bogota, which killed one Chinese lying in his bed. We 
were willing to encounter the Colombian troops at Colon and fight 
it out ; but the commander of the United States cruiser Nashville 
forbade Superintendent Shaler to allow the railroad to transport 
troops for either party. That is our story. 

I call especial attention to the concluding portion of 
this interview, which states the willingness of the Pan- 



Appendices 391 

ama people to fight the Colombian troops and the re- 
fusal of, Commander Hubbard to permit them to use the 
railroad and therefore to get into a position where the 
fight could take place. It thus clearly appears that the 
fact that there was no bloodshed on the Isthmus was di- 
rectly due — and only due — to the prompt and firm en- 
forcement by the United States of its traditional policy. 
During the past forty years revolutions and attempts at 
revolution have succeeded one another with monotonous 
regularity on the Isthmus, and again and again United 
States sailors and marines have been landed as they were 
landed in this instance and under similar instructions to 
protect the transit. One of these revolutions resulted in 
three years of warfare; and the aggregate of bloodshed 
and misery caused by them has been incalculable. The 
fact that in this last revolution not a life was lost, save 
that of the man killed by the shells of the Colombian gun- 
boat, and no property destroyed, was due to the action 
which I have described. We, in effect, policed the Isth- 
mus in the interest of its inhabitants and of our own 
national needs, and for the good of the entire civilized 
world. Failure to act as the Administration acted would 
have meant great waste of life, great suffering, great de- 
struction of property; all of which was avoided by the 
firmness and prudence with which Commander Hubbard 
carried out his orders and prevented either party from 
attacking the other. Our action was for the peace both 
of Colombia and of Panama. It is earnestly to be hoped 
that there will be no unwise conduct on our part which 
may encourage Colombia to embark on a war which can 
not result in her regaining control of the Isthmus, but 
which may cause much bloodshed and suffering. 



392 Appendices 

I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which 
have been made of complicity by this government in the 
revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as desti- 
tute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for 
my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons 
might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self- 
respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one 
connected with this Government had any part in prepar- 
ing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the 
Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the reports of 
our military and naval officers, given above, no one con- 
nected with this Government had any previous knowledge 
of the revolution except such as was accessible to any 
person of ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers 
and kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs. 

By the unanimous action of its people, without the 
firing of a shot — with a unanimity hardly before recorded 
in any similar case — the people of Panama declared them- 
selves an independent republic. Their recognition by 
this Government was based upon a state of facts in no 
way dependent for its justification upon our action in 
ordinary cases. I have not denied, nor do I wish to deny, 
either the validity or the propriety of the general rule 
that a new state should not be recognized as independent 
till it has shown its ability to maintain its independence. 
This rule is derived from the principle of non-interven- 
tion, and as a corollary of that principle has generally 
been observed by the United States. But, Hke the princi- 
ple from which it is deduced, the rule. is subject to excep- 
tions; and there are in my opinion clear and imperative 
reasons why a departure from it was justified and even 



Appendices 393 

required in the present instance. These reasons em- 
brace, first, our treaty rights ; second, our national inter- 
ests and safety ; and, third, the interests of collective civ- 
ilization. 

I have already adverted to the treaty of 1846, by the 
thirty-fifth article of which the United States secured the 
right to a free and open transit across the Isthmus of 
Panama, and to that end agreed to guarantee to New 
Granada her rights of sovereignty and property over that 
territory. This article is sometimes discussed as if the 
latter guarantee constituted its ^ole object and bound the 
United States to protect the sovereignty of New Granada 
against domestic revolution. Nothing, however, could be 
more erroneous than this supposition. That our wise 
and patriotic ancestors, with all their dread of entangling 
alliances, would have entered into a treaty with New 
Granada solely or even primarily for the purpose of en- 
abling that remnant of the original Republic of Colom- 
bia, then resolved into the States of New Granada, 
Venezuela, and Ecuador, to continue from Bogota to 
rule over the Isthmus of Panama, is a conception that 
would in itself be incredible, even if the contrary did not 
clearly appear. It is true that since the treaty was made 
the United States has again and again been obliged forci- 
bly to intervene for the preservation of order and the 
maintenance of an open transit, and that this interven- 
tion has usually operated to the advantage of the titular 
Government of Colombia, but it is equally true that the 
United States in intervening with or without Colombia's 
consent, for the protection of the transit, has disclaimed 
any duty to defend the Colombian Government against 



394 Appendices 

domestic insurrection or against the erection of an inde- 
pendent government on the Isthmus of Panama. The 
attacks against which the United States engaged to pro- 
tect New Granadian sovereignty were those of foreign 
powers; but this engagement was only a means to the 
accomplishment of a yet more important end. The great 
design of the article was to assure the dedication of the 
Isthmus to the purposes of free and unobstructed inter- 
oceanic transit, the consummation of which would be 
found in an interoceanic canal. To the accomplishment 
of this object the Government of the United States had 
for years directed its diplomacy. It occupied a place in 
the instructions to our delegates to the Panama Congress 
during the Administration of John Quincy Adams. It 
formed the subject of a resolution of the Senate in 1835, 
and of the House of Representatives in 1839. In 1846 
its importance had become still more apparent by reason 
of the Mexican war. If the treaty of 1846 did not in 
terms bind New Granada to grant reasonable concessions 
for the construction of means of interoceanic communi- 
cation, it was only because it was not imagined that such 
concessions would ever be withheld. As it was expressly 
agreed that the United States, in consideration of its 
onerous guarantee of New Granadian sovereignty, should 
possess the right of free and open transit on any modes 
of communication that might be constructed, the obvious 
intent of the treaty rendered it unnecessary, if not super- 
fluous, in terms to stipulate that permission for the con- 
struction of such modes of communication should not be 
denied. 
Long before the conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty 



Appendices 395 

the course of events had shown that a canal to connect 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans must be built by the 
United States or not at all. Experience had demonstrated 
that private enterprise was utterly inadequate for the 
purpose ; and a fixed policy, declared by the United States 
on many memorable occasions, and supported by the prac- 
tically unanimous voice of American opinion, had ren- 
dered it morally impossible that the work should be un- 
dertaken by European powers, either singly or in com- 
bination. Such were the universally recognized condi- 
tions on which the legislation of the Congress was based, 
and on which the late negotiations with Colombia were 
begun and concluded. Nevertheless, when the well-con- 
sidered agreement was rejected by Colombia and the revo- 
lution on the Isthmus ensued, one of Colombia's first acts 
was to invoke the intervention of the United States ; nor 
does her invitation appear to have been confined to this 
Government alone. By a telegram from Mr. Beaupre, 
our minister at Bogota, of the 7th of November last, we 
were informed that General Reyes would soon leave 
Panama invested with full powers; that he had tele- 
graphed the President of Mexico to ask the Government 
of the United States and all countries represented at the 
Pan-American Conference "to aid Colombia to preserve 
her integrity"; and that he had requested that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States should meanwhile "pre- 
serve the neutrality and transit of the Isthmus" and 
should "not recognize the new government." In another 
telegram from Mr. Beaupre, which was sent later in the 
day, this Government was asked whether it would take 
action "to maintain Colombian right and sovereignty on 



396 Appendices 

the Isthmus in accordance with article 35 [of] the Treaty 
of 1846" in case the Colombian Government should be 
"entirely unable to suppress the secession movement 
there." Here was a direct solicitation to the United 
States to intervene for the purpose of suppressing, con- 
trary to the Treaty of 1846 as this Government has uni- 
formly construed it, a new revolt against Colombia's au- 
thority brought about by her own refusal to permit the 
fulfillment of the great design for which that treaty was 
made. It was under these circumstances that the United 
States, instead of using its forces to destroy those who 
sought to make the engagements of the treaty a reality, 
recognized them as the proper custodians of the sover- 
eignty of the Isthmus. 

This recognition was, in the second place, further justi- 
fied by the highest considerations of our national interests 
and safety. In all the range of our international rela- 
tions I do not hesitate to affirm that there is nothing of 
greater or more pressing importance than the construc- 
tion of an interoceanic canal. Long acknowledged to be 
essential to our commercial development, it has become, 
as the result of the recent extension of our territorial 
dominion, more than ever essential to our national self- 
defense. In transmitting to the Senate the Treaty of 
1846, President Polk pointed out as the principal reason 
for its ratification that the passage of the Isthmus, which 
it was designed to secure, "would relieve 11s from a long 
and dangerous navigation of more than 9,000 miles around 
Cape Horn, and render our communication with our own 
possessions on the northwest coast of America compar- 
atively easy and speedy." The events of the past five 



Appendices 397 

years have given to this consideration an importance im- 
measurably greater than it possessed in 1846. In the 
light of our present situation, the establishment of easy 
and speedy communication by sea between the Atlantic 
and the Pacific presents itself not simply as something 
to be desired, but as an object to be positively and 
promptly attained. Reasons of convenience have been 
superseded by reasons of vital necessity, which do not 
admit of indefinite delays. 

To such delays the rejection by Colombia of the Hay- 
Herran treaty directly exposed us. As proof of this 
fact I need only refer to the program outlined in the 
report of the majority of the Panama Canal Committee, 
read in the Colombian Senate on the 14th of October 
last. In this report, which recommended that the dis- 
cussion of a law to authorize the government to enter 
upon new negotiations should be indefinitely postponed, 
it is proposed that the consideration of the subject should 
be deferred till October 31, 1904, when the next Colom- 
bian Congress should have met in ordinary session. By 
that time, as the report goes on to say, the extension of 
time granted to the New Panama Canal Company by 
treaty in 1893 would have expired, and the new Congress 
would be in a position to take up the question whether 
the company had not, in spite of further extensions that 
had been granted by legislative acts, forfeited all its 
property and rights. "When that time arrives," the re- 
port significantly declares, "the Republic, without any 
impediment, will be able to contract, and will be in more 
clear, more definite, and more advantageous possession, 
both legally and materially." The naked meaning of this 



398 Appendices 

report is that Colombia proposed to wait until, l^y the 
enforcement of a forfeiture repugnant to the ideas of 
justice which obtain in every civilized nation, the property 
and rights of the New Panama Canal Company could be 
confiscated. 

Such is the scheme to which it was proposed that the 
United States should be invited to become a party. The 
construction of the canal was to be relegated to the in- 
definite future, while Colombia was, by reason of her 
own delay, to be placed in the "more advantageous" posi- 
tion of claiming not merely the compensation to be paid 
by the United States for the privilege of completing the 
canal, but also the forty millions authorized by the act 
of 1902 to be paid for the property of the New Panama 
Canal Company. That the attempt to carry out this 
scheme would have brought Colombia into conflict with 
the Government of France can not be doubted ; nor could 
the United States have counted upon immunity from the 
consequences of the attempt, even apart from the in- 
definite delays to which the construction of the canal was 
to be subjected. On the first appearance of danger to 
Colombia, this Government would have been summoned 
to interpose, in order to give effect to the guarantees of 
the Treaty of 1846 ; and all this in support of a plan which, 
while characterized in its first stage by the wanton dis- 
regard of our own highest interests, was fitly to end in 
further injury to the citizens of a friendly nation, whose 
enormous losses in their generous efforts to pierce the 
Isthmus have become a matter of history. 

In the third place, I confidently maintain that the rec- 
ognition of the Republic of Panama was an act justified 



Appendices 399 

by the interests o£ collective civilization. If ever a gov- 
ernmen:t could be said to have received a mandate from 
civilization to effect an object the accomplishment of 
v^hich was demanded in the interest of mankind, the 
United States holds that position with regard to the in- 
teroceanic canal. Since our purpose to build the canal 
was definitely announced, there have come from all 
quarters assurances of approval and encouragement, in 
which even Colombia herself at one time participated; 
and to general assurances were added specific acts and 
declarations. In order that no obstacle might stand in 
our way, Great Britain renounced important rights under 
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and agreed to its abrogation, 
receiving in return nothing but our honorable pledge to 
build the canal and protect it as an open highway. It 
was in view of this pledge, and of the projpsed enactment 
by the Congress of the United States of legislation to 
give it immediate effect, that the second Pan-American 
Conference, at the City of Mexico, on January 22, 1902, 
adopted the following resolution: 

The Republics assembled at the International Conference of 
Mexico applaud the purpose of the United States Government to 
construct an interoceanic canal, and acknowledge that this work 
will not only be worthy of the greatness of the American people, 
but also in the highest sense a v/ork of civilization, and to the 
greatest degree beneficial to the development of commerce be- 
tween the American States and the other countries of the world. 

Among those who signed this resolution on behalf of 
their respective governments was General Reyes, the 
delegate of Colombia. Little could it have been foreseen 
that two years later the Colombian Government, led 
astray by false allurements of selfish advantage, and 



400 Appendices 

forgetful alike of its international obligations and of the 
duties and responsibilities of sovereignty, would thwart 
the efforts of the United States to enter upon and com- 
plete a work which the nations of America, reechoing 
the sentiment of the nations of Europe, had pronounced 
to be not only "worthy of the greatness of the American 
people," but also "in the highest sense a work of civiliza- 
tion." 

That our position as the mandatory of civilization has 
been by no means misconceived is shown by the prompti- 
tude with which the powers have, one after another, fol- 
lowed our lead in recognizing Panama as an independent 
State. Our action in recognizing the new republic has 
been followed by like recognition on the part of France, 
Germany, Denmark, Russia, Sweden, and Norway, Nica- 
ragua, Peru, China, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Costa 
Rica, Japan, and Austria-Hungary. 

In view of the manifold considerations of treaty right 
and obligation, of national interest and safety, and of 
collective civilization, by which our Government was con- 
strained to act, I am at a loss to comprehend the attitude 
of those who can discern in the recognition of the Re- 
public of Panama only a general approval of the principle 
of "revolution" by which a given government is over- 
turned or one portion of a country separated from 
another. Only the amplest justification can warrant a 
revolutionary movement of either kind. But there is no 
fixed rule which can be applied to all such movements. 
Each case must be judged on its own merits. There have 
been many revolutionary movements, many movements 
for the dismemberment of countries, which were evil, 



Appendices 401 

tried by any standard. But in my opinion no disinterested 
and fair-minded observer acquainted with the circum- 
stances can fail to feel that Panama had the amplest 
justification for separation from Colombia under the con- 
ditions existing, and, moreover, that its action was in the 
highest degree beneficial to the interests of the entire 
civilized world by securing the immediate opportunity 
for the building of the interoceanic canal. It would be 
well for those who are pessimistic as to our action in 
peacefully recognizing the Republic of Panama, while 
we lawfully protected the transit from invasion and dis- 
turbance, to recall what has been done in Cuba, where 
we intervened even by force on general grounds of 
national interest and duty. When we interfered it was 
freely prophesied that w^e intended to keep Cuba and ad- 
minister it for our own interests. The result has dem- 
onstrated in singularly conclusive fashion the falsity of 
these prophecies. Cuba is now an independent republic. 
We governed it in its own interests for a few years, till 
it was able to stand alone, and then started it upon its 
career of self-government and independence, granting it 
all necessary aid. We have received from Cuba a grant 
of two naval stations, so situated that they in no possible 
way menace the liberty of the island, and yet serve as 
important defenses for the Cuban people, as well as for 
our own people, against possible foreign attack. The 
people of Cuba have been immeasurably benefited by our 
interference in their behalf, and our own gain has been 
great. So will it be with Panama. The people of the 
Isthmus, and as I firmly believe of the adjacent parts of 
Central and South America, will be greatly benefited by 



402 Appendices 

the building of the canal and the guarantee of peace and 
order along its line ; and hand in hand with the benefit to 
them will go the benefit to us and to mankind. By our 
prompt and decisive action, not only have our interests 
and those of the world at large been conserved, but we 
have forestalled complications which were likely to be 
fruitful in loss to ourselves, and in bloodshed and suffer- 
ing to the people of the Isthmus. 

Instead of using our forces, as we were invited by 
Colombia to do, for the twofold purpose of defeating our 
own rights and interests and the interests of the civilized 
world, and of compelHng the submission of the people 
of the Isthmus to those whom they regarded as oppres- 
sors, we shall, as in duty bound, keep the transit open 
and prevent its invasion. Meanwhile, the only question 
now before us is that of the ratification of the treaty. 
For it is to be remembered that a failure to ratify the 
treaty will not undo what has been done, will not restore 
Panama to Colombia, and will not alter our obligation 
to keep the transit open across the Isthmus, and to pre- 
vent any outside power from menacing this transit. 

It seems to have been assumed in certain quarters that 
the proposition that the obligations of article 35 of the 
treaty of 1846 are to be considered as adhering to and 
following the sovereignty of the Isthmus, so long as that 
sovereignty is not absorbed by the United States, rests 
upon some novel theory. No assumption could be further 
from the fact. It is by no means true that a state in 
declaring its independence rids itself of all the treaty ob- 
ligations entered into by the parent government. It is 
a mere coincidence that this question was once raised in 



Appendices 403 

a case involving the obligations of Colombia as an in- 
dependent state under a treaty which Spain had made 
with the United States many years before Spanish-Ameri- 
can independence. In that case Mr. John Quincy 
Adams, Secretary of State, in an instruction to Mr. 
Anderson, our minister to Colombia, of May 27, 1823, 
said: 

By a treaty between the United States and Spain concluded at 
a time when Colombia was a part of the Spanish dominions . . . 
the principle that free ships make free goods was expressly 
recognized and established. It is asserted that by her declaration 
of independence Colombia has been entirely released from all the 
obligations by which, as a part of the Spanish nation, she was 
bound to other nations. This principle is not tenable. To all the 
engagements of Spain with other nations, affecting their rights 
and interests, Colombia, so far as she was affected by them, 
remains bound in honor and in justice. The stipulation now 
referred to is of that character. 

The principle thus asserted by Mr. Adams was after- 
ward sustained by an international commission in respect 
to the precise stipulation to which he referred; and a 
similar position was taken by the United States with re- 
gard to the binding obligation upon the independent State 
of Texas of commercial stipulations embodied in prior 
treaties between the United States and Mexico when 
Texas formed a part of the latter country. But in the 
present case it is unnecessary to go so far. Even if it 
be admitted that prior treaties of a political and commer- 
cial complexion generally do not bind a new state formed 
by separation, it is undeniable that stipulations having a 
local application to the territory embraced in the new 
state continue in force and are binding upon the new 
sovereign. Thus it is on all hands conceded that treaties 



404 Appendices 

relating to boundaries and to rights of navigation con- 
tinue in force without regard to changes in government 
or in sovereignty. This principle obviously applies to 
that part of the treaty of 1846 which relates to the 
Isthmus of Panama. 

In conclusion let me repeat that the question actually 
before this Government is not that of the recognition of 
Panama as an independent republic. That is already an 
accomplished fact. The question, and the only question, 
is whether or not we shall build an Isthmian Canal. 

I transmit herewith copies of the latest notes from the 
minister of the Republic of Panama to this Government, 
and of certain notes which have passed between the 
special envoy of the Republic of Colombia and this Gov- 
ernment. 



THE END 







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